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ABSTRACT
This study seeks to explore the British response to the French Revolution through
an investigation of the debate between Burke and his critics on the subject. The
dissertation is divided into two major parts: first, a comprehensive analysis of Burke's
critique of the French Revolution and, secondly, an extensive examination of the
reaction of his critics to his arguments.
Edmund Burke approached the French Revolution with a shrewd discernment. Fie
took up his pen against France because he was aware that her Revolution, since, in
his opinion, it was of a universal nature, would prove dangerous to the old order of
the whole of Europe. But how did the Revolution happen? What had made it so
formidable? Burke traced the origins of the French Revolution to the economic, social
and intellectual changes that had previously taken place in French society. It was a
revolution led by the militant middle class and propelled by Jacobinism. To prevent
Jacobinism from undermining European civilisation, Burke devoted himself to a long
crusade against the French Revolution. At the same time, Burke, who had previously
been regarded as a reformer, was obliged to defend his own political consistency
which was challenged because of his attack on the French Revolution. Fie endeavoured
to relate his politics to the tradition of the 1688 Revolution and he defended the
integrity of his present action on the principles of the old Whigs whose politics, in his
opinion, had always been to assert Britain's mixed and balanced constitution.
Burke's critics, on the other hand, generally welcomed the Revolution in France as
a great triumph of liberty over despotism. Most of those who opposed Burke were
ideologically inclined to embrace the doctrine of popular sovereignty based on the
radical theory of the natural rights of man; and their acceptance of this doctrine had
rendered them politically hostile to the old order. From such an intellectual framework,
these radicals ventured, from various aspects, to vindicate the French Revolution. This
dissertation undertakes to explore their perception of its universal implication, their
interpretation of its origins, their justification of its necessity, their apologia for its
defects, their defence of its leaders, and their conviction of its ability to achieve
perfection in the future. The whole seems to form both a vigorous answer to Burke
and an active justification of the French Revolution. The critics of Burke, in vindicating
the French Revolution, were also defending their own radical politics at home. The
establishment of freedom in France encouraged them to press for change in Britain.
Parliament and the established church formed the main objects in their programme of
reform. The British reformers, generally speaking, did not argue in support of a violent
revolution at home. It was their opinion, however, that without a timely reform, Britain
could be heading in that direction.
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis seeks to examine one major episode in the British response to the
French Revolution: the controversy on Edmund Burke's Reflections on the Revolution
in France (1790). The impact of the French Revolution on Britain has never ceased to
attract the attention of historians,' but it is only recently, with the Revolution
celebrating its 200th anniversary, that substantial efforts have been made to research
this subject.2 This new surge of interest notwithstanding, there are surprisingly few
works so far dedicated to the study of the great debate on the Revolution itself, which
was, without doubt, the main ideological exchange of the time. Indeed, academic
performance in this respect over the last four decades, if we take the publication in
1950 of Alfred Cobban's selections on this topic as a starting point for making an
assessment, has not appeared as impressive as might have been expected. This is not,
of course, to deny that some research on this subject has indeed been carried out. It
has certainly been made the subject of several documentary studies.3 There are,
moreover, considerable achievements on the literary dimension of the debate.4 Rather
few efforts, however, seem to have been devoted to a more extensive analysis of its
main themes. There is, therefore, still a lot of work that needs to be undertaken.5
'
Modern, scholarship. on this subject can be said to have begun with P A. Brown's The French
Revolution inEnglish History (London, 1918). which remains to this day an important work.
2 The achievements hitherto scored are manifold. The impact of the Revolution on the British radical
movement has been well presented by: Gwyn A. Williams, Art/SaOS and Sans~Cu/OtteS: Popular
Movements in France and Britain during the French Revolution 1789-1815 (London. 1968);
Albert Goodwin, The Friends of Liberty: The English Democratic Movement in the Age of
the French Revolution (London, 1979); h. t. Dickinson, British Radicalism and the French
Revolution 1789-1815 (Oxford, 1985). Publications on other aspects of the impact include: Robert
R. Dozier, For King, Constitution and Country: The English Loyalists and the French
Revolution (Lexington, 1983); Frank O'Gorman, The Whig Party and the French Revolution
(London, 1967); j e. Cookson, The Friends of Peace: Anti-War Liberalism in England,
1793-1815 (Cambridge, 1982); ciive Emsiey, British Society and the French War, 1793-1815
(London, 1979). Professor Dickinson's new volume on Britain and the French Revolution,
1789— 1815 (London, 1989), which is a collection of articles by different historians examining various
aspects of the impact, offers an excellent sample showing the strength of recent research in this field.
3 See: Alfred Cobban (ed), The Debate On the French Revolution (London, 1950); Marilyn Butler
led.). Burke, Paine, Godwin, and the Revolutionary Controversy (Cambridge, 1985).
4 See: James t Bouiton, The Language of Politics in the Age of Wilkes and Burke (London,
1963), Olivia Smith, The Politics of Language, 1791-1819 (Oxford, 1984); f. p. Lock. Burke's
Reflections on the Revolution in France (London, 1985).
5 There are, so far, not many contributions on this aspect The main work remains R. R Fennessy's Burke,
Paine and the Rights of Man: A Difference of Political Opinion (The Hague, 1963) Thomas
Philip Schofield has recently completed a thesis on 'English Conservative Thought and Opinion in response
to the French Revolution' (Ph. D thesis. University of London, 1984); and he has also published
'Conservative Political Thought in Britain in Response to the French Revolution', Historical Journal xxix
(1986), 601-22.
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Any student who attempts to approach the British debate on the French Revolution
is apt to find the massive literature he has to cope with particularly daunting. It has
been recently estimated that pamphlets of all kinds which appeared in Britain between
1789-1801 in response to the French Revolution number about four thousand. Even
those which are directly related to the more restricted topic of the Burke-Paine
dispute still amount to no less than 340 titles.6 There is, nevertheless, one possible
way out of the dilemma which so many publications present. If one chooses to focus
the investigation solely on the controversy over Burke's Reflections, the sources which
need to be handled can be significantly reduced and made more manageable. The
number of tracts in reply to Burke's critique of the French Revolution - even if we
take into account all those which argued for or against any of his pamphlets on the
subject - is around one hundred and fifty. This, in fact, forms an almost ideal field of
research for a dissertation such as this.7 There is another, and more important,
strategical advantage if such an approach is adopted. The controversy on Burke's
Reflections lasted for several years and it involved most of the leading minds from all
over the British Isles. It virtually constituted the central part of the great debate on
the Revolution. From this angle, therefore, a proper examination of the theme offers
an important avenue to the understanding of the main currents of British opinion
concerning both the French Revolution itself and its bearings on Britain.
The research deployed in this dissertation sets out to approach the British
reception of the French Revolution through an extensive analysis of the debate
between Burke and his critics on this subject. The main line of discussion examines
how British writers interpreted what was then happening in France. This has been,
perhaps surprisingly, an aspect which has hitherto been generally neglected by most
of those historians who have sought to deal with the British debate on the French
6
See the bibliographical analysis in Gayle Trusdel Pendleton, 'Towards a Bibliography of the Reflections
and Rights of Man Controversy', Bulletin of Research in the Humanities ixxxv (1982), 65-103.
7
This is also the line which this study is to follow. This dissertation will try to make extensive use of any
work Burke had written on the Revolution and any pamphlet which replied to him It must be pointed out
that, in the latter case, I shall refer to those only which can be asserted as obvious responses. For this
reason, I am prepared to exclude tracts which may at best be accepted as implicit replies, such as William
Godwin's An Enquiry concerning Political Justice (London, 1793). There are different opinions
about the relevance of Godwin's Political Justice to the debate F. E. L. Priestley asserts that the work
is neither a reply to Burke, nor a defence of the French Revolution: see the 'Critical Introduction and Notes'
to Priestley's edition of Godwin's An Enquiry concerning Political Justice (Toronto, 1946), iii, 4
And so does Don Locke: A Fantasy of Reason: The Life and Thought of William Godwin
(London, 1980), p. 48. James T. Boulton admits that the tract 'almost defiantly remains aloof from the
furore over Burke's Reflections, but he emphasises that Godwin had shown a 'keen awareness of the
controversy': see The Language of Politics in the Age of Wilkes and Burke pp. 207-8. f. p.
Lock is more in favour of directly treating it as one critique of Burke': see Burke'S Reflections On the
Revolution in France pp i67-70
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Revolution. The dissertation is divided into two major parts. There will be, first of all,
a comprehensive analysis of Burke's critique of the Revolution, and then, secondly, an
extensive examination of the reactions of Burke's critics to his arguments. The entire
work is intended to be not so much a philosophical exposition, as an historical
analysis, of the great British debate on the French Revolution.
In coming to termswith Burke's reaction to the French Revolution, one must bear in
mind that the Reflections on the Revolution in France while undoubtedly his major
piece on this subject, is by no means his only work. French affairs were the main
concern of most of Burke's writings composed in and after 1790. His attack on France
intensified as the Revolution progressed. It can, indeed, be fairly asserted that in a
sense most of Burke's later writings on the French Revolution, written after the
publication of the Reflections, can be categorised more or less as various
developments on the themes which that great work had first thrown out. To
understand the whole picture of Burke's view of the French Revolution, however, one
needs to take into account the complete corpus of his writings, whether tracts or
correspondence, relevant to that event. With regard to the main discussion, the
venture here will chiefly focus on two related themes in Burke's work. It will
undertake, on the one hand, to inquire into what Burke had to say about the
Revolution itself and, on the other hand, it will continue to review how he came to
defend his own political integrity in taking up his pen against the French Revolution.
Edmund Burke approached the Revolution in France with an unusually shrewd
discernment. He based his case against the Revolution on an acute appreciation of its
origins, its nature, and its potential impact.8 It will be pertinent, hence, to commence
this dissertation with an initial examination of the motives that inspired Burke to turn
against an apparently foreign event. Burke launched a severe attack on France mainly
because of his keen awareness that the Revolution, since, in his opinion, it was of a
universal nature, would prove dangerous to the old order of the whole of Europe, and
hence not even Britain could escape its impact. But how did the Revolution happen?
What had made it so formidable? To answer these questions it is necessary to analyse
Burke's perception of the origins, and the dynamics, of the French Revolution. He
traced the collapse of the ancien regime in France back to the economic, social and
8
Historians are apt to undervalue Burke's interpretation of the French Revolution, which has often been
dismissed as being strongly biased and ill-informed. See below, chap 2, section i Modern studies, indeed,
seem to have generally ignored this aspect of Burke's achievement. For a critical survey of recent
scholarship on Burke, cf f p. Lock. Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France pp. 189-99
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intellectual changes that had previously taken place in French society. He deemed the
militant middle class to be the main force of the Revolution and Jacobinism its
propelling principle. It was, above all, a revolution whose nature was
anti-aristocratical, anti-clerical and anti-traditional. We must also attend to Burke's
crusade against the French Revolution. He was convinced that should Jacobinism
prevail in France, European civilisation would soon be jeopardised. To prevent this, he
called for a united front of all states to exterminate the Jacobin revolution. It was only
by restoring France to the European commonwealth of nations that, he believed, peace
would become possible.
Burke was, meanwhile, obliged to defend his own political consistency which was
soon challenged because of his attack on the French Revolution. Burke had previously
been regarded as a reformer and people were surprised at his strong reaction against
the French Revolution. How, then, could he justify his own action? Burke endeavoured
to relate his politics to the tradition of the 1688 Revolution, which was, to him, a
change not, like that of France, meant to undermine, but to restore, the old order in
Britain. He defended the integrity of his present action on the principles of the old
Whigs whose politics had always been to assert Britain's mixed and balanced
constitution of monarchy, aristocracy and democracy.9 It had been his purpose,
throughout his career, to defend the constitutional balance within Britain. This
accounted for his support for the American Revolution, which asserted the right of the
colonists as Englishmen to defend their traditional rights against monarchical
encroachment. This also explained his attack on the French Revolution, which turned
out to be producing an extreme version of democracy. Burke had, after all, always
argued in favour of moderation. He was ready to support cautious reform, but still
determined to resist violent revolution.
This dissertation will proceed, secondly, to investigate the response within Britain
to Burke's thoughts on French affairs. Emphasis here will be placed in the main on the
arguments of his radical critics who actually played the major part in the debate. It
will discuss both the foundation of their political ideology and their defence of the
French Revolution. The British radicals generally welcomed the Revolution in France as
Frederick A. Dreyer has argued that Burke's thought belongs to the tradition of Lockean Whiggism See
his Burke's Politics: A Study in Whig Orthodoxy (Ontario, 1979) Burke, however, might be more
prepared to identify his own politics with the Whiggism of Lord Somers. See: Edmund Burke, Reflections
on the Revolution in France', The Works of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke (6 vols Bohn s
Standard Library, 1877-1885), ii, 294; The Correspondence of Edmund Burke ed. T. W Copeland
et all, 10 vols. Cambridge, 1958-70), vi, 331 'To the Earl of Charlemont - 8 Aug. 1791'.
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a great triumph of liberty over despotism. Most of those who opposed Burke were
ideologically inclined to endorse a doctrine of popular sovereignty based on the
radical theory of the natural rights of man; and their acceptance of such a doctrine
was to render them politically hostile to the old order. With but few exceptions,
Burke's critics were apt to hate the aristocracy, detest the church, and decry the old
constitution. This intellectual framework rendered their defence of the French
Revolution intelligible. From this context, we will venture to look into the various
aspects of their vindication of the Revolution: their appreciation of its universal
implication, their interpretation of its origins, their justification of its necessity, their
apologia for its defects, their defence of its leaders, and their conviction of its ability
to achieve perfection in the future. Their work seems to form both a vigorous answer
to Burke and an active justification of the French Revolution.
There is another dimension in the response of the British radicals. It is manifest
that the critics of Burke, in vindicating the French Revolution, were also defending
their own radical politics at home. The establishment of freedom in France encouraged
them to press for reform in Britain. For all its reputation as a land of liberty, Britain
was in fact replete with oppression and injustice, which, in the opinion of Burke's
opponents, resulted mainly from the corruption and decline of its mixed constitution.
There was, hence, a general call for change. Most of the British radicals were
persuaded that in the present state of Britain a proper reform in Parliament would be
the most effective measure able to cure all her distempers. The established church
was the other major object of reform; the bulk of polemics on this theme duly
reflecting the active involvement of the Dissenters in the debate on the French
Revolution. The reformers in Britain, generally speaking, did not contend in support of
a violent revolution at home. It was their opinion, however, that without a timely
reform, Britain could be heading in that direction.
A comprehensive examination of the debate on the French Revolution offers, in the
final analysis, a pertinent approach to the nature of political ideologies in Britain in the
1790s. It is the purpose of this dissertation to sort out the intricate arguments of the
debate, intending to provide them with an intelligible framework, and to invest them, if
possible, with a coherent structure. Such an endeavour, it is hoped, may enable
historians to penetrate more easily into the ideological world of one of the most
fascinating debates in late eighteenth-century Britain.
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Part One




The French Revolution found in Edmund Burke an unexpected, yet staunch, critic.
To analyse his polemics against the Revolution, it is necessary in the first place to
explore how he conceived the event and its impending impact. This topic, according
to Burke, can be dealt with in three aspects: that is, the effect of the revolution on
France herself, its relevance to British politics and, above all, its implication for the
future of Europe.
The outbreak of the French Revolution had taken most people in Britain by
surprise. The responses that occurred were immediate, though diversified.1 Burke was
not the first among the British to respond to it. As a matter of fact, his initial reaction
had appeared rather perfunctory.2 It was not until 9 August 1789, almost four weeks
after the storming of the Bastille, then he threw out a private comment. In his letter to
the Earl of Charlemont, he thus revealed:
As to us here our thoughts of every thing at home are suspended,
by our astonishment at the wonderful Spectacle which is exhibited in a
Neighbouring and rival Country - what Spectators, and what actors!
England gazing with astonishment at a French struggle for Liberty and
not knowing whether to blame or to applaud! ... In the mean time the
progress of this whole affair is one of the most curious matters of
Speculation that ever was exhibited.3
The feeling was a combination of curiosity and amazement. That the most powerful
monarchy in Europe should have collapsed almost overnight was indeed beyond
comprehension: 'All these things,' as Burke claimed, have happend out of the ordinary
Course of Speculation.'4
.For the.early reception of the French Revolution in Britain, see: P A. Brown, The French Revolutionin English History, pp 28-40; T P. Schofield, Conservative Political Thought in Britain in Response to
the French Revolution,' Historical Journal xxix(1986), 602.
2
For Burke's attitude at the early stage of the French Revolution, see: C. B Cone, Burke and the
Nature of Politics: the Age of the French Revolution (University of Kentucky Press, 1964), PP.
292-294
3 The Correspondence of Edmund Burke, (hereafter, Corn, vi, 10 'To the Earl of Charlemont - 9
August 1789'
4 Corr, vi, 37. 'To Earl Fitzwilliam - 12 Nov. 1789'
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Burke admitted that what had happened in France had indeed given rise in his
mind to 'many Reflexions' and 'some Emotions'. Owing to his yet imperfect knowledge
of France, and the novelty of the occurrence itself, however, he had at first cautiously
refrained from risking any early judgement.5 The spirit of the French struggle for
liberty, he admitted, was 'impossible not to admire'. He had even heartily wished that
France might one day establish 'a solid and rational scheme of liberty'. Concerning the
general tendency of the Revolution, however, he was not without his doubts. The
popular violence in Paris - 'the old Parisian ferocity' as he called it - had shocked him
not a little, and had roused his concern about the newly acquired freedom of France.
Burke was convinced that 'the spirit of liberty in action' would always become 'a
strong principle at work'. Freedom, therefore, must be combined with a spirit of
moderation or it would become 'noxious' and turn out to be a 'nuisance'. Liberty, to be
beneficial and permanent, ought to be incorporated with public force, civil order and
social manners. If the future constitution of France could be settled upon such
principles and calculated for securing the life, liberty and property of the people, then,
Burke assured his French friend, Depont: 'I believe there is no Man in this Country
whose heart and Voice would not go along with You.'6 The French Revolution,
nevertheless, had followed a very different course. When it ran to extremes, Burke
soon abandoned his early reservations and stood out as its unequivocal critic. One
major strand in his critique was his view of the appalling consequences of the
Revolution for France herself.
Since the formation of the National Assembly, the revolutionary movement in
France had taken a drastic turn. Without much struggle, the ancien regime was
shattered and a new order heralded by the Declaration of the Rights of Men and
Citizens The whole course, as Burke remarked, looked not only 'new' but
'revolutionary'.7 It was, however, the general lawlessness and destructiveness in the
Revolution that had mainly attracted Burke's attention. According to his observation,
the French people in that great turmoil had, along with their political servitude, at
once 'thrown off the Yoke of Laws and morals'.® Constraints being once eased away,
5 Corr, vi, 41. 'To Charles-Jean-Francois Depont - (Nov. 17891'
6 Corr, vi, 41-43. To Charles-Jean-Francois Depont - (Nov. 1789)'; Corr, 10. 'To the Earl of Charlemont
- 9 Aug. 1789'; Edmund Burke, 'Reflections on the Revolution in France' (1790), The Works Of the
Right Honourable Edmund Burke (hereafter, Burke's Works\, ii, 282-283.
7
Edmund Burke, 'Letters on a Regicide Peace', Burke's Works (1796), v, 415
8 Corr, vi, 25. 'To William Windham - 27 Sept. 1789'.
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the distraction it caused was terrifying. In a short time, he pointed out, the French had
completely pulled to the ground their monarchy, their church, their
nobility, their law, their revenue, their army, their navy, their commerce,
their arts, and their manufactures.9
It was catastrophic. France was ruined: everywhere could be seen
Laws overturned; tribunals subverted; industry without vigour;
commerce expiring; the revenue unpaid, yet the people impoverished; a
church pillaged, and a state not relieved; civil and military anarchy made
the constitution of the kingdom.'0
Indeed, Burke estimated: 'As much injustice and tyranny has been practised in a few
months by a French democracy, as in all the arbitrary monarchies in Europe in the
forty years of my observation.'" And thus devastated, he claimed, France must be
considered as 'not politically existing'.12 Not only had the framework of the old order
been entirely destroyed, even 'the Elements which compose Human Society seem all
to be dissolved, and a world of Monsters to be producd in the place of it'.13
Amidst the general disintegration of the ancien regime in France, the most
spectacular scene, naturally, was the destruction of her monarchy. This can be
grasped from two angles. In a narrow sense, it referred to the miserable fall of the
royal family. Since the dreadful event of 6 October 1789, the King of France had been
completely subdued.14 From then on, Burke wrote, the world had beheld in Louis XVI
a monarch, insulted, degraded, confined, deposed; his family
dispersed, scattered, imprisoned; his wife insulted to his face like the
vilest of the sex, by the vilest of all populace; himself three times
dragged by these wretches in an infamous triumph; his children torn
from him, in violation of the first right of nature; ... his revenues
9
Edmund Burke, Substance of the Speeches, in the Debate on the Army Estimates' (1790), Burke's
Works, iii, 271.
10
'Reflections on the Revolution in France', Burke's Works, ii, 312.
11 Corr, vi, 96. 'To Captain Thomas Mercer - 26 Feb. 1790'
12 'Substance on the Army Estimates', Burke's Works iii, 270
13 Corr., vi, 30. 'To Richard Burke, Jr. - (circa 10 October 1789)'.
14
For Burke's colourful description of this incident, see. 'Reflections on the Revolution in France', Burko'S
Works, ii, 343-4.
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dilapidated and plundered. . .
The calamity befalling this unfortunate king, he added, was perhaps the 'greatest that
ever fell upon one man'.15 Indeed, in the torrent of the revolution, he was not even
able to save himself. On the other hand, the authority of kingship itself had also
broken down. The National Assembly, Burke claimed, undertook to turn the king into a
mere executive officer, who was afterwards merely to carry out, as a machine, the
orders of the Assembly, without any deliberative discretion in any act of his function.
This would, in effect, amount to degrading the French monarch into 'nothing more
than a chief of bumbailiffs, sergeants at mace, catchpoles, jailers, and hangmen'. He
was to become no longer either the source of honour or the fountain of justice. There
would be nothing left in his position that could have the smallest degree of just
correspondence, or amicable relation, with the supreme power he was supposed to
possess.'6 Above all, the general trend of the Revolution seemed to be pointing to
republicanism. If kingship happened to be retained, Burke was convinced, that was
purely tactical and temporary: They only held out the royal name to catch those
Frenchmen to whom the name of king is still venerable.' Once this reason expired, he
predicted, it would be soon extinguished:
In spite of their solemn declarations, their soothing addresses, and
the multiplied oaths which they have taken and forced others to take,
they will assassinate the king when his name will no longer be
necessary to their designs; but not a moment sooner. . 17
The existence of monarchy, in essence, was not compatible with the principles of the
Revolution. The creation of the French republic in September 1792, and the execution
of Louis XVI in January 1793, had indeed come in time to fulfil Burke's prediction.
These later developments of the Revolution had brought an end to a monarchy which
had almost 'continued for fourteen hundred years'.'8
The nobility and church, the two pillars of monarchy, meanwhile, had also
crumbled. The French Revolution was fundamentally anti-aristocratic. It was a
15
Edmund Burke, 'An Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs' (1791), Burke'S Works, iii, 114-5.
16 'Reflections on the Revolution in France', Burke'S Works, ii, 468-70, 473.
17 'A Letter to a Member of the National Assembly' (1791), Burke'S Works ii, 532.
18 Edmund Burke, 'Preface to the Address of M Brissot to His Constituents' (1794), Burke'S Works iii,
513.
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campaign which professed, Burke noted, 'an implacable hostility to nobility and gentry,
and whose savage war-whoop was "a /'Aristocrats".'9 Measures had been taken to
dismantle the aristocracy. In August 1789, the feudal system was abolished; and most
of the seigneurial rights and privileges soon went with it. The noble titles, one year
later (June 1790), were also officially annulled; hence, all the noble names and titular
descriptions were decried 'as something horrible and offensive to the Ears of
mankind'.20 The nobility of France thus fell to the ground and, after this fall, many of
its members were 'degraded in their rank, undone in their fortunes, fugitives in their
persons'.2' Indeed, Burke lamented, the Revolution had destroyed a vast body of
nobility and gentry who were, he claimed, 'amongst the first in the world for
Splendour, and the i/ezyfirst for disinterested services to their Country':
These they persecuted, they hunted down like wild beasts, they
expelled them from their families and their houses, and dispersed them
into every Country in Europe, obliging them either to pine in fear and
misery at home, or to escape into want and exile in foreign Lands.
It led to the utter dissolution of the French noblesse: There are, at this day,' Burke
estimated in 1792, 'no fewer than ten thousand heads of respectable families driven
out of France; and those remain at home, remain in depression, penury, and continual
alarm for their Lives.'22
The fate of the French church had not fared better. Anti-clericalism constituted
another feature of the French Revolution, one of whose great aims, Burke indicated,
had been 'to destroy their Church22 The Revolution had pursued its policy of
desecrating the Gallican church through two stages. It had first acted, in November
1789, to secularise the property of the church, whose economic basis was hence
shattered. The confiscation of ecclesiastical estates had been made under the pretext
of rescuing the financial crisis of the state. Burke, however, was to denounce it as no
less than a blasphemous plunder of the church and an unjustifiable punishment of
19
'Substance on the Army Estimates', Burke'S Works iii, 277.
20 Corr, vii, 55. 'To William Weddell - 31 Jan. 1792'.
21
'An Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs', Burke'S Works iii, 114
22 Corr, vii, 55, 60. 'To William Weddell - 31 Jan. 1792'.
23 Corr, vi, 103. 'To John Noble - 14 March 1790'.
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virtually 'all prelates'.24 It tended to debase the holy order, reducing many 'men of
opulent condition, and their innumerable dependents, to the last distress'.25 The next
step was the introduction of the Civil Constitution of the Clergy (July 1790), which
was intended to reorganise the Church of France, with a view to turning it into a mere
civil institution of the state. It proposed, on the one hand, to salary, and hence to
equalise, the clergy and, on the other, to render all clerical offices elective. To Burke,
in fact, these plans were deliberate attempts to degrade the clergy and, utterly, to
abolish the church.26 The enforcement of such measures, in fine, had incurred great
injustice. Those who refused their oaths to support the Civil Constitution had become
the objects of merciless persecution:
That these tests were. . . to enable men to hold a poor
compensation for their legal estates, of which they had been unjustly
deprived; and, as they had before been reduced from affluence to
indigence; so, on refusal to swear against their conscience, they are
now driven from indigence to famine, and treated with every possible
degree of outrage, insult, and inhumanity.
It developed into a new persecution, which turned out to be 'infinitely more bitter than
any which had been heard of within this century'.27
If the ancien regime had irrevocably fallen, what about the new order then? The
Revolution, of course, had its noble goal. It was well known that the French people
had revolted for the Tights of man', and that by revolution they meant to bring in a
free system of government. It should therefore be enquired: had this object been
achieved? The Revolution would be for no purpose should that effort fail. To Burke,
however, the prospect seemed deeply pessimistic. The French, he claimed, had
brought in a new order which tended to be in all appearance 'a most bungling, and
unworkmanlike performance'. It contained in its structure no principle of coherence,
cooperation, or just subordination; and the whole would turn rather against the
'condition and wants of the state'.28
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When Burke approached the new order of France, his attention was first drawn to
the conspicuous fact that many proclaimed principles of the Revolution had been
grossly transgressed. The National Assembly, he observed, had in its conduct 'directly
violated not only every sound principle of government, but every one, without
exception, of their own false or futile maxims; and indeed every rule they had
pretended to lay down for their own direction'.29 The 'rights of man', for example, had
been asserted as the Bible of the Revolution; ironically, it was this doctrine which was
first to be violated. It occurred notably in the new system of representation which was
designed to be based on the triple bases of territory, population and contribution.
According to the principle of territory, one third of the representation would be
deputed purely on account of geographical arrangement. In this respect, that is, the
doctrine of the 'rights of man' would be totally irrelevant. The second basis was
population, which, in principle, ought to take account of nothing but persons, who, by
the 'rights of man' principle, 'are strictly equal, and are entitled to equal rights in their
own government'. If this principle was observed, all men in France would be
possessed of unconditional votes. In contradiction to this, however, electoral
qualifications had been set up. It was thus instituted that a direct tax of three days'
labour would be required for voting in the primary assemblies, six days' labour for the
secondary assemblies and finally the value of a mark of silver for deputies to the
National Assembly. With Burke, these qualifications constituted an audacious and
inconsistent encroachment upon the 'indefeasible rights of men': 'You order him to
buy the right, which' you before told him nature had given to him gratuitously at his
birth, and of which no authority on earth could lawfully deprive him.' Though
admittedly not so oppressive, they were none the less strong enough to destroy the
rights of men. It would exclude from a vote the man whose natural equality stood the
most in need of protection and defence. It was indeed to sacrifice a man 'who has
nothing else but his natural equality to guard him'.30
The last basis of the representation, again, had entirely lost sight of the 'rights of
man'. It was grounded upon the principle of contribution, which, having rested 'entirely
on property', was in Burke's eyes 'totally different from the equality of men and utterly
irreconcilable to it'. The National Assembly was itself not blind to this fact, which
proved too obvious to be ignored. To make up such incongruity, a grotesque
29
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compromise had been worked out. It was thus proposed that the representation in
terms of contribution would be granted to the department as a whole rather than the
individuals who paid. Upon this plan, in other words, different departments would be
represented unequally in line with their mass contributions to the state, while all the
franchised individuals within the same department would vote 'upon an exact par'.
Here, however, Burke was keen to discern a double violation of principle. On the one
hand, the principle of property was no sooner admitted than it was subverted again.
For though the predominance of property was in this case secured to the whole
department, the individuals who actually paid the highest contributions were not
entitled to benefit from the advantage of their own riches. At the same time,
according to this principle, voters from different departments would probably enjoy
different votes. Consequently, Burke declared, the principle of equality which had been
previously violated when tax qualifications were set, would be invaded again, even
among the franchised voters themselves.31 The new system of France, as a whole, had
failed to materialise the principle of the 'rights of man'.
The professed principle of democracy, meanwhile, had been crippled as well.
Burke contended that France, if she stuck strictly to her principles, would have
established a democracy which, except for an hereditary monarch, could become
'much more truly democratical than that of North America'.32 The reality, however,
proved to be far otherwise. The spirit of a pure democracy, in Burke's opinion,
consisted in the practice that every man could 'vote directly for the person who was
to represent him in the legislature'. The advantages of this were twofold. It would,
first, enable the voters to know their candidates before their votes were cast and,
secondly, allow the constituents to retain some hold upon their deputies by personal
obligation so as to secure the latter's accountability. But the new electoral system of
France had violated this principle. It adopted a scheme of indirect elections, according
to which the deputies to the legislature would be elected through three stages rather
than chosen directly by the primary constituents. In this manner, the constituents
would be rendered unable either to know the qualities of their deputies, or to call
them to account for their conduct in case of abuse. Under this system, indeed, there
would exist 'little, or rather no, connexion' between the last representative and the
31 Ibid, 446-447.
32 Corr, vi, 25 'To William Windham - 27 Sept. 1789'.
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first contituent.33 It distorted the spirit of election and thereby compromised the
principle of democracy.
The 'rights of man' and democracy had been both declared as the fundamental
principles of the French Revolution; their being grossly violated, therefore, became
highly significant. It served to prove that the French principles, for all their boasted
excellence, were futile in practice. Indeed, Burke tended to believe, their practical
futility would ultimately rather argue their theoretical falsehood: fC]an false political
principles,' he wondered, 'be more effectually exposed, than by demonstrating that
they lead to consequences directly inconsistent with and subversive of the
arrangements grounded upon them?'34
If the principles of the Revolution had been found wanting, revolution politics, in
Burke's eyes, appeared all the more reprehensible. It was observed, first of all, that the
new political structure of France was extremely defective. The National Assembly,
Burke pointed out, had taken advantage of the national crisis illegally to seize the
supreme authority of the nation. It came to monopolise virtually all the power of the
state.35 But its whole structure stood in need of a mechanism of checks and balances.
Externally, the executive branch of the state had already been rendered virtually
subservient; there was, besides, neither a senate nor an independent judicature to
serve as its restraint or corrective.36. Internally, meanwhile, the National Assembly,
since it. was newly formed, had no fundamental laws, strict conventions, or respected
usage to be its own regulation.37 The moderate wing of its members, moreover, had,
from the start, been either purged or intimidated into silence; and one potential brake
from within was hence also lost.38 In the end. Burke declared, the National Assembly,
because of no proper control, had grown into a body possessed of almost 'every
possible power': Their idea of their powers is always taken at the utmost stretch of
legislative competency'.39 'Nothing in heaven or upon earth,' he added, 'can serve as
33
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control on them.'40
Powerful as it appeared to be, nevertheless, the National Assembly had its own
troubles. It had always to suffer the tyranny of a tumultuous mob, which was ever
'ready to Hang them' should they depart from its will.4' It must also face the
intimidation of an unruly army, which 'would instantly dissolve them' if they ordered it
to disband. Under such interventions, Burke claimed, the National Assembly had not
only lost its independence, but could not even maintain the 'physiognomy and aspect
of a grave legislative body'. In fact, its members had acted before the mob but
the farce of deliberation with as little decency as liberty. They act
like the comedians of a fair before a riotous audience; they act amidst
the tumultuous cries of a mixed mob of ferocious men, and of women
lost to shame, who, according to their insolent fancies, direct, control,
applaud, explode them; and sometimes mix and take their seats
amongst them; domineering over them with a strange mixture of servile
petulance and proud, presumptuous authority.42
The Assembly was, that is, reduced to no more than the organ of the Parisian mob.43
It might appear powerful when following the 'popular voice', but it was virtually
possessed of no decided authority. The legislators there could have neither real
deliberative capacity nor free judgment.44 With a 'compelled appearance of
deliberation', Burke added, their votes were all carried out under the 'dominion of a
stern necessity':
It is notorious, that all their measures are decided before they are
debated. It is beyond doubt, that under the terror of the bayonet, and
the lamp-post, and the torch to their houses, they are obliged to adopt
all the crude and desperate measures suggested by the clubs composed
of a monstrous medley of all conditions, tongues and nations.45
The new democracy of France had, in this manner, degenerated into a mere tyranny of
40 Ibid, 318.
41 Corr, vi, 25. 'To William Windham - 27 Sept 1789'.
42 'Reflections on the Revolution in France', Burke's Works, ii, 340-1.
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'a licentious, ferocious, and savage multitude'.46
Burke had, in the quotation above, mentioned the 'clubs'; here, he took notice of
another vital aspect of revolutionary politics. The formal government of France, it
seemed, had disintegrated in the ferment of the Revolution. From this angle, Burke
claimed, revolutionary France had in reality 'no government', and the power of the
state fell into the hands of 'factions'.47 It was obvious that by 'factions' he must have
referred to those political associations, that is, the 'Clubbs and committees',48 which,
since the Revolution, had mushroomed throughout France. Among them the most
predominant were, no doubt, the Jacobin clubs,49 which soon became the only power
that directed all the affairs of state:
This is the power now paramount to every thing, even to the
Assembly itself called National, and that to which tribunals, priesthood,
laws, finances, and both descriptions of military power, are wholly
subservient.50
France was, Burke pointed out, in effect governed by 'two hundred and fifty clubs'.51
Most of them were again affiliated to the 'great patriarchial Jacobiniere of Paris'.
These Jacobin clubs had gained almost an absolute power. There was in that country
no other authority, judicial or executive, that could have the least weight with them,
whenever they chose to interfere; and they chose to interfere in everything, and on
every occasion'.52 During the National Convention, moreover, commissioners had been
dispatched to make continual circuits through every district and every army. There
they supersede all the ordinary authorities civil and military, and change and alter
everything at their pleasure.' New magistrates were imposed upon the people, without
even 'the form or ceremony of an election'.53 Thus, an affected democracy was
46
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heading. Burke lamented, 'in a direct train of becoming shortly a mischievous and
ignoble oligarchy'.54
Burke was convinced that the Jacobins would, in the end, have to maintain their
absolute rule by sheer terror and persecution. These people were activists who were
always vigilant and who had never been slow in taking the alarm against any
discontent.55 Those discontented, if they should dare to stir, would soon be
suppressed as 'rebels and mutineers'. And whoever was suspected of opposition
would have to answer it 'with his life, or the lives of his wife and children'.56 Their
treatment of their opponents, above all, was all the more cruel. To those royalists
'who contend for their lawful government, their property, and their religion', Burke
observed, they had never shown 'the least tincture of mercy'.57 During the high time of
terror (1793-94), worst of all, the committees of 'vigilance and safety' had been
everywhere set up and all kinds of inquisition, imprisonment, confiscation and
execution had hence followed. 'We see every man, that the Jacobins choose to
apprehend, taken up in his village or in his house, and conveyed to prison without the
least shadow of resistance.'58 Indeed, Burke exclaimed, the terror had once become
such that 'You cannot see one of those wretches without an alarm for your life as
well as your goods'.59 And here, he was angered, had ended 'all the deceitful dreams
and visions of the equality and rights of men'.60
The military establishment of France, next, also fell into complete disarray; and
Burke, from the start, had felt great concern over the 'late assumption of citizenship
by the army, and the whole of the arrangement, or rather disarrangement, of their
military'. The French Revolution had indeed seriously weakened the discipline of the
army. Soldiers were seen debauched from their officers and turned into 'base hireling
mutineers, and mercenary sordid deserters'. Many of them had deserted their ranks,
and melted into 'a furious, licentious populace'. The entire organisation was on the
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brink of total anarchy: 'In the present state of the French crown army,' thus Burke
enquired,
is the crown responsible for the whole of it? Is there any general
who can be responsible for the obedience of a brigade? Any colonel for
that of a regiment? Any captain for that of a company? And as to the
municipal army, reinforced as it is by the new citizen-deserters, under
whose command are they? Have we not seen them, not led by, but
dragging, their nominal commander with a rope about his neck, when
they, or those whom they accompanied, proceeded to the most
atrocious acts of treason and murder?61
In Burke's opinion, nevertheless, these disorders had originated mainly from the
ill-judged policies of the Revolution itself.
The National Assembly had, through various ways, conduced to undermine military
discipline. First of all, Burke pointed out, the Assembly, in order to secure control over
the army, had started with a mischievous operation by bribing the soldiers to 'an
universal revolt against their Officers'.62 Likewise, all the happenings of the Revolution
that passed before the soldiers' eyes could not fail to make an impact:
The soldiers remember the 6th of October. They recollect the
French guards. They have not forgotten the taking of the king's castles
in Paris and Marseilles. That the governors in both places were
murdered with impunity, is a fact that has not passed out of their
minds. They do not abandon the principles laid down so ostentatiously
and laboriously of the equality of men. They cannot shut their eyes to
the degradation of the whole noblesse of France, and the suppression of
the very idea of a gentleman. The total abolition of titles and
distinctions is not lost upon them.
Experiences of this nature, there was no doubt, must add to sap their respect of
authority. Furthermore, Burke went on, efforts were also made to instill in the soldiers
the spirit of the Revolution. For this purpose, the National Assembly had undertaken to
disseminate among the army all its resolutions, proceedings and debates, and all
those works of the 'doctors in religion and polities'. It had in this manner, Burke
claimed, virtually kept a 'school' systematically to spread principles 'destructive to all
spirit of subordination':
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The soldier is told he is a citizen, and has the rights of man and
citizen. The right of a man, he is told, is to be his own governor, and to
be ruled only by those to whom he delegates that self-government. It is
very natural he should think that he ought most of all to have his
choice where he is to yield the greatest degree of obedience.
Burke asserted that such doctrines were detrimental to the unity of the army. They
struck at the central point, around which 'the particles that compose armies are at
repose': They have destroyed the principle of obedience in the great, essential, critical
link between the officer and the soldier, just where the chain of military subordination
commences and on which the whole of that system depends.'63
A fatal mistake was further committed when the National Assembly came to cope
with the disorder of the army. Instead of rigorous measures being taken to stop this
'most terrible of all evils', the army had been urged to mingle with local 'clubs and
confederations', and take part in their 'feasts and civic entertainments'. It was hoped
that through free conversations between soldiers and citizens, the army could imbibe
civic virtues which might help to soften their ferocious nature, thus disposing them to
obey. Burke, however, considered this to be chimerical. He was convinced that 'civic
swearing, clubbing, and feasting' could never become the proper means to teach
soldiers better to observe the austere rules of military discipline. Rather, he asserted,
all such schemes to fraternise 'mutinous soldiers' with 'seditious citizens' would
weaken still more the military connections between soldiers and their officers. They
might perhaps serve to produce 'admirable citizens after the French mode, but not
quite so good soldiers after any mode'.64
The command of the army had betrayed serious problems, too. The military forces,
Burke claimed, could never exist 'under a divided command'; the army of France
unfortunately was in need of 'a single authority',85 Within the new structure of power,
the command of the king was but nominal because he would often be hamstrung by
the National Assembly, which was the 'true seat of poweT. Their discord would
become all the more obvious on the issue of promotion, over which the king had no
more than a provisional power of nomination, while the National Assembly reserved
the final say. This divided authority. Burke feared, would bring about adverse effects.
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Those officers who were not favoured by the king, but could carry their promotions
through their personal connections in the Assembly, would slight the king's authority,
while those who were recommended by the king yet rejected by the Assembly, were
likely to 'nourish discontents in the heart of the army against the ruling powers'. It
was, thus, to sow the seeds of factionalism which could lead utterly to jeopardise the
efficiency of the army itself.66
According to Burke, above all, the king and the National Assembly had in fact both
their own weaknesses with regard to military command. No army could be led without
a 'real, rigorous, effective, decided, personal authority'; before the army, then, the king
must be every thing, or he would be nothing. Since the French King was, as noted
above, possessed of no real authority, there was no way that he could effectively
command the army. Meanwhile, the National Assembly, though it had ultimate
authority, was apt to be crippled by its own internal instability. As the Assembly must
be re-elected every two years, its policy could become 'as uncertain as their duration
is transient'. Armies, Burke observed, had so far pledged a very precarious obedience
to popular authority; and least of all would they yield to an assembly which was to
have but a short duration. With the weakness of the king on the one hand and the
fluctuation of the National Assembly on the other, Burke warned, the army could
remain 'for some time mutinous and full of faction', until
some popular general, who understands the art of conciliating the
soldiers, and who possesses the true spirit of command, shall draw the
eyes of all men upon himself. Armies will obey him on his personal
account.
There would be no other way out. But once such a strong man should emerge, he
predicted, the whole course of the Revolution would end with a military dictatorship,
and 'the person who really commands the army is your master; the master ... of your
king, the master of your Assembly, the master of your whole republic'.67
There is little doubt that the French Revolution was largely caused by the financial
crisis of the old regime. The immediate object of the National Assembly, as Burke
pointed out, was, of course, to 'improve the system of revenue'. It is then necessary,
at last, to see how this problem had been dealt with. The finances of France, like
66
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other sectors, had been similarly cast into confusion during the Revolution. Here,
Burke was again ready to blame this chaos on the National Assembly itself, whose
imprudent act, he claimed, had added to worsen the financial disorder of the state.
The Assembly had, among others, chosen to decry their ancient system of taxation in
many of its most essential branches, the salt tax for instance, charging them with
being 'ill-contrived, oppressive, and partial'. This public denunciation led to bad
effects. It encouraged the people of the salt provinces, who were already impatient
under taxes, immediately to relieve themselves by throwing off the whole burden.
Other districts, animated by this example, soon followed suit; and many of them came
to take upon themselves to judge their grievances by their own feelings, to apply their
remedies by their own opinions, and, most of all, to decide 'what part of the old
revenue they might withhold'.68
A government, to be sure, could not subsist without a sound revenue; how, then,
had the National Assembly managed to finance the new regime? 'In the destruction of
the Old Revenue constitution they find no difficulties - but with what to supply them
is the Opus,' claimed Burke.69 The Assembly was found not able to secure an ample
revenue. According to its own committee report, Burke pointed out, the national
income of France since the Revolution, far from increasing, had in reality declined by
more than one third. Notwithstanding, the expenditure of the new government,
considering its financial situation, seemed to remain as prodigal as ever. Deficits,
hence, continued to be a difficult problem. To Burke's chagrin, moreover, the new
taxation was not in fact imposed with judgement and equality. Facing resistance from
the districts, the National Assembly, not capable of enforcing an equal and universal
imposition, was driven instead to tax 'by dispositions'. Those parts of the country
which were the most submissive, the most orderly, or the most affectionate to the
government, as a result, were forced to bear 'the whole burthen of the state'. It turned
out to be as unjust as it was oppressive. Since this arbitrary taxation was unable to
answer the financial needs, the National Assembly, next, ventured to make up the
deficiency by appealing to 'voluntary benevolence', which Burke would brand as a 'tax
in the disguise of benevolence'. Finally, 'patriotic donations' were even called for to
make good the failure of the former. These last two measures were obviously
desperate projects which. Burke stressed, were rarely resorted to during the
68 Ibid, 496, 499-500.
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peacetime, and which, he added, even if able to meet their end for the moment, could
not be expected to solve their fundamental financial problem. They would rather serve
to drain off the resources of the nation. In truth, Burke remarked: The whole indeed of
their scheme of revenue is to make, by any artifice, an appearance of a full reservoir
for the hour, whilst at the same time they cut off the springs and living fountains of
perennial supply.'70
All these plans of impositions, not surprisingly, had failed to 'fill up any perceptible
part of the wide gaping breach which their incapacity has made in their revenues'.71 It
was also deemed not to be feasible for the new government to raise loans, as was
usually done during the old regime, since it, Burke claimed, had not yet existed long
enough to establish 'a foundation of Credit'.72 In desperation, the issue of the
'assignats' seemed to become their last resort.
The question of the assignats actually constituted the main theme in Burke's
criticism of the financial policy of the Revolution. Burke did not in principle dispute the
use of paper currency, but he had great doubt about the ability of the National
Assembly to give it a sound credit, which would be essential for its normal circulation.
The credit of a government, Burke pointed out, depended very much on whether it
could secure a settled revenue. The paper currency issued, to a large extent, had to
represent the real cash on reserve, or it would become no more than a fictitious bill.
In the present case, however, the order was completely reversed, for the assignats,
instead of representing real money, had rather stood for the 'total and urgent want of
it'.73 It might of course be argued that the assignats would be funded upon the
appropriated church property and royal domains. For Burke, nevertheless, this plan
would be tantamount to establish 'a current circulating credit' upon a ' Landbank which
seemed never quite reliable.74 To make matters worse, the poor management of the
National Assembly also added to weaken the speculated credit of the confiscated
estates. No effort had been made to assess the correct assets and liabilities of these
properties. It was indeed discovered later that the financial burden which the National
Assembly, after the confiscation, had to take over from the church had amounted to a
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sum much larger than could be expected from the church property. The revenue to be
secured from the sale of the royal domains was also found to have been grossly
exaggerated.75 But these resources would be used to fund the assignats; that was to
be depended on as the financial panacea to 'cure all the evils of the state':
Is there a debt which presses them? - Issue assignats. Are
compensations to be made, or a maintenance decreed to those whom
they have robbed of their freehold in their office, or expelled from their
profession? - Assignats Is a fleet to be fitted out? - Assignats If
sixteen millions sterling of these assignats. forced upon the people,
leave the wants of the state as urgent as ever - issue, says one, thirty
millions sterling of assignats - says another, issue fourscore millions
more of assignats . . They are all professors of assignats Even those,
whose natural good sense and knowledge of commerce. . . furnish
decisive arguments against this delusion, conclude their arguments, by
proposing the emission of assignats . . All experience of their inefficacy
does not in the least discourage them. Are the old assignats depreciated
at market? - What is the remedy? - Issue new assignats . . .
There appeared to be no other prop 'than this confiscation to keep the whole state
from tumbling to the ground'.76
For want of a solid credit, the value of the assignats proved untenable. There had
occurred. Burke reported, an immediate depreciation of 'five per cent., which in a little
time came to about seven'.77 He went on to predict that the assignats would result in
a total depreciation when once the sale of the confiscated property ran out.78 It had,
indeed, at one time 'sunk so very low, as to leave but one, and that a very short, step
to its utter annihilation'.79 Unable to stand upon its own credit, the assignats, at last,
had to be supported by the sheer power of government. It was later declared to be
legal tender, that was hence to be received compulsorily:
They have compelled all men, in all transactions of commerce, in
the disposal of lands, in civil dealing, and through the whole communion
of life, to accept as perfect payment and good and lawful tender, the
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symbols of their speculations on a projected sale of their plunder.80
Burke asserted that, when once a state compelled its creditors to take paper currency
to clear its debts, there was a virtual bankruptcy.81 He had soon pointed out that
France had sunk everyday more and more in real cash, and swollen more and more in
'fictitious representation', that 'so little within or without is now found but paper'. In
France, at last, the assignats turned out to be not so much a symbol of prosperity, as
the 'badge of distress'.82 It was, he added, made the 'instrument of all the interiour
miseries of France'.83
Having so far examined the new order in its essential aspects, Burke was utterly
convinced that the French Revolution had proved to be a great disaster. Instead of
redressing grievances and improving the fabric of the state, the Revolution had
brought on France devastations which nothing but a long war could ever bring down
on a country.84 For sure, the burden of the people had not been relieved 'in any
form'.85 Yet, the vigour of the nation had suffered such a dilapidation that, Burke
apprehended, it might take a very long time before France could be restored to her
former active existence.86 He came to conclude that 'France has bought undisguised
calamities at a higher price than any nation has purchased the most unequivocal
blessings'.87
Indeed, the people of France failed to achieve freedom. For all their boasted
commitment to the ideal of the 'rights of man'. Burke claimed, their sacrifice for the
Revolution had in fact not been made on the altar of liberty.88 The Revolution had
brought France sinking into a state no better than 'a series of shortlived tyrannies'. It
ushered in a regime which turned out to be, he declared, of all the governments the
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most absolute and despotic. '[I]t is the only nation I ever heard of, where the people
are absolutely slaves, in the fullest sense, in all affairs public and private, great and
small, even down to the minutest and most recondite parts of their household
concerns.'89 The French people had replaced an abusive government with a tyrannical
regime;90 indeed, they only changed 'one piece of barbarism for another, and a
worse'.9' All that France had so far acquired, Burke continued, was 'not a comparative
good, but a positive evil'. He was convinced
that the present state of things in France is not a transient evil,
productive of a lasting good; but that the present evil is only the means
of producing future and (if that were possible) worse evils. - That it is
not an undigested, imperfect, and crude scheme of liberty, which may
gradually be mellowed and ripened into an orderly and social freedom;
but that it is so fundamentally wrong, as to be utterly incapable of
correcting itself by any length of time, or of being formed into any
mode of polity. . .92
To Burke, in the final analysis, the new liberty which the Revolution claimed to have
achieved would come to be no more than a 'frantic delusion'.93
As for the future of France, the prospect did not look optimistic. Born of violence.
Burke pointed out, the French democracy had begun ill. 'I feel no security, that what
has been rapacious and bloody in its commencement, will be mild and protecting in
its final settlement.'94 Since violence and.anarchy had almost become the order of the
day, he feared that, as long as the Revolution lasted, the French people would renew
over again 'the same ferocious delight in murder and the same savage cruelty'.95
Before a final settlement could be achieved, Burke predicted, France might 'be obliged
to pass, as one of our poets says, "through great varieties of untried being", and in all
its transmigrations to be purified by fire and blood'.96 This verdict proved prophetic.
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But to sum up his overall opinion of, and his general feeling about, the French
Revolution, Burke had thus concluded:
All circumstances taken together, the French Revolution is the
most astonishing that has hitherto happened in the world. The most
wonderful things are brought about in many instances by means the
most absurd and ridiculous; in the most ridiculous modes; and,
apparently, by the most contemptible instruments. Everything seems out
of nature in this strange chaos of levity and ferocity, and of all sorts of
crimes jumbled together with all sorts of follies.
When one came to view this 'monstrous tragi-comic scene', he added, the most
opposite passions must 'necessarily succeed, and sometimes mix with each other in
the mind; alternate contempt and indignation; alternate laughter and tears; alternate
scorn and horror'.97
ii
Burke was ever of the opinion that the French Revolution would infallibly make a
far-reaching impact on the future of Europe. The great Revolution which has taken
place in France,' he told the Earl of Charlemont, 'threatned to make no small change in
the State of the rest of the world, and in our part of it as well as in any other.'98 Fie
discerned very keenly that an alarming situation was being ushered in. For the first
time, a political movement, based on the principle of the 'rights of men' and slighted
hitherto as merely speculative, was proving to be a thing feasible in practice; and this
very fact, Burke stressed, was to make a 'mighty difference in the effect of the
doctrine'.99 Viewing it from the perspective of a long European political tradition, he
believed, as a result of its triumph in France, a 'practicable breach' had already been
made 'in the whole order of things and in every country'.'00 This declaration of a new
species of government, on new principles. . . is a real crisis in the politics of
Europe.',0' And it was a great crisis, he added, 'not of the affairs of France alone, but
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of all Europe, perhaps of more than Europe'.102 The triumph of Jacobinism in France
had sparked off a universal conflagration which had spread over Europe,103 and
The whole Edifice of antient Europe is shaken by the Earthquake
caused by that fire - one part of the Building only is level with the
ground - but all is impaired very considerably.10"
No nation, in sum, could stay out of the danger.105
The danger came chiefly from the extraordinary nature of the French Revolution
itself. In the past, Burke pointed out, revolution always tended to be no more than the
internal affair of one government. It had mostly turned on matters but of 'local
grievance', or of 'local accommodation', and therefore could have little or nothing to
do with the interests of neighbouring countries. But the French Revolution was of
quite another character and description: it seemed, observed Burke,
to bear little resemblance or analogy to any of those which have
been brought about in Europe, upon principles merely political. It is a
revolution of doctrine and theoretic dogma. It has a much greater
resemblance to those changes which have been made upon religious
grounds.
Its principles, like those of the Reformation of the sixteenth century, were such as by
its essence could not be local, or confined to the country of its origin.106 They, Burke
made clear, 'are general principles, and are as true in England as in any other
country'.107 A revolution based on such principles should therefore become the
common concern of all, since the mischief it would produce would likewise admit no
territorial limit, and would thus turn out to be a 'general evil'.108
As the French Revolution assumed a character similar to that of the Reformation,
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so the revolutionaries were imbued with the fanaticism of religious bigots and,
accordingly, carried with them a spirit of 'proselytism' which, Burke noted, always
made an essential part of a religious movement. This spirit of proselytism had the
tendency of expanding itself with great elasticity upon all sides; and its effect was to
'introduce other interests into all countries than those which arose from their locality
and natural circumstanced.109 Indeed, Burke noticed that French principles had been
laboriously spread among 'very many persons, and descriptions of persons' in every
country."0 He pointed out that everywhere the revolutionaries were busy in nourishing
their faction of 'opinion', 'interest' and 'enthusiasm':1"
It exists in every country in Europe; and among all orders of men
in every country, who look up to France as to a common head. The
centre is there. The circumference is the world of Europe wherever the
race of Europe may be settled. Everywhere else the faction is militant; in
France it is triumphant. In France it is the bank of deposit, and the bank
of circulation, of all the pernicious principles that are forming in every
state.
Their ambition. Burke warned, was to establish a 'comprehensive system of universal
fraternity' or, in other words, to build 'an universal empire, by producing an universal
revolution'."2
Every effort Burke had made was intended to demonstrate that the revolution in
France would eventually compromise the common liberty and independence of all
nations and all governments."3 As for the direction, and the order, this predicted
universal revolution would start and prevail, he admitted, at the time when he was
writing his Thoughts on French Affairs (MS}), that it was not easy to tell. One thing
however was certain: the seeds of convulsion had already been sown here and there;
and in many places symptoms of its imminent eruption were discernible:
Many parts of Europe are in open disorder. In many others there is
a hollow murmuring under ground; a confused movement is felt, that
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threatens a general earthquake in the political world.
Great discontent was found to have been stirred up in the Swiss republic of Berne,
'one of the happiest, the most properous, and the best governed countries'; and
throughout Germany, Italy and Spain, the revolutionaries were active. Even England,
Burke added, was not left out of the 'comprehensive scheme of their malignant
charity'."4
According to Burke's observation, on the continent Germany, Switzerland, and then
Italy, would be ranked among the first objects for the ambition of the French
revolutionaries. The situations of these countries were quite similar. Politically, none of
them had been closely unified into a single political entity. They each comprehended
respectively under 'some general geographical description' several small member
states which were widely diversified in their forms of government and were but
'loosely united by some federal constitution'."5 This ensured their common weakness.
Considering its overall situation. Burke pointed out that Germany was under a 'very
critical situation', subject to 'the contagion of the French doctrines and the effect of
French intrigues'. Externally, the laws and liberties, the independence and equilibrium,
of the German empire had been maintained so far chiefly upon the international order
structured by the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 which had been supported by the
major European powers, particularly the 'old government' of France.1'8 But as the
Revolution, argued Burke, had in a political sense expunged France out of the old
system of Europe,"7 the security of Germany was thus jeopardised. Internally, the old
basis on which the German states stood was utterly incompatible with the new French
principles:
the Germanic body is a vast mass of heterogeneous states, held
together by that heterogeneous body of old principles, which formed
the public law positive and doctrinal. The modern laws and liberties,
which the new power in France proposes to introduce into Germany,
and to support with ail its force of intrigue and of arms, is of a very
different nature, utterly irreconcilable with the first, and indeed
fundamentally the reverse of it.
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It would therefore be impossible for such German principles of feudal tenure and
succession to exist side by side with the French rights and liberties of man, the
declared enemy to feudalism.118 Indeed, Burke insisted, ever since the first dawning of
the Revolution the German empire had been one of the great objects which the
French had sought to shatter.119 There, he noticed, the French principles had made 'an
amazing progress', especially among the ecclesiastical states whose mild, indulgent
and loose reins, Burke believed, had rather afforded their people the facility to lend
themselves to any scheme of innovation. And he predicted that it was on these
electorates that the 'first impressions of France are likely to be made'. But should they
succeed there, he warned, it would be over with the Germanic body as it then
stood.120
Moreover, even the two leading German powers - Prussia and Austria - had not
successfully warded off the penetration of French principles. Prussian ministers, Burke
claimed, were deeply infected with the 'distemper of dangerous, because plausible,
though trivial and shallow speculation', and generally looked up to the French
Revolution as 'a great public good'. Their diplomats in foreign courts talked 'the most
democratic language with regard to France, and in the most unmanaged terms'. In
Austria, Burke alleged, the advisers of the Emperor had laboriously impressed him with
the new philosophy which had destroyed the French monarchy. They were, he
believed, persuading him, as a measure to consolidate his royal power, to pursue a
most dangerous plan: to cultivate the lower orders in order to weaken the higher.
The present policy, therefore, of the Austrian politicians,' exclaimed Burke, 'is to
recover despotism through democracy'; and in defiance of the freshest experience of
France, he was surprised to find, they seemed to think light of the formidable
consequences of democracy.121
In Switzerland, Burke believed, the revolutionaries had entertained 'very sanguine
hopes'. Since the Revolution they had already disturbed, as mentioned before, the
republic of Berne, and had made, only narrowly failing of success, an attempt on
Geneva. Because of its close connection with France, Switzerland, much more than
Germany, had always depended on the support of the old French government for its
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independence. The Swiss political system was a confederation weakly composed of
several democratic and aristocratic republics. To the French, those democratic
republics, because of their being democracies, were 'a work half done' for them to
aggregate. As for the aristocratic ones, the general clamour and hatred aroused by
the revolutionaries against aristocracy, and the want of troops in these republics to
suppress insurrections, had made them vulnerable. In fact. Burke contended, these
aristocracies had now become so dependent upon the opinion and humour of their
multitude that 'the lightest puff of wind is sufficient to blow them down'.122
Italy would be the next country under threat, though the danger there, Burke
admitted, did not seem so imminent. In the Lombardy area, Savoy was to bear the
brunt of the revolutionary attack. Historically, the French had always regarded this
country as an 'old member of the kingdom of France', and had never given up their
ambition to reunite it to them. Strategically, Savoy held the key to Italy; and if the
French took it, they could easily lay open the 'barrier which hinders the entrance of
her present politics into that inviting region'. As for other Lombardic states, Burke
noted that Genoa had already established close connections with France, while Milan
became increasingly unquiet. In southern Italy, both Naples and Sicily had long
nourished 'an old, inveterate disposition to republicanism', which. Burke feared, would
be as liable to explosion as Vesuvius. Finally, with regard to the Papal States,
notwithstanding the Pope's vigilance against new doctrines, seeds of revolution had
not been wanting. There were serious defects in their politics. The administration was,
Burke pointed out, hopelessly dominated by nepotism; and their government was as
blindly attached to old, abusive customs, as others are wildly disposed to all sorts of
innovations and experiments'. More alarming, their most influential cardinal had nursed
a disposition very 'turbulent, seditious, intriguing, bold, and desperate', and was most
likely to conjure up a 'democratic spirit' among the people. Here Burke saw the real
danger. If once the people of the Papal States should thereby shake off their blind
reverence to the Pope, which was their only bridle, they would naturally become
turbulent, ferocious and headlong, while 'the police is defective, and the government
feeble and resourceless beyond all imagination'.123
Other countries would also be affected by the Revolution to a greater or lesser




French politics, but Spain, however, could not be free from its spell, despite the effort
of its aged inquisition to try to keep out the revolutionary influence. The people in the
provinces of Catalonia and Aragon had, Burke noticed, kept a spirit of republicanism.
They are more in the way of trade and intercourse with France; and, upon the least
internal movement, will disclose and probably let loose a spirit that may throw the
whole Spanish monarchy into convulsions.' In the northern part of Europe, Burke's
attention was chiefly drawn to Sweden, since Denmark and Norway had shown no
sign of a democratic revolution. The new political system of Sweden, which was
brought into existence by its recent monarchical revolution, was, in Burke's opinion,
too green, and too sore, to be considered as perfectly stabilised. And, he warned,
there was a 'great danger that all the republican elemenls she contains will be
animated by the new French spirit'. Among the eastern European countries, the
Russian people, Burke remarked, were not great speculators; their governments were
more liable to be subverted by military seditions, court conspiracies, or the headlong
rebellions of the people, than by a revolution in the French style. None the less, Burke
argued, the 'little catechism of the rights of men' was likely to be learned and
manipulated, if such internal unrest should arise. As for Poland, it had always been a
country of turbulence. Fler new constitution of May 1791, in many respects similar to
the French constitution of the same year, Burke contended, could but serve to 'supply
that restless people with new means, at least new modes, of cherishing their turbulent
disposition'.'24
With regard to the Low Countries, Burke pointed out that the ruling party of
Flolland was sound. But there had always existed, though suppressed, an anti-Orange
party with long and strong French affiliations. This party, he believed, would ever
hanker after a French connection, particularly when the French had just instituted a
republican government so consonant with the one which these 'immoderate
republicans began so very lately to introduce into Flolland'. The situation of the
Austrian Netherlands was much more serious. Like Savoy in Italy, these provinces
were long regarded by the French as the oldest part of the ancient Gallic empire, and
were geographically well situated to be reunited to France. The Austrian politics there,
moreover, seemed highly imprudent: The subordinate court of Brussels talks the
language of a club of Feuillans and Jacobins.'125 Since the accession of Joseph II, the
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policies of its Austrian rulers had been to destroy the historical Brabant constitution
which had conferred the traditional rights of self-government on the provincial
corporate bodies of nobility, clergy and guildsmen.126 Such an anti-corporate policy, in
Burke's opinion, was fundamentally injurious to the monarchical interest, because
firstly, by infringing the privileges of its people, it would inevitably alienate their
support and, secondly, by shaking these old corporations, it would destroy those
ancient land-marks which had been the surest fortifications of the monarchical
interest.127 Indeed, the Emperor's efforts to 'crush the aristocratic party - and to
nourish one in avowed connexion with the most furious democratists in France', it
seemed to Burke, had just answered the purpose of the French revolutionaries.128
In the survey above, Burke meant to demonstrate the widespread influence the
Revolution would produce through Europe. Burke, however, acknowledged that, as
regards the great European powers, the French, for all their ambitions, did not aim at
making direct conquest, but by 'disturbing them through a propagation of their
principles',
they hope to weaken, as they will weaken them, and to keep them
in perpetual alarm and agitation, and thus render all their efforts against
them utterly impracticable, whilst they extend the dominion of their
sovereign anarchy on all sides.129
Besides, from the view of geopolitics, he held that the impact of the Revolution on
Germany would be the most fatal to the future of Europe. The equilibrium among the
European nations had been inseparably associated with the stability and independence
of Germany since the days of the Treaty of Westphalia. The old European system
would collapse if the peace of Germany should be disturbed. It is from this
perspective that Burke, after examining the situation of Germany, declared: 'A great
revolution is preparing in Germany; and a revolution, in my opinion, likely to be more
decisive upon the general fate of nations than that of France itself; other than as in
France is to be found the first source of all the principles which are in any way likely
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to distinguish the troubles and convulsions of our age.'130
In addition to its impact on European politics, the French Revolution would at the
same time have profound social consequences. Never before had the civil life of
mankind been so deeply affected by political change. In the past, Burke observed, the
greatest change which could be apprehended would have had little impact on the
'domestick happiness' of the majority of mankind, but now 'no mans Fireside is safe
from the Effects of a political Revolution'.'31 In the first place, the tranquillity and
security of domestic life was to be undermined, for the Revolution had taught the
doctrine of the rights of man which, Burke insisted, would encourage servants to
betray their masters and thereby smash the domestic trust and fidelity which formed
the 'discipline of social life'. Consequently, the home would be turned into a gloomy
place where the father of a family must 'drag out a miserable existence' and feel
'solitary in a crowd of domestics'.132 Furthermore, the 'revolution harpies' would also
disturb other aspects of social life: 'they are about us'. Burke claimed,
They shake the public security; they menace private enjoyment.
They dwarf the growth of the young, they break the quiet of the old. If
we travel, they stop our way. They infest us in the town; they pursue us
to the country. Our business is interrupted; our repose is troubled; our
pleasures are saddened; our very studies are poisoned and perverted,
and knowledge is rendered worse than ignorance, by the enormous evils
of this dreadful innovation.'33
The whole system of the French Revolution had turned fundamentally against all laws
on which 'civil life has hitherto been upheld'.134 If it should prevail, no one, he insisted,
could enjoy 'a thing so imperfect and precarious as human happiness must be, even
under the very best of governments'.'35
There remains an important theme which underlies implicitly all Burke's reflections
on the French Revolution and must be regarded, above all others, as his ultimate
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concern: that the ancient European culture was in crisis. In Burke's mind, the
Revolution posed a radical challenge to the existence of European civilization. He saw,
in the downfall of the ancien regime in France, that 'the very being and principle of
the Christian Religion in every Nation, the existence of Monarchy in Every state in the
world, and the whole body of the Laws, institutions, manners, and morals. . . as well
as all Societies together are all attacked at once'.136 Europe was threatened with 'the
worst and most degrading barbarism','37 which, Burke feared, tended ultimately to
disrupt that 'happy Course and order of things' by which Europe had arrived at 'its
present State of improvement'.138
Burke's anxiety about the crisis of European culture can be detected from his rage
against the 'atrocious spectacle' of 6 October 1789. To him, that a noble queen should
have fallen so disgracefully 'in a nation of gallant men, in a nation of men of honour,
and of cavaliers', betokened the passing of that priceless chivalrous ideal which had
elevated and beautified modern European society. Modern Europe, Burke argued, had
drawn its character from, and distinguished itself by, a 'mixed system of opinion and
sentiment' - the social manners of civility and gentility - which had its origins in the
'ancient chivalry', and which, though varied in its appearance, had subsisted and
influenced 'through a long succession of generations, even to the time we live in'. But
the French Revolution had threatened to change all of this. Burke complained:
All the pleasing illusions, which made power gentle and obedience
liberal, which harmonized the different shades of life, and which, by a
bland assimilation, incorporated into politics the sentiments which
beautify and soften private society, are to be dissolved by this new
conquering empire of light and reason. All the decent drapery of life is
to be rudely torn off. All the superadded ideas, furnished from the
wardrobe of a moral imagination, which the heart owns, and the
understanding ratifies, as necessary to cover the defects of our naked,
shivering nature, and to raise it to dignity in our own estimation, are to
be exploded as a ridiculous, absurd, and antiquated fashion.139
In other words. Burke was afraid that a new school of 'murder and barbarism' would
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replace that system of ancient 'manners and principles' which had hitherto civilised
Europe.'40 And 'never more shall we behold', he lamented,
that generous loyalty to rank and sex, that proud submission, that
dignified obedience, that subordination of the heart, which kept alive,
even in servitude itself, the spirit of an exalted freedom. The unbought
grace of life, the cheap defence of nations, the nurse of manly
sentiment and heroic enterprise, is gone. It is gone, that sensibility of
principle, that chastity of honour, which felt a stain like a wound, which
inspired courage whilst it mitigated ferocity, which ennobled whatever it
touched, and under which vice itself lost half its evil, by losing all its
grossness.'4'
Burke's message here is unmistakable. He was anxious that, as a result of the
disappearance of such civil manners and moral sentiments, modern European culture
would face the danger of being decivilised through a retrogressive process of
dehumanisation. In the final analysis, it is this perspective of a deep sense of cultural
crisis which sheds light on the ultimate implication of Burke's lamentation that 'the
age of chivalry is gone. That of sophists, economists, and calculators, has succeeded;
and the glory of Europe is extinguished for ever'.142
hi
About a week before the publication of the Reflections, Burke wrote to the exiled
French Minister, M. de Calonne, explaining his intention of writing: 'In reality, my
Object was not France, in the first instance, but this Country.'143 There was no doubt
that Burke's mind was solicitous chiefly for the peace of Britain while he was
reflecting on the happenings in France,144 for he discovered that the cause of the
French Revolution was being enthusiastically acclaimed among some British people:
Extraordinary things have happend in France; extraordinary things
have been said and done here, and publishd with great ostentation, in
order to draw us into a connexion and concurrence with that nation
upon the principles of its proceedings, and to lead us to an imitation of
them.
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Such a disposition, if allowed to run wild, would become 'highly dangerous to the
constitution and the prosperity of this Country'."15 Without an awareness of this
relevance to Britain, Burke's fury against the revolution in France would be
inexplicable. In his opinion, as long as French affairs affected Britain, they necessarily
became part of Britain's concern. Thus, he remarked:
Formerly your affairs were your own concern only. We felt for
them as men; but we kept aloof from them, because we were not
citizens of France. But when we see the model held up to ourselves, we
must feel as Englishmen, and feeling, we must provide as Englishmen.
Your affairs, in spite of us, are made a part of our interest.146
Indeed, he reminded Thomas Mercer, What have I to do with France, but as the
common interest of humanity, and its example to this country, engages me?147
Burke differed widely not only from those in power, but also from those of his
own party, in his views about the potential influence of the French Revolution on
Britain.'48 Far from being complacent, he had persistently held that the success of the
Revolution in France and the safety of Britain were things inseparable: French
principles, claimed Burke, 'considering their quality, and the means by which they are
supported, cannot possibly be realized in practice in France, without an absolute
certainty, and that at no remote period, of overturning the whole fabrick of the British
Constitution'.'49 And all his efforts had been to keep the 'distemper' of France from the
least countenance in Britain.'50
But how could Burke justify his fear? There were several ways of doing so. First,
as mentioned above, Burke believed that the principles of the French Revolution were
in their nature contagious and capable of expansion. Their being spread over Britain
would therefore be quite natural. Moreover, for centuries, Britain had been the major
rival to the ambition of France; and her being the most influential power in Europe
would naturally make her the principal object which the French revolutionaries hoped
145 Corr, vi, 83. 'To Richard Bright - 18 Feb. 1790'.
146 'Reflections on the Revolution in France', Burke's Works, ii, 361.
147 Corr, vi, 97. 'To Captain Thomas Mercer - 26 Feb. 1790'.
148 Corr, vi, 418. 'To Henry Dundas - 30 Sept. 1791'; Corr, vii, 218. 'To Lord Grenville - 19 Sept. 1792'.
149 Corr, vii, 219. To Lord Grenville - 19 Sept. 1792'.
150 'Substance on the Army Estimates', Burke'S Works, iii, 274.
39
the most to corrupt, since their revolution could be assured of becoming 'general'
only if they should take over Britain first.15' Secondly, these two countries were
geographically near to each other, and this afforded another good cause for concern.
'France,' Burke wrote, 'by the mere circumstance of its vicinity, had been, and in
degree always must be, an object of our vigilance, either with regard to her actual
power, or to her influence and example.' And finally, the model of French politics had
always become the fashion for other countries. The perfect despotism of Louis XIV,
for instance, had in the previous century insinuated itself into every court of Europe,
and two British monarchs - Charles II and James II - had been its unfortunate
followers. This day,' Burke continued,
the evil is totally changed in France: but there is an evil there. The
disease is altered; but the vicinity of the two countries remains, and
must remain; and the natural mental habits of mankind are such, that
the present distemper of France is far more likely to be contagious than
the old one; for it is not quite easy to spread a passion for servitude
among the people; but in all evils of the opposite kind our natural
inclinations are flattered. In the case of despotism there is the foedum
crimen servitutis; in the last the falsa species Hbertatis, and accordingly,
as the historian says, pronis auribus accipitur.
Formerly, Britain had been in danger of 'being entangled by the example of France in
the net of a relentless despotism'; but now the threat was from the example of
anarchy; of a danger of being led to an 'imitation of the excesses of an irrational,
unprincipled, proscribing, confiscating, plundering, ferocious, bloody, and tyrannical
democracy'.'52 These reasons combined had convinced Burke that, if the
revolutionaries were suffered finally to triumph in France, they would need no more
than some occasion of domestic trouble or disturbance in Britain to extend
themselves over.153
What had strained Burke's nerves most, however, was the growth in Britain of a
party which had declared its support for the French Revolution. Since the success of
the Revolution, Burke had detected that 'the principles of a new, republican, frenchified
Whiggism was gaining ground',154 and that 'some wicked persons had shown a strong
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disposition to recommend an imitation of the French spirit of reform'.'55 The
appearance of a 'strong Jacobin faction' on British soil had heightened the ominous
bearing of the French Revolution, and hence rendered it an object for particular
vigilance:'56
France, in the very plenitude of any power which she possessd in
this Century, would be no Object of serious alarm to England, if she had
no connexion with parties in this Kingdom: With a connexion here which
considers the predominant power in France as their natural friend and
ally, I should think Three or four departments in Normandy more
formidable than the whole of that once great Monarchy.157
Radicalism, as Burke pointed out, was indeed not a new thing brought into Britain by
the French Revolution. There had long since existed in Britain some radical groups
which had employed themselves 'in speculating upon constitutions'. The French
Revolution, however, had 'discovered it, increased it, and gave fresh vigour to its
operations'.'56 It was the French politics of these domestic radicals which Burke felt
obliged to expose: 'I see some people here are willing that we should become their
scholars too, and reform our state on the French model. They have begun; and it is
high time for those who wish to preserve morem majorum, to look about them.'159
The French Revolution had gained its supporters both in and out of Parliament.
Those extra-parliamentary supporters were branded by Burke as 'Jacobins'.'60 But
Burke never gave a very clear definition of who these British Jacobins were. He had
once described the French party in Britain as comprehending in general
most of the dissenters of the three leading denominations: to
these are readily aggregated all who are dissenters in character, temper,
and disposition, though not belonging to any of their congregations -
that is, all the restless people who resemble them, of all ranks and all
parties - Whigs, and even Tories - the whole races of half-bred
speculators; - all the Atheists, Deists, and Socinians; - all those who
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hate the clergy, and envy the nobility; - a good many among the
monied people; - the East Indians almost to a man, who cannot bear to
find that their present importance does not bear a proportion to their
wealth.'61
In short, Burke seemed to regard all those who, for some reason or other, had
become discontented as downright 'Jacobins'.
None the less, in Burke's opinion, the Dissenters undoubtedly composed the main
force behind the British Jacobins. The Dissenters, he noticed, were among the 'first
and most active' in spreading those French principles,'62 to which the whole body of
the Dissenters was, 'at the very least, nine tenths of them entirely devoted'.163 Burke's
friendship with the Dissenters had been strained since at least the election of 1784 in
which the Dissenters had turned their back against the Whig party.'64 This uneasy
relationship was at length undermined by the fundamental conflict between their
views on the French Revolution, as Burke admitted:
the eager manner in which several dissenting Teachers shewed
themselves disposed to connect themselves in Sentiment and by
imitation,(and perhaps by something more) with what was done and is
doing in France, did very much indispose me to any concurrence with
them.165
Since the French Revolution, he had found some religious activities of the Dissenting
ministers 'not so commendable'. They had, he protested, audaciously turned the pulpit,
from where 'no sound ought to be heard but the healing voice of Christian charity',
into places for political agitation, and for the 'nourishment of a party which seems to
have contention and power much more than Piety for its Object'.166 Fie indeed felt
quite uneasy at seeing their 'most considerable and accredited' ministers being so
'active in spreading mischievous opinions, in giving sanction to seditious writings, in
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promoting seditious anniversaries'.167 The Dissenters were suspected of meditating
wicked designs on the British constitution. Richard Price's Revolution Sermon of 4
November 1789, for example, was accused of containing the 'manifest design of
connecting the affairs of France with those of England, by drawing us into an imitation
of the conduct of the National Assembly'.'68 From the zealous involvement of the
Dissenters in French politics. Burke was convinced that a considerable party was being
formed, and was 'proceeding systematically, to the destruction of this Constitution in
some of its essential parts'.169
The main feature of the politics of the British Jacobins was their zealous
fraternisation with the French revolutionaries: 'they had opened', Burke wrote, 'a
correspondence with a foreign faction, the most wicked the world ever saw, and
established anniversaries to commemorate the most monstrous, cruel, and perfidious
of all the proceedings of that faction.''70 And with the French Jacobins they had ever
moved 'in strict concert and cooperation'.'71 Burke had even suspected that a military
deal had been made, by which the British Jacobins, he alleged, had gone the length of
giving supplies to the French revolutionaries, and had received in turn 'promises of
military assistance to forward their designs in England'.172 In Burke's opinion, it was
such foreign communications which had rendered the British Jacobins formidable: 'As
to the growth of this contagion within our walls, as a meer domestick Evil, and
unconnected with a dangerous foreign power, I have ever had little comparative
apprehension; But combined with the foreign forces - there - there is the danger.'173
The tactic of the British Jacobins was first to exalt the glory of the French
Revolution, to which, Burke claimed, they had looked with 'an eager and passionate
enthusiasm'.'74 In the heat of fervour, the new order of France had been rapturously
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praised as a superior system of liberty,175 while all those evils attending the Revolution
had been studiously palliated and deliberately rationalised. 'When the Jacobins of
France, by their studied, deliberated, catalogued files of murders . . . have shocked
whatever remained of human sensibility in our breasts', Burke wrote, 'then
it was they distinguished the resources of party policy. They did
not venture directly to confront the public sentiment. . . They began
with a reluctant and sorrowful confession: they deplored the stains
which tarnished the lustre of a good cause. After keeping a decent time
of retirement, in a few days crept out an apology for the excesses of
men cruelly irritated by the attacks of unjust power. Grown bolder, as
the first feelings of mankind decayed and the colour of these horrors
began to fade upon the imagination, they proceeded from apology to
defence. They urged, but still deplored, the absolute necessity of such a
proceeding.
-file.
After the aroused sentiment ofABritish public, against the terror of France, had become
somewhat composed in the course of such apology and defence, then, Burke
continued, the British Jacobins 'made a bolder stride, and marched from defence to
recrimination':
They attempted to assassinate the memory of those whose bodies
their friends had massacred, and to consider their murder as a less
formal act of justice. . . . They wept over the lot of those who were
driven by the crimes of aristocrats to republican vengeance. Every pause
of their cruelty they considered as a return of their natural sentiments
of benignity and justice. Then they had recourse to history, and found
out all the recorded cruelties that deform the annals of the world, in
order that the massacres of the regicides might pass for a common
event. ... In order to reconcile us the better to this republican tyranny,
they confounded the bloodshed of war with the murders of peace; and
they computed how much greater prodigality of blood was exhibited in
battles and in the storm of cities, than in the frugal, well-ordered
massacres of the revolutionary tribunals of France.176
Alongside the praise and the justifications of the happenings in France came,
secondly, the wilful vilification of the British constitution which the British Jacobins
had libelled. Burke noted, as 'illegitimate and usurped, or at best as a vain mockery'.177
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The British constitution had been savagely attacked in all its essential parts;178 What
seemed to us to be the best system of liberty that a nation ever enjoyed', Burke
complained, 'to them seems the yoke of an intolerable slavery'.179 Indeed, he lamented,
the British Jacobins seemed so preoccupied with the new system of France that they
had totally forgotten the practices of their ancestors, the fundamental laws of their
country, and the fixed form of a constitution whose merits, Burke contended, had been
confirmed by 'the solid test of long experience, and an increasing public strength and
national prosperity'.180
Inside parliament, the French Revolution had, to Burke's dismay, also found its
sympathisers among the opposition Whig party.181 The Whig supporters of French
principles. Burke had generally denigrated as the 'newmodeld Whiggs' or 'New French
Whiggs',182 though he considered it to be 'irreverent, and half a breach of privilege', to
call them 'Jacobins'.183
The occasion on which Burke first noticed that his own party was infected by
revolution fever was the memorable debate on the Army Estimates of 9 February 1790
when he was surprised by Charles James Fox's support for the French Revolution.184
Since then Burke had been greatly alarmed at discovering that certain 'mischievous'
opinions and principles were gaining ground in the Whig party 'every day, with greater
and greater force'.185 He was particularly appalled that the leaders of the Party had
fallen in with the Revolution, and had taken it upon themselves openly to air the
principles of 'French Levelling and confusion'.186 This distemper in the Whig party had
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become hopelessly 'incurable', Burke noted, for the Party did not even admit that there
was anything dangerous in their enthusiasm for the French Revolution.187
In Burke's opinion, it was highly imprudent that the Whig party should have
declared for the French Revolution, since what had been done in France proved to be
'diametrically opposite to the composition, to the Spirit, to the Temper, to the
Character, and to all the Maxims of our old and unregenerated Party'. The Whig party,
Burke insisted, had always been reputed to be a party of aristocratic bias, whereas the
Revolution was an open war 'against the thing and against the Name'.188 In their zeal
for the Revolution, Burke detected that an 'entire Revolution' was taking place in the
Whig party itself which had thus 'wholly changed its Character, its principles, and the
foundations on which it stood'.189 The Whigs had gone astray; they appeared, Burke
claimed, rather like the 'followers of Pain and Macintosh, and freteau and Bouche than
of their own Whigg ancestors'.190
Burke and the Whig party were divided sharply upon their views concerning the
implications of the Revolution for Britain. To Burke, there was a real danger that
revolution would be imported into Britain, and he had discerned that
considerable number of British subjects, taking a factious interest
in the proceedings of France, begin publicly to incorporate themselves
for the subversion of nothing short of the whole constitution of this
kingdom; to incorporate themselves for the utter overthrow of the body
of its laws, civil and ecclesiastical, and with them of the whole system
of its manners, in favour of the new constitution, and of the modern
usages, of the French nation.191
But he failed to persuade the Whig party to accept this precaution: they, Burke was
heartbroken to find, were not convinced that 'there is any danger of the prevalence of
such doctrines in England, or of their being ever reduced to practice'.192 To the liberal
Whigs, Charles James Fox for instance, the Revolution was not only not an anathema.
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but would be potentially beneficial, to Britain. They had obstinately held, Burke
complained, that 'the danger to this country chiefly consisted in the growth of Tory
principles, and that what happend in France was likely to be useful to us in keeping
alive and invigorating the Spirit of Liberty'.193
Burke quitted the Whig party for ever after he had a painful exchange of opinion
with Fox during the parliamentary debate on the Quebec Act on 6 May 1791.194
Thereafter, he became its bitter critic, and he incessantly attacked the principles and
politics of the Whig party, especially the Foxites. He accused them of embracing the
wild principle of popular sovereignty, and of defiling parliament as no longer being the
true representative of the nation.195 Burke protested that they had always denied the
existence of any Jacobin faction in Britain, and that they had attributed the
supposition of its existence to be the 'evil design' of the government on the liberties
of the people, or the 'forgeries and fictions' which the ministers contrived in order to
fix a pretext for destroying freedom. Instead, they insisted strongly that the danger to
the nation came from the growth of the power of the Crown.196 The Foxites were
taken to task for having supported French doctrines and for having blackened all those
who opposed it as the partisans of despotism. They, Burke pointed out, had
persistently palliated all the evils attending the Revolution as 'matter of accident', and
had condoned them as 'evil of passage' which would at last lead to a permanently
happy state of order and freedom.197 And finally, Burke remonstrated that the Foxites
had viciously disclaimed against all the European powers except Jacobin France: the
'whole college' of the states of Europe were condemned as no better than 'a gang of
tyrants', and their league 'a combination of Despots'. Britain was even urged to quit
that league, to enter into union with Jacobin France.198 All these principles and
political practices, in Burke's eyes, were fundamentally pernicious:
We have certainly thought the tendency of the principal measures
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which Mr Fox has proposed or supported at the present period,
detrimental to the interests of Great Britain, according to the views
entertained by us of those interests, and that they increase in an
eminent degree, the danger with which the independence of Europe, and
the happiness of the whole Civilized World are threatened.199
The Whig party's acceptance of French principles. Burke believed, would have
ominous consequences. First, this party, though a minority in number, was full of
talent and energy. Moreover, since the minority of today might become the majority of
tomorrow, they were possible candidates for office in a future government. Should
that happen, Burke implied, the French doctrines would be put into practice.200
Secondly, the Party was an alliance of the social elite, and had among its members
people 'high in Character' and of 'Great abilities'. Because of their prominent social
positions, their conversion to the French Revolution would inevitably make a most
mischievous impression on the whole society.201 The influence of persons like Fox,
Burke was in no doubt, would certainly be widespread:
Those continual either praises or palliating apologies of everything
done in France . . . coming from a man of Mr. Fox's fame and authority,
and one who is considered as the person to whom a great party of the
wealthiest men of the kingdom look up, have been the cause why the
principle of French fraternity formerly gained the ground which at one
time it had obtained in this country.202
In brief. Burke was convinced, French principles would first make progress in the party,
'and thro' the party, in the Nation'.203
On the whole, Burke admitted that the conversions which the Jacobins had made
in Britain were not numerous. The Jacobin interest, he acknowledged, represented but
a very small minority in British society; and the 'body of the people is untainted in all
Ranks, and it is by far the most sound in the humblest of all'.204 Burke had once
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estimated the numbers of the 'pure Jacobins' as about eighty thousand - that is,
around one fifth of Britain's 400,000 active political citizens. These were real radicals
'utterly incapable of amendment; objects of eternal vigilance; and, when they break
out, of legal constraint. On these, no reason, no argument, no example, no venerable
authority, can have the slightest influence'.205 In spite of their small number, however,
their tempers, talents, activities, and influence ought not to be slighted. On the one
hand, the principles they propagated were capable of extension, and could penetrate
any rank or class, 'from the first Nobility of the Kingdom to the meanest Seaman of
the Fleet'.206 On the other hand, their small number could prove, in Burke's opinion, to
be rather advantageous, because, being small, they could be more easily disciplined
and directed than if their number were greater. And by their spirit of intrigue and their
restless agitating activity. Burke believed, they could form a force 'far superior to their
numbers'. In due course, they could even manage to corrupt those people 'who are
now sound', as well as to convert to their force 'large bodies of the more passive part
of the nation'. In the final analysis. Burke stressed, the British Jacobins were strong
enough to make a mighty call: They desire a change; and they will have it if they
can.'207
The British Jacobins certainly did not celebrate the French Revolution merely for
the sake of it: they had for their object 'the pretended improvement of the British
constitution'.208 Burke was persuaded that their 'Alliance with France, and a change in
this Constitution are things that always go hand in hand'.209 Moreover, considering
their zeal for the new French order, he argued, the change they desired in Britain
would also follow the model of France, for,
After all, if the French be a superior system of liberty, why should
we not adopt it? To what end are our praises? Is excellence held out to
us only that we should not copy after it? And what is there in the
manners of the people, or in the climate of France, which renders that
species of republic fitted for them, and unsuitable to us?210
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That would mean a total and complete revolution. Indeed, as the British Jacobins, in
his view, had nursed the same tempers as that of the French Jacobins and had
founded their plan on the principles of the French Revolution, their revolution, Burke
insisted, would predictably also 'be pursued in the same manner and all its
proceedings will be executed by the same necessities.'2"
Burke's reaction to the activities of the British radicals had always been hysterical.
His oratory had built up an atmosphere which gave a sense of pressing urgency as if
a revolution in Britain were imminent. Nonetheless, his predicted revolution in Britain
had never come to pass. Here, a question may be raised about the extent to which
Burke thought that there was a genuine threat of revolution in Britain. There can,
however, be no doubt that he had always felt, and continued to believe, that there
was some danger somewhere:
In my opinion, as long as the desperate System which prevails in
France can maintain itself, we shall always find some eruption or other
here. The Fire is constantly at work. It sometimes blazes out. - It is
sometimes smothered, or rather coverd, by the Ashes - but there it is -
and there it will be.212
But there is no direct evidence to suggest that Burke's warning was anything but a
wise and timely precaution. In fact, he had once admitted: 'I dont much fear from the
faction here who correspond with those who resemble them on the other side of the
Water.'213 In his Reflections he had also recognised that 'the beginnings of confusion
with us in England are at present feeble enough'. To Burke, however, the remoteness
of the danger at home, at least for the moment, afforded no good reason for
relaxation. What had happened in France had indeed taught a good lesson; for with
France, Burke reviewed,
we have seen an infancy, still more feeble, growing by moments
into a strength to heap mountains upon mountains, and to wage war
with heaven itself. Whenever our neighbour's house is on fire, it cannot
be amiss for the engines to play a little on our own.
He thought that it would be 'Better to be despised for too anxious apprehensions, than
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ruined by too confident a security'.214 Burke had taken a long-term view concerning
the threat of revolution in Britain. It might be true that there was no danger of
convulsion at present; but, he warned, 'our danger must be from our not looking
beyond the moment'.215
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CHAPTER 2
JACOBINISM AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION
The origins of the French Revolution have always perplexed the understanding of
historians.1 To Burke, its contemporary observer, the Revolution at first sight looked
'paradoxical and Mysterious'.2 What puzzled him most, however, was the effortless
passing of the ancien regime: The absolute monarchy was at an end,' he mourned. 'It
breathed its last, without a groan, without struggle, without convulsion.'3 Perhaps few
people had expected the sudden fall of the French monarchy; that government, in
Burke's eyes, had been attacked by surprise':
The time of surprise is over. France continues under its first
stupefaction and the Terrour of its first surprise: for by surprise that
great Kingdom was taken, as if it were a little Fort garrisond by
Invalids.4
And he was stunned at the 'facility with which government has been overturned in
France':5 the revolutionaries had met in their process with little opposition, and their
whole march, Burke pointed out, looked more like a triumphant procession than the
progress of a strenuous struggle.6 That a once most powerful monarchy should have
collapsed so easily was unfathomable, and the more so if the situation of France on
the eve of her catastrophe was taken into account.
The state of the old order in France in Burke's opinion had by no means presaged
the storm of a fatal revolution. The fall of the French monarchy was not preceded by
exterior symptoms of decline; on the contrary, shortly before this fiasco, there had
been a kind of 'exterior splendour" in the Crown, which Burke believed had usually
contributed to consolidate the strength and authority of government at home. Fie
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claimed that the national power of France, generally speaking, had been ever on the
increase and it was continuing 'not only powerful but formidable' right up to the
moment of the Revolution. The monarchy had succeeded in achieving some of the
most splendid objects of the nation's ambition; for some time, no country on the
continent was her serious rival and even Britain had been once humbled. The prestige
■fllg -t
which the French monarchy had acquired in s international arena was high.
Domestically, the kingdom approached the state of prosperity and improvement. On
the one hand, Burke pointed out, the population of France had grown substantially: it
was estimated to have, in the last sixty years, increased from 22 millions to around 30
millions. On the other hand, the economy of France was thriving. The wealth which
she had amassed, though unable perhaps to compete with the riches of Britain, could
still constitute a 'very respectable degree of opulence'.8
Indeed, Burke held that the French monarchy was fundamentally excellent; it was a
government which had brought France 'grown, in extent, compactness, population, and
Riches to a greatness even formidable', and which had 'discoverd the Vigour of its
principle, even in the many Vices and Errours, both of its own and its peoples, which
were not of force enough to hinder it from producing those Effects'.3 The scene of the
kingdom before the Revolution looked spectacular: the opulent and populous cities;
the magnificent high roads and bridges; the extensive canals and navigations; the
stupendous ports, harbours and naval apparatus; the masterfully constructed and
prodigiously maintained fortifications; the wholly cultivated land; the excellent
manufactures and fabrics; the grand foundations of charity; her arts; her brave
soldiers, her able statesmen, and the multitude of her lawyers, theologians,
philosophers, critics, historians, antiquarians, poets and orators. This view of things,
Burke claimed, had revealed 'something which awes and commands the imagination,
which checks the mind on the brink of precipitate and indiscriminate censure'.10
Notwithstanding, in this acme of prosperity and greatness the monarchy had fallen-
to the ground 'without a struggle', and it fell, Burke emphasised, 'without any of those
vices in the monarch, which have sometimes been the causes of the fall of
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kingdoms'." What then had happened? If the ancien regime had been so eminent, why
this sudden fall?
It has been widely held that Burke explained the downfall of the French monarchy
simply in terms of a 'plot' or 'conspiracy' theory.'2 This is a judgment which has done
much injustice to Burke, for, because of this, his interpretation of the French
Revolution has seldom been taken seriously. Alfred Cobban, for instance, had
commented that
In so far as the Reflections deals with the causes of the Revolution
then, they are not merely inadequate, but misleading ... As literature, a
political theory, as anything but history, his Reflections are magnificent.
As a study of the causes of the Revolution they amount to little more
than an elaboration of the 'plot' theory favoured by the emigres.'3
He was surprised at the 'superficial manner" with which Burke had accounted for 'such
a vast upheaval as the French Revolution'.14 The reason for this was attributed to
Burke's ignorance of the political, social and economic situations of pre-revolutionary
France; the 'conspiracy' theory, wrote Cobban, had been 'the common reaction to any
great social or political catastrophe that one does not understand'.'5
This, however, is not itself a fair reading resulting from careful or sympathetic
study. Recent studies have effectively confuted this conclusion. On the one hand, it
has been suggested that though undoubtedly biased against the Revolution, Burke was
by no means ignorant of his subject16; on the other hand, and more important, it has
also been pointed out that Burke's views on the origins of the Revolution were as a
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matter of fact more complicated than merely a 'conspiracy' theory.17 But the new
revision, it must be acknowledged, has not entirely rejected the claim that a
'conspiracy' theory did exist in Burke's writings. Yet, what Burke really meant by it,
has, it seems, usually been neglected.
On various occasions Burke did insinuate that some sort of dark design had been
at work behind the Revolution. He once argued that in the Revolution 'nothing has
been done that has not been contrived from the beginning, even before the states had
assembled'.18 In another place, he asserted: 'All has been the result of design; all has
been matter of institution.'19 And later in his life, in a letter to the French priest,
Augustin Barruel, in which he commended the latter's Memoirs of Jacobinism (1797),
Burke was more articulate:
I can undertake to say from my certain knowledge, that so far back
as the year 1773 they were busy in the Plot you have so well described
and in the manner and on the Principle which you have so truly
presented.20
Thus, not only had a 'plot' existed, but it had been long planned. The important thing
here however is to understand what the nature of this long-contrived plot was. The
volume of Barruel's Memoirs which impressed Burke is a work devoted to exposing
the 'anti-Christian conspiracy' of the Jacobins, which the author has defined as the
'Philosophers conspired against the God of the Gospel', or, 'the conspiracy of the
Sophisters of Impiety'.21 This is obviously that kind of dark design which Burke had
referred to in his own Reflections on the Revolution in France.
The literary cabal had some years ago formed something like a
regular plan for the destruction of the Christian religion. This object they
pursued with a degree of zeal . . . What was not to be done towards
17
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their great end by any direct or immediate act, might be wrought by a
longer process through the medium of opinion.22
The notorious 'conspiracy' theory for which Burke was discredited was therefore not
in fact a common plot; it seems to imply something of an intellectual movement for it
was associated with a 'literary cabal', with the attack on the 'Christian religion', and
with the 'medium of opinion'. In reality, it may not be unreasonable to infer that what
the 'conspiracy' theory in Burke's language amounts to is, in academic terms, an
intellectual or ideological revolution.
'What has happened in France teaches us, with many other things, that there are
more causes than have commonly been taken into our consideration, by which
government may be subverted.'23 To Burke, the fall of the ancien regime in France was
unusual. It was not simply occasioned by political grievances: the French had not
destroyed their monarchy 'from any dread of arbitrary power that lay heavily on the
minds of the people'. Their case, he wrote, was 'wholly foreign to the question of
monarchy or aristocracy'.24 Indeed, the ancien regime of France, in Burke's opinion,
was 'what was next to freedom, a mild paternal monarchy'.25 Though an unqualified or
ill qualified government, it had been long mitigated by religion, laws, manners, and
opinions, so as to become a 'despotism rather in appearance than in reality'.26 Nor
could the Revolution be, as it has so often been in later scholarship, imputed to social
or economic stress, for Burke was convinced that the condition of the country, as
indicated above, was basically sound. Even the notorious financial difficulties, which
have so often been blamed for the disaster, were, to Burke, 'only pretexts and
instruments of those who accomplished the ruin of that monarchy'. They were not the
causes of it,' he insisted.27 A fuller and profounder explanation, therefore, must be
looked for somewhere else.
An ancient edifice such as the French monarchy, it can be readily asserted, could
not have collapsed suddenly without some profound reasons; and part of the
22
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explanation, in Burke's opinion, could be traced to the defect which existed inside the
socio-political structure of the ancien regime. According to Burke's enquiry, the
monarchy of France, in spite of its apparent prosperity, had in reality stood in want of
sound support: 'Its chief supports, the Nobility and the Clergy, are extinguished.'28 And
this outcome, he believed, had resulted from the jealousies and conflicts that had long
existed between the French crown and its aristocracy. Kings were always suspicious
of the higher orders of their subjects, since, Burke explained,
It is from them that they generally experience opposition to their
will. It is with their pride and impracticability, that princes are most hurt;
it is with their servility and baseness, that they are most commonly
disgusted; it is from their humours and cabals, that they find their
affairs most frequently troubled and distracted.
The king of France, being absolute monarch, had ever nursed 'a strong dislike to his
nobility, his clergy, and the corps of his magistracy', regarding them as all intractable.
To sustain his clear and permanent authority, it became his long-standing policy to
weaken his aristocracy.29 The nobility of France had been deliberately obstructed from
cultivating provincial interests and were, as a result, rendered alienated and powerless.
They had enjoyed. Burke pointed out, no manner of power in cities and very little in
the country; the civil government, the police, and the administration of revenue, were
mostly not under their control.30 Aristocracy, however, was the cornerstone of
monarchy; when therefore the king of France weakened his aristocratic orders, he had
virtually 'pulled down the pillars which upheld his throne'. Referring to Louis XVI's
clash with his nobility previous to the Revolution, Burke thus wrote: This unfortunate
king. . . was deluded to his ruin by a desire to humble and reduce his nobility, clergy,
and his corporate magistracy.'3' And he further remarked:
To strengthen itself the Monarchy had weakend every other force:
To unite the Nation to itself, it had dissolved all other ties. When the
chain, which held the people to the Prince was once broken, the whole
frame of the commonwealth was found in a State of disconnection.
There was neither force nor union any where to sustain, the Monarchy,
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or the Nobility, or the Church.32
This was, in his mind, one potential cause which could help to explain the speedy
dissolution of the ancien regime in France.
Burke's approach to the French Revolution, however, was principally cultural. Fie
had acutely detected a profound moral dimension behind this apparent political
change: the Revolution in France was, he declared, a 'complete revolution' which
seemed to have 'extended even to the constitution of the mind of man'.33 Everything
in it, he added, supposed 'a total revolution in all the principles of reason, prudence,
and moral feeling'.34 This concept of an essential 'moral' revolution is a key category
of analysis in Burke's account of the French Revolution.
The revolutionary movement had not emerged in France overnight, though the fall
of its monarchy was a surprise. Long before the outburst of 1789, Burke observed,
profound changes had already been taking place quietly in French society: 'A silent
revolution in the moral world preceded the political, and prepared it.'35 Paradoxically,
this moral revolution had happened in the affluence, rather than the distress, of
pre-revolutionary society; its course thus ran:
In the long series of ages which have furnished the matter of
history, never was so beautiful and so august a spectacle presented to
the moral eye, as Europe afforded the day before the Revolution in
France. I know indeed that this prosperity contained in itself the seeds
of its own danger. In one part of the society it causedlaxity and debility;
in the other it produced bold spirits and dark designs. A false
philosophy passed from academies into courts; and the great
themselves were infected with theories which conducted to their ruin.
Knowledge, which in the two last centuries either did not exist at all, or
existed solidly on right principles and in chosen hands, was now
diffused, weakened, and perverted. General wealth loosened morals,
relaxed vigilance, and increased presumption.
It turned out to be an intellectual movement revitalised as a result of the relaxation of
moral discipline which was itself effected by the opulence of French society. In this
32 Corr, vi, 242, To the Chevalier de la Bintinaye - (March 1791)'.
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intellectual movement, Burke noticed, religion had borne the first brunt: 'Religion, that
held the materials of the fabric together, was first systematically loosened. All other
opinions, under the name of prejudices, must fall along with it.'36 Here can be
discerned the relevance of Burke's 'conspiracy' theory.
The political consequence which this moral and intellectual revolution had brought
about was vital. In Burke's view, a system of traditional values was indispensable for
the maintenance of political order. He held that the 'Empire of Opinion' was the
'cementing principle in the Fabrick of Government',37 and he pointed out that
'prejudices' had been the surest support of government and the firmest dykes and
barriers' in favour of kings.38 And religion, he added, had contributed a good deal in
giving conscience 'coactive or coercive force in the most material of all the social
ties, the principle of our obligations to government'.39 If these values were attacked,
political authority would be endangered by being left naked without proper protection.
In the final analysis, it seems that the unusual fall of the French ancien regime, in
Burke's mind, ought to be grasped in this context. After all, Burke had asserted, a body
politic had its deep cultural foundations, based on humanity, manners, morals, and
religion; the constitution, he emphasised, 'is made by those things, and for those
things: without them it cannot exist; and without them it is no matter whether it
exists or not'.40
Burke regarded the revolution in 'sentiments, manners, and moral opinions' as the
most important of all revolutions.4' Indeed, a profound cultural revolution had, in his
opinion, underlain the whole course of the French Revolution. He had discovered that
a moral revolution had not only paved the way for the political changes, but was
continued as a policy of the Revolution in order to restructure the moral constitution
of the French people. Its goal was twofold. On the one hand, it was intended that by
means of a moral revolution those old values could be wiped out which had attached
the French people to the old order:
36
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They have made the priests and people formally abjure the
Divinity; they have estranged them from every civil, moral, and social, or
even natural and instinctive, sentiment, habit, and practice, and have
rendered them systematically savages, to make it impossible for them to
be the instruments of any sober and virtuous arrangement, or to be
reconciled to any state of order, under any name whatsoever.42
On the other hand, new moral principles would at the same time be inculcated so that
the French people could be accommodated to the new regime. To the leaders of the
Revolution, Burke remarked, the great problem
is to find a substitute for all the principles which hitherto have
been employed to regulate the human will and action. They find
dispositions in the mind of such force and quality as may fit men, far
better than the old morality, for the purposes of such a state as theirs,
and may go much further in supporting their power, and destroying
their enemies.43
Moreover, they had attempted to temper and harden the breast of the people,'in order
to prepare them for the desperate strokes in extreme situations.44 As a consequence,
the people of France, Burke protested, were filled with a black and savage atrocity of
mind, losing all their 'common feelings of nature, as well as all sentiments of morality
and religion'.45
Several measures had been taken to carry out this work of moral renovation. First
of all. Burke pointed out, a new scheme of moral education was planned for the
instruction of the rising generation; for this, books by authors of 'mixed or ambiguous
morality', or by writers of 'deranged understanding', were recommended for study. It
was intended that by means of this scheme young minds would imbibe the 'ethics of
vanity' taught by Rousseau. Everything which advanced the evil dispositions of pride,
petulance and self-conceit. Burke complained, had been deliberately cultivated:
True humility, the basis of the Christian system, is the low, but
deep and firm, foundation of all real virtue. But this, as very painful in
the practice, and little imposing in the appearance, they have totally
discarded. Their object is to merge all natural and all social sentiment
42
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In Burke's eyes, vanity was the worst of vices, and the 'occasional mimic of them all':
'It makes the whole man false. It leaves nothing sincere or trustworthy about him. His
best qualities are poisoned and perverted by it.'46 And it, Burke contended, had totally
changed the national character of Frenchmen.47
Secondly, efforts had been made to transform the social manners of the French
society. The Revolution had witnessed the passing of those ancient manners which
encouraged the 'Chivalrous Spirit which dictated a veneration for Women of condition
and of Beauty, without any consideration whatsoever of enjoying them'.48 In its place,
new manners were introduced, which, Burke noted, taught a love without gallantry, a
love without that 'fine flower of youthfulness and gentility'. Those passions which
usually had been allied to grace and manner had been discarded in favour of an
indelicate medley of pedantry and lewdness, of 'metaphysical speculations blended
with the coarsest sensuality'.49 Further, the state had even made it its policy to
increase every means of seduction in order to corrupt young minds through pleasure.
'Every idea of corporal gratification is carried to the highest excess, and wooed with
all the elegance that belongs to the senses. All elegance of mind and manners is
banished.'50 To the revolutionaries, Burke claimed, all refinements had an aristocratic
character, and therefore had to be destroyed.5'
Thirdly, the revolutionaries had sought to replace traditional social relations with
the new ethics of the Revolution. Burke pointed out that the leaders of the Revolution
had condemned the traditional relations between parents and their children, which he
held to be the 'first amongst the elements of vulgar, natural morality'. This natural
relationship was deprecated by the revolutionaries
as contrary to liberty; as not founded in the social compact; and
not binding according to the rights of men; because the relation is not,
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of course, the result of free-election, never so on the side of the
children, not always on the part of the parents.52
Marriage, being the origin of all relations and the first element of all duties, used to
be made sacred and honourable through religious confirmation. The Constituent
Assembly, instead, had instituted civil registration of marriage, treating it as no more
than a common 'civil contract'. In the same spirit, divorce was declared lawful, to be
granted loosely at the mere pleasure of either party, and at a month's notice. Such
measures tended to desecrate the matrimonial connection: 'With the Jacobins of
France', he wrote, 'vague intercourse is without reproach; marriage is reduced to the
vilest concubinage.' Ultimately, he feared that all these attempts to destroy old familial
relationships would result in the utter corruption of all morals and the total
disconnection of social life.53
Finally, a regular church of 'avowed atheism' was seen to have been instituted, at
the public charge, in every part of the country, in the hope that these novel values
and eccentric manners could be provided with a suitable religious justification. In
Burke's opinion, however, after every effort had been made to prepare the body to
debauch and the mind to crime, this new atheistic religion was to prevent the French
people from seeking any amendment or from having any remorse.54 To Burke, atheism
was a foul and unnatural vice and would be certain to corrupt 'all the dignity and
consolation of mankind'.55 And with atheism established as its religious basis, the
whole work of moral reorientation would be complete.
There was nevertheless an alarming aspect in this radical cultural policy. It was
true that this moral venture had indeed served to sap the moral bases of the old
order; but at the same time, Burke indicated, it had also vitiated unwittingly all
intrinsic moral values, social manners and religious opinions, leaving France without
sound values for a rational government:
All other nations have begun the fabric of a new government, or
the reformation of an old, by establishing originally or by enforcing with
greater exactness, some rites or other of religion. All other people have
52
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laid the foundations of civil freedom in severer manners, and a system
of a more austere and masculine morality. France, when she let loose
the reins of regal authority, doubled the licence of a ferocious
dissoluteness in manners, and of an insolent irreligion in opinions and
practices; and has extended through all ranks of life. . . all the unhappy
corruptions that usually were the disease of wealth and power.56
Wise legislators, Burke insisted, had always sought to improve instincts into morals,
and to graft virtues on the stocks of the natural affections; in contrast, the leaders of
the French Revolution had omitted no pains to 'eradicate every benevolent and noble
propensity in the mind of men'.57 They had 'slain the mind' in their country, stamping
out all the conscious dignity, all the noble pride and all the generous sense of glory
and emulation among the French people.58
At last. Burke came to the conclusion that the new order of France was in reality
founded upon 'moral paradoxes' which tended to distort the whole drift of its
proclaimed principles: Their liberty is not liberal. Their science is presumptuous
ignorance. Their humanity is savage and brutal.' In that system, he continued,
Humanity and compassion are ridiculed as the fruits of superstition
and ignorance. Tenderness to individuals is considered as treason toflie
public. Liberty is always to be estimated perfect as property is rendered
insecure.59
It was, in short, a system of 'wickedness and vice', and was, Burke insisted, in itself 'at
war with all orderly and moral society'.60
ii
It has been pointed out above that Burke regarded the revitalised intellectual
movement as the driving force behind the French Revolution. Indeed, he had more
than once called, in a vein satiric, the French Revolution a 'philosophic revolution'.61 'It
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id, he claimed, 'a revolution of doctrine and theoretic dogmas!62 And the doctrine, or
to couch it in modern language, the ideology, which played a major role in this
Revolution was generally referred to as 'Jacobinism'.
What, then, is Jacobinism? 'It is an attempt', Burke explained when discussing its
leading principles,
to eradicate prejudice out of the minds of men, for the purpose of
putting all power and authority into^ands of the persons capable of
occasionally enlightening the minds of the people. For this purpose the
Jacobins have resolved to destroy the whole frame and fabrick of the
old Societies of the world, and to regenerate them after their fashion:
To obtain an army for this purpose, they every where engage the poor
by holding out to them as a bribe, the spoils of the Rich. . . As the
grand prejudice, and that which holds all the other prejudices together,
the first, last, and middle Object of their Hostility, is Religion.63
According to Burke, therefore, the nature of Jacobinism was to root out ancient
values; but to accomplish this, the Jacobins had managed to undermine those
institutions which had usually embodied these values: they included, as Burke pointed
out to Sir Hercules Langrishe, the religion, the property, and lastly, the old traditional
constitution.64 These themes constituted the main subjects in Burke's interpretation of
the French Revolution.
The foremost feature of Jacobinism, and indeed of the French Revolution, was its
persistent war against religion. 'Look at all the proceedings of the National Assembly,'
Burke wrote in 1793, 'and you will find full half of their business to be directly on this
subject.' This anti-clerical bias, he claimed, formed the spirit of the whole revolution
politics:
It includes in its object undoubtedly every other interest of society
as well as this; but this is the principal and leading feature. It is through
this destruction of religion that our enemies propose the
accomplishment of all their views.65
62
'Thoughts on French Affairs', Burke's Works, iii, 350.
63 Corr, viii, 129-30. To William Smith - 29 Jan. 1795'.
64 Corr, x, 33-4. To Sir Hercules Langrishe - 26 May 1795'
65 'Remarks on the Policy of the Allies', Burke's Works iii, 442-3.
64
The Jacobins had avowed it as their great object to break up the church.66 It was
attempted totally to 'get rid of the clergy, and indeed of any form of religion'.67
Burke noticed that the French Jacobins had developed a secular view of civil
society, which held that a state could subsist 'without any religion better than with
one'.66 Naturally, they became enemies to religion;69 and their religious war, Burke
stressed, came to be not a controversy between different sects as formerly, but a war
against all sects.70 It had been waged not in favour of any 'better mode of professing
the Gospel':
We know that it is the whole Christian religion which these
Blasphemous persecutors treat with every mark their malice can devise
of indignity and contempt in all their publick discourses orders and
proceedings. They shew as little reverence or rather less for the
Scripture as for the Massbook.71
In Burke's opinion. Jacobinism carried both the sentiments of intolerance and of
indifference. It declared not against a variety in conscience, but against all conscience;
under that system, he insisted, people would be driven from their religion without
being provided with another in which 'men might take refuge and expect
consolation'.72
The most notorious measure the Revolution had taken against religion was the
confiscation of church property. It had been enforced on the pretext'of safeguarding
the financial credibility of the old government; that is, for keeping the king's
engagements with the public creditor. To justify this act, it was argued
that ecclesiastics are fictitious persons, creatures of the state,
whom at pleasure they may destroy, and of course limit and modify in
every particular; that the goods they possess are not properly theirs, but
belong to the state which created the fiction.
66 Corr, vi, 103. 'To John Noble - 14 March 1790'.
67
'Thoughts on French Affairs', Burke's Works, iii, 371.
68 'Reflections on the Revolution in France', Burke's Works, ii, 419.
69 Corr, viii, 248. 'To the Rev. Thomas Hussey - 18 May 1795'.
70 'Remarks on the Policy of the Allies', Burke's Works iii, 443.
71 Corr, vii, 220. 'To Walker King - (ante 20 Sept. 1792)'.
72 'An Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs', Burke's Works iii, 9
65
This justification, however, had run counter to Burke's idea of the nature of church
property, which he declared to be a legal possession because it was held 'under law,
usage, the decisions of courts, and the accumulated prescription of a thousand years'.
Burke contended that church property ought not to be pledged arbitrarily as public
estate, which, he pointed out, could only be derived from a fair imposition upon all
citizens. Furthermore, it was also against natural and legal equity to force the clergy
to answer a public debt in which they 'neither were lenders nor borrowers,
mortgagers nor mortgagees'.73
Burke was convinced that the seizure of church property had in fact been
prompted rather by the essentially anti-clerical spirit of the Revolution than by the
financial difficulties of the state. '[W]as the state of France so wretched and undone,
that no other resource but rapine remained to preserve its existence? He claimed that
an examination of its financial situation could by no means warrant this necessity.
According to the former French minister, M. Necker, the late financial crisis of France
could in reality have been solved by some measures of 'savings and improvements of
revenues', and by a plan of 'very moderate and proportioned assessment on the
citizens without distinction'. Even supposing that the situation might have necessitated
the seizure, still, Burke continued, a deficit of 2,200,000 pounds sterling would not
have justified a confiscation of 'five millions'. To force the Church to bear the whole
burden would have been partial, oppressive, and unjust, but it would not have totally
ruined the order of clergy. Their openly declared reason for the confiscation therefore
was suspect: There was no desire,' Burke believed, 'that the church should be brought
to serve the state. The service of the state was made a pretext to destroy the
church.'74
Indeed, according to Burke, the whole religious policy of the Revolution had been
deliberately contrived in order to discredit the church and thus to prepare for its utter
destruction. The proposal to reorganize the Gallican Church in terms of the newly
legislated Civil Constitution of the Clergy, the spirit of which was to bring the Church
back to the primitive condition of Christianity, was, in Burke's opinion, a wilful attempt
to sink the clergy into a miserable state of poverty and persecution.75 In particular, he
claimed, the plan to salary all the clerics as the paid officials of the state had
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impoverished virtually all the higher clergy who had been maintained before by their
own landed property. It had driven the clergy from independence to live on alms,
bringing them down from the highest situation in the country to a 'state of indigence,
depression, and contempt'.76 A long-standing consequence of such a policy to
impoverish the clergy would be the vulgarization of the Church. Once the church was
turned into a 'degrading pensionary establishment', Burke's argument ran, men of
liberal ideas and liberal condition would be reluctant to destine their children for a
career in the Church, which would, as a result, be serviced by the lowest classes of
the people. And he added: 'as you have left no middle classes of clergy at their ease,
in future nothing of science or erudition can exist in the Gallican church.'77
The plan to render the clergy elective was no less destructive. All kinds of
elections in Burke's view tended to be corrupting; and in a large organization like the
Gallican Church, where it would be impossible for the ruling minds to put the whole in
order, its introduction could only be pestiferous.78 If elections were admitted in the
church, all clerical offices would have to be filled through electioneering acts, which.
Burke believed, must necessarily turn out of the clerical profession 'all men of
sobriety; all who can pretend to independence in their function or their conduct', thus
putting all the holy work into the hands of those 'licentious, bold, crafty factious,
flattering wretches' whose low conditions had tempted them to intrigue for the
'contemptible pensions' of the church.79 Should this be the case, then it would not be
long before the church was debased utterly. Therefore,' Burke concluded: They who
would destroy it in our time acted wisely when they proposed to make the Bishops
elective. The Christian religion did not in France survive this arrangement for a year.'80
It could be asserted that the Jacobins had instituted a new constitutional church.
The substance of this new religious establishment, however, appeared dubious. Burke
had noticed that within this church no care had been taken about the qualifications of
its clergy, relative either to doctrine or to morals. The priests of the constitutional
church, he complained, had been allowed to preach at their discretion any mode of
76
'Reflections on the Revolution in France', Burke's Works, ii, 377.
77 Ibid, 418.
78 Corr. viii, 204-5. 'To the Rev. Thomas Hussey - 17 March 1795'.
79 'Reflections on the Revolution in France', Burke's Works, ii, 418-9.
80 Corr, viii, 204. 'To the Rev. Thomas Hussey - 17 March 1795'.
67
religion or irreligion that they would please.81 Moreover, people had been made
bishops for no other merits than
having acted as instruments of atheists; for no other merits than
having thrown the children's bread to dogs; and in order to gorge the
whole gang of usurers, pedlars, and itinerant Jew-discounters at the
corners of streets, starved the poor of their Christian flocks, and their own
brother pastors.82
The constitutional clergy, in Burke's eyes, seemed to act not as the ministers of any
religion, but as the agents and instruments of the Jacobin conspiracy against all
morals. Ultimately, he was persuaded that this new constitutional church had indeed
been founded for nothing but a mere temporary amusement to the people before it
should be able to 'cast off the very appearance of all religion whatsoever'.83 It had
been intended, he insisted,
to be temporary, and preparatory to the utter abolition, under any
of its forms, of the Christian religion, whenever the minds of men are
prepared for this last stroke against it, by the accomplishment of the
plan for bringing its ministers into universal contempt.
And this, Burke claimed, had been the long entertained design of the French
Jacobins.84
The assault on property was the second major feature of the Jacobin politics.
'Jacobinism,' wrote Burke, 'is the revolt of the enterprising talents of a country against
its property.'85 He observed that the National Assembly, in order to shatter the
foundation of property, had openly denounced the doctrine of 'prescription'. With
them, he complained, 'possession is nothing, law and usage are nothing'.86 For the
Jacobins, an 'immemorial possession' amounted to no more than a 'long-continued,
and therefore an aggravated injustice'; they accordingly regarded prescription not as 'a
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title to bar all claim, set up against all possession', but as itself 'a bar against the
possessor and proprietor'.87 However, Burke argued, property could never be secure
without the rule of prescription, which in his view was the very 'rule and maxim which
can give it stability'.88 And he insisted that property, when left undefended by such
principles, would become but a repository of spoils to tempt cupidity, not a magazine
to furnish arms for defence:89 'It is a vain conceit,' he believed, 'that property can
stand against it, alone and unsupported, under any general popular discontent. Part of
the property will be debauched; a part frightend; the rest subdued.'90
From this perspective, the seizure of the church's possessions assumed a specific
implication: it symbolised the violation of property. Burke was of the opinion that, in
confiscating the possessions of the church, the National Assembly had instantly 'laid
the axe to the root of all property, and consequently of all national prosperity, by the
principles they established, and the example they set'91 According to Burke, all
property held under the laws ought to be equally respected without regard to the
description of the persons who held it; therefore, the despoiling a minister of religion
was no less a defiance of the principle of property than the pillage of other men had
been.92 In other words, the danger implied in the seizure of church land lay in the
principle of injustice it had established, rather than in the description of persons
robbed.93
Burke discerned that a general crisis of property had been implied in the attack on
church land, which he believed could not be dispersed without 'leaving the Monarchy
and aristocracy nothing upon which they cart stand'.94 Its reason was clear: once the
confiscation had become a standing policy, no property could be guaranteed. 'I see
the confiscators begin with bishops, and chapters, and monasteries; but I do not see
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them end there.'95 And he beheld:
The spoil of the Royal Domaine soon followd the seizure of the
Estates of the Church. The appenages of the Kings Brothers immediately
came on the heels of the usurpation of the Royal Domaine; The property
of the Nobility survived but a short time the appenages of the Princes
of the Blood Royal. At length the monied and the moveable property
tumbled on the ruin of the immoveable property.
All kinds of properties in France had fallen like dominoes, without the smallest degree
of safety.96 The Revolution had started as a revolt against landed property, but ended
ironically with the ultimate subversion of the monied interest, whose actions, Burke
pointed out, had been of absolute necessity at the beginning of this Revolution.97 As a
matter of fact, he noted, even the plunderers themselves in the end were to have their
own fingers burned. When the disposition to pillage prevailed, those who had just
robbed others would themselves be vulnerable to still newer waves of robbers. It was
from the apprehensions of this threat, he believed, that the new regime was forced to
declare itself in favour of property, promising to 'secure all their brother plunderers in
their share of the common plunder':
The fear of being robbed by every new succession of robbers, who
do not keep even the faith of that kind of society, absolutely required
that they should give security to the dividends of spoil; else they could
not exist a moment.
It was paradoxical, however. This newly pledged security of property, Burke made it
clear, would become in reality a 'seal put upon its destruction', for it was to secure,
he asserted, the confiscators against those innocent former proprietors.98
The attack on property also had its social connotations. If the French Revolution,
as Burke insisted, had been a struggle mainly against the owners of 'landed
property',99 it would inevitably mean a war on the aristocratic classes of nobility and
gentry, for the possession of land was particularly associated with them under the old
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order. Burke was convinced that the Jacobins had taken it as their great object to
destroy the gentry of France: it was the 'condition of a Gentleman', he claimed, which
was under attack. For this, they had shattered 'all the effect of those relations which
may render considerable men powerful, or even safe'.100
Moreover, it appeared that a potential class conflict was being incited. Burke
pointed out that the Jacobins had appealed to the weak and indigent part of society
against their superiors. Discord had been sown among different social interests and
the lowest description of the people had been stirred up to pillage the more eminent
orders and classes of the community.101 The Jacobins were accused of having bought
the lower class to form a body of 'Janizaries' to 'over-rule and awe property':102 they
had, wrote Burke, secured to themselves a force by dividing among the people of no
property the estates of the ancient and lawful proprietors.103 The French Revolution in
his view was the first time in history that the frame and order of a well-constructed
state had been overturned by corrupting the common people with the spoil of the
superior classes.104
It is significant that, though the Jacobins had brought down the French monarchy,
their aim, in Burke's opinion, had not chiefly been to destroy absolute monarchy, but
fundamentally to smash the aristocracy, the pillar of the old order. Their main concern,
he argued, had been 'totally to root out that thing called an Aristocrate or Nobleman
and Gentleman':105
It is against them, as a part of an Aristocracy, that the nefarious
principles of that groveling Rebellion and Tyranny, strike, and not at
Monarchy, further than as it is supposed to be built upon an
Aristocratick Basis.106
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The Jacobins were extremely hostile to the aristocracy; and because of this animosity,
they crushed 'everything respectable and virtuous in their nation', disgracing 'almost
every name, by which we formerly knew there was such a country in the world as
France'.'07 Indeed, the French Revolution had witnessed the entire destruction of 'all
the Gentlemen of a great Country, the utter ruin of their property, and the servitude of
their persons'.108
The French Revolution, in short, was essentially against property. It had ushered
in, Burke held, a new order in which the property had nothing to do with the
government.109 He commented that 'the political and civil power of France is wholly
separated from its property of every descriptiorl: neither the landed interest nor the
monied interest had been allowed the smallest weight or consideration in the
direction of any public concern.110
The last important aspect of Jacobinism to be considered was its relentless attack
on the ancient constitution. It had endeavoured, Burke remarked, to set aside all the
ancient corporate capacities and distinctions of France and to subvert the whole fabric
of its ancient laws and usages.111 The Jacobins, he pointed out, had always made it
their business, and often their public profession, to demolish all traces of ancient
establishment; for this, every 'hereditary name and office' had been abolished, all
'conditions of men' had been levelled, the 'connexion between territory and dignity'
had been broken, and every 'species of nobility, gentry, and church establishments'
had been eliminated.112
To Burke, the Jacobins were self-assertive anti-traditionalists. They have no
respect for the wisdom of others; but they pay it off by a very full measure of
confidence in their own.' With these people, he complained,
it is a sufficient motive to destroy an old scheme of things,
because it is an old one. As to the new, they are in no sort of fear with
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regard to the duration of a building run up in haste; because duration is
no object to those who think little or nothing has been done before
their time, and who place all their hopes in discovery.1,3
When historical experience was thrown away in favour of the temporary and voluntary
will of their own, it was natural that they would treat in an easy manner the arduous
work of setting up a constitution for a great kingdom, which in Burke's opinion had
been the most difficult of all subjects. It was thought that a constitution could be
made by 'any adventurers in speculation in a small given time, and for any country',
and that what had been brought to perfection 'for six or seven centuries' could by
them be achieved 'in six or seven days, at the leisure hours'. But, Burke argued, baleful
consequences would ensue from thus treating the constitution lightly: it must, he
believed, conduce to loosen all the ties, which, whether of reason or prejudice, had
attached mankind to their old, habitual, domestic government.114 All establishments in
the eyes of the Jacobins tended to be mischievous, because they entailed 'perpetuity'.
They treated governments like 'modes of dress' which could be changed at will
without any reference to the 'principle of attachment, except a sense of present
conveniency, to any constitution of the state'.115
The ancient polity of France, according to Burke, was an historical entity which had
developed over a long period through various accidents at different times, and the ebb
and flow of various property and jurisdiction.116 'It grew out of the habitual conditions,
relations, and reciprocal claims of men. It grew out of the circumstances of the
country, and out of the state of property'.117 To break this complicated ancient edifice,
the Jacobins appealed to simple abstract principles. They, Burke discovered, had
cleared away as rubbish whatever they had found, intending to reduce everything into
an 'exact level'. Mathematic mensuration had been adopted to make old feudal
provinces 'regularly square', thus transforming the historical map of ancient France
into a 'new pavement of square within square'.118 The intention behind this abstract
policy of geometrical distribution was but too clear: it was meant. Burke believed,
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to destroy all vestiges of the ancient country, in religion, in polity,
in laws, and in manners; to confound all territorial limits; ... to lay low
everything which had lifted its head above the level, or which could
serve to combine or rally. . . the disbanded people, under the standard
of old opinion.119
Indeed, the whole spirit of Jacobin politics. Burke insisted, had been to demolish the
old bonds of provinces and jurisdictions and to dissolve the ancient combinations of
things, in order that all local ideas could be sunk, and that in the end all people of
France would 'no longer be Gascons, Picards, Bretons, Normans; but Frenchmen, with
one country, one heart, and one assembly'.120
It must be pointed out that the attack on the ancient constitution had been made
so that the ground could be cleared for a new construction. The aim of the Revolution
had been to found, in Burke's words, a 'Jacobin republic', based on the 'supposed
rights of man, and the absolute equality of the human racd.121 Jacobinism, Burke
noted, recognized the 'rights of man' as the only title to government:
They have 'the rights of men.' Against these there can be no
prescription; against these no agreement is binding. . . Against these
their rights of men let no government look for security in the length of
its continuance, or in the justice and lenity of its administration.
This principle had been uniformly stuck to, admitting no temperament and no
compromise. Any government, if not quadrated with the rights of man, would be
denounced as fraud and injustice, no matter whether it was an old benevolent
government, a violent tyranny, or a green usurpation.122
Upon the principle of the rights of man, the Jacobins had developed a theory of
social contract which was unilaterally in favour of the people's sovereignty. They
always speak,' Burke wrote,
as if they were of opinion that there is a singular species of
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magistrate, but which has nothing reciprocal in it, but that the majesty
of the people has a right to dissolve it without any reason, but its
will.123
The consequence was that only a pure democracy would be accepted as the
legitimate form of government.'24 The French constitution, Burke argued, must always
be a government wholly by popular representation: 'It must be this or nothing. The
French faction considers as a usurpation, as an atrocious violation of the indefeasible
rights of man, every other description of government. Take it or leave it; there is no
medium.'125
Two features were prominent in this popular democracy. On the one hand, the
individual would become the basic unit of a political society, since a democracy
entailed a government by the delegates of the people who must be represented as
'equal individuals, without any corporate name or description, without attention to
property, without division of powers'.126 On the other hand, it was to be a rule by
numbers, which would establish that
the majority, told by the head, of the taxable people in every
country, is the perpetual, natural, unceasing, indefeasible sovereign; that
this majority is perfectly master of the form, as well as the
administration, of the state; and that the magistrates, under whatever
names they are called, are only functionaries to obey the orders. . .
which that majority may make.
To the Jacobins, claimed Burke, there was no other natural government than this.127
In fine, Burke concluded that these anti-traditionalistic Jacobins were merely
speculative theorists who wanted to built their politics, 'not on convenience, but on
truth'.128 Their new system had been established. Burke satirised, upon the abstract
system of 'Empedocles and Buffon', rather than on any political principle: 'It is
remarkable,' he was surprised to find, 'that, in a great arrangement of mankind, not
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one reference whatsoever is to be found to anything moral or anything politic; nothing
that relates to the concerns, the actions, the passions, the interests of men.'129 In
Jacobin politics. Burke insisted, efforts had been made, not to fit the constitution to
the situation of the people; but, on the contrary, it had endeavoured utterly 'to destroy
conditions, to dissolve relations, to change the state of the nation, and to subvert
property, in order to fit their country to their theory of a constitution'.130
ill
Having discussed in some detail Burke's concept of Jacobinism, it is now proper to
examine further his perception of the composition, and the social origins, of the
leading French revolutionaries: the Jacobins. A proper investigation of this subject
should help to reveal the social dimension in Burke's interpretation of the French
Revolution.
Burke had always shown his contempt for the origins of those who made the
French Revolution. The Jacobin Revolution,' he declared, 'is carried on by men of no
rank, of no consideration, of wild, savage minds.'131 The revolutionary politics of France
was totally directed by 'the refuse of its chican&:]22 it had placed, he claimed,
the highest powers of the state in churchwardens and constables,
and other such officers, guided by the prudence of litigious attornies
and Jew brokers, and set in action by shameless women of the lowest
condition, by keepers of hotels, taverns, and brothels, by pert
apprentices, by clerks, shop-boys, hairdressers, fiddlers, dancers on the
stage.133
Most of the revolutionaries in his eyes were merely 'a desperate set of obscure
adventurers',134 who were drawn out of the dregs of society, exalted to the evil
eminence by their enormities, and wholly destitute of any distinguished qualifications
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able to command respect.135
Contemptible though the Jacobins were thought to be, their vigour and their
formidableness should nevertheless not be underestimated. First of all, the Jacobins
were by no means men without calibre. Burke never suppressed his good opinion of
the general abilities of the Jacobins:
It is a dreadful truth, but it is a truth that cannot be concealed; in
ability, in dexterity, in the distinctness of their views, the Jacobins are
our superiors.136
Burke believed that Jacobinism was a vice belonging especially to men of parts.'37
Talents, he emphasised, naturally gravitated to Jacobinism: "Whatever ill Humours are
afloat in the State, they will be sure to discharge themselves in a mingled Torrent in
the Cloaca maxima of Jacobinism'.'38
Further, the Jacobins were found to be possessed of enormous energy. What had
made the Jacobins 'terrible even to the firmest minds'? Burke answered: 'One thing,
and one thing only - but that one thing is worth a thousand - they have energy.' It
was, he added, a dreadful and portentous energy which was not restrained by any
consideration of God or man and which was 'always vigilant, always on the attack'.
This distempered energy had been brewed out of the anarchical situation created
when the Revolution engulfed France:
In France, all things being put into a universal ferment, in the
decomposition of society, no man comes forward but by his spirit of
enterprise and the vigour of his mind.'39
The spirit of adventure had animated the Jacobins to the full use of all their native
energies.140
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It was noted, in addition, that the Jacobins were, generally speaking, young and
inexperienced. In the new government of France, or in its army officers, Burke was
surprised to find, there was not a man who was above five and thirty."" He also
pointed out that among the delegates of the Third Estate no one could be found to
have any practical experience in the state: the best of them, he wrote, were but men
of theory.'42 Young and inexperienced men could not be expected to cherish those
virtues of caution and self-distrust. They, guided by heated imagination and the wild
£
spirit of adventure, had always entertained^dangerous vision, imagining themselves as
having been chosen to 'new-model the state, and even the whole order of civil
society itself'.143 It would then be hazardous to trust the public good to such
visionaries, because they, Burke feared, would commit the whole to the mercy of their
untried speculation:
they abandon the dearest interests of the public to those loose
theories, to which none of them would choose to trust the slightest of
his private concerns. . . The public interests, because about them they
have no real solicitude, they abandon wholly to chance: I say to chance,
because their schemes have nothing in experience to prove their
tendency beneficial.144
At this point, a question naturally arises: who, in Burke's view, were these
contemptible, yet formidable, Jacobins? A specific account was given in his analysis of
the composition of the National Assembly. Among the active members of the
Assembly he noticed a number of radical noblemen who, he claimed, had
dishonourably levelled themselves with the populace.145 These turbulent and
discontented 'men of quality', degrading their own status and dignity, had come to
support the cause of the Revolution and had taken part in the spoil and humiliation of
their own peers.146 They were deprecated as aristocratic 'Renegadoes' who, though
their fortunes had been created by the favour of the Crown, had themselves
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perfidiously betrayed and robbed not only the Crown but their own order.'47
It was clear however that the control of the Revolution had mainly rested with the
delegates of the Third Estate, who, joined by the defected representatives of the
clergy, according to Burke, had formed that 'momentum of ignorance, rashness,
presumption, and lust of plunder, which nothing has boon able to resist'. The
delegates of the Third Estate, Burke asserted, had included a handful of 'country
clowns', not a greater number of 'traders', a pretty considerable proportion of the
'faculty of medicine', some 'dealers in stocks and funds', and other descriptions of
men 'from whom as little knowledge of, or attention to, the interests of a great state
was to be expected'. What had dominated the National Assembly, however, were the
'practitioners in the law'; but, instead of being distinguished lawyers, they were mostly
the inferior, unlearned, mechanical and merely instrumental part of that profession,
including the obscure provincial advocates, the stewards of petty local jurisdictions,
the country attornies, the notaries, and the whole train of 'the ministers of municipal
litigation, the fomenters and conductors of the petty war of village vexation'. As for
the delegates of the clergy, a very large part of them, according to Burke, had been
merely 'country curates', who were too poor to respect property and too ignorant to
direct the affairs of the state. This is Burkeiportrayal of the National Assembly; on the
whole, he discovered that the respectable part of French society had not taken a
leading part in the politics of the Revolution.148
In this account, Burke obviously tended rather to besmirch the leaders of the
Revolution, but he was not unaware of their social consequence. He had hit upon an
important point when he completed his analysis of the representation of the Third
Estate; among its delegates, he was impressed to find, there 'was scarcely to be
perceived the slightest traces of what we call the natural landed interest of the
country'.'49 This is a significant comment, which reflects Burke's view that the French
Revolution was basically anti-aristocratic. Indeed, he later pointed out that the
revolutionaries were mostly men without property. The National Assembly, according
to Burke's estimation,
has not fifty men in it. . . who are possesssd of an hundred pound
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a year in any description of property whatsoever. About six individuals
of enormous wealth, and thereby sworn Enemies to the prejudice which
affixes a dignity to virtuous well born poverty, are in the Number of the
fifty. The rest are, what might be supposed, men whose names never
were before heard of beyond their Market Town.150
But, if the Revolution had nothing to do with the propertied classes, then for what
social interest did Burke think it stood?
With regard to its social origins. Burke admitted that the French Revolution was
unprecedented: it was not actuated as was usually the case by the ambitious
aristocracy or by the indigent populace, both of which, Burke claimed, had been feared
in the past as 'instruments in revolutions'.151 This conclusion implied that a new social
force was assumed to have been at work in this great change. To understand the rise
of this new force, it is necessary to relate the whole event back to a broad social and
historical context.
It has been mentioned above that Burke looked upon the French Revolution as a
change produced in a society of profound prosperity. A consequence of this general
affluence was that it had given rise to a new social class which had expanded rapidly
to destabilise the old society. When society grew in such a fashion. Burke analysed,
opportunities would naturally arise to tempt the ambitions of the talented. This was
not long undiscovered,' he explained.
Views of ambition were in France, for the first time, presented to
these classes of men. Objects in the state, in the army, in the system of
civil offices of every kind. Their eyes were dazzled with this new
prospect. They were, as it were, electrified and made to lose the natural
spirit of their situation.152
As men acquired great fortunes, they would be impelled to 'compare, in the partition
of the common stock of public prosperity, the proportions of the dividends with the
merits of the claimants'. These nouveaux riches were frustrated when they found that
their social standing was not commensurate with their own estimate of their worth.153
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They hated being barred from the status which, Burke admitted, wealth, in reason
and good policy, ought to bestow, and they felt 'with resentment an inferiority, the
grounds of which they did not acknowledge'.154 Thus was the awakening, and the
ultimate alienation, of this new social force.
These upstarts had soon found their way, however. To fight for a just share of
social estimation. Burke observed, they managed to associate among themselves,
forming new interests, new dependencies, new connections, and new communications,
which gave them great strength. They were no longer to be controlled by the force
and influence of the grandees', while 'the influence on the lower classes was with
them'. Here Burke obviously identified this new social force with the middle class:
These descriptions,' he asserted further, 'had got between the great and the
populace.' As for the relevance of the rising middle class to the politics of the
Revolution, Burke explained:
The middle classes had swelled far beyond their former proportion.
Like whatever is the most effectively rich and great in society, these
classes became the seat of all the active politics; and the
preponderating weight to decide on them. There were all the energies
by which fortune is acquired; there the consequence of their success.
There were all the talents which assert their pretensions, and are
impatient of the place which settled society prescribes to them. . . . The
spirit of ambition had taken possession of this class as violently as ever
it had done of any other. They felt the importance of this situation.
The Revolution in France therefore emerged as a socio-political movement of the
ambitious middle classes striving for social recognition. And they carried on their
campaign openly, no longer lurking in 'the recesses of cabinets, or in the private
conspiracies of the factious'.155
Several types of men were found to lead the way in this great change; among
them, Burke observed, the 'monied interest' and the 'men of letters' had been among
the most active.156 The monied men, merchants, principal tradesmen, and men of
letters,' he noted, 'are the chief actors in the French Revolution.' This was an outcome
ensuing from the expansion of wealth and the diffusion of information in the
154
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pre-revolutionary society:
as money increases and circulates, and as the circulation of news,
in politics, and letters, becomes more and more diffused, the persons
who diffuse this money, and this intelligence, become more and more
important.157
Their animated activities had made a stirring impact: The correspondence of the
monied and the mercantile world, the literary intercourse of academies, but, above all,
the press, of which they had in a manner entire possession, made a kind of electric
communication everywhere.'158
The growth of the monied interest in France was closely connected with the
expansion of their credit to the old government. With the vast debt of that
government, Burke wrote, a great monied interest had insensibly grown up, and with it
a great power. Notwithstanding, their riches and strength, owing to the laws and
customs of France, had not secured to them their deserved social recognition. 'By the
ancient usages which prevailed in that kingdom,' Burke pointed out,
the general circulation of property, and in particular the mutual
convertibility of land into money, and of money into land, had always
been a matter of difficulty. Family settlements, rather more general and
more strict than they are in England, the jus retractus, the great mass of
landed property held by the crown, and, by a maxim of the French law,
held unalienably, the vast estates of the ecclesiastic corporations, - all
these had kept the landed, and monied interests more separated in
France, less miscible, and the owners of the two distinct species of
property not so well disposed to each other.
The superiority of the monied interest in riches and of the landed interest in social
status therefore caused jealousy and conflict between them. On the one hand, the old
landed interest hated the monied men, not being able to bear that their 'unendowed
pedigrees and naked titles' had been eclipsed by the splendour of 'an ostentatious
luxury', while, on the other hand, the pride of the monied men had swollen with their
wealth, and was ready to take revenge on the outrages of this rival pride, and to exalt
their wealth to what they considered as its natural rank and estimation'. From this
angle, the French Revolution, Burke asserted, became virtually a 'real, though not
157
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always perceived, warfare between the noble ancient landed interest and the new
monied interest'.'59
The monied interest had triumphed and the Revolution had been carried through
clearly in their favour. Burke noticed, for instance, that the financial contracts which
the monied men had made with the old government had been the only acts which the
new regime had observed:
No acts of the old government of the kings of France are held
valid in the National Assembly, except his pecuniary engagements. . .
The rest of the acts of that royal government are considered in so
odious a light, that to have a claim under its authority is looked on as a
sort of crime.
Similarly, the decision to confiscate the property of the church had also reflected their
interest. In Burke's opinion, if anyone should be responsible for the debt of the old
government, it must be those who had managed the agreement; so he asked.
Why therefore are not the estates of all the comptrollers-general
confiscated? Why not those of the long succession of ministers,
financiers, and bankers who have been enriched whilst the nation was
impoverished by their dealings and their counsels?
Instead, it was the innocent church which had become the scapegoat. The tendency
of the Revolution was hence unmistakable.'60
There are several causes which account for the domination of the monied interest.
In the first place, the monied men. Burke observed, were by nature more dynamic and
innovative. These men had secured their fortunes principally by speculation in money.
Without fixed habits and local predilections, which belonged particularly to men of
landed property, they were mostly habitual adventurers: The monied interest,' Burke
argued, 'is in its nature more ready for any adventure; and its possessors more
disposed to new enterprises of any kind.' Moreover, he pointed out, the fortunes of
the monied interest were, comparatively speaking, of a recent acquisition. Being new,
it would also fall in 'more naturally with any novelties'.16'
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Next, Burke discovered that monied men were chiefly townsfolk, not interested in
the 'innocent and unprofitable delights of a pastoral life'. Their gathering together in
cities in his opinion had given them great geographical advantages for establishing
associations. In cities, Burke claimed, everything which conspired against the country
gentlemen had combined 'in favour of the money manager and director':
In towns combination is natural. The habits of burghers, their
occupations, their diversion, their business, their idleness, continually
bring them into mutual contact. Their virtues and their vices are
sociable; they are always in garrison; and they come embodied and half
disciplined into the hands of those who mean to form them for civil or
military action.
In other words, city life had enabled the monied men to develop a kind of esprit de
corps In contrast, among the country gentlemen, Burke contended, anything in the
nature of incorporation was almost impracticable. The nature of country life and of
landed property, he wrote, was not suitable for combination. 'Combine them by all the
art you can, and all the industry, they are always dissolving into individuality.' Without
the capacity of acting in concert, the country gentlemen would unavoidably be
overwhelmed by the united force of the monied men. And the Revolution was seen to
have favoured the demands of the insolent burghers rather than the desires of the
laborious husbandman.162 Here again, the Revolution in France turned out to be a
conflict between the interests of the cities and the concerns of the countryside: its
aim. Burke insisted, was to reduce the 'permanent landed interest' to a 'mere
peasantry, for the sustenance of the towns, and to place the true effective
government in cities'.163
The overwhelming power of the monied men, however, came chiefly from their
control over money, especially their domination over the circulation of the newly
issued paper currency. Burke believed that
A paper circulation, not founded on any real money deposited or
engaged for, amounting already to four-and-forty millions of English
money, and this currency by force substituted in the place of the coin
of the kingdom, becoming thereby the substance of its revenue, as well
as the medium of all its commercial and civil intercourse, must put the
whole of what power, authority, and influence is left, in any form
162 Ibid, 462, 464-5, 494.
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whatsoever it may assume, into the hands of the managers and
conductors of this circulation.
The management of money always brought forth enormous power; and its influence in
revolutionary France was even more extensive, for there the operation of money.
Burke noted, was entangled with the sale of confiscated property. The money dealers
were keen to speculate as 'the market of paper, or of money, or of land, shall present
an advantage'. They were therefore able to buy or sell portions of confiscated land at
opportune moments, thus carrying on a continual process of 'transmutation of paper
into land, and land into paper'. By such operations, the spirit of speculation would
steal from money into the mass of land, thus rendering volatilised the function of
money itself:
it assumes an unnatural and monstrous activity, and thereby
throws into the hands of the several managers. . . all the representative
of money, and perhaps a full tenth part of all the land in France.
Those, whose operations can take from, or add ten per cent, to, the possessions of
every man in France,' Burke insisted, 'must be the masters of every man in France.'
Then, the Revolution would most certainly settle all the powers obtained in the towns
among the burghers and the monied directors who led them. At length, he was
convinced, France would be governed completely by an 'ignoble oligarchy' formed of
'the directors of assignats, and trustees for the sale of church lands, attornies, agents,
money-jobbers, speculators, and adventurers'.'64
Another kind of revolutionary force in society was the men of letters who had
grown up along with the monied interest, and who had, with them, formed a close
and marked union.'65 This radical intelligentsia had been referred to in Burke's writings
variously as 'men of letters', 'political men of letters', philosophers', 'literary cabals', or
'sophisters'. The literary men were active internal agitators; their principal task. Burke
emphasised, was to provide 'spirit and principles' for the Revolution:166
I hear on all hands that a cabal, calling itself philosophic, receives
the glory of many of the late proceedings; and that their opinions and
164
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systems are the true actuating spirit of the whole of them.167
The men of letters had in the past usually been regarded as a peaceable and even
timid part of society;168 their rise in France as the leaders of the Revolution was a
surprise: 'How many,' Burke asked, 'could have thought, that the most complete and
formidable revolution in a great empire should be made by men of letters, not as
subordinate instruments and trumpeters of sedition, but as the chief contrivers and
managers, and in a short time as the open administrators and sovereign rulers?'169
The history of the gradual radicalization of French literary men could be traced
back to the later years of the reign of Louis XIV, when they began to lose the
protection and patronage of the court. Thus, Burke wrote:
Since the decline of the life and greatness of Louis the
Fourteenth, they were not so much cultivated either by him, or by the
regent, or the successors to the crown; nor were they engaged to the
court by favours and emoluments so systematically as during the
splendid period of that ostentatious and not impolitic reign.
Aggrieved at the loss of their social prestige, these men of letters, typical of the
middle class, had strived for a recovery by combining themselves into an incorporation
which was to produce great effect: 'Writers, especially when they act in a body, and
with one direction'. Burke contended, 'have great influence on the public mind.'170 He
was persuaded that should the literary men come to understand one another and to
act in^corps, 'a more dreadful calamity cannot arise out of hell to scourge mankind'.171
The men of letters had exerted their influence chiefly through their control of the
press, particularly the newspapers. The impact the newspapers could make was
tremendous, because information could thereby be circulated more efficaciously and
extensively: They are a part of the reading of all, they are the whole of the reading of
the far greater number.'172 In reality, Burke pointed out, the press had virtually made
167
'Reflections on the Revolution in France', Burke'S Works ii. 361.
168
'jhoughts on French Affairs', Burke'S Works iii, 354.
169 'Remarks on the Policy of the Allies', Burke'S Works, iii, 456-7.
170 'Reflections on the Revolution in France', Burke'S Works, ii, 382, 384.
171 'A Letter to a Noble Lord', Burke'S Worki\ v, 141.
172
'Thoughts on French Affairs', Burke'S Works iii, 356.
86
every government in its spirit 'almost democratic'. Without the agitation of the press,
he believed, the first movements in this Revolution perhaps could not have been
given.173 The writers of the newspapers were compared to a battery, in which 'the
stroke of any one ball produces no great effect, but the amount of continual repetition
is decisive'.174 Indeed, with pens and tongues, these writers had by every exaggeration
rendered hateful all the faults of courts, of nobility, and of priesthood.175
The principal object of the radical men of letters was to harass religion: They
worked themselves up to a perfect phrenzy against religion and all its professors,' said
Burke. They tore the reputation of the clergy to pieces by their infuriated
declamations and invectives, before they lacerated their bodies by their massacres.' In
opposition to religion, a system of 'fanatical atheism' was spread.176 In Burke's eyes,
these literary men were all warm, hot-heated and zealous atheists.177 Their minds
were intoxicated with a violent zeal, and their thoughts and actions were pervaded by
a spirit of 'cabal, intrigue, and proselytism'. These atheistical fathers, Burke contended,
had their own bigotry, inclining 'to talk against monks with the spirit of a monk'; it
was, he added, a proselytism of the most rabid kind.178 Here, the extraordinary thing
was that the atheism, which was professed against religion, should have nursed up
the 'most violently operative principles of fanaticism', discovered so far only in the
propagators of religious opinions.179 Of this, Burke had given an illuminating
explanation, based on considerable knowledge of social psychology:
They, who had made but superficial studies in the natural history
of the human mind, have been taught to look on religious opinions as
the only cause of enthusiastic zeal and sectarian propagation. But there
is no doctrine whatever, on which men can warm, that is not capable of
the very same effect. The social nature of man impels him to propagate
his principles, as much as physical impulses urge him to propagate his
kind. The passions give zeal and vehemence. The understanding
bestows design and system. The whole man moves under the discipline
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of his opinions.180
Religion, it was true, had previously been the most powerful cause of fanaticism, but
the French Revolution had since exemplified that even^political doctrine could become
as much a cause of fanaticism as a dogma in religion.181
On the whole, Burke was of the opinion that 'Men of letters, fond of distinguishing
themselves, are rarely averse to innovation'.182 These people, he did not deny, were
the 'first gifts of Providence to the world', but they chiefly depended for their fame
and fortune on their knowledge and talent. To Burke, they were all metaphysicians of
callous hearts. Like geometricians or chemists, he claimed, they would treat men in
their political experiments as they did 'mice in an air pump', without the least regard
to the feelings and habitudes of a moral man. In short. Burke concluded:
These philosophers are fanatics; independent of any interest, which
if it operated alone would make them much more tractable, they are
carried with such a headlong rage towards every desperate trial, that
they would sacrifice the whole human race to the slightest of their
experiments.183
Apart from the monied interest and the men of letters, Burke also attended to a
further corps of dissidents: this was a group of discontented politicians, whose role in
the French Revolution was to give it a 'character and determination'. These politicians,
Burke pointed out, had shared with the radical literary men thoroughly all the objects
of ambition and irreligion, and substantially all the means of promoting these ends.
Indeed, while the literary men provided theoretical principles for the Revolution, it was
these politicians who actually gave them a practical direction.184 These gentlemen,
Burke thus ridiculed them, took up naively those speculative paradoxes which eloquent
writers had brought forth purely as 'a sport of fancy', to try their talents and to excite
surprise: These paradoxes become with them serious grounds of action, upon which
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they proceed in regulating the most important concerns of the state.'185
According to Burke, these discontented politicans had existed extensively
throughout the official ranks of the civil government and particularly in the diplomatic
part. They did not include however those regular diplomats serving the government,
but a column of secret agents commissioned by the king to spy on the regular
diplomats ever since the reign of Louis XV. Like the monied interest or the men of
letters, these politicians were also discontented, but for different reasons: they
dissented from the ministry over the foreign policy of France. These people. Burke
noted, were zealous French imperialists, always looking upon the exterior
aggrandizement of France as their ultimate end. They were distressed at experiencing
the recent decline of France as the most influential power in Europe; its cause was
imputed to the mistaken policy of their government which had been diverted from a
more aggressive continental policy, and instead began pursuing a pacific policy for
keeping peace on the continent, particularly with Austria, in order to be able to rival
Britain at sea. But, according to these politicians, the circumstance of France could by
no means support an advantageous maritime adventure. Its result had proved
disastrous, since as a consequence not only had France lost ground herself, but,
owing to her neglect of her European interests, three great powers on the continent,
each strong enough to balance France, had been suffered to arise:'Russia and Prussia
had been created almost within memory; and Austria, though not a new power, and
even curtailed in territory, was. . . greatly improved in her military discipline and
force.' In short, France was said to have been overshadowed.186
It was this national failure which frustrated these patriotic politicians and which
utterly alienated them from the government. They were thus always at odds with the
government, and for this reason they had been, Burke pointed out, 'continually going
from their function to the Bastile, and from the Bastile to employment, and favour
again'. In this way, the number of frustrated politicians had increased considerably,
and the whole, Burke noted,
formed a body of active, adventuring, ambitious, discontented
people, despising the regular ministry, despising the courts at which
they were employed, despising the court which employed them.
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From their disappointment at the poor performance of French ministriesin international
politics, these politicians started to criticise their government and they were even
driven to question the suitability of monarchy for their imperial dream:
There was no point on which the discontented diplomatic
politicians so bitterly arraigned their cabinet, as for the decay of French
influence in all others. From quarrelling with the court, they began to
complain of monarchy itself, as a system of government too variable for
any regular plan of national aggrandizement.
They appealed to history, and compared the systematic proceeding of a Roman senate
with the fluctuation of a monarchy. It was thus discovered that the politics of
monarchy had hinged too much upon the personal character of the prince, and that
the vicissitudes produced by the succession of princes of a
different character, and even the vicissitudes produced in the same man,
by the different views and inclinations belonging to youth, manhood,
and age, disturbed and distracted the policy of a country made by
nature for extensive empire, or. . . for that sort of general over-ruling
influence which prepared empire or supplied the place of it.
These politicians. Burke observed, were deeply impressed by the fact that the Roman
republic had often conquered more 'in a single yeaT than all that the whole power of
France, driven by all her ambition, had acquired 'in two centuries'.187
The ability of a great military and ambitious republic to achieve national greatness
was therefore superior, and this had effectively converted these politicians into
republicans. They accepted. Burke remarked, that only in^republic could they look for a
cure for the radical weakness of the French monarchy, to which all
the means which wit could devise, or nature and fortune could bestow
towards universal empire, was not of force to give life, or vigour, or
consistency.
But, 'Out the word came; and it never went back'. Republicanism in their hands had
been turned into an active principle ready to operate when opportunities should offer.
It was this republican imperialism, Burke believed, which not long before had
prompted this diplomatic corps to contrive the revival in Holland of an old republican
<87 Ibid, 248-50.
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party and to make a revolution there. And the late intervention of France in the
American Revolution, Burke contended, had also proceeded from the working of their
republican principles and republican policy. Unfortunately, this American alliance
produced ominous consequences: This new relation undoubtedly did much,' he
continued,
The discourses and cabals that it produced, the intercourse that it
established, and, above all, the example, which made it seem practicable
to establish a republic in a great extent of country, finished the work,
and gave to that part of the revolutionary faction a degree of strength,
which required other energies than the late king possessed, to resist, or
even to restrain. It spread everywhere; but it was nowhere more
prevalent than in the heart of the court. The palace of Versailles, by its
language, seemed a forum of democracy.
This had been the contribution which the discontented politicians had given to the
Revolution. In that great turmoil, Burke concluded, they had succeeded not only in
destroying their monarchy, but in 'all the objects of ambition that they proposed from
that destruction'.188
The interpretation which Burke had given of the origins, the dynamics and the
nature of the French Revolution, it becomes now clear, has been much more
complicated, and much profounder still, than historians have been so far prepared to
acknowledge. Generally speaking, Burke had properly placed his interpretation in an
historical context of social change which had occurred long before 1789, as a result of
economic progress within French society. This change, according to Burke, had its
influence on the development of the French Revolution in two prominent aspects.
There is, on the one hand, a profound cultural dimension. The growing affluence of
French society prior to the Revolution had gradually led to the relaxation of its moral
vigilance and had thus supplied an appropriate environment for the French to
reanimate their intellectual life. Owing to this intellectual revival, a cultural revolution
took place silently, challenging and then undermining the system of ancient values
which used to shield the old order. And, in Burke's view, it was this moral shake-up
that was ultimately to account for the seemingly sudden collapse of the ancien regime
in France. Meanwhile, the social and economic advance had also given rise to a new
188 Ibid, 251-3.
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social force, the middle class. This new social class became discontented because
their wealth had not received the proper social recognition they thought it deserved.
They were for this reason driven determinedly to attack the anachronistic aristocratic
ascendancy existing under the ancien regime. From this angle, the French Revolution
was deemed as a typical middle-class revolution. There remains, above all, a broad
historical significance in Burke's view of the French Revolution. There can be no doubt
that in his interpretation particular emphasis had been laid on the moral and
intellectual dynamics of the Revolution. It was also true that, to him, the Revolution,
as its Jacobin ideology had revealed, was fundamentally anti-clerical, anti-aristocratic
and anti-traditionalistic. Viewed from the vista of the eighteenth-century history,
therefore, it seems that Burke had utterly linked the French Revolution to the main




Burke devoted the last eight years of his life (1790-97) to a holy mission against
Jacobinism. His concern in this crusade had two dimensions: it was both national and
universal. In its immediate sense, Burke's effort was by every means to call forth the
British people to support a 'just and necessary war' on Jacobin France in order
to save my country from the iron yoke of its power, and from the
more dreadful contagion of its principles; to preserve, while they can be
preserved, pure and untainted, the ancient, inbred integrity, piety, good
nature, and good humour of the people of England, from [its] dreadful
pestilence.
But his ultimate concern was more than European: he declared it to be his calling to
'animate Europe to eternal battle, against a tyranny that threatens to overwhelm all
Europe and, all the human race'.1 This anti-Jacobin crusade, he claimed, would be a
campaign for
not the Cause of a King, but of Kings; not the Interest of the
French Nation but of all nations; Not the Business of this time, but what
must decide on the Character and of course on the happiness of many
Generations.2
At length. Burke proclaimed the whole campaign as being a great struggle for the
'Interest of mankind at large in the highest and most important of its Concerns'.3 It
was a cause which, he thought, would prove favourable to humanity, to rational
freedom, to all morals, and to all the elegancies, ornaments and decencies of life."
Burke's move for a holy war was based on the belief that a general crisis, as a
Of
consequence of the fall of the ancien regime in France, was facing the wholeAEurope.
Burke had never localised the influence of the French Revolution, believing that it had
universal implications.5 The event had caused a great crisis to the French monarchy
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and to all monarchies.6 Furthermore, he insisted, not only the cause of all monarchies,
but the banner of 'all Republicks' that were constituted upon 'antient models', were in
France similarly on their trial.7 In Burke's opinion, what the great revolution of France
had brought in was not simply a political change: 'It is a destruction and
decomposition of the whole society.'8 Here the challenge to the existing order was
general; hence Burke concluded 'that in the Case of the Sovereign of France the
Cause of all Sovereigns is tried; that in the Case of its Church is tried the Cause of all
Churches; and that in the Case of its Nobility is tried the Cause of all the respectable
orders of all Society'. It was even a trial of civil society itself.9
The foundation for this worry was Burke's conviction that the Jacobin system was
utterly inimical to the ancient governments of Europe. The French Revolution, he
claimed, had introduced principles contrary to the 'well-being of men and of citizens,
and to the safety and prosperity of every just commonwealth'.10 The Jacobin republic
which the Revolution set up was founded virtually on the principles of 'anarchy': the
whole amounted to no more than 'a college of armed fanatics, for the propagation of
the principles of assassination, robbery, rebellion, fraud, faction, oppression, and
impiety'.11 Burke contended that this wild and enthusiastic regime, if once established
in the centre of Europe, would not tolerate any other form of government to stand, be
it a monarchy - limited or unlimited - or an old republic.12 All parts of Europe would
be similarly endangered while 'any power, under any Name exists in France, professing
the principles, and executing the Views, and actuated by the policy, which has made
the predominant Faction there so mischievous to Religion, Laws, manners, Commerce
and the common Liberty and independence of all Nations and all Governments'.13
Burke had never looked upon Jacobin France as a system of the usual kind;
consequently, he did not perceive its strength and formidableness in an ordinary light.
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According to his observation, the vigour of France rested not principally on her
physical resources:
The vast territorial extent of that country, its immense population,
its riches of production, its riches of commerce and convention - the
whole aggregate mass of what, in ordinary cases, constitutes the force
of a state, to me were but objects of secondary consideration. . . Great
as these things are, they are not what make the faction formidable.14
If France was terrible, it was not merely because 'she is France', but because 'she is
Jacobin France':16 that is, her manners, her maxims and her politics were the elements
which rendered her 'so dreadful to the world'.16 Burke obviously related the power of
France to the system of Jacobinism, which he believed was the 'evil spirit'
that possesses the body of France; that informs it as a soul; that
stamps upon its ambition, and upon all its pursuits, a characteristic
mark, which strongly distinguishes them from the same general
passions, and the same general views, in other men and in other
communities.
By this spirit, France was inspired into a new, pernicious and desolating activity.17 A
system like that of Jacobin France, even with the worst and least exertion of the
natural force of the country, would in Burke's opinion still be formidable:18
Were France but half of what it is in population, in compactness, in
applicability of its force, situated as it is, and being what it is, it would
be too strong for most of the states of Europe, constituted as they are,
and proceeding as they proceed.19
He admitted that he would dread 'more from one or two maritime provinces in France,
in which the spirit and principles of that Revolution were established, than from the
14
'Letters on a Regicide Peace', Burke's Works v, 231.
15 Ibid, 194.
16 Corr, ix, 99. 'To William Lushington - 26 Oct. 1796'.
17 'Letters on a Regicide Peace', Burke's Works v, 231.
18 Corr, vi, 333. 'To Richard Burke, Jr - 9 Aug. 1791'.
19 'Letters on a Regicide Peace', Burke'S Works, v, 256.
95
old French monarchy possessed of all that its Ambition ever aspired to'.20
The disposition of the Jacobin system to spread, increased further the danger of
revolutionary France, whose contact, whose example, and the infection of whose
doctrines. Burke warned, were the most dreadful of her arms.21 Burke contended that
the Jacobin system must diffuse rapidly, because it was founded on principles 'the
most delusive indeed, but the most flattering to the natural propensities of the
unthinking multitude, and to the speculations of all those who think, without thinking
very profoundly'.22 The 'moral scheme' of France, he pointed out, had furnished the
only pattern ever known which 'they who admire will instantly resemble'. It formed an
'inexhaustible repertory of one kind of examples'.23 But it was an example the most
uncomfortable, since it exemplified that
The royal family perished because it was royal. The nobles
perished because they are noble. The men, women, and children, who
had property because they had property to be robbed of. The priests
were punished after they had been robbed of their all, not for their
vices, but for their virtues and their piety.
Such an example was by itself ruinous in every point of view: religious, moral, civil
and political. When supported by force, Burke added, its impact would be even more
overwhelming: The example of what is done by France is too important not to have a
vast and extensive influence; and that example, backed with its power, must bear with
great force on those who are near it.'24
Considering the nature of the Jacobin system, the danger thus apprehended from
France would become not a mere presumption, but real and determinate. That regime,
Burke wrote, had persistently harboured malicious designs towards her neighbours:
'Enmity to us and to all civilized nations is wrought into the very stamina of its
constitution.'25 Far from spreading peace and goodwill, it had 'meditated war against
all other governments; and proposed systematically to excite in them all the very
20 Corr', ix, 333. 'To French Laurence - 12 May 1797'.
21 Corr, vii, 176. 'To Lord Grenville - 18 Aug. 1792'
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24 'Letters on a Regicide Peace', Burke's Works v, 219, 382-3.
25 Ibid, 418.
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worst kind of seditions, in order to lead to their common destruction'.26 Meanwhile, the
Jacobin republic was also active and dynamic. Burke claimed that revolutionary France
was a power that was always vigilant, that was always on the attack, and that would
allow itself no repose and suffer none to rest an hour with impunity.27 It had been
ever 'on the watch, qualified and disposed to profit of every conjuncture, to establish
its own principles and modes of mischief, wherever it can hope for success'.28 In sum,
Burke warned, the Jacobin regime had always intended wilfully to disturb and distract
other governments.29 He felt it to be far better to be conquered by any other nation
than to have such a regime as a neighbour:
They, who are to live in the vicinity of this new fabric, are to
prepare to live in perpetual conspiracies and seditions; and to end at
last, in being conquered, if not to her dominion, to her resemblance. But
when we talk of conquest by other nations, it is only to put a case. This
is the only power in Europe by which it is possible we should be
conquered. To live under the continual dread of such immeasurable evils
is itself a grievous calamity.30
It would be mischievous to Europe if such a public enemy was suffered there to
contrive directly or indirectly against its peace.31
Further, Burke discovered that an imperial ambition had in fact played an essential
role in the politics of the Jacobin revolution. The Jacobins had seized the 'most
[WcrftJ
important part of Europe, andAstruggling for the rest'. They had planned, he noted,
seditions and wars against neighbouring nations, aiming at transforming Europe into a
'confederation of republics' with France at its head.33 The intention of the Jacobins, in
other words, was meant to 'form an universal empire, by producing an universal
revolution'. The process of this empire-building, however, could be gradual and
circuitous: some old states, if they could not be taken at one swallow, would probably
26
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be allowed a temporary existence. Yet, Burke believed,
whilst they give to these tolerated states this temporary respite in
order to secure them in a condition of real dependence on themselves,
they invest them on every side by a body of republics, formed on the
model, and dependent ostensibly, as well as substantially, on the will, of
the mother republic, to which they owe their origin. These are to be so
many garrisons to check and control the states, which are to be
permitted to remain on the old model, until they are ripe for a change.34
In this manner, a Jacobin empire would be accomplished. And this plan of empire,
Burke asserted, had long been projected 'from the very first revolt of the faction
against their monarchy', and had been ever since 'uniformly pursued, as a standing
maxim of national policy, from that time to this'.35
Apprehensions about the fate of Europe had thus embarked Burke on his mission
to rescue the 'Remains of the civilized World from impiety and barbarism'.36 He always
tied the fate of the whole of Europe to the settlement of the internal affairs of France:
the liberty and the safety of European nations, he argued, could only be ensured by
restoring order, law and true freedom to that country.37 The evil of Jacobinism must
be rectified right there, or else great mischief would radiate from it, spreading 'circle
beyond circle, in spite of all the little defensive precautions which can be employed
against it'.38 In short, to preserve Europe from being barbarized, it was necessary
firstly to 'civilize' France.39
The task of de-Jacobinising France would be onerous however. 'Nothing internal in
France can of itself produce any change.'40 Burke had never expected that the malady
of France could be cured through internal remedies:41 'I am very sorry to say,' he
insisted, 'that the Evil in France does not promise to administer any thing towards its
34
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Own Cure.'42 On the one hand, there was little hope that any substantial change would
happen spontaneously among the Jacobins themselves so that the disorder in France
could be redressed automatically:
As to a change of mind in these men, who consider infamy as
honour, degradation as preferment, bondage to low tyrants as liberty,
and the practical scorn and contumely of their upstart masters as marks
of respect and homage, I look upon it as absolutely impracticable.
These madmen,' Burke claimed, 'to be cured, must first, like other madmen, be
subdued.'43 On this point, Burke had shown his realism, accepting that the struggle
against Jacobinism would have to rely more on real force than on theoretical
argument. A monstrous thing like the Jacobin revolution was not to be argued out of
existence by the mere force of reasoning; and those who combatted with it would
need to use their 'military and financial Strength':44
Nothing more can be said. Something must be done. You have an
armed Tyranny to deal with; and nothing but arms can pull it down.
Aided by these, reason may resume its natural authority: without them,
by frequent repetition it loses its force; by frequent failure, it loses its
credit.45
It was swords, not pens, that could ultimately be relied on to reduce the Jacobins to
reason.46
On the other hand. Burke also gave up the hope that any action against the
Jacobins could be fostered within the French territory. The domestic situation of
France, he claimed, had indicated the utter impossibility of a counter revolution from
any internal cause.47 First of all, there was nothing which could be depended upon to
sustain any anti-Jacobin attempt. Under the new regime, discontents had indeed
everywhere prevailed, but these distressed people could do nothing for themselves
42
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because, Burke pointed out, they had 'no arms, nor magazines, nor chiefs, nor union,
nor the possibility of these things within themselves'.48 More particularly, the
anti-Jacobin forces were seriously in want of competent leadership. Effective action
could only be launched under a resolute, vigorous, zealous, and enterprising leader,
who, in this case, should properly be King Louis XVI himself; unfortunately, a man of
his personality, though well-intentioned and virtuous, did not possess that kind of
mind which was made for 'breaking their prisons, terrifying their Enemies, and
animating their friends'. Nor could strong leadership be looked for in the numerous
nobility of France, among whom. Burke lamented, not one man could be found who to
great military Talents adds any sort of lead, consideration, or following, in the Country,
or in the Army'.49 These aristocratic classes, despite their incompetence for leadership,
would surely still be the true and sole supporters of the anti-Jacobin cause.50 But
Burke took notice that after the Declaration of Pilnitz (27 August 1791) large numbers
of the leading aristocratic families had in fact fled the kingdom because of the hope
of support held out to them by the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia.
Without the support of these noblesse, even if a counter revolution could have been
started, he insisted, there was not likely to have been anything to feed it.5' On the
whole. Burke despaired: There seems no Energy in the French Monarchy able to revive
the Royal Authority. Its chief supports, the Nobility and the Clergy, are extinguished. . .
The King is heavy, inert, inexperienced, timid, without resources.'52 His opinion was
essentially pessimistic.
The second obstacle to anti-Jacobin activities was that the Jacobin regime had
exerted an absolute rule which placed all transactions in the country, from the capital
down to the municipalities, under close surveillance and firm control. Burke pointed
out that the internal governments of the French municipalities were the strongest that
had ever been seen:
Each municipal republic has a committee, or something in the
nature of a committee of Research. In these petty republics the tyranny
48
'Remarks on the Policy of the Allies', Burke's Works iii. 422.
49 Corr, vi, 241-2. 'To the Chevalier de La Bintinaye - (March 1791)'.
50 'Remarks on the Policy of the Allies', Burke's Works iii. 412.
51
'Thoughts on French Affairs', Burke's Works iii, 375; Corr. vi, 443-4. 'To the Empress of Russia - 1
Nov 1791'.
52 Corr, vi, 36. 'To Earl Fitzwilliam - 12 Nov. 1789'.
100
is so near its object, that it becomes instantly acquainted with every act
of every man. It stifles conspiracy in its very first movements. Their
power is absolute and uncontrollable. No stand can be made against it.
Furthermore, every municipality had been kept in complete isolation so that between
them no intelligence of any kind could possibly be communicated. Under such
circumstances, should any sporadic local discontents arise, they could not be
channelled into coordinated actions strong enough to produce great effect. Paris was
the capital of the Revolution, and was in Burke's opinion the only place where any
rebellion that could arise against the present system must begin. In that city, Burke
agreed, some freedom of communication had indeed existed; but even there any
anti-Jacobin attempt would be easily frustrated, as there had been installed 'so many
servants as any man has, so many spies and irreconcilable domestic enemies'.53 In
reality, he believed, as the Jacobins had completely achieved their ends, they would
have the determination and the means to preserve quiet: for this, he noted, a police
was established; an army was apparently under their command; and an unfixed
number of militia too was in almost constant service.54 After all, Burke could not but
acknowledge that the Jacobins were tough enemies, not to be dealt with easily:
The predominant Faction is the strongest as I conceive, without
comparison. They are armed. Their Enemies are disarmed and
dispersed. . . But the grand point against all internal attempts, is that the
faction are in possession. Unless it be taken by surprize, as the late
French Monarchy was, it is not easy by conspiracy or insurrection to
overturn any Government.
And a republican government could certainly not, like a monarchy, be 'taken by a
Coup de main; or put an end to by the seizure of one Person'.55 Indeed, under the
tyrannical rule of the Jacobins, Burke feared, any internal attempt would be doomed to
fail, only to produce misery to those who nursed them.56
Besides, Burke also discovered that the notorious financial policy often predicted
to be bankrupting, and hence undermining, the Jacobin regime had in effect
paradoxically contributed a great deal to save it from the threat of any counter
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revolution. It was well known that the Jacobin regime, in order to solve the financial
problem, had forced the assignats, its newly issued paper currency, upon the French
people as legal tender in every transaction of life. One perhaps unexpected effect of
this measure had been that it had thus compelled every one in France virtually to
have a share in, and as a consequence to have his fortune unwittingly tied up with,
the future of the new order. Not surprisingly, therefore, they became reluctant to
support any action calculated to destabilise the new regime, upon whose existence
their fortunes must hinge. Hence, Burke concluded, as the assignats had in a manner
become the 'only visible maintenance' of the whole people, their dread of a
bankruptcy in the new government thus helped considerably to hold up the
occurrence of a counter-revolution. '[I]n my opinion,' he wrote, 'the counter-revolution
cannot exist along with it.'57
After surveying the entire situation, Burke acknowledged that no opportunity
existed inside France by which 'a second revolution can be accomplished'.58 Despairing
of any internal rectification, his thoughts quite naturally reverted to the possibility of
foreign intervention, and he was convinced at last that, if any force was to be relied
upon to destroy the Jacobin revolution, it 'must come from without', and especially
from those neighbouring countries that were alarmed about the potential threat of the
Revolution to their own safety.59 Indeed, Burke had not hesitated to declare that 'Arms,
and I am sorry to say, foreign Arms, must decide your fate':60 the only hope of
restoring monarchy to France, he asserted, must rest with the neighbouring powers
and in their ability to render assistance.61 Moreover, the force required not only must
come from abroad but had to be substantial: 'Nothing else but a foreign force can or
will do. . . Nor is it a small military force that can do the business. It is a serious
design, and must be done with combined strength.'62
Burke was fully convinced of the necessity of foreign intervention if order was to
be restored to France; but one question remains: on what ground could a nation be
57 Ibid, 370-1.
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entitled to interfere, according to its own discretion, in the interior affairs of another?
Burke justified his stand, first by appealing to the law of nations. According to the
authority of Emmerich von Vattel, there was a rule in the law of nations which
established that whenever 'a civil war is kindled in a state, foreign powers may assist
that party which appears to them to have justice on their side'.63 In Burke's eyes,
France under the Revolution was without doubt a kingdom divided for the moment
between the revolutionaries and the royalists; by the law above mentioned, therefore,
every other nation could freely choose to 'take any part she pleases'.64 Burke insisted
that an act of intervention in such a situation was justifiable by all means provided its
motive was noble:
This interference must indeed always be a right, whilst the
privilege of doing good to others, and of averting from them every sort
of evil, is a right: circumstances may render that right a duty. It depends
wholly on this, whether it be a bona fide charity to a party, and a
prudent precaution with regard to yourself, or whether, under the
pretence of aiding one of the parties in a nation, you act in such a
manner as to aggravate its calamities, and accomplish its final
destruction. In truth, it is not the interfering or keeping aloof, but
iniquitous intermeddling, or treacherous inaction, which is praised or
blamed by the decision of an equitable judge.65
He distinguished carefully the case of 'taking a part in the divisions of a Country',
which was justifiable, from that of 'promoting Rebellion and sedition in a neighbouring
Country', which was not. It was true that to intervene in a civil dissension would
require indeed great prudence and circumspection, and a serious attention to justice
and to the policy of one's own country, as well as to that of Europe; but, he insisted,
a public law forbidding such action would not be supported by the 'reason of that law,
nor by the Authorities on the Subject, nor by the practice of this Kingdom, nor by that
of any civilized Nation in the World'. This principle of interference, he believed, had in
a sense already been written into the basis of the 'public Law of Europe'.66
The right to intervene could also be vindicated upon the universal 'right of
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vicinage', which had developed analogously out of the 'law of civil vicinity' that
prevailed in a civil community. Burke remarked that it had been customary for
international jurists to seek to regulate relationships between nations via principles
elicited from those civil codes which were the conclusions of 'legal reason' and which
were hence of 'universal equity'. Among civil laws, he noted.
There is a Law of Neighbourhood which does not leave a man
perfectly master on his own ground. When a neighbour sees a new
erection, in the nature of a nuisance, set up at his door, he has a right
to represent it to the judge; who, on his part, has a right to order the
work to be stayed; or, if established, to be removed.
From this parent 'Law of Neighbourhood' was derived a 'right of vicinagd which
empowered public authority in certain circumstances to, 'without destroying, regulate
and restrain the right of ownership. According to this rule, Burke explained.
No innovation is permitted that may redound, even secondarily, to
the prejudice of a neighbour. The whole doctrine. . . is founded on the
principle, that no new use should be made of a man's private liberty of
operating upon his private property, from whence a detriment may be
justly apprehended by his neighbour.
And this 'law of denunciation', he added, was by nature prospective; 'It is to anticipate
what is called damnum infectum, or damnum nondum factum, that is, a damage justly
apprehended, but not actually done.' When a case of this nature arose, the judge could
issue a prohibition to innovate, even before the damage caused by the innovation at
issue was clearly demonstrated, until the point could be determined. To Burke, this
rule of vicinity was no doubt internationally applicable; but he stressed that when it
was thus enforced, as between nations no judge had been constituted, the 'vicinage'
could therefore become the natural judge: that is, the neighbour itself could assume
the role of being 'preventively, the assessor of its own rights, or remedially, their
avenger'. Thus defined, this rule of vicinity. Burke wrote,
has bestowed on the grand vicinage of Europe a duty to know, and
a right to prevent, any capital innovation which may amount to the
erection of a dangerous nuisance. Of the importance of that innovation,
and the mischief of that nuisance, they are, to be sure, bound to judge,
not litigiously; but it is in their competence to judge. They have
uniformly acted on this right. What in civil society is a ground of action,
in politic society is a ground of war.
In the present case, the French Revolution had unquestionably constituted a
pestilential 'nuisance' to Europe; therefore, the neighbours of France had 'not only a
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right, but an indispensable duty, and an exigent interest', to denounce this new work
before it would produce the danger which Europe had sorely felt and would long feel.
Though the competence to judge in such cases must always be a matter of moral
prudence, and though the act of war should ever be conducted with great deliberation,
when dangers impended, Burke contended, 'the duty of the vicinity calls for the
exercise of its competence; and the rules of prudence do not restrain, but demand
it'.67
Finally, Burke defended the propriety of the European nations to interfere upon a
specific 'civil war' theory, which held that the contest ushered in by the Revolution in
France would come to be not so much a domestic dissension in a single nation as a
great internal conflict of the European community at large, engulfing every member
state in it. 'If I understand at all the true Spirit of the present contest,' he remarked,
'We are engaged in a Civil War, but on a larger Scale, and on far more important
objects, than civil wars have generally extended themselves to, or comprehended.'68
This theory of a general 'civil war' in Europe had developed from the idea that none of
the European nations, because of their common cultural heritage, could escape the
challenge posed by the Jacobin revolution. In Burke's mind, all the European nations,
despite their national boundaries, had formed virtually an enlarged community; The
writers on public law have often called this aggregate of nations a commonwealth',
with essential correspondence in religions, laws, manners, governments, and so on.
They had reason,' he explained:
It is virtually one great state having the same basis of general law,
with some diversity of provincial customs and local establishments. The
nations of Europe have had the very same Christian religion, agreeing in
the fundamental parts, varying a little in the ceremonies and in the
subordinate doctrines. The whole of the polity and economy of every
country in Europe has been derived from the same sources. It was
drawn from the old Germanic or Gothic customary, from the feudal
institutions, which must be considered as an emanation from that
customary; and the whole has been improved and digested into system
and discipline by the Roman law. From hence arose the several orders,
with or without a monarch. . . in every European country. . . From all
those sources arose a system of manners and education which was
nearly similar in all this quarter of the globe; and which softened,
blended, and harmonized the colours of the whole.
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The Jacobin revolution, by destroying the old France, had made a 'violent breach of
the community of Europe'; and the challenge it posed to that community was
universal, for the system it set up, Burke claimed, had nursed determined ambition and
systematic hostility towards all those ideas and usages, religious, legal, moral, or
social, of this civilised world.69 The conflict which thus ensued was therefore not just
a narrow civil dissension limited particularly to France herself; 'It is a war,' Burke
declared, 'between the partisans of the ancient, civil, moral, and political order of
Europe, against a sect of fanatical and ambitious atheists which means to change
them all.'70 Consequently, the efforts which the European powers were persuaded to
make for crushing the Revolution in France should not be deemed as malicious
meddling with the interior affairs of another country: it was a just campaign for the
common safety of Europe. At any rate. Burke maintained, the anti-Jacobin war turned
out to be not an ordinary local and domestic dispute in which there could be no
general concern. It was, on the contrary, to champion a cause 'which we have in
common'.7' And, he stressed: 'We are, as I think, fighting for our a//'72
The case for foreign intervention was thus justified; for Burke, indeed, an
anti-Jacobin crusade was not simply just but necessary.73 Before this war could be
carried out properly, however, one needed to be acquainted with the 'true knowledge
of its specifick Nature'.74 Burke acutely discerned that a war against Jacobinism would
certainly be different since the enemy to be met with was unusual. 'We are in a war
of a peculiar nature,' he explained:
It is not with an ordinary community, which is hostile or friendly as
passion or as interest may veer about: not with a state which makes
war through wantonness, and abandons it through lassitude. We are at
war with a system, which, by its essence, is inimical to all other
governments, and which makes peace or war, as peace and war may
best contribute to their subversion. It is with an armed doctrine that we
are at war.75
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A campaign against a hostile system, which was set in motion by a militant ideology,
could not be conducted as if it was a 'common War about Trade, or Territorial
Boundaries, or about a political Balance of power, among Rival or jealous States'.76 It
should be. Burke insisted, a 'War of Principle' rather than a 'War of Ambition',77 as
the present Evil of our time, though in a great measure an Evil of
ambition, is not one of common political ambition; but in many respects
entirely different. It is not the Cause of Nation as against nation, but as
you well observe, the cause of mankind against those who have
projected the subversion of that order of things under which our part of
the world has so long flourished. . .78
Indeed, he admonished the European powers to take the flames that were consuming
France seriously as a warning to protect their own buildings, instead of regarding the
situation avariciously as 'a happy occasion for pillaging the goods, and for carrying off
the materials, of their neighbour's house'.79 The purpose of the crusade was to
preserve the ancient system of Europe. It was 'not at all a foreign war of empire, but
as much for our liberties, properties, laws, and religion, and even more so, than we
had ever been engaged in'.80
Quite naturally, a mission for such a purpose ought to be politically, or
ideologically, oriented. Burke indeed preferred to call it a 'political war',81 and had
persistently contended that a wise military plan in this campaign must proceed from
proper political principles.82 And to him, the principles here referred to were
unequivocal: 'Our principles are antijacobin,' he declared.83 'I had but one single
principle to guide me - namely that the extinction of Jacobinism in France, was the
sole worthy object of the Arms and politicks of this time.'84 The aim of the crusade
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should be to root out the doctrines and the examples of the French Revolution;85 and
its military operations, accordingly, had to be destined 'not for Dunkirk, or this or
t'other Town - but to drive Jacobinism out of the World'.86 He believed that so long as
Jacobinism subsisted in France
it is not, in my opinion, the gaining a fortified place or two, more
or less, or the annexing to the Dominion of the allied powers this or
that Territorial district, that can save Europe, or any of its Members. We
are at war with a principle, and an example, which there is not shutting
out by Fortresses or excluding by Territorial Limits.
'No lines of demarcation can bound the Jacobin Empire,' he argued: 'It must be
extirpated in the place of its origin, or it will not be confined to that place.'87 If the
evils of Jacobinism were not destroyed in the seminary from whence they were
propagated, their prevalence over Europe, Burke warned, would be a matter not of
contingency or speculation, but of absolute certainty.88
A political war, it can be certain, could not be conducted purely as an operation of
arms; it would require, Burke pointed out, as much political arrangement as military
skill.89 The plan he proposed for the war was indeed distinctly based on political and
ideological considerations. He deliberately distinguished the French nation from the
Jacobin regime, claiming that the enemy to be dealt with was not the France seeking
a foreign empire: 'it is a sect aiming at universal empire, and beginning with the
conquest of France.' With this in mind, he contended that the crusade must be
directed at 'France as a faction' rather than at 'France as a state'.90 The spirit of the
whole effort was not at war with France but with Jacobinism.9' The diminution of the
power of France, as a State, is pursued as an Object, as well as its reformation, as a
distemperd State; but the latter is, in my opinion, much the more important object of
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the two.'92 In short, the destruction of Jacobinism should be always held as the
guideline of the anti-Jacobin war.93 All the efforts in this crusade would be futile if
this principle was lost sight of:
Jacobinism. . must stand as long as the powers think its
extirpation but a secondary object, and think of taking advantage under
the name of indemnity and security to make war upon the whole nation
of France, royal and Jacobin, for the aggrandizement of the allies on the
ordinary principles of interest, as if no Jacobinism existed in the world.94
In Burke's eyes. Jacobinism was the most dreadful evil that had ever afflicted mankind,
'a thing which goes beyond the power of all calculation in its mischief.95 It could not
be reduced safely by any act; it must be destroyed, or it would destroy all Europe.
Indeed, the crusade, with regard to Jacobinism, he maintained, ought to be a war of
extermination, believing that there was nothing independent which could co-exist with
the Jacobin regime:96
you are enemies, that must subdue or be subdued, on the one side
or the other. If your hands are not on your swords, their knives will be
at your throats. There is no medium, - there is no temperament, -
there is no compromise with Jacobinism.97
Burke repulsed any move for a peace with the Jacobin republic. The struggle with
Jacobinism, he contended, was not a race for any trivial object: it was with the
system itself that they were at war. Thus, he concluded: 'As I understood the matter,
we were at war not with its conduct, but with its existence; convinced that its
existence and its hostility were the same.'98
It must be noticed, however, that, though Burke would have liked to have seen the
Jacobin system destroyed, he had by no means desired France to be ruined as a
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nation. As this issue touched the critical problem concerning the balance of power in
Europe, it therefore had to be considered carefully. Bearing in mind the principle of a
European equilibrium. Burke argued that the sinking of France as a member state of
the European community, by whatever causes, could do nothing good to the security
of Europe as a whole. It could not be right that
a second Kingdom should be struck out of the System of Europe,
either by destroying its independence, or by suffering it to have such a
form in its independence, as to keep it as a perpetual Fund of
Revolutions, in the very center of Europe; in that Region, which alone
touches almost every other, and must influence even where she does
not come in contact."
Burke admitted indeed that, for the general interest of Europe, France might need to
be circumscribed within moderate bounds, lest she should be able to overpower her
neighbours; none the less, he was more concerned about the great inconveniences
that might accrue from the 'total political extinction of a great civilized Nation situated
in the heart of our Western System'.100 It would be unwise, he contended, to suffer
France to be sunk into a 'lower condition than is good for the total balance of Europe,
and consequently for our welfare':101
I do not conceive that the total annihilation of France. . . is a
desirable thing to Europe; or even to this its rival nation. Provident
patriots did not think it good for Rome that even Carthage should be
quite destroyed; and he was a wise Greek, wise for the general Grecian
interests, as well as a brave Lacedaemonian enemy, and generous
conqueror, who did not wish, by the destruction of Athens, to pluck out
the other eye of Greece.102
The main object of this crusade, as Burke insisted, was to root out Jacobinism. When
this danger was removed, it would be a serious matter to consider how far a further
reduction of France would secure the general safety of Europe. Indeed, Burke was
convinced that in the end it might be necessary for the European powers to 'nurse
France, not to exhaust it', for even France herself had not been spared from the
severe devastation caused by the Revolution. Never had a country been so completely
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ruined, an appalled Burke noted. They who enter into France do not succeed to their
resources. They have not a system to reform, but a system to begin.'103
As for the conduct of this war, Burke had constantly urged the anti-Jacobin
powers to undertake effective action. Generally speaking, Burke recognised that in
order to launch a successful war against the Jacobins the force opposed to it 'should
be made to bear some analogy and resemblance to the force and spirit which that
system exerts'. With regard to the dynamics of the Jacobin regime, Burke perceived
that a jacobinised France belonged to a kind of power totally different from that of the
ancien regime. 'It is not the ancient France with ordinary ambition and ordinary
means,' Burke pointed out: 'It is not a new power of an old kind. It is a new power of
a new species.' Thus, he explained:
France differs essentially from all those governments, which are
formed without system, which exist by habit, and which are confused
with the multitude, and with the complexity of their pursuits. What now
stands as government in France is struck out at a heat. The design is
wicked, immoral, impious, oppressive; but it is spirited and daring; it is
systematic; it is simple in its principle; it has unity and consistency in
perfection.
It came near to a totalitarian system in which the sole will of the state prevailed:
To them the will, the wish, the want, the liberty, the toil, the blood
of individuals, is as nothing. Individuality is left out of their scheme of
government. The state is all in all. Everything is referred to the
production of force; afterwards, everything is trusted to the use of it. It
is military in its principle, in its maxims, in its spirit, and in all its
movements. The state has dominion and conquest for its sole objects;
dominion over minds by proselytism, over body by arms.
The Jacobin regime, in short, emerged as a 'martial republic': a republic made up of
'intriguers' and 'warriors', and with a character 'the most restless, the most
enterprising, the most imperious, the most fierce and bloody, the most hypocritical
and perfidious, the most bold and daring, that ever has been seen, or indeed that can
be conceived to exist'.104
This anatomy suggests that the anti-Jacobin campaign would need to be carried
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on with a spirit of unusual force. 'Republican spirit,' Burke contended, 'can only be
combatted by a spirit of the same nature; of the same nature, but informed with
another principle, and pointing to another end.' First, the anti-Jacobin crusade should
be pursued with enormous zeal. In Burke's opinion, a crusade, though fighting for an
ancient cause, should be able to animate as ardent a spirit, as 'novelty' had inspired
innovators 'to destroy the monuments of the piety and the glory of ancient ages'.105
to
Without such enthusiasm, the struggle would be doomedAfrustration:
There must be zeal. Universal zeal in such a cause, and at such a
time as this is, cannot be looked for; neither is it necessary. Zeal in the
larger part carries the force of the whole. Without this, no government,
certainly not our government, is capable of a great war.106
Secondly, this mission needed desperately to be imbued with a spirit of adventure. In
wars, Burke noted, something always had to be risked; and in the contest with
Jacobinism, he stressed, it was not precautions, but the having used too many of
them, that was to be apprehended:107
We are to break in upon a power in possession; we are to carry
everything by storm, or by surprise, or by intelligence, or by all.
Adventure, therefore, and not caution, is our policy. Here to be too
presuming is the better error.108
Thirdly, this campaign ought to be fought with all possible vigour.109 To subdue a
vicious and distempered energy would need a manly and rational vigour. '[I]f we meet
this energy,' Burke wrote.
. . .with doubts, fears, and suspicions, with a languid, uncertain
hesitation, with a formal, official spirit, which is turned aside by every
obstacle from its purpose, and which never sees a difficulty but to yield
to it, or at best to evade it; down we go to the bottom of the abyss -
and nothing short of Omnipotence can save us.110
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Lastly, and most important, this war must be launched at once. To Burke, the more
permanent the Jacobin system promised to be, the more alarming it would become."'
The Jacobin system, he believed, would gather strength by continuance and increase
its credit by success; and it would hence gradually, he feared, gain the confidence of
the people to join, or at least to accommodate themselves, to it:"2
Every hour any system of Government continues, be that system
what it will, the more it attains consistency, and the better it will be
able to provide for its own support, and the less the People who always
look to settlement of one kind or other, will be disposed to any
enterprizes for overturning it."3
Worse still, when the present system grew stronger because of longer existence, it
would have the power utterly 'to destroy discontents at home, and to resist all foreign
attempts in favour of these discontents'."4 After all, Burke believed that a 'speedy
determination' was indispensable for this anti-Jacobin crusade."5 Of course, he did
not mean to prompt the anti-Jacobin powers to any precipitate action: 'I am far
indeed from recommending rash enterprises with inadequate force.'"6 None the less,
he warned, every instant would give the enemy time to strengthen itself."7
Meanwhile, the tactics to be adopted in this war should also be specific. Burke
made it clear that the present war would not bear the least resemblance to any that
had ever happened before. Accordingly, the anti-Jacobin forces ought not to draw on
the examples and reasonings taken from the former wars for their guidance."8 It
would be inadequate for them to follow the 'old, worn out principles and Topics of
Policy', because the enemy they were to face was a 'new Evil' which no 'antient
Maxims' were able to destroy."9 Neither the present politics, nor the present war.
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Burke claimed, belonged to war and politics of past experience; therefore, all the
ordinary political and military procedures would prove ultimately unavailing.'20 'Never
did an attempt require more a sort of conduct out of the common Routine, or more
belonging to the specifick occasion.'12' Here, he declared, the beaten path might
become the very reverse of the safe road.'22
Two points have figured particularly in the proposal which Burke made for the
crusade. In the first place, an offensive strategy had to be adopted. Burke pointed out
that what the European nations had to apprehend from France was not so much a
direct invasion as her exportation of revolution: the danger would come mainly not
from external attack, but from 'internal corruption'. A threat of this nature was not to
be effectively guarded against by a merely defensive resistance.'23 It would be absurd,
he wrote, that a 'defensive alliance' should be meditated to prevent the 'operation of
intrigue, mischievous doctrine, and evil example, in the success of unprovoked
rebellion, regicide, and systematic assassination and massacre'.124 As noted above,
Burke had not grasped the power of Jacobin France purely in terms of its physical
strength: that regime was a kind of power 'which was not so truly dangerous in its
fortresses nor in its territories, as in its spirit and its principles'. It thus became a
danger against which not even armies and fortresses could form the least effective
defence:'25
We are at War with that principle and that Example and not with
an ordinary power. In the whole Circle of political Expedients I am afraid
that there is no sort of merely defensive plan, of the least force, against
the Effect of the Example given in France, subversive of every regular
form of Government, and every one of those regular intermediate Bodies
which support the Governments.'26
He ridiculed the prospect of composing a defensive alliance to hinder the propagation
of Jacobin principles as being an effort to 'form a Cordon to hedge in the Cuckoo'.
120 Corr, vii, 413. 'To William Windham - 18 Aug. 1793'.
121 Corr, vi, 333. 'To Richard Burke, Jr - 9 Aug. 1791'.
122
'Letters on a Regicide Peace', Burke's Works v, 232.
123
'Thoughts on French Affairs'. Burke's Works iii. 376.
124 'Heads for Consideration on the Present State of Affairs', Burke's Works, iii, 409
125 'Letters on a Regicide Peace', Burke's Works, v, 235
126 Corr, vii, 383. 'To Lieutenant General Edward, Count Dalton - 6 Aug 1793'.
114
That would be like a 'League of Princes against bad Syllogisms': 'An alliance of whfch
the Casus foederis is sophistic Maxims'.'27
There would still be practical difficulties in the effort to concert the but too
dissonant European powers. Burke believed it to be a mere chimera to hope that a
lasting alliance for defence could possibly be formed among a number of nations, who
were 'of long discordant interests, with innumerable discussions existing, having no
one pointed object to which it is directed', and who had to be held together with an
unremitted vigilance, as watchful in peace as in war'. In contrast, an offensive alliance
would be more feasible. Burke believed that if European powers would form an
offensive alliance, their union could be more successfully maintained as a result of
their 'common efforts in common dangers, against a common active enemy'. It would
be able to preserve its unity, and produce for a given time some considerable effect.'28
Indeed, an alliance for offensive operations not only would be more practicable,
but it could serve better the aim of the anti-Jacobin crusade. If the crusade, as Burke
pointed out, was to extinguish the Jacobin system, the surest way for it to do so was
to destroy it in the place from where it was spread; and this could not be done
through a mere defensive strategy. A war to destroy a whole system must be very
much a war of extermination; therefore, not only was an offensive strategy necessary,
but it had to be directed at the 'heart of affairs'. It had to be a 'centrifugal war' which,
Burke insisted, could not be effectively carried on by always keeping on the
circumference around the enemy.'29 In effect, great advantages could ensue from
tackling France directly from within. According to his analysis, France, though most
formidable abroad, was essentially weak at home. It was terrible on its frontiers,
because the vices of the French system at home had tended paradoxically to give
force to her foreign exertions: The generals must join the armies. They must lead
them to enterprise, or they are likely to perish by their hands.' In contrast, its interior
seemed feeble, as the internal disorders resulting from the Revolution were ever ready
to shatter the Jacobin regime.'30 'France is strong at arm's length,' Burke thus
commented:
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She is, I am convinced, weakness itself, if you can get to grapple
with her internally. If you keep on the frontier - if you should even gain
all the frontier - she may, if you are resolved to give her time, (which is
giving her everything,) make another frontier.131
It would be, he warned, ten times more easy totally to destroy the system itself, than,
when established, it would be to reduce its power.132
Nevertheless, whereas Burke tenaciously pressed for offensive actions, he did not
mean to pursue the war unrelentingly in the form of indiscriminate hostility to the
French Nation without distinction of persons, parties, or principles.133 Sticking to his
anti-Jacobin principles, he solicited the foreign powers, in their attack, to stand as 'the
Enemy only of a pernicious faction Tyrannizing in that Country', and not to fall on 'the
Nation universally'.134 He invoked precedents from history and argued that on similar
occasions foreign powers had approached such a war in the manner of giving aid to
one party in a civil contest rather than of launching a hostile invasion:
When the Spaniards, in the sixteenth century, sent aids to the
chiefs of the league, they appeared as allies to that league, and to the
imprisoned king (the Cardinal de Bourbon) which that league had set up.
When the Germans came to the aid of the Protestant princes, in the
same series of civil wars, they came as allies. When the English came to
the aid of Henry the Fourth, they appeared as allies to that prince. So
did the French always when they intermeddled in the affairs of Germany.
They came to aid a party there.135
Burke exhorted foreign nations to act as friendly powers applied to for counsel and
assistance in the settlement of a distracted country. They should deem it as their
primary object, he stressed, to help 'the dignity, the religion, and the property' of
France to 'repossess themselves of the means of their natural influence', thus paving
the way for the final resettlement of the country.136
In support of this principle comes Burke's other major tactic for the anti-Jacobin
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crusade: his unremitting call for collaboration with the French royalists. If the
restoration ofjbld order to France was the main object of the crusade, it would be
politic for foreign powers to recruit the service of the remnants of the French
anti-Jacobins and to make common cause with them. Burke claimed that
if I could command the whole military arm of Europe, I am sure,
that a bribe of the best province in that kingdom would not tempt me
to intermeddle in their affairs, except in perfect concurrence and concert
with the natural, legal interest of the country. . 137
The French royalists, of course, would be the sole and natural party with whom
foreign powers ought to concert their actions in this contest.138 Though the French
royalists were in general disarray, the anti-Jacobin powers could still manage to
reintegrate these forces and provide them with an effective leadership. Burke pleaded
that protection and succour should be promised to these 'unfortunate people' who had
bravely endeavoured the restoration of monarchy to their country.139 It was them, he
insisted, that 'we are to use as our instruments in the reduction, in the pacification,
and in the settlement of France'.140
The French royalists included those numerous resistants who still remained in their
homeland and a corps of emigres who had, since the Revolution, taken refuge abroad.
According to Burke, the resistants inside France could be of great value if the
intervening powers would employ them as their internal collaborators. They could
form, he pointed out,
an ally in the heart of the country, who, to our hundred thousand,
would at one time have added eighty thousand men at the least, and all
animated by principle, by enthusiasm, and by vengeance; motives which
secured them to the cause in a very different manner from some of
those allies whom we subsidized with millions.
And this internal ally, Burke added, was potentially more formidable to the Jacobin
regime than 'all his other foes united'.141 As for the emigres, Burke requested the
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intervening powers to consult, and as much as possible to use, them in affairs of their
own concern.142 These people, he pointed out, were the natural, legal and
constitutional representatives of ancient France; they therefore ought to be taken
counsel with on the important interests in which they had a major stake: those
interests concerned their king, their country, their laws, their religion, and their
property.143 Indeed, the emigres, because of their knowledge of, and their interests in,
their country, could perhaps be dispatched most effectively as a column of the
'advanced guard' in the crusade, while the grand, well-disciplined army of the
European powers 'proceeded leisurely, and in close connexion with all its stores,
provisions, and heavy cannon, to support the expedite body in case of misadventure,
or to improve and complete its success'.144
Several justifications could be assigned for the wisdom of the policy of
collaborating with the French royalists. First of all. Burke argued, the French people
would be more eligible to manage their own concerns: 'I have a strong opinion,' he
claimed, 'that Frenchmen are best for French affairs.'145 This reason was readily
comprehensible. No foreigner whatsoever would be either in interest so engaged, or in
judgement and local knowledge so competent, as the natives of the country could be,
£
for taking up such^task:
The affair of the establishment of a government is a very difficult
undertaking for foreign powers to act in as principals, though as
auxiliaries and mediators, it has been not at all unusual, and may be a
measure full of policy and humanity, and true dignity.
And Burke specified that the most serious endeavours to restore royalty would be
made by royalists and that property could be most energetically restored by the
ancient proprietors of that kingdom. Secondly, a noble cause that conjoined the
French royalist force would make it more appealing to the sentiments of the French
people and it would thus be easier to secure their indispensable support:
If we wish to make an impression on the minds of any persons in
France, or to persuade them to join our standard, it is impossible that
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they should not be more easily led, and more readily formed and
disciplined ... by those who speak their language, who are acquainted
with their manners, who are conversant with their usages and habits of
thinking, and who have a local knowledge of their country, and some
remains of ancient credit and consideration, than with a body
congregated from all tongues and tribes.
Moreover, the presence of these 'respectable native interests' in their actions would
help to dispel any suspicion, which might arise in the minds of the French people, of
ill-designing motives on the part of the intervening powers. It would indeed convince
the French people that the European nations had no intention of entering France in
the style of conquerors, but had only come to 'maintain their legitimate monarchy in a
truly paternal French government, to protect their privilege, their laws, their religion,
and their property'.'46
The most valuable role which the French royalists could play, however, was to
perform as special instruments to de-Jacobinise France. To restore France back to
normal. Burke claimed, it would not be enough merely to break her power. Ultimately,
it would need to re-civilise it; and for this task, he wrote, some descriptions of people
of their own race, but 'better in rank, superior in property and decorum, of honourable,
decent, and orderly habits', would become absolutely necessary. The Jacobins, in
Burke's eyes, were 'ferocious savages' who, to be civilised, ought to be put under the
direction and the government of better Frenchmen than themselves; otherwise, they
would soon relapse into another fever of aggravated Jacobinism.147 Among the French
royalists, the Gallican clergy were reckoned as the most operative instrument of
civilisation. Burke contended that 'if we can make any serious impression upon France
by Arms in the beginning, the Clergy will be of more effect in the progress of this
Business, than an hundred thousand Soldiers'.148 This corps of priests in his eyes were
discreet, gentle, well-tempered, conciliatory, virtuous, and pious; and they could
practise, on the heel of military operations, most suitably the works of the 'physicians
and magistrates of the mind'. To the clergy would be added an army of French
gentlemen who, according to Burke's observations, were well-informed, sensible,
ingenious, high-principled, and spirited. These gentlemen stood for the expatriated,
landed interest of France; and they, when restored to their own lands, could join the
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clergy in reanimating the French people to their loyalty, their fidelity, and their
religion. And because of their familiarity with their own country, they would then be
able to sort out their people and thus to arm the 'honest and well-affected' against
the 'factious and ill-disposed'.149
Burke proclaimed again and again that the contribution of the French royalists was
utterly essential in the effort for the final pacification of France. 'We are convinced,' he
wrote,
that a number of persons so disposed and so qualified as they are,
if restored to their Country their property, and the influence which
property in good hands carries with it, would be a necessary
supplement to the use of arms; and that, under a Wise administration,
they might do great things indeed for restoring France to the civilized
World. Without this help such a deplorable Havock is made in the minds
of men (in both sexes) in France, still more than in the external order of
things, and the Evil is so great and spreading, that a remedy is
impossible on any other Terms.160
He reiterated his suspicion about the fitness of foreigners to carry out such a
sophisticated task. France would be gained and settled, but it ought to be gained and
settled 'by itself, and through the medium of its own native dignity and property'. 'It is
not honest,' he concluded, 'it is not decent, still less is it politic, for foreign powers
themselves to attempt anything in this minute, internal, local detail, in which they
could show nothing but ignorance, imbecility, confusion, and oppression.'151
Any discussion of Burke's anti-Jacobin crusade must at last focus on his proposals
for the post-war order in France. To resettle France with good judgment would
require wise policy. Generally speaking, Burke's approach to this issue seemed fairly
open-minded: he favoured a plan which would temperately secure as its basis some
general principles of religion, loyalty, and civil order, while leaving 'every thing else to
be discussed'.152 Indeed, he would rather see reestablished in post-war France an
order in which everything was settled upon its old foundation, but with an 'improved
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and permanent superstructure'.153
This prospect suggests that Burke would prefer a policy which might compromise
subtly between different principles of restoration and reform. There can be no doubt
that in Burke's mind a programme of restoration should be made the foundation for
the future settlement of France. They who wanted to reform a state, he pointed out,
ought to assume some actual constitution of government which was to be reformed.
It was necessary, therefore, to commence the resettlement of France by the
're-establishment of order and property of every kind, and, through the
re-establishment of their monarchy, of every one of the old habitual distinctions and
classes of the state'.'54 When things were returned to their old grounds, it might then
be realistic to talk with safety, upon some practical principles, of reforming what had
been amiss:155 'I am satisfied,' Burke declared, 'that nothing can possibly do it any real
service, but to establish it upon all its antient Bases Till that is done, one Man's
speculation will appear as good as anothers.'156
The general principle which underlines Burke's policy of restoration was
perspicuous. Essentially, he called for France to be reinstated 'without exception as
nearly as possible upon its former Basis'.157 In his vision, every man in every
denomination should be restored afterwards 'to his own House and to his own Altar,
from the palace of the Prince and the Bishop, and the Castle of the Noble, to the
parsonage House of the Curate and the Cottage of the peasant'.158 To provide a basic
political framework for France, Burke, appealing to the international law of Europe,
argued strongly for the restitution of a fundamentally monarchical government:159
In all our transactions with France, and at all periods, we have
treated with that state on the footing of a monarchy. Monarchy was
considered in all the external relations of that kingdom with every
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power in Europe as its legal and constitutional government.160
Indeed, he had not only contended that the French monarchy needed to be
reinstituted, but insisted that the restored monarch had to remain a very strong one.161
To meet the exigencies of a nation so situated and so related as that of France, its
king must wield a real, solid and extensive power: what a king of France in common
sense had to possess, according to Burke, should include
Every degree of power necessary to the state, and not destructive
to the rational and moral freedom of individuals, to that personal liberty,
and personal security, which contribute so much to the vigour, the
prosperity, the happiness, and the dignity of a nation - every degree of
power which does not suppose the total absence of all control and all
responsibility on the part of ministers.
At any rate, he should be made powerful enough, alone and by himself, to hold a just
balance between different orders and, at the same time, to effect the interior and
exterior purposes of a protecting government.'62
It must be pointed out, however, that when Burke pressed for restoring the French
monarchy, his object was to rebuild the entire monarchical order, including its
kingship and its aristocratic bases. He had more than once warned that, to campaign
for the monarchy of France, it would be impolitic to consider its monarch as
everything and to ignore the intermediate orders which supported it as nothing.163 The
aristocratic principle was essential to a viable monarchical system. On the one hand,
aristocracy was the strongest pillar that propped up the monarchy. No permanent and
hereditary royalty, Burke claimed, could survive ' where nothing else is hereditary or
permanent in point either of personal or corporate dignity) and it would be
unimaginable, he continued,
that monarchy can be acknowledged and supported in France upon
any other basis than that of its property, corporate and individual, or
that it can enjoy a moment's permanence or security upon any scheme
of things, which sets aside all the ancient corporate capacities and
160
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distinctions of the kingdom, and subverts the whole fabric of its ancient
laws and usages.
Monarchy and property, Burke insisted, must also go together, or neither could exist.'64
Before a government could be firmly reinstated in France, therefore, it would be of
absolute necessity to have all the property faithfully restored.'65 On the other hand,
the aristocratic orders would also form a natural bulwark to guard against the excess
of monarchical authority. Burke contended that the future government of France must
be founded upon property and 'regulated by it'.'66 It would be wise, he suggested, if
the programme of resettlement would declare clearly and distinctly in favour of the
restoration of property, and then to 'confide to the hereditary property of the kingdom,
the limitation and qualifications of its hereditary monarchy'.'67 Without an aristocracy
to be its brake. Burke was convinced, 'every Dominion must become a mere despotism
of the Prince, or the brutal Tyranny of a ferocious and atheistick populace'.'68
Burke's eagerness for restoration, nevertheless, had not driven him to espouse any
programme which would seek to revive every bit of the ancien regime without
distinction. The discussion above has obviously indicated that, though Burke pressed
hard for restoration, what he insisted upon in fact was the general framework, rather
than the specific details, of the coming settlement. Indeed, he was ready to admit that
any attempt for a total restoration in the case of France would be virtually out of the
question. He had not been blind to the great muddle that the Revolution had produced
in France and he argued that, after such a violent and total shake-up, no effort would
be able to bring France back to her ancient state intact:
When such a complete convulsion has shaken the State, and hardly
left any thing whatsoever, either in civil arrangements, or in the
Characters and disposition of mens minds, exactly where it was,
whatever shall be settled although in the former persons and upon old
forms, will be in some measure a new thing.'69
164
'Remarks on the Policy of the Allies', Burke's Works, iii, 416-7.
165 Corr.', vii, 384. 'To Lieutenant General Edward, Count Dalton - 6 Aug. 1793'.
166 Corr, vii, 521. To Captain Emperor John Alexander Woodford - 13 Jan. 1794'.
167 'Remarks on the Policy of the Allies', Burke's Works, iii, 416.
168 Corr, vii, 160. 'To Richard Burke, Jr - 29 July 1792'.
189 Corr, vi, 479. 'To Unknown - (1791)'.
123
Any resettlement afterwards, even when based on old foundations, would unavoidably
have to undergo some degree of change.
In truth, any idea of an indiscriminate restoration would be quite undesirable. First,
Burke had entertained no doubt that the French people, after having a taste of
freedom, would not like to see the coming back of their old monarchical despotism:
'after having changed a sort of despotism for a sort of Anarchy, they should not
change back from anarchy to despotism'.'70 Moreover, neither was Burke himself,
despite his hatred for the Jacobin revolution, a friend of any arbitrary power;
#
For my part for one, though I make no doubt of preferring the
antient Course, or almost any other to this vile chimera, and sick mans
dream of Government yet I could not actively, or with a good heart, and
clear conscience, go to the establishment of a monarchical despotism in
the place of this system of Anarchy.'71
He had explicitly disclaimed supporting any motion which would seek to restore
'L'ancien Regime' in the sense of reviving 'that system of Court Intrigue miscalled a
Government as it stood, at Versailles before the present confusions'. That had been a
state no less chaotic than that of the Jacobin system and therefore it could only be
untenable. Thus, Burke wrote: 'If it were even possible to lay things down exactly as
they stood, before the series of experimental politicks began, I am quite sure that they
could not long continue in that situation.'172
At any rate, Burke accepted that some modifications would need to be made so
that the old order of France could be rationalised and hence revitalised. To lay down a
proper basis for such a change. Burke had alluded to the 'Business of June 1789' for a
blueprint. Here, he clearly referred to that reform proposal which Louis XVI presented
before the States General on the 23 June 1789 and which promised a moderate
reform without impairing the fundamental social fabric of the ancien regime.173 Burke
himself also had once sketched out a memorandum which epitomised plainly his
general prospect of the future settlement of France: 1st, it was fundamental primarily
170 Corr.. vi, 423. To the Chevalier de La Bintinaye - (27 Oct. 1791)'.
171 Corr., vi, 414. To Richard Burke, Jr - 26 Sept. 1791'.
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to restore the monarchy as the basis, and then to secure with it a free constitution;
2nd, for this purpose, it was necessary to cause a meeting of the States General,
freely chosen according to the ancient legal order and voting by order; 3rd, to secure
personal freedom, all Letters de Cachet and other means of arbitrary imprisonment
had to be abolished; 4th, all taxation must be raised by the States General in
conjunction with the King; 5th, ministerial responsibility ought to be established, and
public revenue put out of the power of abuse and malversation; and lastly, a synod of
the Gallican Church had to be convened to reform all its abuses.174 These guidelines
reveal Burke's view of reform. He favoured a moderate approach and he hoped to
transform the old order of France into a free system: 'I must think,' he had once
declared, 'such a government well deserved to have its excellencies heightened, its
faults corrected, and its capacities improved into a British constitution.''75 After all, his
aim was to reconstruct in France a 'Government under a Monarchy acting by fixed
Law'.176 It ought to be a system which would incorporate into monarchy the sober
liberty of the subjects and hold out some security to the people.177
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The Reflections on the Revolution in France, according to Burke's own account,
had been published because of his apprehension that 'the principles of a new,
republican, frenchified Whiggism was gaining ground in this Country'.' Indeed, the
cause which chiefly motivated Burke to pronounce on French affairs was his solicitude
for the portentous influence which the French Revolution would exert on Britain rather
than his concern over the fate of France.2 The coming of the French Revolution had
been acclaimed with great zeal in Britain among the radicals who, not slow in
appreciating its universal implication, had earnestly welcomed it as a timely
encouragement to their own dormant cause of reform. The spirit and determination of
the French people to struggle for liberty had been much admired. It was the
enthusiasm of the British radicals for the French Revolution that aroused Burke:
When I saw all this mingled Scene of Crime, of Vice, of disorder, of
folly, and of madness, receivd by very many here, not with the Horrour
and disgust, which it ought to have produced, but with rapture and
exultation, as some almost supernatural Benefit showred down upon the
Race of mankind; and when I saw, that arrangements were publickly
made for communicating to these Islands their full share of these
blessings, I thought myself bound to stand out and by every means in
my power to distinguish the Ideas of a sober and virtuous Liberty. . .
from that profligate, immoral, impious, and rebellious Licence, which,
through the medium of every sort of disorder and calamity, conducts to
some kind or other of Tyrannick domination.3
The Reflections was thus written with a view to exposing the 'English friends of
French liberty', intending, of course, to caution the British public against the
penetration of French principles.4
This principal preoccupation is clearly revealed by the fact that the Reflections
though mainly dealing with the French Revolution, starts with a precursory attack on a
sermon entitled A Discourse on the Love of Our Country, which Dr. Richard Price, a
'
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celebrated Dissenting minister, had been invited to preach before the meeting of the
Revolution Society on 4 November 1789 to commemorate the anniversary of the
Glorious Revolution.5 The striking feature of Price's Sermon consists in its bold
republican tone, inspired obviously by what was then going on across the Channel.
Price, in the course of his preaching, had openly declared that the British monarch
was 'almost the only lawful King in the world, because the only one who owes his
crown to the choice of his people'. This assertion had been grounded, there can be no
doubt, on the view that the Revolution of 1688 had been achieved as a result of the
triumph of the people: 'By a bloodless victory,' Price claimed, 'the fetters which
despotism had been long preparing for us were broken; the rights of the people were
asserted, a tyrant expelled, and a Sovereign of our own choice appointed in his room.'
And to elucidate the heritage of 1688, Price went on to impress upon his audience
that by the Revolution the British people had secured the right to liberty of
conscience, the right to resist power when abused, and, more especially. The right to
chuse our own governors; to cashier them for misconduct; and to frame a
government for ourselves'. However, he reminded them, the achievement of 1688,
great as it had been, was by no means perfect: religious toleration in Britain remained
limited and the defect of representation had yet to be corrected. The people of Britain
therefore must continue their efforts to reform the constitution until they were put 'in
the secure and complete possession of the blessings of liberty'. The sermon ended
with an enthusiastic panegyric for the French Revolution, which insinuated that the
French people were but following the step which the British had taken in 1688.®
Price of course was not here to preach revolution for Britain; to be sure, his call
for complete toleration and his pressing for parliamentary reform could by no means
be deemed revolutionary. However, his eagerness to cast the Revolution of 1688 in
republican colours, and particularly to view it from the angle of the French Revolution,
proved only too provocative: the sermon, claimed Burke, had contained 'shocking
Sentiments, and seditious principles'.7 The principle which undoubtedly aroused Burke
5
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most was the theory of popular sovereignty, which Price had audaciously broached in
his sermon. In fact, Price's principles had been readily linked to a prevailing radical
ideology which Burke had contemptuously branded as new Whiggism whose leading
principles were understood to be included in the republican idea
that the sovereignty. . . did not only originate from the people, . . .
but that in the people the same sovereignty constantly and unalienably
resides; that the people may lawfully depose kings, not only for
misconduct, but without any misconduct at all; that they may set up any
new fashion of government for themselves, or continue without any
government at their pleasure; that the people are essentially their own
rule, and their will the measure of their conduct; that the tenure of
magistracy is not a proper subject of contract, because magistrates
have duties, but no rights; and that if a contract de facto is made with
them in one age, allowing that it binds at all, it only binds those who
are immediately concerned in it, but does not pass to posterity. . .8
Meanwhile, a concomitant ideological confusion had also distressed Burke: there was
a general tendency in the nation indiscriminately to associate 'this strange thing,
called a Revolution in France' with 'the glorious event commonly called the Revolution
in England'.9 Indeed, he was much surprised when he discovered that members of the
Whig party were similarly nursing certain radical opinions. These radical Whigs, it was
noticed, had been so imprudent as to preach up the perilous doctrine of 'resistance
and revolution' and had even gone so far as to assert 'that our last Revolution of 1688
stands on the same or similar principles with that of France'.10
Burke had always reckoned himself as among the most forward in the zeal to
maintain the principles of the Glorious Revolution, and of the British constitution, in
their 'utmost purity and vigour'." When therefore such a challenge arose, he naturally
felt it incumbent upon himself to bring out the truth of the 1688 Revolution, in order
on the one hand to cleanse it from a republican taint and on the other to absolve it
from being associated with the French Revolution. Moreover, it also became necessary
for efforts to be made to restate the 'true principles of our constitution in Church and
state'.12 The publication of Burke's Reflections, however, had failed to settle the
8
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problem, but had sparked off an unpleasant dispute which led to the irrevocable split
of the opposition Whig party.13 His friend, Charles James Fox, had, much to his
chagrin, publicly declared his 'entire disapprobation' of the book in the 'most
unqualified Terms', while another colleague, Richard Sheridan, threatened to write
against it.14 Consequently, Burke was 'disowned' by the Whig party, to which he had
been so much attached.15 It was then indeed generally held that Burke had wandered
from the principles of the Whig tradition and had betrayed his long-cherished cause
of reform. To vindicate himself and, indeed, further to reinforce the principles which
he laid down in the Reflections, appeal was made to history.16 In his An Appeal from
the New to the Old Whigs (1791), Burke drew upon the Whig arguments of Queen
Anne's reign, endeavouring to prove that his Reflections had 'stated the Revolution
and the Settlement upon their true principles of legal reason and constitutional policy'
and that his interpretation of the 1688 Revolution was 'in perfect harmony with that of
the ancient Whigs'.17
The controversy here occasioned undoubtedly had immediate political relevance,
but the debate proceeded, as was usual at the time, around the historical question
concerning the nature of the Revolution in 1688.18 Naturally, Burke chose to establish
his own view through controverting Price's theory that the 1688 Revolution had
mandated the people to choose their rulers, to cashier them for misconduct, and to
form a new government. Price's claim was apparently based on the allegation that the
British people had deposed King James II and replaced him with King William III in
1688. The fundamental task falling on Burke, therefore, was to prove that Price's
interpretation of the 1688 Revolution was historically untenable. The first issue here to
be tackled touches the question about the nature of the British kingship: had the
British nation set up the 'choice of his people' as the foundation of 'the king's
exclusive legal title' in 1688? To elucidate this question, Burke had, at the outset,
13 Corr, vi, 308. 'To the Bishop of Salisbury - 31 July 1791'.
14 Corr, vi, 178. 'To Sir Gilbert Elliot - 29 Nov. 1790'.
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readily pointed to a plain fact that the present king of Britain was not called to the
throne through election although historically, he admitted, kingship might have
originated from some sort of popular election:
At some time or other, to be sure, all the beginners of dynasties
were chosen by those who called them to govern. There is ground
enough for the opinion that all the kingdoms of Europe were, at a
remote period, elective, with more or fewer limitations in the objects of
choice. But whatever kings might have been here, or elsewhere, a
thousand years ago, or in whatever manner the ruling dynasties of
England or France may have begun, the king of Great Britain is, at this
day, king by a fixed rule of succession, according to the laws of his
country.
And Burke went on to deny categorically the assertion that the king of Britain had
ever owed his high office to 'any form of popular election'.19
It could well be argued, however, that since the Hanoverian succession had based
its legality upon the Revolution Settlement and as the Revolution Settlement had
implied the principle of the choice of the people, it was therefore legitimate to claim
that the British monarchy, after 1688 at least, was elective. Indeed, did not those
decisions amount to the most daring acts of choice when the British nation enthroned
King William in 1688 and when they later offered the crown to the House of Hanover
through the Act of Settlement? To defuse such a challenge, Burke had invoked firstly
historical documents from the Revolution as his authority and pointed out that the
Declaration of Rights in effect had been quite silent on the so-called right of election,
for throughout that great cornerstone of the British constitution, he noted, 'not one
word is said, nor one suggestion made, of a general right "to choose our own
governor#'. At the same time, he was anxious to play down the elective connotation
in the case of King William's accession. He contended that though the accession of
King William did constitute, so far as the hereditary succession was concerned, 'a
small and a temporary deviation' from its regular order, it nevertheless could not be
grossly interpreted as a downright popular election. The British people's acceptance of
King William, he claimed, was not the result of an election freely made. It was rather a
'necessity' forced upon them by the situation of the time:
their accepting King William was not properly a choice but to all
19
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those who did not wish, in effect, to recall King James, or to deluge
their country in blood, and again to bring their religion, laws, and
liberties into the peril they had just escaped, it was an act of necessity,
in the strictest moral sense in which necessity can be taken.
King William's accession, at any rate, ought not to be made too much of. Whatever it
might be. Burke argued, it was at most but a special case, made at an unusual
moment; and it would be improper to draw a principle 'from a law made in a special
case, and regarding an individual person'. He took the radicals to task for their
imprudence to 'see nothing in that of 1688 but the deviation from the constitution'
and then to 'take the deviation from the principle for the principle'. Indeed, even here
the deviation did not seem to have strayed too far. To Burke, in truth, King William
himself was no alien to the title of the throne: he was both James It's son-in-law and
Charles I's nephew, and therefore 'though not next, was however very near, in the line
of succession'.20
If the British nation had not in effect made their king elective in 1688, they had
more emphatically demonstrated their determined commitment to the principle of
inheritance in the Act of Settlement of 1701. When a total failure of issue from King
William III, and afterwards from Queen Anne, was in prospect, Britain would again face
the thorny problem of settling the succession to the throne. There was then a
pressing need to maintain a certainty in the future succession and, moreover, to
secure the liberties of the people. Burke pointed out that when Parliament came to
solve this problem, it revealed great judgment in the decision, on the one hand, to
reaffirm without hesitation the principle of inheritance, which Burke believed had
'prevailed in the Declaration of Rights', and, on the other, to specify with precision the
'persons who were to inherit in the Protestant line'.21 The hereditary nature of the
Hanoverian succession was undeniable:
The Princess Sophia was named in the act of settlement of the
12th and 13th of King William, for a stock and root of inheritance to our
kings, and not for her merits as a temporary administratrix of a power,
which she might not, and in fact did not, herself ever exercise. She was
adopted for one reason, and for one only, because, says the act, 'the
most excellent Princess Sophia, Electress and Duchess Dowager of
Hanover, is daughter of the most excellent Princess Elizabeth, late
Queen of Bohemia, daughter of our late sovereign lord King James the
20 Ibid. 290-2, 296.
21 Ibid, 291.
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First'. . . This limitation was made by parliament, that through the
Princess Sophia an inheritable line not only was to be continued in
future, but. . . that through her it was to be connected with the old
stock of inheritance in King James the First; in order that the monarchy
might preserve an unbroken unity through all ages, and might be
preserved. . . in the old approved mode by descent.
The making of such a settlement on that uncertain occasion, indeed, had betrayed
quite remarkably the pertinacity of the nation in support of the principle of
inheritance: 'At no time, perhaps,' Burke explained,
did the sovereign legislature manifest a more tender regard to that
fundamental principle of British constitutional policy, than at the time of
the Revolution, when it deviated from the direct line of hereditary
succession. The crown was carried somewhat out of the line in which it
had before moved; but the new line was derived from the same stock. It
was still a line of hereditary descent; still an hereditary descent in the
same blood, though an hereditary descent qualified with Protestantism.
When the legislature altered the direction, but kept the principle, they
showed that they held it inviolable.
The fact that the Hanoverian succession was a foreign line also reinforced this point.
If it had been true that the British nation had been honoured with the right freely to
choose their king without regard to the constitutional policy of the land, it would then
appear puzzling. Burke suggested, that they should have fastidiously rejected the fair
and abundant choice which our country presented to them, and searched, in strange
lands for a foreign princess'. Certainly, it was unreasonable that they should risk 'a
plan of hereditary Protestant succession in the old line, with all the dangers and all
the inconveniences of its being a foreign line full before their eyes'.22
The cautious step which the British people had then taken to settle the throne, in
Burke's view, revealed the reserved nature of the 1688 Revolution. It had to be
admitted that, had there been any occasion more favourable for the British people to
render their king elective, it must have been at the era of the Revolution when the
nation was left without a king. 'It is true,' Burke pointed out, 'that, aided with the
powers derived from force and opportunity, the nation was at that time, in some
sense, free to take what course it pleased for filling the throne.' Indeed, they could
have even totally abolished the monarchy and torn apart the whole frame of the




dissuaded the British nation from thinking such bold changes within their commission:
It is indeed difficult, perhaps impossible, to give limits to the mere
abstract competence of the supreme power, such as was exercised by
parliament at that time; but the limits of a moral competence,
subjecting, even in powers more indisputably sovereign, occasional will
to permanent reason, and to the steady maxims of faith, justice, and
fixed fundamental policy, are perfectly intelligible, and perfectly binding
upon those who exercise any authority, under any name, or under any
title, in the state.
The reluctance of the then Parliament to establish the principle of popular election as
the legal title to the British throne had important implications. If the nation had not
thought it rightful to assert such a principle at its most favourable opportunity, it
proved. Burke was convinced, that the people 'was of opinion it ought not to be done
at any time'. He had gone so far as to declare that not only had the British people not
acquired by the Revolution a right to choose their king, but, even had they possessed
it before, they 'did at that time most solemnly renounce and abdicate it, for
themselves, and for all their posterity for ever'.23
In the final analysis, Burke insisted, the throne of Britain had been succeeded
neither along the absurd doctrine of indefeasible hereditary right, nor through the
frantic theory of popular election. Rather, it
has always been what it now is, an hereditary succession by law:
in the old line it was a succession by the common law; in the new by
the statute law, operating on the principles of the common law, not
changing the substance, but regulating the mode, and describing the
persons.
This, he believed, had been a rational settlement, 'bottomed upon solid principles of
law and policy'.24 Above all. Burke wrote, the British throne had been settled for ever
in the House of Hanover upon the idea of an hereditary succession qualified with
protestantism, and not upon ' elective principles, in any sense of the word elective, or
under any modification or description of election whatsoever'.25
23 Ibid, 291, 294.
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If it had been delusive and ill-founded to assert that the 1688 Revolution had
secured to the British people the right to choose their governors, the claim that it had
mandated them to cashier them for misconduct was even more misleading and utterly
mischievous. 'No government could stand a moment,' Burke warned, 'if it could be
blown down with anything so loose and indefinite as an opinion of "misconduct".' The
crucial point here naturally turns on the question about the right of resistance:
namely, would revolution ever be justifiable? To Price, that power should be resisted
when abused, was a matter of course and the 1688 Revolution seemed to have made
it clear that misconduct could justify resistance. Burke was of quite another mind. To
be sure, Burke had not disputed in principle the claim that the people had indeed
reserved a right to resist; instead, he was more concerned lest it should be agitated
too often and too lightly, for, in his view, any event which should involve resisting
supreme power would always be a cause of great concern and, therefore, should
always be approached with the highest seriousness. To Burke, a charge of
'misconduct' tended to be ambiguous and was too liable to 'light and uncertain'
rendition to become a suitable justification for such a serious case as dethronement.
The British people had not revolted against King James II for such vague reasons; on
the contrary. Burke pointed out,
They charged him with nothing less than a design, confirmed by a
multitude of illegal overt acts, to subvert the Protestant church and
state, and their fundamental unquestionable laws and liberties: they
charged him with having broken the original contract between king and
people.
The crime here that James II was accused of was 'more than misconduct'. In reality,
it was out of grave necessity that the British nation was obliged to resist. And even
then, Burke noted, they took it 'with infinite reluctance, as under that most rigorous of
all laws'.26
It was therefore not chiefly the right of resistance per se, but the expediency of its
licentious use, that was at issue. To repudiate the allegation that the 1688 Revolution
could be summoned to justify any resistance, Burke turned his attention chiefly to the
unusual nature of the case to find his arguments. The 1688 Revolution, he pointed out,
had been no wanton enterprise. It amounted to no less than a desperate measure for
curbing the nearly successful attempt which King James had made to subvert the
26
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British constitution; it could therefore constitute no other than an exceptional instance,
and justifiable, '<?r7/yupon the necessity of the case', as the sole means left for the
recovery and the future preservation of that constitution.27 In other words, it could
establish no precedent for future revolution. This view was vindicated by appealing to
the arguments which the Whig defenders, attempting to justify the 1688 Revolution to
themselves, had put forward in the impeachment of Dr Sacheverell in 1710.28 Burke
resorted to the historical trial of Dr Sacheverall because he was persuaded that the
case had enunciated an orthodox, because clearly Whig, interpretation of the 1688
Revolution: the impeachment was then undertaken by a Whig government, carried on
before a Whig parliament and intended for 'the express purpose of stating the true
grounds and principles of the Revolution'. Burke was actually inclined to deem it as
but a show trial, deliberately 'made' by the Whigs for an authentic and recorded
'declaration of their political tenets upon the subject of a great constitutional event
like that of the Revolution'.29
Basically, Burke acknowledged that the Whig managers of the impeachment had
asserted in principle that the British people were possessed of a right to resist, which
they had used justly in 1688. The British constitution, according to Nicholas Lechmere,
one of the Whig managers of the impeachment, presumed the existence of an 'original
contract' between the crown and the people, which implied that there was a power in
the latter, who had 'inherited' their freedom, to 'assert their own title to it'. Under this
constitution, the British government was a limited monarchy, with its supreme power
shared between Crown, Lords and Commons. Should therefore any one of them
contrive to subvert the constitution, the original contract would then be broken and
'that part of the government, thus fundamentally injured, hath a right to save or
recover that constitution in which it had an original interest'. However, Burke
contended that, despite his arguments for the right of resistance, Lechmere in practice
had not endorsed its unqualified use. Resistance should never be resorted to, said
Lechmere, save for dire necessity, such as the case of Britain in 1688:
the right of the people to self-defence and preservation of their
liberties, by resistance as their last remedy, is the result of a case of
27
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such necessity only, and by which the original contract between king
and people is broken
Burke asserted that the Whig apologists had been utterly unwilling to justify the
general principle of resistance by pointing to the example of the 1688 Revolution.
They were content rather to see it as an exception reached out of exigency. General
Stanhope, he observed, had stressed that the Revolution had resulted from the
'necessities of the time when 'no other remedy was left to preserve our religion and
liberties'.30 Sir Joseph Jekyll, meanwhile, was not prepared to legalise resistance,
except by 'extreme necessity'; and he emphasised that such necessity, if it arose,
ought to be 'plain and obvious to the sense and judgment of the whole natiorl. To Sir
John Holland, the resistance at the Revolution was but a 'necessary exceptiod to the
general rule of obedience:
Tis with this view of necessity only, absolute necessity of
preserving our laws, liberties, and religion; 'tis with this limitation that
we desire to be understood, when any of us speak of resistance in
general. The necessity of resistance at the Revolution was at that time
obvious to every man.
He went on to deny that their defence of the 1688 Revolution could in any way be
induced to plead for licentious resistance, 'as if subjects were left to their good-will
and pleasure, when they are to obey, and when to resist.31 Sir Robert Eyre, Burke
added, had struck the same note when he argued that the resistance in 1688, being a
clear case of unavoidable necessity, could not be construed to mean that 'the people
might cancel their allegiance at pleasurd. It could never. Eyre emphasised, be 'inferred
from the lawfulness of resistance, at a time when a total subversion of the
government both in church and state was intended that a people may take up arms,
and call their sovereign to account at pleasurd22
According to Burke, the Whig veterans, for all their defence of the 1688 Revolution,
had merely treated resistance as a negative principle, unsuitable to be instituted by
law as a positive right. Joseph Jekyll, Burke observed, had thought it imprudent to
state 'the limits and bounds of the subject's submission to the sovereign' and was
30 Ibid, 46-50
31 Ibid, 53, 64
32 Ibid, 58-9.
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utterly unwilling to put 'any case of a justifiable resistance, but that of the Revolution
only'. On this point, Robert Walpole had enlarged considerably:
Resistance is nowhere enacted to be legal, but subjected. . . to the
greatest penalties. It is what is not, cannot, nor ought ever to be
described, or affirmed in any positive law, to be excusable: when, and
upon what never-to-be-expected occasions, it may be exercised, no
man can foresee; and it ought never to be thought of, but when an
utter subversion of the laws of the realm threatens the whole frame of
our constitution, and no redress can otherwise be hoped for. It therefore
does, and ought for ever, to stand, in the eye and letter of the law, as
the highest offence33
Sir Robert Eyre considered it to be absurd that any law could be enacted to 'authorize
the destruction of the whole'. It would be no less preposterous if the legislature
'should, in express terms of law, declare such an ultimate resort as the right of
resistance, at a time when the case supposes that the force of all laws is ceased'. A
case like the 1688 Revolution, which implied a total subversion of the constitution,
was with Eyre what 'the laws of England could never suppose, provide for, or have in
vieW.34 All the attestations, Burke observed, had thus unanimously argued against
resistance being set up as a positive right. This of course had been precisely what
Burke had unequivocally wanted to assert. The ceremony of cashiering the king, he
claimed, could never become a proper object of the constitution. The question of
dethroning,' he explained.
. . . will always be, as it has always been, an extraordinary question
of state, and wholly out of the law; a question (like all other questions
of state) of dispositions, and of means, and of probable consequences,
rather than of positive rights. As it was not made for common abuses,
so it is not to be agitated by common minds. The speculative line of
demarcation, where obedience ought to end, and resistance must begin,
is faint, obscure, and not easily definable. It is not a single act, or a
single event, which determines it. Governments must be abused and
deranged indeed, before it can be thought of; and the prospect of the
future must be as bad as the experience of the past. When things are
in that lamentable condition, the nature of the disease is to indicate the
remedy to those whom nature has qualified to administer in extremities
this critical, ambiguous, bitter potion to a distempered state.




occasions, and provocations, will teach their own lessons.' Still, with or without right,
Burke stressed, revolution should always remain the very last resort.35
Burke's interpretation of the right of resistance, it is now clear, had been, generally
speaking, cautious and restrictive. To be sure. Burke, as a Whig, had not gone as far
as to rule out the principle of resistance altogether, which had long been a recognised
element in the Whig ideology. Resistance, however, would always be a very dangerous
principle; and there was a sense in which Burke seemed to have purported implicitly
to dispose of it by deliberately playing down its practical relevance to current politics.
He had in fact enlarged particularly upon the preventive nature of the Revolution
Settlement, arguing that those who led the 1688 Revolution had intended not to make
the Revolution 'a precedent for further revolutions', but to render 'such revolutions, so
far as human power and wisdom could provide, unnecessary'.36 To prevent future
revolutions, he noted, efforts had been made to stop future sovereigns from
compelling the nation 'to have again recourse to those violent remedies'. Ministerial
responsibility had been established, thus rendering the king perfectly irresponsible
before the law; the frequent meetings of parliament had been secured in order that
government could be brought under its constant inspection and active control; and,
finally, the granting of a royal pardon had been prohibited for any impeachment
initiated by the House of Commons. All these measures obviously had been contrived,
on the one hand, to reduce the accountability of the king and, on the other, to prevent
the vices of administration. It was hoped thus to forestall forever the claim of
revolution, 'a right so difficult in the practice, so uncertain in the issue, and often so
mischievous in the consquences'. In truth, Burke insisted, the 1688 Revolution had
been intended to be 'a parent of settlement, and not a nursery of future revolutions':
'III would our ancestors at the Revolution have deserved their fame for wisdom, if they
had found no security for their freedom, but in rendering their government feeble in
its operations and precarious in its tenure; if they had been able to contrive no better
remedy against arbitrary power than civil confusion.'37
The most revolutionary among Price's claims perhaps was his allegation that the
1688 Revolution had honoured British people with the right to frame a new
government by their own will. In making this allegation, Price, it is plain, had assumed
35
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that the post-1688 political order in Britain had been in essence a new edifice created
at the hands of the people. It was however not an interpretation that Burke was
prepared to endorse. Burke's view of the Revolution had never been this audacious.
Far from being a bold move to remake the old order of things, the Revolution in effect
had turned out to be rather a circumspect step taken to preserve the 'ancient,
indisputable laws and liberties' of the land and that 'ancient constitution of
government', which was regarded as their sole security. It could therefore furnish
nothing which would serve, either as principle or as precedent, to allege that the
people of Britain had thereby secured a right to reformulate their government at
pleasure.38
To explain this view. Burke, not untypically, had drawn his arguments mainly from
the tradition of British political culture. He pointed out that the claim that the people
had retained a right to remodel their government at will was grossly out of tune with
the reasoning of the British public, who, in his opinion, had been characteristically
indisposed to the spirit of innovation. The very idea of the fabrication of a new
government is enough to fill us with disgust and horror.' It tended to be, he added, 'as
ill-suited to our temper and wishes as it is unsupported by any appearance of
authority'. This essentially conservative cast of British political culture had consisted
•»
of two primal features. On the one hand, there had prevailed among the nation a
general inclination to cherish their ancient traditions. The minds of the British people,
Burke noted, had been generally filled with a 'powerful prepossession towards
antiquity'. Under its influence, political change in Britain, instead of taking a drastic
turn, had usually proceeded in the mode of reaffirming those rights and liberties
which were believed to have long existed in their ancient constitution. Most
reformations in British history, Burke pointed out, had been carried out according to
the principle of 'reverence to antiquity':
Our oldest reformation is that of Magna Charta. You will see that
Sir Edward Coke, that great oracle of our law, and indeed all the great
men who follow him, to Blackstone, are industrious to prove the
pedigree of our liberties. They endeavour to prove, that the ancient
charter, the Magna Charta of King John, was connected with another
positive charter from Henry I., and that both the one and the other were
nothing more than a re-affirmance of the still more ancient standing




And this spirit, he added, had pervaded all the laws which the nation had hitherto
made to guard their rights and liberties. On the other hand, and in line with this, it
had long become the established policy of the British people to claim their most
sacred rights and franchises 'as an inheritance. From Magna Carta onwards, Burke
observed,
it has been the uniform policy of our constitution to claim and
assert our liberties, as an entailed inheritance derived to us from our
forefathers, and to be transmitted to our posterity; as an estate specially
belonging to the people of this kingdom, without any reference
whatever to any other more general or prior right. By this means our
constitution preserves a unity in so great a diversity of its parts. We
have an inheritable crown; an inheritable peerage; and a House of
Commons and a people inheriting privileges, franchises, and liberties,
from a long line of ancestors.
A most celebrated case to testify to the tenacity of this principle was the Petition of
Right (1628). In that historical document. Parliament had plainly declared to King
Charles I that his subjects had 'inherited' their freedom. They were disposed, that is,
to assert their franchises as the 'rights of Englishmen', regarding them as 'patrimony
derived from their forefathers'. It was from the perspective of this tradition that, to
Burke, the 1688 Revolution was to be properly appreciated. 'We wished,' he claimed,
'at the period of the Revolution, and do now wish, to derive all we possess as an
inheritance from our forefathers' Indeed, he stressed, the leaders of the Glorious
Revolution, in their Declaration of Rights,had sagaciously declared their mission to be
to secure the laws, liberties and religion, that 'had been long possessed, and had been
lately endangered'.39
The 1688 Revolution was hence explicitly linked up to the historical efforts of the
British people to revive their ancient constitution.40 The British nation in 1688, Burke
wrote, had endeavoured to 'defend its ancient constitution':41 their aim had been not
so much to claim new franchises as to restore their ancient rights, unlawfully violated
by King James II. He was persuaded that the 1688 Revolution had never been intended
39 ibid, 305-6.
40 On the idea of the 'ancient constitution', see: j. g. a. Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the
Feudal Law. A Reissue with a Retrospect (Cambridge, 1987) With regard to Burke's role in this
tradition in particular, see: idem, 'Burke and the Ancient Constitution - A Problem in the History of Ideas',
Historical Journal iii (i960), 125-143.
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to be innovative. When King William was invited to Britain, he had given his fullest
assurance to the nation that his enterprise was not to introduce 'any change whatever
in the fundamental law and constitution of the state'. In fact, William's declaration had
shown his determination to restore the old order:
All magistrates, who have been unjustly turned out, shall forthwith
resume their former employments, as well as all the boroughs of
England shall return again to their ancient prescriptions and charters,
and more particularly, that the ancient charter of the great and famous
city of London shall be again in force. And that the writs for the
members of parliament shall be addressed to the proper officers
according to law and custom*2
Throughout the Revolution, Burke insisted, 'no essential change' had then been made
'in the constitution of monarchy, or in any of its ancient, sound, and legal principles'.43
In order to safeguard the rights and liberties of the nation, solid securities had indeed
been taken, doubtful questions had been settled, and anomalies in the law had been
corrected; but, he claimed,
In the stable, fundamental parts of our constitution we made no
revolution; no, nor any alteration at all. We did not impair the
monarchy. Perhaps it might be shown that we strengthened it very
considerably. The nation kept the same ranks, the same orders, the
same privileges, the same franchises, the same rules for property, the
same subordinations, the same order in the law, in the revenue, and in
the magistracy; the same Lords, the same Commons, the same
corporations, the same electors.
In other words, the political order in Britain had remained the same after the
Revolution as it had been before, 'but better secured in every part'. From the
constitutional light, therefore. Burke would rather argue that what the nation had
done in 1688, was in substance 'a revolution, not made, but prevented'.44
This essentially conservative view of the 1688 Revolution, according to Burke, had
always been the established interpretation accepted by all quintessential Whigs. Sir
Joseph Jekyll, during the trial of Dr Sacheverell, had categorically denied that any
innovation had been made in the constitution during the Revolution: ' The Revolution,'
42
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Burke quoted him with emphasis, 'did not introduce any innovation; it was a
restoration of the ancient fundamental constitution of the kingdom, and giving it its
proper force and energy.' Indeed, Jekyll had rather marvelled at the miraculous result
that the frame of the government could have been thus restored 'entire and unhurt':
This showed the excellent temper the nation was in at that time,
that, after such provocations from an abuse of the regal power, and
such a convulsion, no one part of the constitution was altered, or
suffered the least damage; but, on the contrary, the whole received new
life and vigour.
Burke asserted that the leading Whigs of Jekyll's generation had never associated
Revolution principles with the spirit of innovation. Sir Robert Eyre had contended that
the Revolution was to 'revive' the British constitution; and he had made efforts to
distinguish it, Burke wrote, from 'a proceeding at pleasure, on the part of the people,
to change their ancient constitution, and to frame a new government for themselves'.
In the same vein. Sir John Holland had stressed that what the British people had then
campaigned for had been the preservation of their laws, liberties, and religion, as
provided in the British constitution. He was prepared to guard against
a confusion of the principles of the Revolution, with any loose,
general doctrines of a right in the individual, or even in the people, to
undertake for themselves, on any prevalent, temporary opinions of
convenience or improvement, any fundamental change in the
constitution, or to fabricate a new government for themselves, and
thereby to disturb the public peace, and to unsettle the ancient
constitution of this kingdom.
After all, Burke believed, no sound Whig would have the^rudence to countenance any
arbitrary attempt which would mean to remodel, upon fancies, their ancient
constitution. It should be the object of all honest men not to sacrifice the constitution
of a nation to the visionary theories of their own, but to 'preserve our whole
inheritance in the constitution, in all its members and all its relations, entire, and
unimpaired, from generation to generation'.45
With Burke, therefore, the whole range of Price's theorising on the 1688 Revolution
had proved ill-founded. In the end, of course, this judgment must also undermine
Price's reasoning about the majesty of the people. Indeed, in Burke's eyes, Price's
45
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doctrine had secured a 'most unfounded, dangerous, illegal, and unconstitutional
position'. The professed rights of the people to choose governors, to depose them for
misconduct, and to frame a new government, Burke claimed, had composed in reality
a 'new, and hitherto unheard-of, bill of rights', which was completely foreign to the
opinions of the British people. The nation, he was persuaded, would be ready to reject
it: They utterly disclaim it. They will resist the practical assertion of it with their lives
and fortunes. They are bound to do so by the laws of their country, made at the time
of that very Revolution. . ,'46 It had never occurred to them that they had ever acquired
a 'moral or civil competence' to change their monarch, or any right to set up a new
government by their own will.47
The dispute on the nature of the 1688 Revolution, as has been pointed out above,
was extremely relevant to the political ferment of the 1790s. It had actually formed an
essential part of the constitutional controversy sparked off by the French Revolution.
Without doubt, in the debate. Burke aimed in the main to expose the adverse
implications which Price's preaching would have for the British constitution.48 Price's
doctrine, he warned, would affect the British constitution 'in its vital parts'.49 Indeed,
its impact could be even more far-reaching: These doctrines concerning the people .
. tend, in my opinion, to the utter subversion, not only of all government, in all modes,
and to all stable securities to rational freedom, but to all the rules and privileges of
morality itself.'50
Burke's concern here naturally led him further to elucidate the historical foundation
of the British constitution. What was then the nature of the constitution which Burke
was obliged to defend? Burke had declared his firm commitment to the 'principles of a
mixed constitution'.5' The political system of Britain, according to current opinion, was
not built upon any simple form of government. It was neither a pure monarchy, nor a
46
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pure aristocracy, and much less a pure democracy.52 The British constitution, Burke
claimed, ought to consist 'of the three members, of three very different natures, of
which it does actually consist'. They included King, Lords and Commons, representing
respectively the various principles of monarchy, aristocracy and democracy. To
maintain such a mixed construction, Burke stressed, each member ought to be
preserved 'in its proper place, and with its proper proportion of power'.53
Within this edifice, it was pointed out, the monarchy had constituted the presiding
and connecting principle of the whole.54 In Britain, all establishments, to be viable,
should be built upon its monarchy 'as its essential basid. It was necessary, Burke
contended,
that all such institutions, whether aristocratic or democratic, must
originate from their crown, and in all their proceedings must refer to it;
that by the energy of that main-spring alone those republican parts
must be set in action, and from thence must derive their whole legal
effect.
Monarchy, that is, was the only focus which was in a position to unite the entire body
politic; and deprived of it the whole would fall into confusion.55 Burke in fact was
inclined to insist that all the benefits that had ever accrued from the British
constitution ought to be attributed to the existence of its monarchy: 'without
monarchy in England, most certainly we never can enjoy either peace or liberty.'
Historically, Burke noted, it was owing to such an understanding that the British
people, after experiencing the terror of Cromwellian republicanism, had been so ready
to restore their monarchy in 1660 and that 'the very regular step, which we took on
the Revolution of 1688, was to fill the throne with a real king'.56 With regard to his
role in politics, the king of Britain, Burke asserted, was a real, not a nominal,
monarch.57 Under the constitution, the British monarch had kept nothing short of
52
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power and splendour. He was a genuine king, possessed of 'real, solid, extensive
power':
The direct power of the king of England is considerable. His
indirect, and far more certain power, is great indeed. He stands in need
of nothing towards dignity; of nothing towards splendour; of nothing
towards authority; of nothing at all towards consideration abroad.58
Burke would support an effective, though limited, monarchy, with its proper rights and
prerogatives maintained.59 The royal office, he remarked, was a great trust, instituted
for active exertion. It should therefore be environed with proper dignity, authority and
consideration so that it could become strong enough to fulfil the 'tasks of power'.60
The monarch of Britain, in short, had to be secured not only 'in its peculiar existence,
but in its pre-eminence too'.61
Monarchy, however, would never be suffered to become absolute in Britain. It had
long been limited, as well as fenced, by other orders of the realm.62 The estate next to
the crown was the peers who, in Burke's opinion, were the 'pillars of the Crown'.63 The
House of Lords was exclusively made up of hereditary property and hereditary
distinction.64 It represented virtually the aristocracy of Britain and was the 'great
ground and pillar of security to the landed interest'.65 An influential and independent
aristocracy, according to Burke, was indispensable to the British constitution. It could
form an impenetrable fence to stop any attempt to breach the constitution.66 Within
the political structure of Britain, the aristocratic orders had secured a sort of middle
place between the crown and the people.67 They constituted a strong bulwark, able to
prevent either the 'mere despotism of the Prince' or the 'brutal Tyranny of a ferocious
58
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and atheistick populace'.68 Burke had looked upon aristocracy as the 'ballast in the
vessel of the commonwealth'.69 It was they who had sustained the stability and
continuity of the nation:
no great commonwealth could by any possibility long subsist,
without a body of some kind or other of nobility, decorated with honour,
and fortified by privilege. . . no political fabric could be well made
without some such order of things as might, through a series of time,
afford a rational hope of securing unity, coherence, consistency, and
stability to the state.70
The aristocracy, in sum, was the estate that could 'give a bias, and steadiness, and
preserve something like consistency in the proceedings of state'.71 Paradoxically,
however, influential as it was, the House of Lords by itself was in Burke's view 'the
feeblest part of the constitution'. It could not subsist independently: 'the House of
Lords,' he contended, 'is supported only by its connexions with the crown, and with
the House of Commons.' And with the Commons especially, the Lords had, through
the operation of property in elections, secured a close 'connexion and communication
of interests'.72 Hence Burke was bound to oppose any radical scheme for parliamentary
reform that aimed to reduce the aristocracy's ability to influence the outcome of
elections in areas where they had a natural and preponderant interest.
The House of Commons was a 'more subtle and artificial combination of parts and
powers'. As an essential part of the legislature, Burke wrote, the Commons had
incorporated itself with other members of the constitution, forming at once 'the
great support and the great control of government'. It intended on the one hand to
limit, and on the other to secure and even strengthen, the crown.73 As the House of
Lords was the joint which united the aristocracy to the crown, so the House of
Commons was the link which connected both the crown and the aristocracy with the
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mass of the people.74 Constitutionally, Burke claimed, the Commons stood for the
people, speaking their sense and taking care of their interests:75
In legal construction, the sense of the people of England is to be
collected from the House of Commons; and, though I do not deny the
possibility of an abuse of this trust as well as any other, yet I think that,
without the most weighty reasons, and in the most urgent exigencies, it
is highly dangerous to suppose that the House speaks anything contrary
to the sense of the people.
And to him, the House of Commons did perfectly represent 'the whole Commons of
Great Britain'.76 In the meantime, Burke pointed out that the House of Commons was
possessed of great power: The powet of the House of Commons, direct or indirect, is
indeed great; and long may it be able to preserve its greatness, and the spirit
belonging to true greatness, at the full.' Of course, this power similarly was not infinite:
the Commons had used to be
circumscribed and shut in by the immoveable barriers of laws,
usages, positive rules of doctrine and practice, counterpoised by the
House of Lords, and every moment of its existence at the discretion of
the crown to continue, prorogue, or dissolve. . "
Burke was not prepared to see a predominant Commons: 'the abstract and unlimited
perfection of power in the popular part,' he warned, 'can be of no service to us in any
of our political arrangements.'78 There could be no true security to the liberty of the
people should the Crown be deprived of its proper prerogatives and the Lords its just
influence.79 On the whole, Burke remarked, the House of Commons was indispensable
for maintaining the mixed constitution of Britain. It was, however, a House of
Commons whose composition was greatly influenced by the patronage of the crown
and the aristocracy. It was chosen by an irregular system of representation which
gave great weight to landed property and other vested interests and which rejected
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the radical claim that all men deserved the right to vote. Burke was determined to
defend the existing electoral system: That artificial representation of the people being
once discredited and overturned, all goes to pieces, and nothing but a plain French
democracy or arbitrary monarchy can possibly exist.'80
The operation of this mixed constitution had proceeded upon the principle of
'check and balance', which aimed to prevent its members from going beyond their
own power so as to destabilise the whole edifice. The British constitution, Burke
explained, had been so constituted that none of its principles might be 'carried as far,
as, taken by itself, and theoretically, it would go':
To avoid the perfections of extreme, all its several parts are so
constituted, as not alone to answer their own several ends, but also
each to limit and control the others: insomuch, that take which of the
principles you please - you will find its operation checked and stopped
at a certain point. The whole movement stands still rather than that any
part should proceed beyond its boundary.
Throughout its proceedings, there were always some 'treaty and compromise'
perpetually going on, 'sometimes openly, sometimes with less observation'.81 The
result was that a state of equilibrium had been maintained in the body politic. The
political system of Britain therefore was in essence an embodiment of the spirit of
'check and balance'. It came to be, Burke wrote,
a monarchy directed by laws, controlled and balanced by the great
hereditary wealth and hereditary dignity of a nation; and both again
controlled by a judicious check from the reason and feeling of the
people at large, acting by a suitable and permanent organ.
It was a 'mixed and tempered' government, combining all the advantages of monarchy,
aristocracy and democracy.82
On the other hand, under the framework of 'check and balance', the members of
the constitution not only could not be suffered to trespass on the rights of others but
would not be even allowed to give away their own parts. The mixed constitution
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would be jeopardised should that happen. Burke declared that the engagement of the
British nation had forbidden such invasion and such surrender:
The House of Lords, for instance, is not morally competent to
dissolve the House of Commons; no, nor even to dissolve itself, nor to
abdicate, if it would, its portion in the legislature of the kingdom.
Though a king may abdicate for his own person, he cannot abdicate for
the monarchy. By as strong, or by a stronger reason, the House of
Commons cannot renounce its share of authority.
All parts of the nation, in his view, had already entered into an irrevocable pact for
pursuing their common interest. They were therefore all obliged to 'hold their public
faith with each other, and with all those who derive any serious interest under their
engagements'.83
The benefits which the principle of 'check and balance' had accrued to British
politics were enormous. Most important of all, Burke noted, it had caused moderation
to be the leading spirit of the British political tradition: They render deliberation a
matter not of choice, but of necessity; they made all change a subject of compromise,
which naturally begets moderation; they produce temperaments' The mutual restraint
between the opposed interests of the nation could interpose a salutary check to all
precipitate resolution in political transactions. It would then be able to prevent the
sore evil of harsh, crude, and unqualified reformations and to render all the 'headlong
exertions of arbitrary power, in the few or in the many, for ever impracticable'. With
different social interests balancing one another, Burke was persuaded, the liberty of
the people could procure 'as many securities as there were separate views in the
several orders'.84
For all its merits, the apparatus of 'check and balance', it must be admitted, was in
essence a negative principle. Presupposing a conflict of interests, it tended naturally in
the main to prevent abuses. But it could harbour at the same time certain centrifugal
effects, potentially inimical to the integration of the constitution. There could be no
doubt that the working of the body politic would be crippled if its various social
interests were in permanent conflict. In any society, however, just as there was some




Accordingly, along with the principle of 'check and balance', there had also existed a
spirit of cooperation. With respect to the British constitution, Burke pointed out, the
various parts, 'whilst they are balanced as opposing interests, are also connected as
friends; otherwise nothing but confusion could be the result of such a complex
constitution'.85 He emphasised that the contending parts of British society had
%
'gradually, and almost insensibly, in a long course of time, accommodated themselves
to each other, and to their common, as well as to their separate, purposes'.86 The
inter-connection between different estates of the nation was indeed essential to the
British constitution: 'Our fabric is so constituted, one part of it bears so much on the
other, the parts are so made for one another, and for nothing else.'87 Despite their
diverse interests, Burke noted, they had all become so interwoven that none could
possibly survive without the others. 'As they have lived, so they will die, together.'88
Any attempt to separate them could only result in their common destruction.89 After
all, in Burke's eyes, the three estates of the realm - the King, the Lords and the
Commons - had become virtually incorporated into an unbreakable 'triple cord' and
had become the guarantees of each other's being and each other's rights.90
Burke's view of the British constitution, generally speaking, was derived from his
understanding of the complexity of British society. The British constitution, he wrote,
had been 'no simple, no superficial thing'.9' It was a highly complicated construction,
developed to realise the diverse ends of the British nation: The British state is,
without question, that which pursues the greatest variety of ends, and is the least
disposed to sacrifice any one of them to another, or to the whole.' It wished to take in
the entire circle of human desires and was ready to secure for them their fair
enjoyment.92 Its whole structure had embraced diverse views and had made many
combinations.93 The body politic of Britain, in short, comprised different parts which
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reflected correspondingly the various forces of the community. And between them,
there were all the combination, and all the opposition, of interests, with every kind of
action and counteraction. In the end. Burke pointed out, the British constitution was a
'harmony of the universe' that had emerged out of the reciprocal struggle between
these discordant powers.94
Looked at as a whole, the British constitution appeared to have achieved a high
order of excellence. This eminent edifice, Burke observed, was not an instant creation
'struck out at a heat by a set of presumptuous men'; rather, 'It is the result of the
thoughts of many minds, in many ages.'95 It could not therefore, as had often been
alleged, be deemed to be a wicked system which was an usurpation in its origin,
unwise in its contrivance, and mischievous in its effects. On the contrary, Burke
recommended it as a noble establishment which the 'Wisdom of our Ancestors has
formed for giving permanence to those blessings which they have left to us as our
best Inheritance'.98 It was all the more a superior system whose merits had been
'confirmed by the solid test of long experience, and an increasing public strength and
national prosperity'97
The concept of a mixed and balanced constitution could furnish a useful means to
help clarify the much debated issue concerning the consistency of Burke's principles.
The publication of Burke's Reflections had thrown his credit into endless disputes.
Since Burke had for most of his career associated himself with the Whig opposition in
attacking the influence of the Court, his outburst against the cause of the French
Revolution confounded many of his contemporaries. For them, Burke's condemnation
of French liberty was a grossly 'unjustifiable change of opinion'. It had embarrassed
the Foxite Whigs, in particular, who were so inflamed as to charge that Burke had 'for
a bad reason, or for no reason', disgraced 'his whole public life by a scandalous
contradiction of every one of his own acts, writings, and declarations'.38 Did Burke
then contradict his old principles when he chose to attack the French Revolution? Had
94
'Reflections on the Revolution in France', Burke's Works ii, 308-9
95 'An Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs', Burke's Works iii, 111, 112.
96 Ibid, iii, 99; Corr, vi, 194. 'To William Windham - 22 Dec. 1790'.
97 'Reflections on the Revolution in France', Burke's Works ii, 331.
98 'An Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs', Burke's Works iii, 23.
151
he after all betrayed the spirit of the Whig political tradition?
To Burke, a Whig veteran, accusations of this nature were no doubt exceedingly
offending. Burke had always entertained a high opinion of his own political integrity. If
he should venture to value himself upon anything in his life, he wrote, it would be on
the virtue of consistency that he would value himself the most: 'Strip him of this, and
you leave him naked indeed.'99 Meanwhile, he was ready to lay claim to the ideological
consistency of his Reflections 'I hope I have been pretty consistent with myself, in
that piece.'100 But was this assertion justifiable? It must be noticed, before entering
into the main discussion, that to a politician of Burke's long career and prolific
experiences, faults could always be easily found with the coherence of his politics or
the consistency of his principles. To be sure, Burke noted, there would be no lack of
hostile critics who simply intended to harass him:
In the case of any man who had written something, and spoken a
great deal, upon very multifarious matter, during upwards of twenty-five
years public service, and in as great a variety of important events as
perhaps have ever happened in the same number of years, it would
appear a little hard, in order to charge such a man with inconsistency,
to see collected by his friend a sort of digest of his sayings, even to
such as were merely sportive and jocular. This digest, however, has
been made, with equal pains and partiality, and without bringing out
those passages of his writings which might tend to show with what
restrictions any expressions, quoted from him, ought to have been
understood.101
Such hypercritics would merit no reply; and Burke would fain leave them to 'rejoice in
that discovery and in my inconsistency, and the antidote they have found in one part
of my writings against the poison that exists in another'.102
To be sure. Burke did not remain altogether silent on all those doubts about his
political integrity. The success of any attempt to vindicate his own consistency,
however, must hinge on whether he was able to convince those, who had
remembered him as the great defender of American liberty and as the notorious critic
of the crown's influence, that he was not at all eccentric when he came to flay the
99 Ibid, 24.
100 Corr, vi, 178. 'To Sir Gilbert Elliot - 29 Nov. 1790'
101 'An Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs', Burke's Works, iii, 24.
102 Corr, ix, 241. 'To William Windham - 12 Feb. (1797)'.
152
French Revolution. How then did Burke vindicate himself?
In the main, Burke realised the complexity of the problems which the British
constitution would come across in the course of its development. Throughout his
career, he claimed, he had ever been 'awfully impressed with the difficulties arising
from the complex state of our constitution'. The defence of such a system of course
was no simple task. As revealed before, the British constitution was a mixture made
up of different parts of very different nature. To defend it, therefore, it would require
'in different emergencies, different sorts of exertions, and the successive call upon all
the various principles which uphold and justify it'.103 Based on this conviction, Burke's
tactics for defence contained two major points. On the one hand, he pointed out, the
compound nature of the British constitution had made it necessary that its different
parts would need to be vindicated upon the various principles particularly belonging to
them: 'He cannot assert the democratic part on the principles on which monarchy is
supported, nor can he support monarchy on the principles of democracy; nor can he
maintain aristocracy on the grounds of the one or of the other, or of both.' On the
other hand, different circumstances might also call for different exertions to be
attended to those parts that were in danger while leaving undisturbed those that were
out of question:
As any one of the great members of this constitution happens to
be endangered, he that is a friend to all of them chooses and presses
the topics necessary for the support of the part attacked, with all the
strength, the earnestness, the vehemence, with all the power of stating,
of argument, and of colouring, which he happens to possess, and which
the case demands. He is not to embarrass the minds of his hearers, or
to encumber or overlay his speech, by bringing into view at once. . . all
that may and ought, when a just occasion presents itself, to be said in
favour of the other members. At that time they are out of the court;
there is no question concerning them.
On a specific occasion, indeed, a man might, among the various things which he held
in equal regard, attend with more care to the object which happened to fall under his
immediate solicitude. This however would not necessarily mean that he had no regard
for 'the just rights of all the rest'. This principle being established, Burke hence
contended that, if he had defended popular privileges at one time, this should not
imply that he would concur on another occasion with those who would mean to
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destroy the throne. It would also be unreasonable to say that his vindication of the
throne at some moment should imply that he deserted the rights of the people.104 To
him, association of this kind was not only absurd but pernicious:
This mode of arguing from your having done anything in a certain
line, to the necessity of doing everything, has political consequences of
other moment than those of a logical fallacy. If no man can propose any
diminution or modification of an invidious or dangerous power or
influence in government, without entitling friends turned into adversaries
to argue him into the destruction of all prerogative, and to a spoliation
of the whole patronage of royalty, I do not know what can more
effectually deter persons of sober minds from engaging in any reform;
nor how the worst enemies to the liberty of the subject could contrive
any method more fit to bring all correctives on the power of the crown
into suspicion and disrepute.105
Indeed, Burke was ready to defy tactical rigidity in the defence of the mixed
constitution of Britain. Whenever a distemper was found in the commonwealth, he
claimed, it had to be treated according to the 'nature of the evil and of the object'.106
A dutiful supporter of the British constitution should be prepared to protect it against
'all the various partisans of destruction, let them begin where, or when, or how they
will'. He would suffer neither the Commons to be undermined through the Crown, nor
the Crown through the Commons, nor both through another force.107
It had often been argued that Burke's anti-French stand had belied his much
acclaimed role in the economical reforms of the early 1780s, which were held to have
connoted popular principles.108 To explain his case, Burke admitted that his proposal
for economical reforms had indeed been an attempt to curb the influence of the
monarch. The purpose of that reform, he claimed, had been to cure a malady in the
nation, originating in the overgrown influence of the throne. During that period, the
government had invidiously increased its 'means of strength'. Moreover, it had
threatened to destabilise the constitution by using its influence to corrupt Parliament,
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on worthy motives'. The rationalisation of the crown's influence hence became the
main concern in Burke's reform. However, Burke noted, the measures which he had
then proposed were chiefly 'healing and mediatorial', aiming purely to prevent evils. 'A
complaint was made of too much influence in the House of Commons; I reduce it in
both Houses; ... A disposition to expense was complained of; to that I opposed, not
mere retrenchment, but a system of economy.' These reforms had not been intended
to temper the main body of the constitution:
I had. . . a state to preserve, as well as a state to reform. . . In that
situation of the public mind, I did not undertake, as was then proposed,
to new-model the House of Commons or the House of Lords; or to
change the authority under which any officer of the Crown acted, who
was suffered at all to exist. Crown, Lords, Commons, judicial system,
system of administration, existed as they had existed before; and in the
mode and manner in which they had always existed.
Indeed, the spirit of that reform was not revolutionary at all: 'It was then not my love,
but my hatred, to innovation, that produced my plan of reform.'"® On the whole, Burke
emphasised that though aiming to retrench the influence of the throne, his economical
reforms could by no means be deemed as part of an anti-monarchical movement. It
had never been desired, Burke claimed, to proceed to indefinite lengths, so as not
merely to reduce, but 'wholly to take away all prerogative and all influence
whatsoever'. Still less could it be supposed to have embraced republicanism: 'No
correctives which he proposed to the power of the crown could lead him to approve
of a plan of a republic . . . which has no correctives.' Above all, Burke's economical
reforms would not oblige him to endorse the French Revolution which had gone so far
as to reduce their monarchy to 'its present nothing'."0
Granted that economical reforms had nursed no anti-monarchical sentiment, how
could Burke justify his defence, a few years earlier, of the American revolt, an
unequivocally democratic revolution? Burke's explanation of his support for the
American cause was much subtler. It had been current among the sympathisers of the
American Revolution to hold that the Americans had rebelled chiefly because of their
desire to enlarge their liberty. Charles James Fox, Burke pointed out, had insisted that
from the beginning the Americans had aimed at independence, meaning entirely to
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'throw off the authority of the crown, and to break their connexion with the parent
country'. Burke's reading of the cause of the American Revolution was quite different.
Instead of purporting to enlarge their liberty, he argued, the American revolt had in
fact resulted from the colonial people's determination to defend the 'ancient laws,
rights, and usages' of Englishmen. In contrast with the hostile attempt of the
British government, Burke was convinced, the Americans 'were purely on the defensive
in that rebellion'. Indeed,
He considered the Americans as standing at that time, and in that
controversy, in the same relation to England, as England did to King
James the Second, in 1688. He believed, that they had taken up arms
from one motive only; that is, our attempting to tax them without their
consent.
The American Revolution, in other words, was fully justifiable from the principles of
the British constitution. 'No taxation without representation' had long been an
undeniable constitutional principle which the American colonists, being Englishmen,
were also entitled to. Burke was thus inclined to consider the American Revolution as
a movement to defend the principle of the British constitution.'11 From this angle, his
support of the American cause was consistent with his general political principles. It
therefore could not be properly introduced into the debate in order to contradict his
stand against the French Revolution: the foundations of these two cases, in his view,
had not stood 'exactly upon a Par'.112 In the case of the French Revolution, Frenchmen
had in reality rebelled against a mild monarch who, after divesting himself of his
arbitrary powers, had been rather on the defensive' in his effort to secure some
fragment of royal authority. It was all the more a revolution, aiming utterly to
annihilate the whole royal authority and to 'level all ranks, orders, and distinctions in
the state'. In any case. Burke insisted, his defending the just cause of the American
Revolution should not imply that he would 'enter into an alliance offensive and
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In retrospect. Burke was persuaded that nothing that he had done before had in
principle contradicted his 'opinions on the hideous changes, which have since
barbarized France'.114 Indeed, he claimed, all his political career he had never pursued
any 'high popular courses' which he was then accused of having subsequently
deserted. He drew attention to the fact that as early as 1774 he had, in a popular
election at Bristol, already publicly rejected the popular claim that people had the right
to instruct their representatives. And for years, he went on, he had uniformly and
steadily opposed the proposals for the reform of the system of representation and the
bills for shortening the duration of parliaments.115 It had ever been his opinion that
those changes proposed under the 'misnomer called parliamentary reforms' would lead
inevitably to the undermining of the British constitution, and leave the whole nation in
the 'death-dance of democratic revolution'.116
Burke's abhorrence of high popular politics, nevertheless, had not led him to
support absolute monarchy. Rather, he had taken a balanced view. 'I have struggled to
the best of my power against two great public evils, growing out of the most sacred
of all things, Liberty and Authority.' He would never endorse either the Tyranny of
Freedom' or the 'Licentiousness of Power'.117 The duty of government, he wrote, was
to protect its people from both the tumults of the multitude and the insolence of the
powerful. All the vices of pride, cruelty and oppression had to be repulsed, whether
they should take place under royal, or aristocratic, or democratic power.118 The Crimes
of Democracy, and the madness and folly of Aristocracy alike frighten and confound
me,' Burke claimed.119 To avoid all these evils, no other alternative could be found but
in a mixed government. It would constitute a 'third option' between the new violent
scheme of liberty and the old abject system of servitude: between the despotism of
monarchy and the tyranny of the multitude.120
The framework of Burke's defence, it was then clear, had been based on his
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doctrine of the mixed and balanced constitution. Those who would be concerned to
see the mixed constitution of Britain preserved 'entire, and practically equal to all the
great ends of its formation had to support it 'not in one single part, but in all its
parts'.12' They must not suffer any of its parts to be sacrificed to another and should
always take care to prevent 'either the regal power from being swallowed up on
pretence of popular rights, or the popular rights from being destroyed on pretence of
regal prerogatives'.122 To Burke, the maintenance of the British constitution was the
ultimate concern of his politics; as for 'popularity' and 'power', they were merely
different means to achieve that object. No preference therefore should be given to any
of them but 'as one or the other might afford a surer or a less certain prospect of
arriving at that end'.123 Hence there was room for pragmatism in Burke's politics.
Not surprisingly, Burke's approach to politics must of necessity beget a spirit of
moderation. He contended that his politics had been based on a political tradition
which would never go to the extreme: They who go with the principles of the ancient
Whigs. . . never can go too far. They may indeed stop short of some hazardous and
ambiguous excellence, which they will be taught to postpone to any reasonable
degree of good they may actually possess.' It had ever been his disposition to travel
along the safe and middle path. Indeed, he claimed, all his principles must by nature
'gravitate to a middle point, or to some point near a middle'.124 And he proclaimed that
he was a man who had always chosen to keep himself 'in a medium'. Against those
who were pleased to accuse him of shifting from extreme to extreme, he rebuked:
This charge is not so wonderful. It is in the nature of things, that
they who are in the centre of a circle should appear directly opposed to
those who view them from any part of the circumference. In that middle
point, however, he will still remain, though he may hear people, who
themselves run beyond Aurora and the Ganges, cry out, that he is at the
extremity of the west.125
Thus, the dispute over Burke's consistency ultimately becomes a question
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concerning ends and means. Burke tended to believe that all such controversies had
resulted from the failure of his critics to tell his ends from his means. The prominent
feature of Burke's politics, as discussed above, had been his determination to maintain
the mixed and balanced constitution of Britain. To reach this end, he stressed, his
approaches could be variable. Upon this conviction, Burke contended that he had
indeed always been prepared to preserve his consistency, but he would like to
preserve that consistency 'by varying his means to secure the unity of his end'. His
political career was compared to a sailing at sea. In the voyage, he claimed, he, 'when
the equipoise of the vessel in which he sails may be endangered by overloading it
upon oneside, is desirous of carrying the small weight of his reasons to that which
may preserve its equipoise'.126 While he had in previous years struggled mostly to ward
off the abuses of authority, it was now his concern to fight against the excess of
liberty. And if there was any discrepancy to be detected in his career, he asserted, it
was not so much an 'inconsistency in principle' as a 'difference in conduct under a
variation of circumstances'.127
According to Burke, indeed, not only had his opinions of the French Revolution not
run counter to his former principles, but they were essentially in line with the spirit of
the old Whig tradition. On the one hand, he declared that his Reflections, though
hated by the radical Whigs, had received full approbation and kind indulgence from
those 'old Stamina of the Whiggs' of the day, including the Duke of Portland, Lord
Fitzwilliam, the Duke of Devonshire, Lord John Cavendish Montague, and so on.128 On
the other hand. Burke had actually claimed no invention of principles. What he had
written, he emphasised, had but conveyed 'what were the avowed sentiments of the
old Whigs'. Throughout the debate he had made every effort, endeavouring to prove
that his principles had been derived no more than from those held by the old Whig
party, that is, 'the Whigs of the Revoiutioh.129 Of this, he entertained no doubt:
I think at least that I have shewn, beyond a Dispute, that my
Sentiments are those of the rational Whiggs who settled the succession,
upon the antient principles of the constitution, in the House of
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Hannover.'30
He proclaimed himself to be 'no worse a Whigg than the Somers's, Godolphins, and
Jekylls', and retorted that those who condemned him, 'condemn their predecessors in
principle whom they so highly and justly honour and esteem'.'3'
The whole controversy on Burke's consistency, or on his Whiggishness, however,
might in the end come to be rather meaningless. It seemed to have ignored a truly
essential point in the question. To Burke, in a debate over his political principles, what
should matter most ought to be whether these principles had embraced anything
valuable rather than whether they had been consistent with certain systems. In the
present case, Burke argued that the principles spread in his Reflections, be what they
might, had at any rate had their intrinsic value and were able to stand on their own
merits. Thus, he sneered at the cynicism of those contradictious critics, who would
bother to find fault with his supposed inconsistency while remaining blind to the value
of his principles themselves:
It is certainly a great aggravation of his fault in embracing false
opinions, that in doing so he is not supposed to fill up a void, but that
he is guilty of a dereliction of opinions that are true and laudable. This
is the great gist of the charge against him. It is not so much that he is
wrong in his book. . . as that he has therein belied his whole life.'32
Burke of course would never admit that his Reflections had taught anything
contradictory to what he had 'formerly ever said in a style either ludicrous or serious'.
But he was all the more persuaded that his doctrines were not adverse to the true
principles of freedom. Again, he indicted his critics:
as they are unable to cite any such contradictory passage, so
neither can they show anything in the general tendency and spirit of the
whole work unfavourable to a rational and generous spirit of liberty;
unless a warm opposition to the spirit of levelling, to the spirit of
impiety, to the spirit of proscription, plunder, murder, and cannibalism.
His principles, in short, had been perfectly agreeable to a rational plan of free
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government,'33 and were therefore by no means those to which 'honest men are
bound to declare, not a shade or two of dissent, but a total, fundamental
opposition'.'34
After all. Burke professed himself to be a man in whom 'no anger durable or
vehement has ever been kindled, but by what he considered as tyranny'. Throughout
his political career, he claimed, he had always been struggling for the liberty of
others.'35 It had been his mission to support with unrelaxing vigilance every right,
privilege and franchise in their proper places and to screen every man in every class
from oppression:'36
No man would set his face more determinedly against those who
should attempt to deprive them, or any description of men, of the
rights they possess. No man would be more steady in preventing them
from abusing those rights to the destruction of that happy order under
which they enjoy them.'37
He made it clear, however, that he had never intended to endorse every programme of
liberty without discrimination, least of all the system that the French Revolution stood
for, for this he believed to be 'nothing but the rein given to vice and confusion'.'38
Instead, he was willing to stand by a 'wise, moral, well-natured, and well-tempered
spirit of freedom': a freedom maintained in its full vigour, but qualified in all its
exertions.'39 It ought to be, in other words, a liberty associated with order, virtue,
morality, and religion.'40 In effect, he insisted, it was by this kind of rational liberty that
he had ever been animated: 'I flatter myself that I love a manly, moral, regulated
liberty. . . and perhaps I have given as good proofs of my attachment to that cause, in
the whole course of my public conduct/'4'
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In the final analysis, Burke declared that, so long as the cause he championed was
just in itself, the question about his consistency ought to become, in comparison, a
'matter of small moment'.142 Meanwhile, to allege that his thoughts on French affairs
had not contained the sentiments of the present Whig party would also not
necessarily constitute an affront to him.143 Thus, he claimed:
My principles upon any publick matter are of no great importance:
for, there is an end of my political exertions. Whatever they are, they are
sufficiently declared. Whether they are allowed to be Whigg principles,
or not, is a very small part of my concern. I think them exactly such as
the sober, honourable, and intelligent in that party, have always
professed. I think, I have shewn, beyond a possibility of debate, that
they are exactly the same. But if any person or any number of persons,
choose to think otherwise, and conceive that they are contrary to the
Doctrines of their Whigg party, - be it so. I am certain, that they are
principles of which no reasonable man or good citizen need be ashamed
of. If they are Tory principles, I shall always wish to be thought a Tory,
If the contrary of these principles be Whigg principles, I beg, that you,
my Dear Friend will never consider me as belonging to that description:
For I look upon them to be wicked and absurd in the highest degree;
and that whatever they shall become the ruling maxims, they must
produce exactly the same Effects, which they do, in the miserable,
depraved, and contemptible Nation in which they now predominate.'44
Indeed, he emphasised, none of his principles should, from consistency, oblige him to
advocate an exchange of mischief and to justify the replacement of a mitigated
monarchy with a new, and far more despotic, democratic power, which he supposed
the French Revolution to have been.145 At any rate, Burke was persuaded, the
principles his Reflections had maintained were necessary to the welfare and dignity of
his country and could only be enforced by 'the general persuasion of his sincerity'.146
And while he insisted on his ultimate consistency of principles, he went on to claim:
'If I had all my Life been of a quite different opinion from my present, . . . what has
happend in France would have perfectly cured me of the distemper of my erroneous
metaphysics.'147
142 Corn', vi, 179 'To Sir Gilbert Elliot - 29 Nov. 1790'
143 'An Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs', Burke's Works, iii, 6.
144 Corr, ix, 446. To [Dr Richard Brocklesby] ~ n. d.'.
145 'An Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs', Burke's Works, iii, 34-5.
146 Com, ix, 373. 'Jane Burke to Charles James Fox - (ante 9 July 1797)'.
147 Com; vi, 179. 'To Sir Gilbert Elliot - 29 Nov. 1790'.
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Part Two
THE CRITICS OF BURKE
CHAPTER 5
THE RIGHTS OF MAN
Burke's attack on the French Revolution and its British supporters served to
aggravate the underlying ideological tension which had, for some time, been building
up uneasily within the world of British politics. As Philip Francis had predicted, the
publication of Burke's Reflections was to provoke a great 'war of Pamphlets' that
would last many years.' The rage of Burke at the new Gallic liberty had indeed
surprised many of his contemporaries who had long become used to his reformist
polemics of the last two decades. Thomas Paine had obviously entertained no idea
that Burke would deplore the Revolution in France when he wrote to Burke from Paris
in January 1790, with jubilation, to report the miraculous progress of events.2 From
Burke's defence of the American Revolution, Paine thought, it was natural to assume
that he would also welcome the approaching freedom of France. It could hardly be
expected that he would give vent to such 'outrageous abuse on the French Revolution,
and the principle of Liberty'.3 Similarly, when Charles-Jean-Francois Depont, the young
Frenchman to whom the Reflections was addressed, approached Burke in early
November 1789 to secure his opinion on the Revolution, he seemed to have
anticipated that Burke would respond positively.4 James Mackintosh perhaps was
among the few who had been able to grasp the ideological connection between the
political convictions of Burke and the seemingly eccentric position which he took on
the French Revolution: The late opinions of Mr. Burke,' he wrote, when commenting
on the Reflections
furnished more matter of astonishment to those who had distantly
observed, than to those who had correctly examined the system of his
former political life. An abhorrence for abstract politics, a predilection
for aristocracy, and a dread of innovation, have ever been among the
most sacred articles of his public creed. It was not likely that at his age
he should abandon to the invasion of audacious novelties, opinions
which he had received so early, and maintained so long, which had been
fortified by the applause of the great, and the assent of the wise, which
'
Corr, vi, 86. 'Philip Francis to Edmund Burke - 19 Feb 1790'.
2 Corf, vi, 67-75. 'Thomas Paine to Edmund Burke - 17 Jan. 1790'.
3 Thomas Paine, Rights Of Men (London, 1791-2), ed Henry Collins (Pelican ed., 1969), p 57
4 m Depont, Answer to the Reflections of the Right Hon. Edmund Burke, with the original
notes (London, 1791), pp 3-4. Cf Corr, vi, 31-2. 'Charles-Jean-Francois Depont to Edmund Burke - 4
Nov. 1789'
164
he had dictated to so many illustrious pupils, and supported against so
many distinguished opponents.
Mackintosh, nevertheless, was still much amazed at the range and ardour of Burke's
philippic. It might not be unreasonable for Burke to deride the excesses that
seemed to tarnish the lustre of the Revolution, but it could hardly be imagined,
Mackintosh claimed, that he should have exhausted against it almost every epithet of
contumely and opprobrium which language could furnish. And all the more
extraordinary was it 'that the rage of his declaration should not for one moment have
been suspended, that his heart should not betray one faint glow of triumph, at the
splendid and glorious delivery of so great a people'.5
The Reflections, there was no doubt, had achieved an immediate and magnificent
success in its circulation,6 but, almost at once, it had also engulfed British public
opinion in a bitter controversy. Indeed, though the reception accorded to this treatise
was sensational, the opinions it had thus invited were conflicting. While Burke
received warm acclamations from his sympathisers, the radical attacks on him, at the
same time, had scarcely been of less vigour. As a matter of fact, during the debate,
those who disagreed with Burke on the whole would appear to have been much more
vociferous.7 There was, of course, no lack of reasons why the British radicals should
be so infuriated. Like Paine or Depont, to be sure, few of these writers had been well
prepared for Burke's somewhat unusual action. '[I]t certainly never was expected,' one
author exclaimed,
that the admirers of the late measures in France would meet their
vehement antagonist in EDMUND BURKE. It was not expected, that the
warm champion of political liberty would desert his cause, and act in
5
James Mackintosh, Vindiciae Gallicae {London, 1791), pp. i-iii.
6 For a discussion on the publication and reception of the Reflections see: J. T Boulton, The
Language of Politics in the Age of Wilkes and Burke PP. 75-82; and f p Lock, Burke's
Reflections on the Revolution in France pp 132-143
7
It has been suggested recently that in the Price-Burke-Paine controversy the contributions from the
conservative writers had, in terms of quantity at least, overshadowed those penned by their radical
counterparts. See: Gayle Trusdel Pendleton, 'Towards a Bibliography of the Reflections and Rights Of
Man Controversy', Bulletin of Research in the Humanities Ixxxv (1982), 74. Here, Pendleton takes
a broader view of the debate and includes in her bibliography all the publications arguing for, and against.
Price, Burke and Paine. It is indeed very likely that, in the whole debate on the French Revolution, the
conservative pamphleteers published more materials; so far as the particular debate on Burke's
Reflections is concerned, however, it seems to remain true that, as F. P Lock points out, 'it was mainly
those who differed from Burke who set down their opinions at length'. See Lock, Burke's Reflections
on the Revolution in France, p 133 Cf. Boulton, The Language of Politics in the Age of
Wilkes and Burke, p 83.
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hostility to his former principles, at the moment when that liberty
became more honestly asserted ... in manly actions.8
Thomas Christie similarly was shocked to find that Burke was prepared to defend such
a bad cause: 'Mr. Burke,' he wrote,
... is the first example I ever knew of a liberal scholar. . . who
was capable of writing an elaborate apology for despotism; of
composing an elegy on the fall of arbitrary power, or of prostituting
eloquence, and the rich treasures of a mind stored with the wisdom of
ages, to undermine the birthright of human-kind, and to abuse Patriots
whom Athens would have adored, and of whom Rome was not worthy.9
Understandably, many radical writers - not a few of them Burke's erstwhile admirers -
must have felt themselves betrayed. 'Do we live to hear,' thus Benjamin Bousfield
exclaimed, 'the eloquent declaimer in favour of the right of humanity, and the freedom
of the subject, become the avowed advocate of cruelty and despotism?10 As a result,
the consistency of Burke's politics was cast into great doubt. James Parkinson, for
instance, had made efforts to discredit Burke, likening him to a chameleon whose
appearance, he indicated, had ever changed with its situation. Burke, he claimed, had
stood out one day as a friend of liberty, while boldly avowing himself, the next, to be
the 'admirer and champion of those whom all the world besides call tyrants'." Indeed,
in the opinion of Charles Pigott, the Reflections had left in the lurch all those
principles which Burke had previously supported and to which he had in effect owed
all his success and elevation in life.'2 And, on the other hand, one critic would feel it
regrettable that Burke had undeservedly tarnished the close of an honourable career
'by preaching the most polluted maxims of servitude'13
The radical pamphleteers were soon to be concerned about what appeared to
them the sinister tendency of Burke's polemics, which might become repugnant in the
8 Political Correspondence (London, 1793), pp. 70-1
9 Thomas Christie, Letters On the Revolution Of France (London, 1791), pp 2, 4-5.
10
Benjamin Bousfield, Observations on the Right Hon. Edmund Burke's Pamphlet, on the
Subject of the French Revolution (Dublin, 1791), p. 2.
" [James Parkinson], An Address, to the Hon. Edmund Burke. From the Swinish Multitude
(London, 1793), pp. 12-3.
12 Charles Pigott, The Jockey Club (London, 1792), part iii, p 97
'3 Parallel between the Conduct of Mr. Burke and that of Mr. Fox(London, 1791), p. 1
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end to their own radical politics. The sentiments conveyed in the celebrated
publication of Burke were, George Rous remarked,
neither more nor less than the exploded doctrine of the old school
revived in a new dress, calculated equally to support bad as good
Government, under all its forms, from the mad despotism of Asia to the
mild administration of laws in Great Britain.'4
Mary Wollstonecraft was not in the least amused with the 'grand principles' which
lurked under the specious garb of Burke's 'sophistical arguments'. She came to attack
the Reflections, accusing it of having burnished up 'rusty, baneful opinions'.15 There
was a prevalent view that Burke's reflections on the French Revolution had entirely
wandered away from the old tradition of English liberty: 'It is the duty of an
Englishman,' one pamphleteer wrote,
while he reveres that constitution which pronounces him a son of
liberty, to rejoice at any change by which the invaluable advantages of
freedom are communicated to another people: from this duty Mr. BURKE
has widely deviated; he has praised the English constitution, but not in
the language of liberty - he has stigmatized the French Revolution, but
from no other visible motives, than those of prejudice, petulance, and
misrepresentation.16
According to Joseph Priestley, what the Reflections had advocated was in reality
downright Toryism: its principles, he claimed, consisted of 'no other than those of
passive obedience and non-resistance, peculiar to the Tories and the friends of
arbitrary power'.17 It was apprehended at length that Burke's doctrines would tend to
encourage tyranny and superstition to the detriment of the natural rights and liberty
of mankind.18 Moreover, George Rous emphasised, they had also flown in the face of
the wise and free constitution of Britain.19 The principles which Burke cherished, in
short, were, as Benjamin Bousfield concluded, altogther 'inimical to the rights of the
14
George Rous, Thoughts On Government (London, 1791), pp. 2-3.
15 Mary Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Men (London, 1790), pp. iii-iv, 7.
18 A Letter to a Member of the National Assembly {London, 1791), p 23
17
Joseph Priestley, Letters to the Right Honourable Edmund Burke (Bi rmingham, 1791), p viii
18
Robert Wooisey, Reflections upon Reflections (London. 1790>, p. i.
19
George Rous, A Letter to the Rt. Hon. Edmund Burke, in Reply to His Appeal from the
New to the Old Whigs (Dublin, 1791), p 4
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people, and subversive of the fundamental principles of the British constitution'.20
The attacks launched on Burke, generally speaking, were extensive in range and
blatant in tone; as a whole, however, the camp of Burke's opponents again seem to
have shown no overall ideological unity. Various factors can be advanced to help to
explain this phenomenon. The social origins of the individual critics, first of all, were
vastly different. There could be found among them men of noble family, such as Earl
Stanhope.2' Mark Wilks had styled himself as a 'Norfolk farmer',22 while John Butler
would appear to be merely an 'obscure citizen' of Canterbury.23 Burke's critics were in
fact spread over a wide arc of the social spectrum; nevertheless, the majority, it
seemed, had mainly come from those classes of men who could be said to be
'comfortable in their circumstances'.24 Secondly, the political affiliations of these
radicals were also extremely complicated. There were many who belonged to the
circle of the progressive Whigs: some of them, such as James Mackintosh, George
Rous and Joseph Towers were more radical, while others, such as Sir Brooke Boothby
and Samuel Parr, less so. Another group of Burke's opponents were in close
connection with the Dissenting community, including most notably Richard Price,
Joseph Priestley, Robert Hall, Francis Stone, and Samuel Heywood. There remained
others, Thomas Paine for instance, who seemed to have no specific political affiliation,
but who had somehow felt impelled to controvert Burke for different reasons.25 Thirdly,
with such diverse backgrounds, the ideological orientations of these critics not
surprisingly turned out to be highly divergent. There was on the far left Paine's
outright republicanism; meanwhile, the radical opinions of Mary Wollstonecraft, David
Williams, John Oswald and Benjamin Flower were no less unequivocal. On the other
hand, the political views of Boothby and Parr would appear rather moderate. Few
pamphleteers, however, had gone to the length of Paine's radical republicanism: the
majority seem to move, one scholar has pointed out, within the wide range between
20
Bousfieid, Observations on the Right Hon. Edmund Burke's Pamphlet, on the Subject of
the French Revolution Advertisement', p 2.
2'
He published A Letter from Earl Stanhope, to the Right Honourable Edmund Burke
(London, 1790). It was a reply to Burke's speech on the Army Estimatesof 9 Feb 1790
22 See the title page of his The Origin and Stability of the French Revolution ([Norwich?l, 1791).
23 See his Brief Reflections on the Liberty of the British Subject (Canterbury, 1791 >. p. 143.
24
Pendleton, 'Towards a Bibliography.of the Reflections and Rights Of Man Controversy', p. 72.
25 For a tentative effort to define the political groupings of Burke's opponents, see: Boulton, The
Language of Politics in the Age of Wilkes and Burke pp 83-96
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'the unrevolutionary tradition of whiggism and Dissenting radicalism'.26 Finally, the
manner in which the debate proceeded also added not a little to complicate the
situation. Most of the pamphleteers, being virtually provoked to meet Burke's attack
without proper preparation, had not been in a position to coordinate their reactions.
When these factors are put together, the range of opinions in the individual
pamphlets, and of the topics discussed, were as diverse and complicated as could be
imagined. James T. Boulton has acutely touched on the complexity of the subject.
The controversy, he observes, had assumed no clearly defined shape and showed no
signs of orderly development:
it was the natural outcome of the complex political situation in
1790. The pamphleteers. . . were guided by their private political
loyalties, their views on the whole question of reform, and their
estimation of the value of the French example for the English reform
movement. The anti-Burke writers had, then, a common adversary, but
they wrote largely as individuals. The reason for this is not difficult to
determine. The material of the Reflections is so far-ranging and Burke's
attitude so provocative that there was no single and narrow point at
issue. Writers were compelled to oppose Burke where they felt
themselves attacked; the issue seemed to be between him and
themselves as representative individuals, and consequently their tone is
chiefly personal. Opposition came, then, from so many sides that there
was no concerted effort, no possibility of mutual support.27
There were indeed even differences existing among these critics themselves, which
sometimes could be as serious as their disagreement with Burke. Both Boothby and
Parr, for instance, had harboured no more liking towards Paine than towards Burke.28
Likewise, another critic would share Burke's abhorrence at the tendency of Price's
politics and partake no less in his contempt for such a popular association as the
Revolution Society.29 In fact, many critics of Burke - notably those of moderate
opinions - would find Burke's account of the British constitution agreeable though
they were not prepared to endorse his view of the French Revolution.30
26
Pendleton, 'Towards a Bibliography of the Reflections and Rights Of Man Controversy', pp 74-5
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28 See: Sir Brooke Boothby, Observations on the Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs,
and On Mr Paine's Rights of Man (London, 1792), part ii, Samuel Parr, Miscellaneous Remarks on
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29 Temperate Comments upon the Intemperate Reflections (London, 1791). pp 8-9. 13-4
30 For instances, iHenry Mackenzie], The Letters Of BrutUS (Dublin, 1791), Letter iv; A Letter to 3
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The lack of ideological unity, no doubt, was characteristic of those who contended
against Burke. Care should be taken, when their opinions are investigated, in order
that over-simplification can be avoided. The heterogeneous nature of Burke's critics of
course poses methodological difficulties for any one who intends to analyse their
opinions as a whole. This concern, however, need not lead us to abandon such an
attempt. Indeed, if a proper approach is taken, the diversity of the radical arguments
can in fact highlight the many sides of the debate in question. With such a conviction,
to catch the comprehensive outlook of British radicalism, with due regard to its
internal complexity, the analysis undertaken here will focus on the numerous topics
which were debated and the different arguments called forth.
The efforts of Burke's critics collectively brought his Reflections under a most
searching examination. Almost no aspect of Burke's principles was left untouched and
nearly every kind of opinion was advanced. Despite their want of overall unity,
however, some fundamental assumptions were still commonly asserted. Generally
speaking, the opponents of Burke had tended, implicitly or explicitly, to base- their
arguments upon a theory that contended for the sovereign authority of the people.
Earl Stanhope had perhaps represented a common conviction shared by many critics
of Burke when he declared:
All warrantable political Power is derived, either mediately, or
immediately, from the People All political Authority is a TRUST; and
every wilful act of abuse of that Authority, is a Breach of Trust The
natural RIGHTS of the PEOPLE are sacred and inalienable - Rights of
which Despotism may rob them for a time, but, which is not in the
Power of Tyranny to annihilate31
George Rous would advocate the same opinion:
Magistracy is created for the benefit of the people - derived from
the people - and, from its nature, perpetually held in trust for the
people.32
The assertion of Robert Hall was even more straightforward: 'Government,' he
declared, 'is the creature of the people.'33 The most prominent feature which
31
Eari Stanhope, A Letter from Earl Stanhope, to the Rt. Hon. Edmund Burke, p 26
32 Rous, A Letter to the Rt. Hon. Edmund Burke p.44.
33 Robert Hail, An Apology for the Freedom of the Press (London, 1793), p. 9
170
distinguished the radicalism of Burke's critics, no doubt, had consisted in their popular
politics. The origin of political power, according to Benjamin Flower, had to be traced
back to the people at large for its primary source: 'All authority,' he claimed, 'proceeds
from the people - All is executed by those whom the people appointed, and - All is
designed for the benefit of the people'3* In the same vein, David Williams insisted that
the supreme power of a nation had resided in the body of its people.35 It could never,
Thomas Paine added, be deposited in other hands:
Sovereignty, as a matter of right, appertains to the Nation only, -
and not to any individual; and a Nation has at all times an inherent
indefeasible right to abolish any form of Government it finds
inconvenient, and establish such as accords with its interest, disposition,
and happiness.36
Indeed, William Cuninghame would find it difficult to oppose the sovereignty of the
people and consider it unreasonable to dispute the sanctity of their rights. 'Can there
be the shadow of a doubt,' he asked, 'that their wishes are authority, their will law,
and their actions government?37 The sovereign authority of the state, in short, ought
ever to be seated, as another writer insisted, in the 'aggregate will of the nation'.38
To vindicate the popular origin of government, the concept of 'consent' had been
invoked. All the lawful governments, it was widely maintained, had derived their
authority from the consent of the people, implied or expressed.39 In this respect, both
George Rous and Robert Hall were ready to appeal to the political tradition of John
Locke.40 Rous had ventured to repeat the doctrine, 'taught by Locke and Sidney', that a
legitimate government could have no other foundation than the consent of the people
34
Benjamin Flower, The French Constitution; with Remarks on Some of its Principal Articles
(London, 1792), pp. 123-4.
35 [David Williams], LeSSOnS to a Young Prince (London, 1791), 7th ed., p. 22.
36 Paine, Rights of Man p 165.
37 William Cuninghame, The Rights Of Kings (London, 1791), p 32
38 Thoughts on a Peace with France (London, 1796), p 37
39 ICatharine Macauiayl. Observations on the Reflections of the Rt. Hon. Edmund Burke, on
the Revolution in France (London, 1790), p. 94; William Belsham, 'Examination of An Appeal from the
New to the Old Whigs' (1792), Essays Philosophical and Moral, Historical and Literary (London,
1799), ii, 320; Political Correspondence, p 43.
40 For Locke's theory of consent, cf John Dunn, 'Consent in the Political Theory of John Locke', Historical
Journal X (1967), 153-82.
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under its rule.41 The necessity of popular consent for the legitimation of civil
government, according to Hall, could be inferred from the Lockean theory of natural
equality:
The doctrine of Mr. Locke and his followers is founded on the
natural equality of mankind; for as no man can have any natural or
inherent right to rule any more than another, it necessarily follows, that
a claim to dominion, wherever it is lodged, must be ultimately referred
back to the explicit or implied consent of the people. Whatever source
of civil authority is assigned different from this, will be found to resolve
itself into mere force
As a matter of fact, Hall insisted, the great Author of Nature had placed the right of
dominion in no particular hands, leaving instead every point relating to it to be settled
by the consent and approbation of mankind'. The origin of political authority must at
length rest upon the acquiesence of the people and could only be explained by
resolving it into the will of the nation.42 The opponents of Burke, in general, were
disposed to cherish the consent of the people as the sole legitimation of government.
To William Belsham, there could be no other just or lawful foundation of political
power than the choice or consent of the people.43 In contrast, the authority of rude
force was condemned. The writer of Political Correspondence had pointed out:
On two principles only can all Government be founded, viz, on
force, or on popular agreement. That which exists not with the popular
consent, exists against the popular consent, and such Government is a
Government of force.
He dismissed all rude force as but a kind of usurpation that always incurred injustice.
It could be no more than a vicious ground, unsuitable for any authority whatever.44
After all, it was asserted, the pretensions of those rulers who had usurped their
powers through rude force could never deserve the respect which was paid to the
claims of those sovereigns whose titles had been conferred by 'exalting choice of an
approving people'.45
41
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On the other hand, some radical thinkers had stepped forward to bring out a more
positive aspect of popular sovereignty: the right of the people to meddle in the affairs
of government. The people of every country, William Cuninghame declared, had a
constant and inalienable right to form their own government and to change their ruler.
They were entitled to remodel the former as often as it became defective and to
remove the latter as soon as he abused his powers.46 The author of The Political Crisis
went further. The people, he insisted, possessed an undoubted right to set up
whatever magistracy they would please, retaining meanwhile a power, once they saw
fit, to alter it, for any reason, or for no reason at all: 'if they will it, it is sufficient'.47
After all, George Rous pointed out, civil authority, being held solely for the benefit of
the nation, should count upon the people at large to define its power. He compared
the claim of the nation to change its government to the right of the individual to
dispose of his own property, arguing that
A man who should disinherit a worthy son in favour of a worthless
stranger, would act a most immoral pare, but his right to dispose of his
property could not be questioned. So a nation which should change
their government, without an adequate motive, without a rational
prospect of advancing the public happiness, would likewise act a most
immoral part; but their right to judge for themselves . . is alike
unquestionable.48
Most certainly, Rous was convinced, when determined to exercise their sovereign
power, the whole body of the people could theoretically be restrained by 'no human
controul' though, in practice, they would certainly be subject to a 'moral obligation'
not to damage the public felicity of all.49
These radical reasonings on the sovereignty of the people had connoted a new
conception of the relationship between the ruler and his people at large. If the power
of the governor had, as argued above, been derived from the people, he could then no
longer be deemed, as hitherto, as the master of the nation. Thus, David Williams
declared:
46
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The depositaries of delegated power, whether called princes,
senates, or parliaments, are not proprietors or masters, they are subject
to the people, who form and support the society; by an eternal law of
nature, which has ever subjected a part to the whole.50
Francis Stone contended that the king had not been created to become the proprietor
of the nation: rather, he was intended to act as the protector of the people. He
compared the power which the governor derived from the people to the light which
the moon reflected from the sun, asserting
that the majesty of the people, to whom, by God's permission,
kings owe their creation as kings, is as much superior to the majesty of
the crown, as the strong, dazzling, native lustre of that glorious luminary
the sun outshines the pale reflected light of the moon, from whom she
derives her borrowed splendour.
/
The body of the people ought to be the master, while^magistrate was no more than
their servant.51 Being a public servant, another critic went on to assert, a magistrate
ought to be made accountable to the people for the use he would make of public
power.52 Above all, Robert Hall emphasised, civil rulers could never claim any rights
which would be considered co-extensive with those of the people or which might
tend to form a distinct part separate from the nation. They are appointed by the
community to execute its will, not to oppose it; to manage the public, not to pursue
any private or particular interests.' To claim that they could become independent of
the people's will, he believed, would be as absurd as to assume that 'water can arise
above its source'.53
The principle of popular sovereignty, without doubt, was central to the political
arguments of Burke's critics. In itself, nevertheless, this doctrine could not be
separated from the more fundamental theory of the 'rights of man'. To a great extent,
in fact, the 'rights of man' theory can be said to be what had truly underlain the
radical polemics of those who rose to defend the French Revolution.
50
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It is necessary then to make an enquiry into the views of these writers concerning
the rights of man, in order to understand the nature of their radical arguments. The
rights of man, according to John Thelwall, had grown out of the nature of man.54
Catharine Macaulay meanwhile stressed that these rights existed 'in the very
constitution of thingd.*5 In the main, those who were at odds with Burke's principles
were prepared to cherish the rights of man as the fundamental values of their politics.
To Francis Stone, the natural equal rights of men formed the 'first principles' of
government.58 Thomas Christie proclaimed these rights to be things of greater and
dearer concern, because, he stressed, they were founded upon the great principles of
eternal justice and reason.57 But the most elegant opinion came from Capel Lofft who
claimed that, compared with other civil inheritance, the rights of man were principles
of date far higher and of origin more venerable:
It is an inheritance coeval with the commencement of humanity:
its ensigns is the countenance impressed with the divine character of
Reason; its gallery the extent of the habitable earth; its monuments the
unperishable memory of the wisest, best, and bravest of the species of
every age and country; its evidence, the voice of nature; its title our
equal relation to the Deity.58
They came down, another writer asserted, as the 'gift of Heaven to all mankind' and
had on that account assumed superior claims.59 In the final analysis, William Belsham
concluded, the rights of man had resulted purely from the reason and nature of
things, dependent upon no other artificial or positive institution. They were, he cited
David Hume's words, 'rights perpetual and unalienable, which no time, no precedent,
no statute, can either abrogate or impair'.60
The role of the rights of man in civil life was asserted in two main aspects. On the
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one hand, many radical writers were ready to see natural rights laid down as the
foundation of civil liberty. All liberty, one critic pointed out, must be grounded upon
the natural rights of man.61 Another writer shared this opinion and compared these
rights to the 'root of the tree'.62 To deny the authority of natural rights, it was warned,
would be to leave the freedom of the people in danger of being subject entirely to the
arbitrary will of the civil power.63 At the same time, the rights of man were also
thought to be the only principles that could legitimate any civil authority. A lawful
government, Catharine Macaulay was convinced, could have no other foundation than
the 'native and unalienable rights of man'.64 Francis Stone insisted that natural rights
ought to form the basis of all government.65 According to Benjamin Flower, the grand
end of political association had been to secure those natural rights, which are the
birth right of every man, and of which he cannot be justly deprived'.66 It was, Thomas
Christie contended, from these rights that all particular constitutions derived their
authority; and no civil power could therefore deserve respect until it was rendered
conformable to this unchangeable standard.67
But how had the theory of the rights of man been built up? To elucidate natural
rights, the foremost task that befell the radical writers was to trace their origin.
Arguing in the Lockean tradition, those who defended the rights of man were
generally inclined to relate the origin of these rights to a state of nature.68 George
Rous obviously assumed such a position when he asked: 'what can be the origin of
human rights, if they be not derived from nature?'69 The same view was more
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distinctly declared in another anonymous pamphlet:
The best way to discover the natural rights of man, is to refer to
him in a state of nature. There certainly was a time when he existed in
that state, unless we supposed that government dropped upon him from
the clouds. When he was, or how long he remained in it, we cannot tell;
but common sense compels us to conclude, that in that state he must
have been some time or another.70
From an historical perspective, this natural state was by some referred to as the
period before civil society was formed. It was, to Vicesimus Knox, a stage 'preparatory
to forming a convention'.71 'I believe,' another critic declared confidently, 'few will deny
but that there was a time prior to any social compact in society.' At that time, he
suggested, the world had been only a state of nature where solitary men could not
find any established rule to follow.72
It needs to be remembered here that not every radical writer had in fact been
convinced enough to accept the historical authenticity of this state of nature. Robert
Hall, notably, remarked that there were no traces, 'even in tradition, of a period when
men were utterly unconnected with each other'.73 A man without society, or a society
without government, John Thelwall contended, had never been known: The fact is,' he
stressed, 'we are not only unacquainted with solitary man, but with society
uninfluenced by political compact' In spite of such doubts, however, Thelwall would
still find it advisable, and indeed necessary, to abstract a state of things, conceived to
be the 'natural condition of man', in which, he believed, man's original rights could be
identified:
But though neither history nor observation furnish any examples
either of unassociated man, or of society without some sort of political
institution, yet it is not difficult to form a distinct idea of what may be
called the natural condition of man: that is, to distinguish, in our minds,
between what the individual has derived from nature, and what has
been conferred, or abrogated, by civil society.
And, in his mind, this state was sketched to be a situation in which every man existed
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purely as an individual, 'stripped of all the relationships of Society, independent of its
compacts, and uninfluenced by its reciprocationd.7A Various portrayals had been given
to illustrate this supposed natural state. To Sir Brooke Boothby, a state of nature had
been almost an animate and uncivilized state.75 Francis Stone called it a state of
savage nature,76 while yet another writer tended to associate it with an 'unsocial state
of savage life'.77 In any case, as Thelwall emphasised, it was not supposed to be either
an ideal era of perfect happiness or a poetical vision of a golden age.78
A savage state of primitive life, according to The Political Crisis, had been an order
in which every man, governed by no civil regulations, had simply followed the dictate
of his native reason, restrained merely by the law of nature, to seek after his own
welfare. In such situation, a man must naturally possess a power to will, and to act,
in whatever manner might contribute the most to his own happiness.79 In this context,
what could the natural rights of man be said to stand for? [I]n a pure state of nature,'
Sir Brooke Boothby declared, 'right and power seem to be perfectly equivalent terms.'
Boothby contended that in the natural state, since man was driven purely by his
physical necessity, his rights must hence become 'co-equal with his natural powers,
and capacities, and wants'.80 John Thelwall had interpreted the original rights of man
in the same physical terms. The natural rights, he wrote, consisted in the mere
powers and means, of which the individual was by nature possessed. To make plain
his point, he explained:
Man, from the very circumstance of his existence, has an
inheritance in the elements and powers of nature, and a right to
exercise his faculties upon those powers and elements, so as to render
them subservient to his wants, and conducive to his enjoyments. In
other words, Man is the sovereign; the material universe is the subject;
his faculties are the powers by which he enforces his authority; and
expediency is his rule of right. He is a despot, to the limit of his power,
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over the physical universe; and he has a right to be so.
On the whole, Thelwall summed up, the rights of man in the natural state had been
simple in their elements: They are determined by his wants, and his faculties; and the
means presented by the general system of nature. . . for the gratification of the
former, and the improvement of the latter.' There would be no other boundary.81
Before civil society was formed, therefore, every individual could be supposed to
have been totally independent, retaining, as James Mackintosh alleged, his natural
sovereignty over his own actions.82 Man had at that time acted, Samuel Heywood
claimed, as his own soldier, his own lawgiver and his own judge, without giving up
the government of himself and his concerns.83 Theoretically, of course, a state of
nature ought to be an ideal world of perfect freedom and complete independence in
which man could fully enjoy his natural rights. This, however, seemed to have been far
from the case. The rights of man in the natural state, according to the definition
above, should be equal to his native wants. Unfortunately, Thomas Paine observed,
man was never rendered physically competent enough to gratify his own desires. In
all cases, nature had made his natural wants greater than his individual powers and no
one had been able, without aids, to supply his own needs.84 In fact, man's life in the
natural state could hardly be quite secure. He was then left, John Thelwall noted,
entirely to the wild growth of nature, living like other animals and, if particularly
feeble, liable to perish in the bleak wild of barbarism.85 'Man, at his origin,' The Political
Crisis stressed, 'felt himself depressed with wants, debility and woe, and exposed to
every kind of hardship.' Indeed, the first proprietors of the world must have
experienced great inconveniences of living independent and unconnected, subject to
all sorts of insults and wrongs without the power of proper redress.86 The moral
imperfection of men, another pamphlet added, had also conduced to turn the natural
state into a miserable world of conflict and oppression:
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If no man had a right to controul another in a state of nature,
every man had a right to be free. Men, however, were not perfect
beings; they had vices and passions, and these vices and passions
produced mischievous effects in society. The strong oppressed the
weak.
Since every individual would be liable to become the weaker some time or other, no
one hence could be secure for ever.87 In all probability, Francis Stone was persuaded,
the stronger would always subdue the weaker, depriving him of his life and liberty.88 In
truth, Thelwall insisted, a state of nature must at all times be a state of incessant war,
ever tending to degenerate into an 'anarchic Tyranny of Physical Forcd"
The state of nature, it must then become plain, would never form a proper
environment in which the rights of man could be better maintained. Thelwall was
virtually convinced that at the rude stage of society all those boasted liberties and
independence were extremely precarious because they had been then 'little calculated
for permanent establishment'. Worse, he stressed, 'liberty' under that condition could
be easily perverted into 'a privilege of the strong to tyrannize over the feeb/d.90 In this
circumstance, therefore, the search for protection and security naturally became the
main concerns of mankind. And as a result of necessity, it was assumed, men were
driven to contrive government: They devised the expedient of chusing some one
person or persons to rule them, whose power they shall all support, and whose power
so supported should be sufficient to restrain oppression.'91 Similar observations were
made by one Irish author who came to stress that
every society of human creatures who wish for protection from
internal and external violence, will consent to pay those who will protect
them, and are willing to agree some individuals should direct the public
power to those purposes; every society wishes therefore for some
government.92
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To avoid the inconveniences of the natural state, in other words, human beings had
been forced to associate together: 'Mankind,' as Francis Stone remarked, 'conscious
that in a state of savage nature the weakest becomes a prey to the strongest, embody
themselves in civil society for the preservation of these rights, namely, their lives,
liberties, and properties.'93
Many radical writers were actually inclined to view this movement towards civil
society as a process quite conformable with the natural disposition of man. A state of
nature, Benjamin Flower noted, had been virtually a state of solitude, in which it was
impossible that human beings would like to stay for long:
Man originally was, and still is, formed for a social creature; he is
by choice, as well as necessity, compelled to seek the help of, and to
unite in society with, his fellow creatures. We find it our interest, as well
as our duty, to endeavour to encrease each other's happiness.94
It was indeed generally held that man was by nature a social creature, destined
especially for civil life. There is no dispute but that man is naturally a social being,'
one writer wrote.95 Thomas Paine was of the same opinion. Fluman beings, he claimed,
had as well from natural instinct, as from reciprocal benefits, habituated themselves to
civil life. 'In short,' he wrote, 'man is so naturally a creature of society, that it is
almost impossible to put him out of it.'96
We need further enquire: what was then the process which created civil society?
Upon this, a prevalent opinion was to approach it as an institution established through
some kind of original contract. The author of The Political Crisis had manifestly
assumed that it was the people's 'combining together in social compact, and
relinquishing a portion of their natural rights, and making regulations for the common
good, which creates civil society.97 But two different accounts had been advanced to
explain the making of this social contract. Some pamphleteers, first of all, were ready
- and it seemed natural - to conceive it as an act transacted between the ruler and
his people. In the formation of civil society, Francis Stone pointed out, the people had
93
Stone, An Examination of the Rt. Hon. Edmund Burke's Reflections, p. 36-7
94 Flower, The French Constitution p 114.
95 The Political Crisis p 7.
96
Paine, Rights of Man pp. 185-6.
97 The Political Crisis p 10.
181
'entered into a convention or compact with their governors'.98 Joseph Priestley
declared that there had existed a virtual, though not express, 'compact between the
king and the peopid which set down stipulations for protection on the part of the king
and for allegiance on the part of the people.99 This original compact, another writer
asserted, was derived from a 'great agreement between the governing and the
governed'.100 It was, thus William Belsham concluded, a contract 'subsisting between
the magistrate and the people'.101
This reading of the social contract, nevertheless, would prove unacceptable to
many other radical writers, who were keen enough to discern in it certain theoretical
flaws and, moreover, to apprehend from it some mischievous implications. Instead, a
more radical version was brought out. William Cuninghame denounced the assumption
that civil authority had been founded upon an original contract, supposed to be
engaged by the people with their magistrate: 'If we mean anything by a contract,' he
argued,
it is that, while one party abides, the other is bound by it. Now is
this our sense of government? If the king of any country should
possess too much power by its constitution, could not the people
diminish it? Could the king urge that he had never broken his contract,
and could not, therefore, lose any of his power? Could he oppose his
language to the unanimous voice of the people? If he could not, there is
no contract, no bargain - the idea is ridiculous.102
No government, in his view, could ever be entitled to claim a share in the sovereignty
of the nation. David Williams likewise contended that the act which constituted a
government should never become the subject of a contract. It was the will, or rather
the 'arbitrary law', of the people.103 The arguments which Thomas Paine elaborated
were much better reasoned. Paine accepted in principle the view that the social
contract had been essential in the foundation of civil government, but he refused to
grant that a compact of this nature could be seen as a transaction negotiated
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between the governor and the governed:
It has been thought a considerable advance towards establishing
the principles of Freedom, to say, that government is a compact
between those who govern and those who are governed: but this
cannot be true, because it is putting the effect before the cause; for as
man must have existed before governments existed, there necessarily
was a time when governments did not exist, and consequently there
could originally exist no governors to form such a compact with.
The social contract, that is, could only originate with the people at large. It was a
transaction in which 'the individuals themselves each in his own personal and
sovereign right, entered into a compact with each other to produce a government'.
And this, he added, was the only mode in which government could have the right to
arise.104 To make plain the nature of the social contract, Paine went on to maintain:
there is no such thing as the idea of a compact between the
people on one side, and the government on the other. The compact was
that of the people with each other, to produce and constitute a
government. To suppose that any government can be a party in a
compact with the whole people, is to suppose it to have existence
before it can have a right to exist.
It was, after all, not an offer granted by the governor, but the act of 'a people
constituting a government'.'05
No matter how the social contract was interpreted, there was at any rate no
dispute about the necessity of civil society. Most radical writers seemed ready to
allow that the institution of civil society was ultimately essential for the proper
maintenance of the rights of man. 'I do not intend to say,' Samuel Parr had declared,
'that all the rights of men derive their origin from society, but that, in a well-regulated
society, their natural rights are recognized, preserved, defined, and invigorated.'106 To
James Mackintosh, only in a civil society could the rights of man be much better
defended: 'In a state of nature, the equality of right is an impotent theory, which
inequalities of strength and skill every moment violate. It is called into energy and
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effect only by society.'107 But the important point here is: when once civil society was
formed, what would happen to man in terms of his rights? This is a question crucial
to the radical polemics of Burke's critics.
Among Burke's opponents some were disposed to assert that, when man became
a member of civil society, he must surrender to it all his natural rights and receive
instead what that society would give as his real rights. After the formation of civil
society, according to Sir Brooke Boothby, those rights which were originally attached
to man in the natural state must be assumed to have been given up in exchange for
the benefits of that society. Consequently, he asserted, the rights of man to be
enjoyed afterwards had to be 'determined and ascertained by the laws and institutions
of the society in which he is born'. Since the rights of man in society, thus
considered, would mainly depend on the established laws, they could therefore never
be insisted upon as anything absolute. Boothby's view about the rights of man in truth
had been fundamentally utilitarian:
Liberty is one of the means of happiness, but not happiness itself.
It is only good as it gives the power of enjoying the good which we
possess; where there is nothing to enjoy it is useless; where it can only
be employed in doing evil to ourselves or others it is pernicious. . . Civil
liberty therefore consists as much in the restraint as in the exercise of
natural liberty.
With this conviction, he continued to claim that the rights of man in civil life had been
only of secondary importance and must always be made subordinate to all laws and
institutions for the good of the whole. They were, in his eyes, all relative, ever liable
to vary with circumstances and not suitable to be 'reduced to any positive or
immutable principles'.'08
Most of Burke's critics, however, would find it quite difficult to appreciate
Boothby's sentiments on the rights of man, which must certainly appear to them not
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so much different from the stand they associated with Burke. The opinion which Burke
asserted, Mackintosh pointed out, tended to infer that man, after entering into civil
society, had abdicated all his natural rights and that henceforth 'the only rights which
he retains are CREATED by the compact which holds together the society of which he
is a member'.109 Samuel Heywood treated Burke in the same light: 'Mr. Burke in his
Reflections on the French Revolution,' he claimed,
countenances this error, when treating the rights of men in
society, he says, they 'are their advantages and these rights are often
in balances between differences of good, in compromises sometimes
between good and evil, and sometimes between evil and evil. . .' From
this sublime passage I collect, that when man enters into society, and
becomes a civil social being, all the direct original rights which he
enjoyed in a state of nature are destroyed, and he has no rights left but
the advantages for which civil society was formed The argument must
amount to this, or it amounts to nothing.110
To Robert Hall, Burke's theory implied that a total surrender had been made by man of
his natural freedom, in return for the superior advantages of civil society. Upon this
argument, he warned, man would never be permitted to appeal again to any original
principles, 'but must rest content with the advantages that are secured by the terms
of the society'.111
No true radicals among Burke's opponents, it can be easily perceived, could be
persuaded, with consistence, to endorse such an authoritarian view. They were, on the
contrary, convinced that liberty must be founded upon the natural rights of man, or it
would be entirely left to the tender mercies of the ruling power. One critic argued that
civil liberty, being rooted in the natural rights of man, could never be restricted to
those rights only which civil government would allow man to enjoy. To render civil
authority the source of human rights, he insisted, would be to justify every kind of
oppression.112 The Political Crisis was horrified at the Burkean suggestion that 'man
has no natural, but all are civil rights'. Man would be enslaved if such a principle
prevailed, since according to this doctrine, he claimed,
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he is totally subject to the will and caprice of those in power; has
no business to murmur at, or to enquire into the conduct of the
magistrate, be it ever so cruel and oppressive; has no concern with
government, but must submit to every imposition, believe whatever is
taught and bear whatever is imposed upon him."3
For Mackintosh, indeed, to contend for the absolute surrender of natural rights by civil
and social man would serve to justify every kind of atrocious despotism, outraging the
most avowed conviction of man."4 'It requires little discernment to see,' thus Robert
Hall wrote, 'that this theory rivets the chains of despotism, and shuts out from the
political world the smallest glimpse of emancipation or improvement.'"5
The rational object of political society, according to John Thelwall, was to increase
the welfare and happiness of the whole, which he believed could only be achieved
through promoting the future enjoyment of natural rights."6 To be sure, Thomas Paine
claimed, man did not enter into civil society in order to become worse than he had
been in the natural state and he never intended to 'have fewer rights than he had
before, but to have those rights better secured'."7 For all such constant calls for the
promotion of natural rights, however, few radical writers would in reality pretend to
insist upon these rights in their entirety. Vicesimus Knox admitted that there might be
occasions when the natural rights would need to 'stand compromised and affected by
incidental circumstances'."8 In practice, John Butler emphasised, such a compromise
had been virtually rendered inevitable as a result of the need to maintain a civil
authority; '[W]ithout a government,' he wrote, 'we would be in a state of perpetual war
and rapine; it is therefore absolutely necessary that our liberty and freedom should be
both reasonable and limited.'"9 After all, Robert Hall remarked, since government
implied restraint, every one under it must hence be obliged to give up some part of
his natural freedom.120
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'I believe,' The Political Crisis declared, 'it is admitted on all hands, that there was
a voluntary resignation and a deposit of a certain portion of the rights of individuals
at the foundation of society.'121 In discussing the rights of man in society, therefore,
what would truly concern the radicals in the end became not so much whether any
right had to be resigned as how far such a resignation could be justly made. When
man entered into a state of society, one writer pointed out, he relinquished a part of
his natural liberty for the general good of the community.122 In the same vein, Francis
Stone claimed that every individual, in virtue of his uniting himself into a civil
association, had surrendered a small portion of his liberty, in order that he might
secure the greater portion of it.123 Generally speaking, the radical pamphleteers were
prepared to claim that the natural rights which man was obliged to give up had been
very partial. According to James Mackintosh, a society could not require its members
to surrender any right which was not in accordance with the end for which it was
formed. Civil society had been intended principally to protect every man against
abuses from others; accordingly, the rights which needed to be sacrificed to the
public authority should include those only which 'in their exercise might be injurious
to ANOTHER'. Man, in other words, could never be supposed to have resigned all of
his natural rights.124 Robert Hall maintained that civil government had been instituted
for quite specific aims: chiefly to secure man from 'eternal injury and violence'. It
would be absurd, then, to suggest that 'by submitting to civil power, with a view to
some particular benefits, we should be understood to hold all our advantages
dependent upon that authority'. Civil restraints could imply no more than a resignation
of liberty in some points, so as to maintain undisturbed others of more importance.125
Samuel Heywood admitted that man had indeed brought into the aggregate stock of
society some natural rights to be modified and arranged for the great end of social
union. Nevertheless, he contended, this did not mean that he was thereby stripped of
all his natural rights. There remained, besides the advantages from civil institutions,
rights which 'certainly never could be surrendered to society, or dependent on its
institutions'.126
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Many a pamphleteer, meanwhile, went further to stress that the rights which had
been thus resigned were not merely quite limited; they in reality belonged to the kind
which tended to be not so fundamental to the welfare of the individual himself. 'It
must be admitted,' one critic claimed,
that men necessarily abridge themselves a part of their natural
rights, those of an inferior nature, that are not essential to their
happiness, in order to obtain the advantages resulting from society,
which are of superior value.
He insisted that a good government would never conspire to take away rights which
were 'compatible with strict justice to individuals'.127 It would be too unequal indeed,
Capel Lofft maintained, if man should resign in trust the whole of his natural rights in
order to preserve a part of them:
a surrender of primary independent rights, to preserve secondary
and adventitious rights, the whole of natural liberty for a precarious
portion of civil, is an imaginary compact so replete with more than
paradox, so incompatible with every idea of reason and justice, that the
wildest imagination never created such a chimera.
To Lofft, in short, the rights to be given up should extend to no more than those
which might stand inconsistent with the end of civil society.'28 They were, another
writer added, rights fit only for the unsocial state of savage life and alienable
therefore for the purpose of giving energy to the operation of a social contract.'29
Social man, in any case, was believed to have still reserved the essential part of
his natural rights. Robert Hall was positive that there had always been some liberty
which man could freely exercise without the need of permission from civil authority.'30
In the opinion of John Thelwall, man was no doubt entitled to all those rights which
he was not obliged to resign:
Society is responsible, in the first place, for an equivalent for that
which society has taken away. For all the rest, you have still a right to
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employ your faculties for your own advantage.
Every one, for instance, had the rights to gratify his natural appetites and to practise
his rational faculties. Rights of this nature ought to be inalienable because, he
contended, they were indispensable for basic human existence.131 Samuel Heywood
meanwhile would refuse to allow that all rights were civil. There were certain rights
which were neither springing out of, nor affected by, civil institutions and which must
therefore remain 'to social man, in the strictest sense, a natural right'.132 In the final
analysis, James Mackintosh stressed, natural rights could never be supposed to lie
dormant in civil society: 'It remains,' he remarked, 'in its full integrity and vigor, if we
except that portion of it which men mutually sacrifice for protection against each
other.'133
True to their radical politics, most of Burke's critics, alongside with their insistence
on the natural rights of man, were in the meantime reluctant to second an
all-powerful civil authority. It had been their persistent effort to try to keep the
minimum of government in the hope that the natural rights of man could be promoted
to their maximum possible level. The more free and mild a government became,
Benjamin Bousfield claimed, the stronger could the natural rights of man be
maintained. 'In every material departure from the rights of men,' he was convinced,
'the subject is aggrieved, the trust violated, and government assumed an arbitrary and
despotic sway.'134 John Thelwall argued that the just and rational object of civil
authority ought, not to retrench or abrogate, but to secure and equalise, natural
rights.135 John Oswald had gone further. He pointed out that the end of good
government was to give 'free and unimpeded operation to the will of the peopld, and
he contended that only a despotic system would attempt to obstruct such
operation.136 For some writers, hence, the extent to which the rights of man had been
promoted became a ready criterion to assess the merit of a government. Thus, Robert
Hall declared: 'Political arrangement is more or less perfect in proportion as it enables
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us to exert our natural liberty to the greatest advantage.' It should not be suffered to
impose greater restraint than its object had prescribed. If that should be the case, he
warned, the whole system would degenerate into a baneful order of oppression and
tyranny.'37
This inclination to temper the power of civil government, in favour of man's natural
rights, had obviously stemmed from the deep distrust of the radicals over the
contribution which civil power could positively make to the civilization of mankind.
The advantages to be expected of civil government, according to Robert Hall, were
quite limited. Compared with the general condition of man, only a small part of human
concerns could fall under its influence.138 Thomas Paine had elaborated more upon this
point. Formal government, he wrote, was able to affect but a narrow area of civilised
life, which he believed had been for the most part virtually run by the common usages
and natural rules of the community:
GREAT part of that order which reigns among mankind is not the
effect of government. It has its origin in the principles of society and
the natural constitution of man. It existed prior to government, and
would exist if the formality of government was abolished. The mutual
dependence and reciprocal interest which man has upon man, and all
the parts of a civilized community upon each other, create that great
chain of connexion which holds it together. . . Common interest
regulates their concerns, and forms their law.
The laws ordained by common usage, generally speaking, had exerted greater
influence than civil laws. Indeed, Paine observed, human society had virtually
performed for itself most of the functions which, however, had been mistakenly
attributed to civil government. A public authority could be no farther necessary than
to supply 'the few cases to which society and civilization are not conveniently
competent'. He had gone so far as to ridicule the existence of government as having
been for most of the time a matter 'more in name and idea, than in fact':
It is to the great and fundamental principles of society and
civilization - to the common usage universally consented to, and
mutually and reciprocally maintained - to the unceasing circulation of
interest, which. . . invigorates the whole mass of civilized man - it is to
these things, infinitely more then to anything which even the best
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instituted government can perform, that the safety and prosperity of the
individual and of the whole depends.
Paine's arguments connoted a strong anarchic sentiment which led him to set at
defiance all the formal governments.139
Having surveyed the various situations that affected the subsistence of the rights
of man, it is now time to examine what those rights were which man was thought
able to maintain in civil society. There was no right, it could be readily assumed,
which was not originally a natural right. According to Paine's definition, natural rights'
referred to those which appertained to man 'in right of his existence'. Theoretically,
then, they ought to include all the rights, intellectual and physical, which man had
possessed as an individual to promote his own comfort and happiness. But if civil
society implied, as discussed above, resigning some portion of these natural rights,
upon what criterion could one decide between the rights to be surrendered and those
to be reserved? Thomas Paine had set down a simple principle:
The natural rights which he retains, are all those in which the
power to execute is as perfect in the individual as the right itself.
Among this class. . . are all the intellectual rights, or rights of the mind.
. . The natural rights which are not retained, are all those in which,
though the right is perfect in the individual, the power to execute them
is defective. They answer not his purpose.
Rights unable to be carried into practice, anyway, would be good for nothing; they
were therefore deposited in society as common stock, in order that public force could
be relied on to promote their enjoyment. The rights thus trusted, in Paine's opinion,
became 'civil rights'.140 The author of The Political Crisis, drawing virtually on Paine's
principle, had pronounced a similar opinion. All those rights were relinquished which,
he wrote, the individual could not exercise without incurring manifest inconvenience.
They were put into the common stock of society, over which trustees were appointed
to exercise them for the good of all.' On the other hand, all those rights had been
reserved, which the individual could enjoy by himself, without relying on the arm of
society for support. His only difference with Paine was that he would prefer to term
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those deposited rights 'political'.141
By this definition, two categories of rights could be distinguished. There were, on
the one hand, 'natural' rights which man was able to exercise independently and, on
the other, 'civil' rights which could not be enjoyed without the aid of civil authority.
The rights thrown into society, according to Thomas Paine, were mainly those which
were related to 'security' and 'protction'.'42 This appeared to be a position widely
assumed. Civil society, Samuel Heywood asserted, had been principally formed for
securing the life and property of its members. In the state of nature, every one had to
defend himself. He must come to judge how far the offender should be punished and
then to inflict the punishment by his own hands. But, he went on,
when he enters into society he gives up those rights; the general
defence is then intrusted to persons selected for that purpose; judges
are appointed to examine into criminal charges, and apportion the
punishments, and their sentences are carried into execution by the
officers of the public.143
To Robert Hall, the duties of public authority ought to contain mainly the
administration of justice, the protection of property, and the defence of its people
from violence and outrage. The purpose of maintaining a civil government, he
remarked, had been primarily to help remedy the injustice which lay beyond the
individual power to redress: 'we give up the liberty by repelling force by force, in
return for a more equal administration of justice than private resentment would
permit.' Where there was no injustice, there would be no need for protection; public
force would then become dispensable and every one could thereby be left without
restraint or control.144 The Political Crisis had made the same point. So long as man
was able to redress, or to avoid, his own wrongs, it claimed, civil government would
be unnecessary. In the meantime, this author conceived a broad view of the matter.
He tended to read protection both in personal and national terms and would like to
include in the rights to be resigned not only that of every one to judge in his own
cause, but all those concerned with levying war, mobilising the public force, making
treaties, and 'all other national concerns'. The deposit of these rights in a common
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authority, he believed, could serve to create 'one soul' in the nation, so that foreign
invasions could be more effectively repelled and the domestic peace better
maintained.145
The category of rights declared inalienable referred chiefly to those which were
believed to be fundamental to the existence, and essential to the dignity and
happiness, of man. Upon this, most radical writers were content in the main to follow
■Hie- ef Men
the principles set down in the French Declaration ofARightssand Citizens. The most
important of such rights was the freedom of the person. Personal freedom, one writer
claimed, composed the first of natural rights:'It affords a picture of liberty in its native
simplicity.'146 Every person it was widely maintained, should have the natural right to
exert his corporal power in whatever manner not injurious to others; and he was
entitled, as an individual, to pursue his own good by any means without encroaching
on the rights of another man.147 'Liberty,' thus David Williams declared, 'is a power,
obtained for every citizen by the disposition and arrangement of the general force, to
act for his own happiness, without injuring others.' And all beyond this would become
licence.148 Personal freedom, of course, ought never to be allowed to degenerate into
licence, but neither could it be arbitrarily limited. On leaving a state of nature, one
critic remarked,
man resigned his personal freedom. . . to be modelled for the good
of the community, but it was to be modelled by certain institutions. He
must, then, retain whatever is left by these institutions, and on this
principle. . . where a man is not bound by the laws of his country, he is
as free at this moment, as ever he was in a state of nature.
The freedom of the person, above all, could only be regulated by laws properly made:
'Where the laws restrain him, he is bound, in all other cases he is free.'149 John Butler
was indeed prepared to endorse neither a perfect liberty nor a severe restriction. He
admitted that in a well-regulated commonwealth the liberty of man would need to be
circumscribed within certain bounds. However, he warned, if the people were screwed
up in too narrow a compass, they would surely be forced to overthrow the
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'boundaries of political districts' which restrained them.150
The second right reserved was the right of property. Man was entitled, Mary
Wollstonecraft pointed out, to enjoy the acquisitions which his talents and industry
had acquired and to bequeath them to whom he would choose.15' The author of The
Political Crisis asserted that every one had an exclusive right to the property he
procured by his own efforts: 'If a man fenced and tilled a piece of ground,' he
illustrated, 'it became his by occupation or improvement, and no one could legally
enter upon it till he had relinquished it.' Labour, in his view, had created the sole right
to any thing held in common.152 The right of property, another critic echoed, had
originated in 'occupancy':
When men were in a state of nature, the only objects of
possession were the birds and beasts of the field, and they became the
property of the first occupant. A man was supposed to create a title to
a thing, by the trouble he took to procure it.
To explain the sacredness of property, this author invoked the old maxim that the
people should never be taxed without their own consent. This principle, he stressed,
had, in truth, formed one of the great bulwarks of liberty: 'take away that, and we lose
every degree of security.' Its infringement could even justify rebellion.153 David
Williams was prepared to extend the right of property to include not merely the
ownership of real estate, but the title of every person to the advantages of all his
honest industry.154 Some pamphleteers, meanwhile, drew attention to the question
concerning the equity of distribution. John Thelwall proposed that production ought
not to be taken as the sole object of human economic activities. It was more
important that society should take care to ensure for all a 'General and impartial
distributiori. Without a just distribution, the encreased production could but serve to
aggravate the evils it was expected to remove It would turn out to be a curse rather
than a blessing: 'better is a little that is well distributed, than much that is
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monopolized and wasted.'155 The author of The Political Crisis concentrated his attack
upon monopoly. The earth was common to all and all therefore had a common right
to the products of it. The law of nature, he pointed out, would not suffer any one to
heap up all the goods of providence: 'If he acquired more than he wanted, he had no
right to withhold the overplus from the sufferer.' He was bound in reason to give it to
those who stood in need of it.'56
The third unabridgeable right consisted in the liberty of expression. The freedom of
thought, Robert Hall contended, was crucial to the happiness and dignity of man in
every stage of his existence. He deemed it to be much more valuable to preserve this
right than to protect other constitutions.157 Nothing had ever been so favourable to
liberty as the freedom of opinion, exclaimed another writer: 'That a citizen should be
obliged to conceal his opinions, is one of the most disgraceful marks of slavery.'158
The main function of civil authority, Robert Hall stressed, was not to direct the
opinions of its people, but to protect their lives and property. When a people set up a
civil government, what they invested in it was 'power' rather than 'wisdom'. For a
government to assume the wisdom to tell truth from error and to countenance one
set of opinions to the prejudice of another, it abused its power in a manner most
mischievous and absurd.159 In truth, Samuel Heywood claimed, the right of private
judgment had not sprung out of, and was not in the least affected by, civil institutions.
The governing power, therefore, could lay no claim to jurisdiction over the opinions of
its subjects and must never intend to punish or restrain them in whatever manner, or
on whatever pretence.160
The claim to the freedom of opinion had a specific implication for those radical
pamphleteers with a Dissenting background. To them, it was a struggle for liberty of
conscience. The free use of human faculties to tell truth from falsehood, and hence
the free choice of religion, Robert Hall declared, were the branches of natural freedom
which no civil authority could with justice invade. Man must have a right to worship
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God after whatever mode he should think appropriate; and he ought not in this matter
to be forced to consult anything other than his own conscience.161 The Political Crisis
stressed that the concerns which touched the human heart were not within the
capacity of civil authority to mould. Religion belonged to the right of mind. It was the
practice of man bringing 'to his Maker the fruits of his heart and it could hence
subsist neither between man and man, nor between government and its subjects, but
between 'GOD and MAN'. If any civil power attempted to interfere in the right of
religion, it would constitute a most arbitrary and dangerous abuse of its authority.
'Experience teaches us,' he observed, 'that modes of worship and church-discipline
established and enforced by law, are abhorrent to the feelings of men, and repugnant
to the wise dictates of Heaven.' It denied the ability of the people to choose a religion
for themselves.'62
The freedom of the person, the right of property and the liberty of expression had
been generally reckoned among rights fundamental and sacred. There were still many
writers who were prepared moreover to extend the inalienable rights to include
political rights. It was contended that man, after becoming a member of civil society,
ought to have the privilege to mould his own government: a right, one writer claimed,
'subservient to our happiness'.163 Joseph Towers was anxious to assert it
an original right of men in civil society, to adopt those measures
that are most conducive to the welfare of the whole, and of
consequence to appoint such men to public offices, or to establish such
a mode of government, as the majority shall judge best calculated to
advance the general happiness.164
In particular, Capel Lofft wrote, the people ought to be entitled to take part in the
formation of the laws which were intended to govern their community.165 Lofft's
opinion was echoed by another author who also insisted that every one must have an
equal share in making those laws by which his liberty was to be limited:
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If he has had no share in making those laws, I do not see how
those laws concern him; he lives it is true among others under laws
which restrain natural liberty, but what is that law to him who has no
share in the making it, and is therefore not bound to obey it.166
The political rights, in sum, were essential to the liberty of mankind. If a man were
deprived of these rights, Francis Stone concluded, he became to all intents and
purposes 'a slave'. 'He is compelled to obey laws, made without his consent, given
either personally, or by his representative: he, therefore, wears the distinguishing,
humiliating badge of a bondman.'167
This claim to political rights could be vindicated in terms of the principle of
popular sovereignty. The people ought to have a share in the management of their
government, one critic claimed, because it was from them that all powers had
originated and by them that every state had been supported.168 John Oswald tended to
regard governors as public agents employed to manage the common stock of society.
Since this stock was the collective wealth of all, every one therefore must reserve a
voice in the appointment of their common agents.169 To Francis Stone, the political
rights had stemmed from the necessity of man to protect their basic rights of lives,
liberties, and properties;
It is sufficient for my purpose to remark, that all men are
interested in the enjoyment of these natural equal rights, and that from
these rights are deducible their claim to the choice of that form of
government which is best adopted to protect them, and to reform it
when, through inadvertence, length of time, or the craft of designing
men, or from any other cause, they find such errors or abuses crept
into it as bear hard on these natural rights, and threaten the impairment
or loss of them. Hence too arises the right of every man to a voice in
the choice of those who are to be entrusted with the. . . important
functions of government.
He continued to define the main political rights of the people to be including; the right
to choose their legislators, the right to be elected a legislator, the right to annual
election, and the right to remonstrate with or even cashier them. These, Stone
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stressed, ought to be insisted upon as 'among the direct original rights of man in civil
society.'70
There was however considerable disagreement among Burke's critics over whether
political rights ought to be made available, and equal, to all. William Belsham was not
convinced that all men should have an equal and inherent right to share in the powers
of government. The distribution of political rights, he claimed, was chiefly a question
of utility. It must be calculated whether it would bring to society the greatest number
of advantages and the greatest sum of happiness. He would think it not incompatible
with the principle of equity to deprive, if it should prove necessary for general good,
some citizens of their right to take part in public affairs:
The grand axiom of equitable government is this - that as all men
are naturally equal, all civil or political inequality must rest upon the
basis of public utility. If then any class of men be disqualified, in a
moral view, by extreme ignorance, gross venality, abject dependence, or
any other cause, from exercising the privilege of voting in the elections
of those who are to guide and govern the great concerns of the
community, they have no more right to complain of the injustice or
hardship of not being permitted to nominate the rulers of the state, than
of the injustice of not being allowed to rule the state in person.17'
Vicesimus Knox had similarly refused to treat the claim to take part in politics as the
'first right of marl. He argued that not in fact every man in a society was capable of
making good political judgements. There were three different classes of men: namely,
those who could judge for themselves, those who were able to find some others to
judge for them and those who were capable of doing neither properly. For the good of
the community, he suggested, only the first two classes could be properly conferred
with political rights. The desideratum of civil society, of course, ought to be to impart
rights and blessings to the greatest number of its members; however, he insisted,
if it should happen, that a large description of men should be
found below that temperament, either of virtue or of knowledge, which
is necessary to enable them to assist, either directly or indirectly, in
judging of the general welfare, the happiness of the whole will require
the exclusion of such portion from all interference in politics.
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Such an exclusion would be unavoidable though it was, as he admitted, 'much to be
lamented'.172
At the other end, many other writers harboured a deep sympathy for the political
weakness of many members of society. A people, one writer claimed, could be said to
enjoy their civil and political liberty only when they had personally, or by delegates,
voted for their magistrates. He declared that political rights should be equal and
universal. Men of opulence, high birth and good education, he remarked, were not
naturally more capable of offering services to the public. Neither were they necessarily
better calculated to regulate the great machine of government. Politics was no
abstruse thing. Every one who could boast of having noble feelings of man and
humanity and who possessed a dignified sense of virtue and public spirit, he was
confident, ought to be qualified enough for 'every thing great and glorious'. It would
be unjust, then, to attempt to cut off the people of lower rank from any participation
in the civil and political order of the state.'73 The equality of political rights was
likewise central to the arguments of John Oswald. Every member of the state, he
contended, must be actually represented and ought to have an equal vote in the
choice of his delegate. Indeed, the have-nots, no less than the haves, had had their
own great stakes in the administration of their government: 'Is not the poor man,' he
asked, 'whose very existence depends on the wisdom or folly of administration, at
least as much interested in the right management of government, as he whose
superfluities alone are endangered by its imprudence?" Oswald was prepared to speak
for the 'political weakness of poverty', who, he stressed, would need much more to be
protected from the outrageous insults and cruel oppression of the powerful and the
rich. Thus, he claimed: 'If there be any class of men that might, with some degree of
safety, be left without a voice in the government, it is the opulent; for in all
governments not absolutely despotic, the opulent are sufficiently protected by their
wealth.',74
On the whole, what Burke's critics contended for was to reassert that men in civil
society had by no means lost all his natural rights. There had remained in civil
society, as one writer insisted, original rights which 'ought to be sacred, and are what
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no power on earth can, consistent with the trust reposed in them, destroy'.175 Man, in
any case, could not be supposed to have set aside all the 'claims of nature' when he
became a member of civil society.176 James Mackintosh held the same opinion and
exclaimed: 'Nothing. . . can be more fallacious, than to pretend that we are precluded
in the social state from any appeal to natural rights.'177 To William Belsham, above all,
natural rights, though protected by civil society, had suffered nothing from such a
protection. Their abstract clearness and perfection, he insisted, had never been in the
least diminished by any means which had been adopted to secure their 'uninterrupted
and peaceable exercise'.178
From the view of moral philosophy, in addition, James Mackintosh came to justify
the claim for the perfection of the inalienable rights of man. All political principles, he
pointed out, had been no more than 'moral principles adapted to the civil union of
men'. The rights of man, in his opinion, were the first principles of politics and could
be considered as forming part of the 'GENERAL MAXIM of social morale. General
moral principles ought ever to be rendered inflexible: 'A general moral maxim is to be
obeyed, even if the inutility is evident, because the precedent of deviating more than
balances any utility that may exist in the particular deviation.' The natural rights of
man, that is, ought always to be strictly insisted upon, against either the seduction of
passion or the suggestion of interest. He insisted that no plea whatsoever of
expediency could be pretended to justify any slight relaxation in their observance,
which he was convinced would open the door for unending violation, thus leading to
their total ruin:
The moment that the slenderest infraction of these rights is
permitted for motives of convenience the bulwalk of all upright politics
is lost. If a small convenience will justify a little infraction, a greater
pretended convenience will expiate a bolder violation. The Rubicon is
past. Tyrants never seek in vain for sophists. Pretences are multiplied
without difficulty and without end.
To him, after all, nothing but an inflexible adherence to the natural rights could serve
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to 'preserve the purity, consistency, and stability of a free State'.179
The natural rights of man, hitherto, have been given a comprehensive, and
theoretical, vindication. But no matter how sound and cogent its arguments might be,
at last, what measure could be taken if civil authority should venture to violate these
sacred rights? To provide for such an occasion, most of the radical writers were
determined to reserve, as a final resort, for the people the right of resistance - a right
so mischievous in the eyes of Burke. Joseph Priestley frankly declared that it was a
most sacred right for the people to resist oppressive government.'80 The right to
revoke power when abused, another critic echoed, was natural, inherent, eternal and
inalienable.'81 What is more, William Belsham also asserted it to be an undeniable truth
that the people were entitled 'to resist oppression, to dethrone and punish tyrants,
and to provide, by the most effectual means in their power, for their own security and
happiness'.'82 Indeed, even Sir Brooke Boothby felt impelled to give his hearty assent
to the proposition that
when government under any form or denomination offers
oppression in the room of protection and injury instead of justice; a
stone for bread and a serpent for fish; such government ought to be
resisted with all the powers which God and nature have placed in our
hands.
Oppression was a great and grievous disease, for which, he stressed, a revolution was
the 'only true specific'.'83 On the whole, John Thelwall insisted that, if the rights of the
people were invaded, the injured could rise to remonstrate and seek redress. When
they were obstinately and systematically violated, he added, obedience would then
become a question, not of morality, but of 'prudence' and the people could thereby
assume a firm, inalienable right to renounce the broken compact and dissolve the
system.'84
In speaking of its origin, the right of resistance was clearly derived from the
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principle of popular sovereignty- The people, it was claimed, had the right to recall
power which had constantly resided in themselves and they could reassert it as often
as they should consider the occasion proper.185 Joseph Priestley pointed out that the
magistrate was originally appointed by the people and that, as a consequence, he
ought to be answerable to them for his conduct and removeable at their pleasure.186
The sovereign authority of a nation, William Belsham explained, ever inhered in the
people at large, who thus reserved at all times a right to provide for their own
security and happiness. To William Belsham, all civil authorities were delegated from
the people. When therefore the purpose of that delegation was missed, their
commission should be terminable at the discretion of those who had originally
entrusted it.187 Thus, Benjamin Bousfield urged: 'It should be remembered that all
power originates with the people, that it is delegated, but never alienated; that when
power is abused, the people have a right to resume it.' This principle, he claimed, had
formed the key-stone which bound and supported a free government.188 In the end,
George Rous asserted, the people ought to have the right, and had certainly
possessed the power, to change their government, whenever in their judgment the
aim of their association could be better attained. It hinged on them to determine
under what circumstances their constitution had to be corrected, varied, or even
totally changed.189
To help elucidate this argument, the concept of 'trust' had been readily invoked.
Capel Lofft was of the opinion that all the rights resigned to public authority were
merely held in trust. They were, he emphasised, 'held by the Government, in trust for
the Society and the individual, than directly by the Society at large'. If the terms of
this trust should be neglected or transgressed, the people could redress it by means
of collective interposition.190 The author of The Political Crisis elaborated upon this
point. He had, in the first place, made an effort to explain the nature of 'trust' by
illustrating:
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If I resign part of my goods to a man in trust to keep them safely
for me, or to trade upon them, I hold him accountable at any time I
please; and if I begin to doubt his fidelity in the trust and find that he
is converting my goods to /i/s own use, and means to wrong me, I have
an undoubted right by the laws to demand them back, and to inflict a
punishment on him proportionable to his guilt.
There would be no difference in politics. Every civil authority was maintained in the
form of a trust. Being the source of all political powers, the people had naturally
retained a supreme authority to alter, or to remove, that government which should act
in contradiction to the trust reposed in it. When once the end of government was
manifestly opposed, he claimed, 'the trust must necessarily be forfeited, and the
power devolve into the hands of those who gave it, who may place it anew where
they shall think best for their safety and security'.'91
The right of resistance was generally thought to be an effective measure to deter
the abuse of power. Samuel Heywood was inclined to defend the principle of
resistance as part of the right of self-defence. The right to resist tyranny, he
contended, could never be surrendered to civil society because it was the only right
which could form the ultimate security for all those which civil authority was intended
to protect.192 A right without a remedy, William Belsham claimed, would be absurd: the
extraordinary principle of resistance was what the people could rely on to secure
themselves from the abuse of the superior power. It was, above all, a doctrine which
proved consonant to the spirit of a free constitution and which ought never to be
forgotten or lost sight of.193 On the other hand, another writer pointed out, the main
force of the principle of resistance consisted in the fact that it was a principle which
could give efficacy to all the regulations imposed upon the ruling authority:
Nothing proves more clearly the right of ultimate resistance, than
the consideration, that if that right did not exist, all the laws, which
human ingenuity could contrive, to secure the state from the abuse of
power in its governors, would be utterly ineffectual.
To be sure, he stressed: 'All the laws in the world to restrain governors are but
sentinels to give the alarm; the right of resistance is the main body.' Without this last
191 The Political Crisis pp 13. 80
192 [Heywood], High Church Politics, p 158.
193 Belsham, 'Reflections on the French Revolution', Essays, ii, 265.
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check, a ruler could be free by his single authority to subjugate his people into his
own arbitrary will. Under such situation, he warned, all the laws would be reduced into
nothing but waste papers and 'the most sacred charter no better than a piece of
parchment with a lump of wax dangling from the end of it'.194
But the justification of the right to resist could by no means be misunderstood to
be to encourage rebellion. Resistance, one author claimed, was a right which the
people should desire to know, but dread to exercise. He was convinced that, the
better this right was made known, the less occasion would there be to use it.195 Under
normal circumstances, obedience to civil authority would be still honoured as a
fundamental principle of political behaviour. William Belsham strongly denounced it to
be senseless and monstrous for any one to urge that the people could subvert an
established government from mere caprice. In principle, of course, a civil community
would be entitled to act in the manner the most conducive to its own good, but, he
argued, this right must at the same time involve in it an obligation not to violate the
principles of equity, justice and civil subordination which were themselves essential to
public happiness. Resistance, in other words, ought always to be regarded as a
serious right which must ever be exercised in conformity to the dictate of reason. It
could not all the more be directed to disturb the general principle of obedience:
Obedience to civil authority is, most undoubtedly, a duty of the
highest magnitude and importance. Without any particular reference to
excepted cases it may be justly affirmed, that not only the peace and
happiness but the very existence of society depends upon it. For a
community to resume the powers it had once delegated, from mere will
and caprice, would argue a species of infatuation more deplorable than
history exhibits an example of. And for any individual to presume to
resist the lawful authority of the magistrate because such is their
pleasure, would be treason and rebellion in their most odious and
aggravated form.
The principle of obedience could never be deviated from without very cogent reasons.
Indeed, Belsham stressed, nothing would be sufficient to justify resistance to
supreme authority other than motives of the highest urgency and importance: motives
'so obvious as to approve themselves to the general understanding, and so
194 An Answer to the Rt. Hon. Edmund Burke's Reflections p 7.
195 Ibid. p. 5.
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comprehensive as to affect the foundations of the general happiness'.'96
For Burke's critics, certainly, the right of resistance was never meant to harass any
good and lawful government. 'A chief magistrate, duly chosen, should be the parent of
civil society, the guardian of our inherent liberty, and the preserver of our tranquillity,'
claimed John Butler. He continued to urge that the people ought to respect and obey
a government which executed its duties with justice and precaution.197 Whenever a
government was founded upon justice and equity, Benjamin Flower asserted, it should
become the duty of every people to submit to its rule and those who refused to obey
would be 'culpable in the sight both of God and man'.'98 Francis Stone meanwhile
insisted that the people were obliged to abide by those laws which were not
flagrantly repugnant to the invariable principle of the natural equal rights of men.'99 In
truth, Robert Hall claimed, all the existing authorities of the state ought to be
respected and obeyed as the interpreters of the public will. Till they were set aside
by the unequivocal voice of the people, they should form the law to every member of
the community. To resist them is rebellion; and for any particular set of men to
attempt their subversion by force, is a heinous crime, as they represent and embody
the collective majesty of the state.'200 To Samuel Heywood, the right of resistance,
unlike other natural rights, had never been active; and it would always lie dormant
until, through the misconduct of the governing power, the objects for which the
individuals associated were lost.20' In that case, Francis Stone asserted, the public had
the duty, for common interest, to take efficacious measures to redress their own
grievances, by either 'reforming their political constitution, or, if absolutely requisite,
modelling it anew'.202 This, in Hall's opinion, ought to be a right which could be neither
alienated nor diminished and which had been exerted 'as often as a free government
has been formed'.203
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It might be apprehended of course that the right of resistance, in the hands of the
multitude, could be easily perverted into wanton use, thus threatening to destabilise
every kind of civil authority, good or bad. There could be no doubt, William
Cuninghame admitted, that the people had the right to change their government even
if they were happy: 'What can hinder them, if unanimous?' Nevertheless, he argued,
this seemed to be a mere possibility which could but exist hypothetically and which
would never happen in reality.204 The majority of the people, Robert Woolsey claimed,
were disposed to be governed more by their natural feelings than by their speculative
notions.205 They are,' another writer resumed, 'ever roused into action, or lulled into
peace, in proportion to the good or bad effects of the government under which they
live.'206 In fact, William Cunninghame indicated, the multitude were by nature politically
passive. They were normally submissive and would usually bear much oppression from
their rulers.207 'Men indeed are naturally inclined to submit patiently and long to
oppressive governments; and nothing short of a necessity, real or imaginary, can
impel them to resist,' concurred Samuel Heywood.208 For sure, another critic was
convinced, the common people, from various reasons, were always averse to
revolution and would never be provoked to resist simply on trivial occasions.209 After
all, Woolsey stressed, a state of revolution would by no means become beneficial to
the public:
when any government is once established, the misconduct of the
governors must be very gross indeed, and speak home to the feelings
of the majority of men, before such government can be subverted. Men
do not quit a state of peace for that of war, till goaded to it by tyranny
of their governors.2'0
This seemed to have been well attested in history. Throughout its pages, as John
Thelwall noticed, there had never been a great popular revolution which had not taken
place till grinding and long-continued oppression had rendered it absolutely
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necessary, till 'groaning Nature called for the dire relief'.2"
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THE CRITIQUE OF THE OLD ORDER
Having set up the doctrine of the rights of man as the ideological foundation of
their political arguments, Burke's opponents went on to launch an extensive and
vehement attack on the old order which Burke had made efforts to defend. In this
debate, they struck at the aristocracy, they fell upon the church, and they went on to
run down the old system of government. Ultimately, the arguments here called forth
were to form a theoretical framework, in terms of which the Revolution in France was
to be vindicated.
Aristocracy became the most conspicuous landmark of the ancien regime first to
attract the attention of Burke's critics. It has to be noticed, at the outset, that on this
subject, as on others, no unanimous opinions were put forth and that all those who
disagreed with Burke were not necessarily inclined to oppose the aristocratic orders.
Sir Brooke Boothby, for instance, never intended to suppress every kind of social
distinction. Boothby, to be sure, was no defender of hereditary titles: that personal
distinction should be rendered hereditary, he admitted, would be 'not only barren of
any good, but very mischievously prolific in evil'. It could achieve for nothing but
divide a nation into unnatural classes and would prove utterly 'unfavourable to liberty
and all virtuous exertion'. The elimination of titles in France, indeed, was to win from
him little pity: its occurrence, he was convinced, had 'its peculiar necessity in the
peculiar constitution of the body of nobility in France'. In principle, however, Boothby
was in no sense an egalitarian and he did not commit himself to the radical theory of
the perfect natural equality of man. For all his dislike of hereditary titles, he posed no
objection to personal distinctions, though he would have liked them to be reserved as
the personal rewards of public service. He was in fact prepared to preserve a class
such as the 'judicial or legislative peerage' of Britain, which was in his opinion an
order instituted to honour the respectable public characters of society and
representing, generally speaking, 'the better sort of the nation.1
Some critics were more unequivocal in support of social distinctions. One
1
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anonymous writer cautioned his audience not to take his criticism of Burke to mean
that he would approve those levelling principles which had cost the nobility of France
their titles. No one, he contended, could venture, under any pretence, to demolish the
hereditary distinctions which the nobility had long enjoyed and which had probably
existed ever since the first appearance of regular government.2 Capel Lofft was
displeased with the abolition of 'titles and armorial Bearings'. Titles and honours, he
observed, always commanded domestic sentiments of affection and respect. They had
been conferred to 'cherish the remembrance of public Virtue, distinguished in Council
and in the Field'; and, at any rate, many of those
who possessed them, had not overlooked, in these artificial Titles
to respect, higher objects of generous ambition; but had disinterestedly,
and with zealous alacrity, cooperated in the cause of Freedom. 3
The writer of A Letter to a Member of the National Assembly was concerned to
preserve ranks. The public, he urged, ought never to be jealous of those titles which
society had bestowed as rewards on their 'men of public merit': There can be,' he
continued,
no rational objection to honourable distinctions, they are frequently
conferred on individuals obscure in birth, but who distinguish
themselves by various qualifications from the general mass of people;
there are also many men of bravery, of splendid talents, and liberal
fortune, who are willing to hazard their lives, and employ their abilities,
to the advantage of their country, and to whom the honour of nobility is
the only acceptable reward.
With this author, stars and ribbons were by no means such 'contemptible playthings'
as Thomas Paine was pleased to ridicule them: 'they are portraits emblematical of
learning, of diligence, and virtue; they are historical pictures that represent the
atchievements of military heroism, or the splendor of political talents; they are tokens
of memorable service performed in the cabinet, or field.'4
Several radical writers, moreover, were even ready to acknowledge the positive
value of an aristocracy. Samuel Parr disputed the claim of the National Assembly that
2 Strictures on the Letter of the Rt. Hon. Edmund Burke, p 9
3
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the existence of ranks was repugnant to social union. Whether hereditary or personal,
he argued, social distinctions could be rendered instrumental to public good. Indeed,
many feudal principles of virtuous actions could well be 'adapted to the exigences of
a more enlightened and more civilized age'. Parr's evaluation of the bearings of
aristocracy on European society was in fact remarkably Burkean:
The manners of Europe, which form so large a part of our social
duty and social happiness, originated chiefly among the nobility of
Europe. And even in the more improved and more equalized state of
society, numerous gradations of rank are necessary to preserve those
sentiments which soften the ruggedness of human character, and teach
every man at once to respect the dignity of others, and to support his
own.
In particular, he pointed out, the existence of the noble order could serve to spread
refined culture among the lower orders of society:
Refinement generally descends from the higher to the lower ranks,
and its progress seems to be facilitated by the authority of illustrious
example, and by the necessity which custom imposes upon us to
recognize that pre-eminence, which is fixed by a known rule, and
distinguished by an appropriate name.5
The author of Temperate Comments upon Intemperate Reflections likewise, praised
the value of orders: 'Varieties of order in society,' he wrote, 'contribute to the
elegance and beauty of the whole.' He admitted that this thought could hardly be
reconciled to the suppression of titles. In any case, he believed, the abolition of
nobility would certainly be regarded with utter disgust in Britain, where the peerage
had formed not only an ornament of her society but an essential part of her excellent
constitution.6
These opinions notwithstanding, the main force of Burke's critics were, without
doubt, fundamentally anti-aristocratic. The nobility, James Mackintosh remarked, was a
'Gothic' ornament that had long deformed and encumbered the august fabric of
European society.7 John Oswald derided the privileged orders as the disgraceful
5
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'Gothic badges of Barbarian insolence'.8 Many radical writers went on to vilify the
noble as a kind of dreadful being. Mary Wollstonecraft, for instance, attacked the
pernicious effect of hereditary distinctions: The man,' she claimed, 'has been changed
into an artificial monster by the station in which he was born, and the consequent
homage that benumbed his faculties like the torpedo's touch.'9 Another critic
disparaged the nobility as 'State monster'.10 'A Peer,' John Oswald echoed, 'is a sort of
political monster, who is born a law-giver, sucks from his nurse's breast the wisdom
of legislation, and comes into Parliament to represent - himself.'" It was so, Thomas
Paine decried, 'whether we view it before or behind, or sideways, or any ways else,
domestically or publicly '.12 Francis Stone took issue with Burke, ready to confute his
claims that aristocracy was 'a graceful ornament to the civil ordet and that it formed
'the Corinthian capital of polished society. 'I regard it,' he asserted to the contrary,
rather as an excrescence, a fungus in the body politic, and more as
a wart, which, on the application of a proper caustic, may be with safety
corroded, than a wen, which the operation of the knife cannot extirpate,
without hazarding an effusion of blood, which may terminate in a loss
of life.13
To Thomas Cooper, every hereditary institution was absurd and useless, dangerous
and unjust'. They had all been calculated to render the happiness and welfare of the
many subservient to the pride and emolument of the few.14 In the end, Paine believed,
the aristocratic system was so full of evil, and had become so inconsistent with
justice, wisdom and nature, that everyone would call for its total abolition.15
Naturally, then, most of Burke's critics would fain see the noble ranks and titles
suppressed. With jubilation, Thomas Paine hailed the eventual abolition of titles in
France: This species of imaginary consequence,' he claimed, 'has visibly declined in
8
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every part of Europe, and it hastens to its exit as the world of reason continues to
rise.' The elimination of titles in France, that is, was attributed to the awakening of the
'elevated mind' of the French people:
The world has seen this folly fall, and it has fallen by being
laughed at, and the farce of titles will follow its fate. - The patriots of
France have discovered in good time, that rank and dignity in society
must take a new ground. The old one has fallen through. - It must now
take the substantial ground of character, instead of the chimerical
ground of titles; and they have brought their titles to the altar, and
made of them a burnt-offering to Reason.'6
Joel Barlow responded to the destruction of the French nobility with similar
enthusiasm. In France, he exclaimed, the feudal system, with all its notorious
idolatries, had fallen to the ground and the whole nation was united into one:
Honor is restored to the heart of man, instead of being suspended
from his button-hole; and useful industry gives a title to respect. The
men that were formerly dukes and marquisses are now exalted to
farmers, manufacturers, and merchants; the rising generation among all
classes of people are forming their maxims on a just estimate of things.
France had eventually extracted the 'poisoned dagger' that the barbarian conquest had
long planted in the vitalsof her society.'7 Francis Stone was also deeply impressed that
the French people, by a determined spirit of freedom, had shattered their feudal
system:
They have destroyed all the remains of the power of the great
Barons in the suppression of the order of nobility. In France no
Seigneuries or usurped manorial rights, now exist. . . There that
tyrannous system is annihilated, which, like a blight, blasts the fair
blossoms of the mild spirit of equal liberty.
In the French Revolution, he remarked, Europe had beheld a great nation happily
emancipating from the aristocratic encroachments and its government brought back to
its true basis, the 'sacred regard to the natural equal rights of men'.'8 At last, George
Rous concluded, the French people had, with justice, abolished an order which had
16 Ibid, pp. 102-3.
17 Joel Barlow, Advice tO the Privileged Orders, Part I (London, 1792), pp. 46-7.
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ever been possessed of invidious claims. And this effort, he added, constituted an
heroic act that bid 'a bold defiance to the prejudice of all Europe'.19
There were several reasons to explain the anti-aristocratic sentiment of Burke's
opponents. The order of nobility was, first of all, often resented as an historical
vestige of despicable feudalism. A titled nobility, James Mackintosh pointed out, was
the 'most undisputed progeny of feudal barbarism'.20 Thomas Paine drew attention to
its barbarian foundation. The aristocracy, he wrote, had arisen out of a political order
established by conquest; and it embodied the uncivilised principle of governments
founded in conquest, and the base idea of enslavement.21 The author of The Political
Crisis proceeded to condemn the iniquitous origin of nobility, whose foundations, he
hinted, had been laid by the sword and servitude. To illustrate his point, the historical
experience of Norman England was drawn upon:
When William of Normandy conquered England, he divided it into
baronies, or rather into so many little kingdoms or petty republics, and
bequeathed them to his officers and adherents, for their services in
carrying on the work of devastation. Thus the original inhabitants, who
were lords of the soil, became, by the fortune of an unjust war, the
humble tenants of the stall, were plundered of their property, and, from
wealth and affluence, were doomed to misery and want; from freedom,
to the vilest servitude!
In his opinion, the original ancestors of the nobility were no better than a gang of
robbers and their posterity held their titles only by the execrable right of conquest.22
It was, from here, further noted that, historically, the aristocracy had been in the
main a military establishment. 'It was,' as Thomas Paine observed, 'originally a military
order, for the purpose of supporting military government.'23 To Joel Barlow, the
noblesse and the military system were in reality almost inseparable: They are
mutually necessary to each other's existence, - concurrent and reciprocal causes and
effects, generating and generated, perpetuating each other by interchangeable wants.'24
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For this military affiliation, the nobility was ready to be associated with wars and
atrocities. 'War, they created; by War they were created,' Thomas Cooper wrote.25
Barlow held similar opinions. The noble order of Europe, he claimed, had always 'fed
upon human gore': they originated in war, they lived by war, and without war they
could not survive.26 In Cooper's eyes, the history of mankind had been but a record of
wars and bloodshed which the privileged orders occasioned, and in which 'the people
have been the miserable Victims of ambition and persecution, and have been led
without remorse, like beasts to the slaughter'. The nobility, in short, had been no
better than a band of 'hereditary Scourges of the human race'.27
The chief argument used against aristocracy, however, was ideological. In
principle, one writer noted, the existence of hereditary distinctions was repugnant to
the doctrine of the natural rights of man.28 It stood, in particular, in direct opposition
to the principle of natural equality, a principle which most of Burke's opponents
cherished. In highly sarcastic terms, another critic denounced the aristocratic
assumption that inherent distinctions existed among men:
Nothing in Nature has baffled our understandings more than the
distinctions of royal, noble, and mean BLOOD! From whence did this
variety proceed? Had we royal, noble, and Vulgar Adams, at the
beginning of the world? ... If there is a real physical difference between
the blood of a Duke and a Drayman a Lord and a Labourer, a Prince and
a Peasant why are our dispensateries and other medical books so silent
on the subject? . . . But if there is no inherent difference, why should we
be eternally humbugged with unmeaning sounds, and tantalized with
Aristocratical nonsense!!!29
Thomas Paine sought to vindicate 'the unity or equality of marl. He resorted to the
divine authority of the creation, contending that men, having equally derived their
existence from God, were all of the same kind and bore no other distinction than that
of the sexes:
Every history of the creation, and every traditionary account,
25
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whether from the lettered or unlettered world, however they may vary in
their opinion or belief of certain particulars, all agree in establishing one
point, the unity of man, by which I mean, that men are all of one
degree and consequently that all men are born equal, and with equal
natural right.
This was, he stressed, the oldest, and most indisputable doctrine on record.30 Equality,
Benjamin Flower contended, was a birth-right which no man could ever be deprived
of. He argued in favour of the new French constitution, accepting its declaration that
'All men are born, and remain, free and equal in rights; social distinctions cannot be
founded but in common utilityi.3] William Belsham, having recourse to John Locke,
declared that the equality of men was a simple, just and noble principle and it lay at
'the very foundation of all just reasoning on the subject of government'.32 The Political
Crisis also rejected the claim that asserted the natural superiority of some men over
others. The inequality of men was more owing to their own misconduct than to any
'natural cause': The Almighty makes men free and equal, though he may deal very
unequally with them after they are made; yet, his dealing unequally with them, does
not destroy their natural and inherent rights on earth.' Above all, he insisted, civil
power ought never to create social distinctions on the groundless assumption of
natural inequality.33
The natural equality of man was here invoked chiefly to condemn aristocratic
distinctions. There was, it seemed, no intention to disturb property. Robert Hall, for
instance, stressed that he had insisted on the equality of man mainly as a principle
'opposed to feudal oppression and hereditary distinctions'. It was by no means his
purpose to force it into a system of equalisation: the equality of rights, he allowed,
could subsist with the unequal possession of things. And least of all did he propose
to equalise property.34 Francis Stone, however, was more concerned lest the unequal
distribution of property should be turned to upset the dignity of human nature.
Property, he argued, was not necessarily, or in its own nature, unequal; its unequal
possession had been mainly due to 'accidental or contingent circumstance' and could
not therefore be used to overthrow the natural equality of men. To create artificial
30
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distinctions and give 'pre-eminence and preference to birth, he warned, would
promote 'that imaginary jure-divino right of aristocratic tyranny'.35 James Mackintosh,
on the other hand, frankly admitted that wealth would, in effect, always remain
unequal. It would run against justice, then, to turn the wealthy into a separate class
and to honour them with political distinctions, because that, he asserted, would only
serve to fortify and widen the inevitable inequality of fortune. The laws, if unable to
bring about equality, ought never to be applied to 'aggravate the inequality which they
cannot cure'. In the end, he stressed that political authority, instead of creating
inequality, ought 'to recognize all only in their capacity of citizens, and to offer no
assistance to the natural preponderance of partial over general interest'.36
The radical critics attacked the aristocracy on two fronts: its external signs, the
titles of honour, and its internal principle, the law of primogeniture. Titles, John
Oswald claimed, were apt to corrupt the mind of man and 'overset the frail bark of
human understanding'.37 It marked, Thomas Paine noted, a sort of foppery, serving to
distort the character of man: 'It reduces man into the diminutive of man in things
which are great, and the counterfeit of woman in things which are little.' Paine soon
turned noble titles into ridicule, jeering at them as a kind of 'chimerical nondescript'
that baffled even the power of fancy:
When we think or speak of a Judge or a General, we associate
with it the ideas of office and character; we think of gravity in the one,
and bravery in the other: but when we use a word merely as a title no
ideas associate with it. Through all the vocabulary of Adam, there is not
such an animal as a Duke or a Count; neither can we connect any
certain idea with the words. Whether they mean strength or weakness,
wisdom or folly, a child or a man, or the rider or the horse, is all
equivocal.38
Nonsensical though it might be, titles were nevertheless believed to be valuable to the
noble order, as a means of boosting the social status of its members. Thomas Cooper
observed that, not being able to gain public esteem through their own merits, the
privileged orders had, instead, keenly contrived to clothe themselves with the Titles of
Honours' and 'distinction of Dress', in order to make use of the artificial glare of these
35
Stone, An Examintation of the Rt. Hon. Edmund Burke's Reflections pp. 94-6.
38
Mackintosh, Vindiciae Gallicae pp 67-70.
37 Oswald, Review of the Constitution of Great-Britain, p. 11.
38 Paine, Rights of Man pp. 102, 103
216
contrivances to dazzle the multitude, thus beguiling them to gain their respect:
Careless of intrinsic Merit, they have been Monopolists of every
nominal Virtue which Fiction and Flattery have combined to create; and
in every age, and Country, they have sedulously appropriated to
themselves, attributes of the most ridiculous extravagance, the most
fulsome adulation, and (in fact) the keenest and most ironical Sarcasm.
The Language of every nation has been tortured, to furnish Appelations
of the most hyperbolical panegyric, to gratify their unbounded vanity,
and glut their insatiable avarice of unmerited praise.39
On the whole, as another writer remarked, the 'bombastical and superstitious' titles
were but things that the noble order had invented to bewilder the mind of the lower
classes of people.40
Other writers drew attention to the wider social and political implications of noble
titles. George Rous pointed out that the titles of honours were ostentatious names
which could remind the noblemen of their lordly superiority. Their existence served to
divide the nation into different orders and to promote in society every kind of
invidious distinction.4' James Mackintosh made a similar point. The noble titles, he
claimed, were the notorious badges of inequality that perpetually inspired sentiments
adverse to the spirit of free government. They connoted social distinctions and thus
served 'to unfit the Nobility for obedience, and the people for freedom; to keep alive
the discontent of the one, and to perpetuate the servility of the other'. They tended,
on the one hand, to deprive the aristocracy of the moderation that would link them to
the citizen and, on the other hand, to rob the multitude of the spirit that would exalt
them into free men. Titles, in sum, would cultivate a kind of 'slavish prejudice' which
could impede a nation's search for liberty.42
The major attack on aristocracy, however, was centred on its internal principle, the
'law of primogeniture', whose operation was thought vital to its existence. Burke's
critics generally detested the aristocratic rule of succession that deprived all but the
eldest male issue of their rights to inherit. Thomas Christie attacked the claim of
primogeniture as a most shocking, unnatural and abominable feudal right. It unjustly
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'appropriated almost the whole of a man's fortune to his eldest son, and left the rest
of his children nearly beggars'43 The law of primogeniture, John Thelwall declared,
was hideous, barbarous and unnatural. It was a law
which, if contemplated with any reference to the principles and
rights of nature, is a most iniquitous usurpation, ... an act of
aggravated robbery, perpetuated by the elder brother, upon all the
branches of his defenceless family.
It invaded the equal rights of man, annulled the common claim of justice and became
the great root of all evils.44 In Thomas Cooper's opinion, the law of primogeniture
execrably violated the plain dictate of justice, humanity and natural affection. It tore
asunder the ties of domestic union, sacrificing the welfare of all but the first-born in
order that the family pride of aristocracy could be supported in all the splendour of
luxurious ostentation.45 To Paine, at length, primogeniture had itself duly betrayed the
unnatural and iniquitous nature of aristocracy. The nature and character of aristocracy
shows itself to us in this law,' he claimed. 'It is a law against every law of nature, and
Nature herself calls for its destruction. Establish family justice, and aristocracy falls.'46
The radical pamphleteers were well aware that the law of primogeniture was of
critical importance to the existence, and the continuation, of the aristocratic order. In
origin, John Thelwall pointed out, the barbarous law of primogeniture had been
instituted with a view to preserving intact the order of aristocracy so that the normal
working of the feudal system could be secured. It had been set up to maintain the
original chains of the feudal relationship in the hope
that the respective links might not be broken or weakened; that
the vassal might never, by looking round upon his family, forget to look
up to his chief; and, above all, that every proprietor (or usurper) might
be able, according to the original rank and character of his fee, to
attend, with an appropriate number of vassals, upon his chief, and
support the expence and preparation of new conquests and incessant
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To continue the perpetual succession of a noble family, Thomas Paine observed, the
law of primogeniture had to be established and the younger branches of the same
house needed to be lopped off. He believed that aristocracy was founded upon 'family
tyranny and injustice'.48 In fact, Thomas Cooper asserted, this baneful law of
succession was entailed on the privileged orders as a means indispensable for their
own survival. It was a measure contrived to counteract the natural tendency of these
orders to self-destruction from the 'effects of Luxury, Extravagance, and dissipation'.49
The effects which this rule of succession brought to society were manifold and
reprehensible. To individuals, it had conferred great injustice. Because of this law,
Thomas Paine pointed out, the younger children of a family were inequitably deprived
of their fair shares of inheritance.50 They were all cast out, Mary Wollstonecraft
observed, so that 'they might not encroach on what was called, with shameful
falsehood, the family estate'.51 The author of The Political Crisis, indeed, felt for the
fate of these innocent outcasts who, he exclaimed, were cruelly 'turned loose upon
the wide world without the means of support, while the elder brother enjoys the
patrimony of his father'.52 To society as a whole, its repercussions were even more
detrimental. First of all, this swarm of noble outcasts were economically burdensome
to the entire community. The disowned children of the nobility, Thomas Paine noted,
were always cast upon society, 'to be provided for by the public, but at a greater
charge'. To support them, useless posts had been installed, redundant places had been
created and unnecessary offices had been set up.53 In truth. The Political Crisis
complained, society had been forced to assume this unnecessary burden, without
whose protection such unfortunate rejectees would be sure to expire for want.54
Secondly, the children of noble families were usually sent, in the case of younger
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sons, into the church or the army and, in the case of daughters, to the gloomy prison
of a convent'.55 This would produce two adverse effects. On the one hand, the celibate
nature of both the religious and military lives might discourage the growth of
population. Meanwhile, the fact that most children of noble families preferred military
careers also enabled the government of every country to maintain a large standing
army which was ever dangerous to public liberty. Thus, Thomas Cooper exclaimed: 'No
wonder, therefore, that the military establishment of every European State should be
so large, when it serves such useful purposes to the privileged orders, in whose
hands are the Governments of Europe.'56 Thirdly, the law of primogeniture itself was
apt to cultivate in the noble order a character not fit for a free government. Thomas
Paine observed that noblemen always started their life by trampling upon their
younger brothers, sisters and other relatives and they continued to be educated to do
so.57 Once children of the same family were taught to believe in the unconquerable
distinctions of birth among themselves, Joel Barlow asserted, they would then become
ready for an aristocratic society because their minds were already accustomed to all
the feudal gradations and degradations that such a society required.58
The majority of Burke's critics were, thus, inclined to have this detestable right
abolished. Thomas Christie, for instance, approved the general spirit of the new French
Law of Succession (1791) which granted all children the same title to inherit 'without
any distinction of elder or younger, male or female'.59 In point of justice, John Thelwall
argued, the property of parents should descend to all those whom their passions had
'brought into an appropriated world'. The inheritance of property ought to be based on
the principle of 'consanguinity' by which every child would be, all alike, eligible to be
the heir.60 Mary Wollstonecraft, too, declared her support for the principle of equal
inheritance. She expected that the operation of this principle would promote the
fluctuation of property and could thus help to shatter this 'everlasting rampart' of
55
Barlow, Advice to the Privileged Orders Part I. p. 25.
56 Cooper, A Reply to Mr. Burke's Invective against Mr. Cooper and Mr. Watt pp 34, 45-6;
Barlow, Advice to the Privileged Orders. Part 1, p. 26.
57 Paine, Rights of Man p. 105.
58
Barlow, Advice to the Privileged Orders Part i, pp 26-7.
59 Christie, however, did not entirely support the principle of equal inheritance. He was still prepared to
allow the eldest issue a larger share of inheritance, who, he stressed, always had to assume more
responsibility of a family. Christie, Letters on the Revolution of France, pp. 265-8.
60 Theiwaii, The Rights of Nature Part n, p. 111
220
barbarous feudalism.6' To Thomas Paine, the abolition of primogeniture would be the
most effective way to exterminate the 'monster Aristocracy, root and branch'.62 It was
no less than, Thomas Cooper wrote, to lay the axe to the root of the aristocratic
genealogy. It would strip the hereditary privileges of their principal coadjutor and
would hasten the aristocratic order towards its utter disintegration.63
To most of Burke's critics, in fine, the existence of aristocracy was altogether
incompatible with the state of a free society. The feudal aristocracy, one author
pointed out, would always be opposed to a liberal order:
It was founded on, and supported by, military principle; and, by
consequence, well suited to the condition of those military ages, which
were ferocious; and therefore ill adapted to promote, or to secure, the
liberty of the present, or any other civilized times.
It was an intolerable source of oppression and only its abolition could help to secure
the enjoyment of natural liberty.64 From an historical view, James Mackintosh
contended that the rise of titled nobility was only a recent phenomenon belonging
specifically to modern Europe. Hence it could not be insisted upon as a universal
experience of mankind; and even less could it be pretended that it was a thing
'necessary to the order and existence of society':
A titled Nobility, was equally unknown to the splendid Monarchies
of Asia, and to the manly simplicity of the ancient Commonwealths. It
arose from the peculiar circumstances of modern Europe, and yet its
necessity is now erected on the basis of universal experience, as if
these other renowned and polished States were effaced from the
records of history, and banished from the society of nations.
The nobility, as a corporation, had always been inimical to the freedom of the
community. It was therefore necessary for it to be abolished if a democratic order
was to be created:
61
Woiistonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Men p 50
62 Paine, Rights of Man p 104.
63 Cooper, A Reply to Mr. Burke's invective against Mr Cooper and Mr Watt pp. 65-6.
64 Observations on the Reverent Doctor Hurd's . . . Two Dialogues, on the Constitution
of the English Government {London, 1790), pp 3, 69.
221
To give stability to a popular Government, a democratic character
must be formed, and democratic sentiments inspired. The sentiment of
equality which titular distinctions have, perhaps, more than any other
cause, extinguished in Europe, and without which democratic forms are
impotent and short lived, was to be revived.65
Above all, John Oswald argued, when a society became truly free, there would be no
room for the privileged order to survive. 'In a free State, there can be but one class
of men, which is that of the citizen; as there is but one will, which is that of the
people.' It would be totally alien to the minds of a free people that there should be
any absurd barrier between man and man. The fall of the nobility in France soon after
the Revolution had well testified the untenableness of this order. And once the people
in Britain were able to obtain a democratic order, he added, the aristocracy there
'must also bid adieu to their political existence'.66
ii
The second object that came under severe attack was the church. The established
church, according to George Rous, had, alongside the nobility, constituted the other
pillar of despotism.67 In almost every country of modern Europe, Joel Barlow pointed
out, the established church could be ranked as among the 'surest supporters of
arbitrary power'. It had always acted as a sort of standing army, ever ready for both
internal oppression and external violence. Indeed, its operations, combined with the
privileges of the aristocracy, had 'founded and supported the despotisms of Europe in
all their divisions, combinations and refinements'.68 James Mackintosh linked the clergy
and nobility together, and denounced both of them as the 'strongest fortresses and
most faithful troops' of absolutism. He was convinced that the clergy could never be
preserved with safety to public liberty: they had formed themselves into a great
corporation and become virtually the most 'determined and implacable enemy of
freedom'.69
The opponents of Burke, it can be readily asserted, were mostly not in favour of
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the established church, but their anti-clericalism, it has to be acknowledged, does not
suggest that they were opposed to religion itself. Joseph Towers, for example, was
ready to admit the importance of religion to public felicity: 'there can be no doubt,' he
wrote, 'but that real religion. . . tends in a very high degree to advance the best
interests of men even in the present world.'70 Many critics, in fact, were cautious
enough to make a distinction between religion and the civil establishment of it; and
they could be as well-disposed to the former as they were critical of the latter. One
author had asserted that there was perhaps nothing more necessary than religion in a
state. Nevertheless, he stressed, to maintain a religion and to keep priests were
things totally different.7' Joseph Priestley, in his reply to Burke, had once again
accused the latter of having confounded religion with its civil establishments.72 In
essence, religion was useful to all men of all ranks. It could furnish an additional
motive to good behaviour in every situation'. However, he argued, this function of
religion could well be carried out without the aid of any church establishment, which
indeed tended rather to hinder its beneficial operation.73 Even Thomas Paine had not
been so imprudent as to denounce religion itself: 'All religions,' he admitted, 'are in
their nature kind and benign, and united with principles of morality.' If religion had lost
its native mildness and become morose and intolerant, its cause could be traced to its
union with the state, that is, its becoming a church established by law. Thus, he
claimed: 'Persecution is not an original feature in any religion; but it is always the
strongly marked feature of all law-religions, or religions established by law. Take away
the law-establishment, and every religion reassumes its original benignity.'74
An established church, as Priestley defined it, was 'a church defended, and even
regulated, by the state, which either wholly prescribes, tolerates, or barely connives at,
other religions'.75 It referred to, Joel Barlow asserted, a code of worship which was
declared to be national or which enjoyed some preference in the eye of the law.76 This
idea of establishment, Samuel Heywood pointed out, implied that the right of private
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judgment must be restrained and that civil government could exercise a jurisdiction
over the conscience of men.77 Thus understood, the institution of a national church
became explicitly inconsistent with freedom of conscience, which most of Burke's
opponents had defended as among the inalienable natural rights of man. 'Of the
natural rights which God has given to man,' George Rous declared.
the most perfect is the freedom of his own mind. This he can not
renounce, though he may disguise. He cannot abandon, though he may
belie his conscience, and deceive mankind. Of all the employments in
which the powers of the human mind can be engaged, the worship of
the Divine Being is peculiarly that. . .which always must belong
exclusively to the individual. As it regards another life, it can affect none
but him. As it indirectly affects the affairs of this life, its operation
depends solely on the sincerity with which it forms the heart and
internal habits of the individual.78
Robert Hall, meanwhile, stressed that religion was purely based on the belief of some
'invisible realities' and had for its object 'the good and evil of eternity'. Its power could
operate upon nothing but the conscience of men.79 On this matter, therefore, every
one ought to be left to follow the dictate of his own reason. Thus, Sir Brooke Boothby
asserted that no man, or body of men, could assume to govern the beliefs of others
without impiously violating the authority of God:
Religion as a rule of faith by which we are to be saved or
condemned in another life must be the exclusive private concern of the
individual, in which every man has an indisputable right to follow the
light of his own reason and to reject all authority founded on the reason
of others. Law is a rule of action only and cannot be extended to the
sentiments and feelings of men. Those who denounce to us eternal
damnation as the consequence of errour in faith, and then would force
us to hazard our immortal souls upon their judgments who have no
concern in the matter, contrary to our own reason who has so deep an
interest in it, are the most execrable of all tyrants.80
On the whole, Francis Stone insisted, every one ought to have the sacred right to
freedom of conscience. Religion, being a purely private concern between man and his
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God, was something in which no other party could interfere.81
Moreover, many critics maintained that political authority was of a civil nature and
that therefore it could have nothing to do with such matter as religion. Civil
government, Thomas Christie claimed, had no right to meddle with the religious
concerns of its subjects. It had been mainly instituted to take care of the civil
interests of the community and it was its duty to grant 'equal encouragement and
equal protection to every good citizen, whatever his mode of faith may be'.82 Joseph
Priestley pointed out that civil authority was never omnipotent. There were always
things which should remain out of its reach and which should therefore be left to the
individual himself to handle. Based on this principle, he thus challenged:
Pray, then, what right. . . has any man to complain of me, if 1
worship God in what manner I please, or if I do not chuse to worship
God at all? Does my conduct in this respect injure them? What, then,
has the state. . . to do in this business, any more than with my food or
my medicine?83
Indeed, Benjamin Flower insisted, so long as man had not by any overt act infringed
the legal rights of others, he ought to be entitled freely to express his own opinions
and, without limitation, to follow that mode of worship he was inclined to.84 Religion,
Francis Stone added, could never be enforced; and God, all the more, required not a
forced worship, but a 'voluntary homage of the heart'. Hence, Stone proposed:
The mind of men ought to be left at liberty to acknowledge and
worship God or not; and if it determine in favour of such
acknowledgement and worship, to worship him in private, or in public
with his neighbours, and to join with them in supporting preachers by
voluntary contribution or not, as his judgment shall decide to be most
conducive to his own moral improvement or religious edification.85
It would be a most partial, arbitrary and unreasonable assumption, another critic
claimed, if the state should attempt to force man to embrace a religion and, in the
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case of a refusal, to deprive him of his civil rights.86 In the last analysis, Christopher
Wyvill concluded, a religion with divine authority would not depend upon the support
of force, or fraud, or corruption. It would be improper to use force or corrupt influence
to promote the acceptance of religious truth: 'the propagation of Religion by any
means, but those of argument and rational conviction, is contrary to the whole tenor
of the Gospel, and the practice of our Divine Master.,a7
The civil establishment of religion was, next, thought to be entirely inconsistent
with the fundamental principles of Christianity itself. 'A hierarchy considered as a
religious institution,' Sir Brooke Boothby remarked, 'is contrary to the plain precepts of
Christ and to the whole tenor of the christian religion.'88 An established church stood
for the union of church and state; it embodied the alliance between the Christian
religion and temporal authority. From a theological point of view, many critics claimed,
this mixture of religion and politics clearly ran counter to the explicit teaching of
Christ who had declared his kingdom to be not of a worldly nature. Joseph Priestley
was one of those who questioned the theological basis of the established church.
Neither Christ nor his apostles had ever given instructions calling for a connection
between religion and the civil power. In fact, he claimed,
our Saviour declared that his kingdom was not of this world, which
must mean that it did not resemble other kingdoms, in being supported
by public taxes, and having its laws guarded by civil penalties.89
Benjamin Flower followed a similar line of argument. According to the New Testament,
he remarked, the Christian system, as taught by Christ, was purely spiritual. He
pointed out that,
from first to last, it is not of a worldly nature, and that it was
never designed to assist mankind in the attainment of those objects,
which the majority, in all ages of the world, have been in the pursuit of;
but that on the contrary, its grand design is to enlighten the
understandings, and purify the passions of men; and turn their attention
to those objects which are not of a temporary, but of an eternal
duration.
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The Christian church, that is, had never been intended for temporal dominion; and the
gospels ought not to be propagated through force. With this conviction, Flower set at
defiance all the church establishments
which have been supported by human authority, guarded by penal
sanctions, the members of which have claimed the highest offices and
titles, have forcibly deprived mankind of their liberties and properties,
and have held the sword in their hand, as the principal means of
preserving their wealth, their pomp, their titles, their authority, their
CHRISTIANITY.
The civil establishment of religion, he insisted, was not congenial to the 'plain and
explicit language of sacred writ' and totally in contradiction to the 'nature and design of
Christianity'.90
Historical experiences had been employed to confute the claim that church
establishments were essential to the growth and spread of Christianity. The Christian
religion, Christopher Wyvill observed, had been gradually spread, for three centuries
after the death of Christ, without the aid of an established clergy.9' 'Civil
establishments of Christianity were altogether unknown in the early ages,' Joseph
Priestley agreed. At its primitive stage, the Christian church had been a purely
voluntary association. It was then maintained by voluntary contributions and its social
influence did not depend upon any civil connection: 'It was the virtue, it was the well
known piety and extensive benevolence, of the primitive christians. . . that procured
respect to themselves, and to their cause.'92 Sir Brooke Boothby held the same view:
'If the apostles were obeyed,' he remarked,
it was from reverence of their virtues and not from any obligation;
they received the voluntary gifts of the brethren, but they laid no claim
to a tenth share in every man's possessions or the produce of his
industry. Excommunication was no more at first. . . than expulsion from
a club or society; and bishops only men of the wiser and discreter sort,
chosen by the brotherhood to preside over their ceremonies and to
instruct the ignorant, to whom all submission was entirely voluntary.93
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To Robert Hall, the Christian church had been opposed to any alliance with temporal
authority during its pristine period. It had not only received no aid from civil power,
but had, on the contrary, suffered harsh oppression, which, nevertheless, had hardly
prevented it from thriving.94 Indeed, Priestley claimed, the primitive Christian church had
been itself no other than 'a sect or a heresy. It was sometimes connived at, but
never openly tolerated; and its followers were often frowned upon and violently
persecuted. In defiance of such difficult circumstances, however, it had survived and
had continued to flourish. It gradually expanded its influence 'till it triumphed over all
opposition, and the Roman empire itself became christian'.95 On the other hand,
Benjamin Flower pointed out, whereas Christianity had previously prospered without
the support of civil authority, it had gradually declined after it was established. Since
then, he observed, the record of the established church had, for the most part,
contained
the ambition, the cruelty, the folly, the villany of men assuming the
character of Christian ministers, stiling themselves servants of the
church. These servants of the church have robbed sovereigns of their
crowns and scepters, kingdoms of their properties and liberties, and
devastation and blood have marked their footsteps.96
As Robert Hall summed up, the civil establishment of Christianity since the reign of
Emperor Constantine seemed to diminish its purity rather than increase its
splendour.97
Other facts were also added to stress the irrelevance of church establishments to
the dissemination of the gospels. One well-known example was the rise of Islam. The
Mahometan religion, one critic claimed, had extended much farther, and had converted
a great many more devotees, than Christianity had achieved. This great achievement,
moreover, had been brought about 'without the aid of a single priest'. Indeed, despite
being without a splendid church establishment, the muslims had generally displayed a
more fervent zeal for their faith, persevering with more active vigour in their
devotion.98 The experience of America provided a more manifest example. The United
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States, Joseph Priestley noted, had kept no established church, but her people, far
from becoming atheists or unbelievers, had, instead, nursed a stronger sense of
religion than other nations." In effect, one writer contended, the clergy had become
respectable in America because of their independence. Their exclusion from politics
had rendered them more attentive to their principal duty, as ministers, 'of reforming
the manners of the people, thereby making them good subjects:100 It was this lack of
an established church, Joel Barlow stressed, that had secured to Americans the
unembarrassed exercise of religion and the continued public instruction in 'the science
of liberty and happiness'.101 The religious dedication of the Dissenters in England could
all the more prove that religion could well be promoted without being established.
Christopher Wyvill called attention to the success which attended the labours of the
Dissenting Ministers who, he noted, had 'devoted themselves to the service of
Religion, without a prospect of legal provision'.102 It was noticed, after all, that,
notwithstanding the lack of priests, the devotion, the piety, and the purity of manners
among the Dissenters had remained as good as those of any other sect .103 With
regard to the general situation of the church, Robert Hall made an illuminating
comparison:
In France, where the establishment had attained the utmost
splendour, piety had utterly decayed; in England, where the hierarchy is
less splendid, more remains of the latter; and in Scotland, whose
national church is one of the poorest in the world, a greater sense of
religion appears among the inhabitants, than in either of the former.
So far as England herself was concerned, the spirit of religion seemed to have
flourished 'much more among dissenters, than among the members of any
establishment whateveT.104
The union of church and state, at length, would prove totally destructive to both
religious concerns and political interests. To the cause of the church, it would be
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detrimental. On the one hand, the civil establishment of faith could hardly ensure that
those doctrines sanctioned would be the true ones. The magistrate, Robert Hall noted,
was no better a judge of religious opinions than anyone else. Should, therefore, he
assume to establish some article of faith, the risk would be great that a false system
might be wrongly defended. If this should be the case, he warned, error would be
perpetuated; and
that set of opinions which happens to prevail when the
establishment is formed, continues in spite of superior light and
improvement, to be handed down without alteration from age to age.
Hence the disagreement between the public creed of the church and the
private sentiments of its ministers.
Its outcome would be the 'rapid spread of infidelity'.105 On the other hand, a church,
when established, was apt to be susceptible to abuse and dilapidation. In the
beginning, Christopher Wyvill observed, an established church might have been wisely
planned and its functions faithfully carried out. After the primitive zeal passed away,
however, its professional duty would become an irksome routine. It was bound to be
'gradually relaxed, neglected, and at length wholly abandoned', though
/
the emolument originally annexed to the actual discharge of duty,
will frequently be retained, and even increased to the highest amount,
when little or no professional duty has been performed.106
In truth, another critic pointed out, the priests of the established church had often
neglected their religious duties, leaving the people generally 'in a torpor of supineness
and indifference'.107 Moreover, the splendid establishments of the church were
themselves able, Joseph Priestley noticed, to corrupt the minds of the clergy, to
whom people would look for an example of religious piety.108 When priests were
excessively exposed to secular attractions, they would be more occupied with
temporal concerns than with spiritual pursuits. There was great danger that they
would be utterly infected by all 'the contagious distempers of ambitions, corruption,
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flattery, intrigue and dissimulation'.109 On the whole, Robert Hall remarked, in the
established church the truth of religion was often lost amidst the splendour, opulence
and power of the church.1,0 Hence, another writer echoed, one could find in it little
essence of religion, but, instead, 'occasional form, ceremony, show and parade'. It was
not so much the religious truth as the civil interest which had mainly formed most of
the established church.111 In fine, Joseph Priestley concluded, splendid establishments,
far from procuring respect for religion, tended rather to render it contemptible,"2 'It
will always ultimately debase the clerical character, and perpetuate both in discipline
and doctrine, every error and abuse,' Robert Hall added."3
The established church also proved no less mischievous to public felicity. Sir
Brooke Boothby pointed out that the confederation between civil power and
ecclesiastical authority created a complicated regime of tyranny, fatal to both the
bodies and souls of men. It brought about a system of despotism, under which 'the
mind is first to be enslaved and then the body delivered over to the secular arm with
its active principle, the spring of all its virtues and faculties, bound up in chains'."4
Robert Hall claimed that a church, once united with the state, would become an
execrable coadjutor of despotism and yield to it a 'powerful support':
To select. . .and endow a particular order of clergy to teach the
duties of submission is. . . a means. . . well fitted to produce a slavish
subjection. Ministers of that description, considering themselves as
allies of the state. . . will be disposed, on all occasions, to strike in with
the current of the court; nor are they likely to confine the obligation to
obedience within any just and reasonable bounds. They will insensibly
become an army of spiritual janizaries. Depending, as they everywhere
must, upon the sovereign, his prerogative can never be exalted too high
for their emolument, nor can any better instruments be contrived for the
accomplishment of arbitrary power.
It became the mission of the church to exact from the people a spiritual submission,
thus preparing them 'for a servile acquiescence in the encroachments of civil
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authority'."5 But an established church might not even always be favourable to the
civil authority itself. One critic warned that a church exclusively supported by, and
possessed of, any political power would form an unpleasant burden on the state.
History witnessed that the state
has long borne the church, like a sickly brother, on its back; has
humoured its peevishness, and indulged its intolerant whims. . . with no
return but ingratitude; it has been distracted by plots and cabals, from
the very object of its indulgence and protection."6
When the church was suffered to take part in politics, Joseph Priestley was persuaded,
it developed a sort of 'totally new powef, which could in due course grow so strong
as able to stand on a par with the state. Since these two powers could not be easily
balanced, their mutual struggle must then become incessant. In effect, Joseph
Priestley noted, this kind of conflict had produced 'the worst effects, for many
centuries, in all parts of Christendom'."7
The most catastrophic consequences of the union of church and state were
perhaps the religious persecutions and wars which had previously afflicted European
society. According to Robert Hall, the interference of civil power in religion had
provoked and inflamed violent sectarian conflicts which had almost shaken Europe 'to
its base'. It was because of this alliance that the history of the church was filled with
a chaos of crimes and the progress of religion was to be traced in blood."8 Joseph
Priestley also blamed, the government's meddling with religion for all the evils of
persecution that had happened in the past and for all the hatred and animosity that
had arisen among the different sects of Christians."9 In Joel Barlow's eyes, the church
had always appeared 'like a giant, stalking over society, and wielding the sword of
slaughter'. It had been turned into an engine which, under the assumption of
Christianity, had committed 'greater ravages than any other of its dreadful
denomination':
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This fatal deviation from the principles of the first founder of the
faith, who declared that his kingdom was not of this world, has deluged
Europe in blood for a long succession of ages, and carried occasional
ravages into all the other quarters of the globe. The pretence of
extirpating the idolatries of ancient establishments and the innumerable
heresies of the new, has been the never-failing argument of princes as
well as pontiffs, from the wars of Constantine, down to the pitiful, still
born rebellion of Calonne and the Count d'Artois.
The church, in short, was often made a terrible instrument of destruction and
devastation: 'Could we form an estimate of the lives lost in the wars and persecutions
of the Christian Church alone,' Barlow remarked, 'it must be nearly equal to the
number of souls now existing in Europe.'120 Thomas Paine, in addition, drew attention
to the economic consequence of intolerance. The persecution of nonconformity had
deprived many countries of their best entrepreneurs and thus depressed their
industries: The union of church and state has impoverished Spain. The revoking the
edict of Nantes drove the silk manufacture from France into England; and church and
state are now driving the cotton manufacture from England into America.' It brought
about great ill effects upon the prosperity of many nations.121
Viewed from every angle, the alliance between church and state was utterly
baneful. The following comment thrown out by Robert Hall could perhaps represent
the general opinion of Burke's opponents concerning the established church:
Turn a christian society into an established church, and it is no
longer a voluntary assembly for the worship of god; it is a powerful
corporation, full of such sentiments, and passions, as usually distinguish
those bodies; a dread of innovation, an attachment to abuses, a
propensity to tyranny and oppression.122
What, then, ought to be the proper relation between church and state? In principle,
most critics would have liked them to be separate. Benjamin Bousfield proposed that
religion and politics were matters which should be keep 'as much apart as possible'.
The great object of religion had originally consisted of the 'worship of the deity, and
the hope of salvation'. Political involvement, he believed, had only served to debase
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the spirit of Christianity and pervert the true principle of religion.'23 Joseph Priestley
insisted that the Christian church had to be disengaged from any connection with civil
power. Only when this was completed, could the church be 'restored to its pristine
state, and recover its real dignity and efficiency'.'24 Christianity, Joseph Towers
stressed, would be more cheerfully received and more cordially embraced if it could
be exhibited 'unadulterated and uncorrupted, with its native excellence, in the original
beauty and simplicity with which it was delivered by its divine author'.'25 To The
Political Crisis above all, once their union was dissolved, church and state could each
be left to 'progress forward in its proper sphere'. Hence, 'Religion would be the more
carefully attended to, and the civil politics of the State appear with a brighter
aspect.''26
With regard to religious policy, Burke's critics were generally disposed to support
the universal toleration, and impartial protection, of different religious opinions.
George Rous, for instance, had argued in favour of toleration. The sentiments of men
would always remain divergent on the 'metaphysical subtlety' of faith. On this concern,
therefore, everyone ought to show mutual forbearance, allowing other people 'to
render his service most acceptable to the Deity'. Intolerance, he warned, could but
serve to engulf the community in convulsion and bloodshed.'27 The author of Political
Correspondence tried to provide toleration with a rational foundation. He declared that
the truth of faith was not 'as demonstrable as a problem of Euclid' and that hence
religious opinions could never be expected to be uniform. Everyone hence ought to be
free to adopt such a system of religion as best satisfied his own conscience; and no
man had the right to impeach others for having imbibed different opinions.128 Another
critic condemned the attempt of any state to regulate the religions of its people.
Magistrates, he claimed, were 'as blind as the rest' and could be no more competent
to decide upon questions of religion. It would be better if everyone was left to choose
his own religion:
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No human authority can have a right to bend my conscience to his
religion, because it cannot determine which system of religion is the
purest; therefore, ... let every man go as his conscience directs; not for
the sake of opposition, but for the conscience sake.
If any one was dissatisfied with the doctrines delivered in one place, he could resort
to another more agreeable to his own persuasion. In sum, he stressed, civil power
must be always dictated by the spirit of toleration. It ought equally and impartially to
protect all sects, punishing 'only such as are refractory and destroy the public
129
peace .
There were, however, different opinions about how far toleration should extend. It
is interesting to note, first of all, that the radical author of The Political Crisis, though
advocating the right of everyone to choose his own mode of worship, was not
prepared to tolerate the unbelievers: 'I have no doubt,' he declared,
that government has a right to make laws sufficient to oblige the
people to provide themselves with ministers of religion, and in case of a
non-compliance, to impose a suitable penalty: for it is evident, that
society is greatly promoted by the preaching of the gospel, its bonds
are strengthened by it, and morality encouraged.
Such compulsion, he insisted, was necessary and justifiable. It would constitute no
infringement on the natural rights of man.130 Some critics, on the other hand, were
disposed to defend a full and complete toleration Samuel Heywood, appealing to the
ideas of Locke, set out to take toleration to mean an unrestrained enjoyment of
religious liberty.13' The author of Political Correspondence going further, proposed that
toleration should not only apply to every sect of Christian, but ought to 'extend to
infidels, and even to Atheists'. He was to apprehend nothing from the philosophical
infidelity of speculative atheists:
Speculative Atheists have been studious, retired, and inoffensive
men, whose minds, elevated above the rank of common intellect, have
pursued enquiries into subjects too grand for the limited sphere of
human faculties to embrace, and, involved in metaphysical intricacies
which mortals cannot solve, have ended in a disbelief of the existence
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of God, the original cause of all things. Puzzled by the extreme difficulty
of conceiving how any Cause can possibly have been self-existent, and
yet forced to admit the necessity of some such principle, or to re-trace
causes to their causes without end, they have adopted Nature as their
self-existent subject, and imagined their hypothesis to profess most
truth, because possessing most simplicity.
This kind of speculation might preclude the atheists from the mental pleasure of
religious contemplation, but it was by no means incompatible with 'pure intentions,
and a strict discharge of the duties of life'.132 Thomas Paine and Francis Stone both
took a step even further. Paine was resolved to defend the universal right of
conscience. He was not even amused with the very idea of toleration, which, in his
opinion, was but despotism in disguise: Toleration is not the opposite of Intolerance,
but is the counterfeit of it.' It audaciously usurped to itself the power to grant a
liberty which was the natural right of man. Thus, he satirised:
Man worships not himself, but his Maker; and the liberty of
conscience which he claims, is not for the service of himself, but of his
God. . . Toleration, therefore, places itself, not between man and man,
nor between church and church, nor between one domination of religion
and another, but between God and Man; between the being who
worships, and the BEING who is worshipped; and by the same act of
assumed authority by which it tolerates man to pay his worship, it
presumptuously and blasphemously sets itself up to tolerate the
Almighty to receive it.'33
With Francis Stone, the right of conscience was man's inalienably just claim. Its
exercise must be unconditional: 'I detest the idea of man's presumption,' he wrote, 'in
only tolerating that which God freely grants, namely, that every man should worship
him according to his knowledge and dictates of his conscience. '34
Amidst this universal call for the liberty of conscience, however, not all of Burke's
opponents desired the immediate abolition of the established church. Notwithstanding
his wide disagreement with Burke, the author of Temperate Comments upon
Intemperate Reflections accepted Burke's opinion that it was necessary to keep a
church establishment and maintain it in dignity and independence. 'Such an
establishment,' he claimed, 'is the pride of this country, where the clergy enjoy their
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just importance in the State, and are secured in a revenue which gives comfort and
consequence to the order.''35 Christopher Wyvill, likewise, contended that it would still
be important to preserve some church establishments 'in the present very imperfect
state of knowledge and virtue in the World'. He acclaimed, in particular, the good
example of the English parochial clergy, who, he noted, were mostly learned and
useful men, 'exemplary in the performance of their duty, and successful in promoting
good morals and a serious sense of Religion'. It was mainly their efforts which
contributed to promote good order, decency and civility even in the most remote
parts of the country.'36 To these critics, in fact, there was no fault to find with the
established church so long as it was maintained in line with justice. George Rous, 'a
churchman and friend to establishment', believed that church establishment was
useful, and justifiable upon the broad basis of public utility. But he would not suffer it
to combine its safety with injustice to others.137 Samuel Heywood professed himself to
be harbouring no particular hatred of the established church:
I am not yet an enemy to church establishments in general,
especially in countries where they have long prevailed. I am not inclined
to object to state's giving a preference to that religion which is
approved of by the majority of the people; nor have I discovered that
there is any thing sinful in an episcopal form of church government.
He made it clear, however, that an established church, whatever its form, ought to be
'accompanied with the enjoyment of religious liberty, in the fullest extent, by those
who dissent from it'.138 Benjamin Flower meanwhile opposed any violent approach to
the issue of the established church. Under the present situation of men, he argued,
any attempt by force to overthrow the church would be imprudent:
The major part of mankind are yet in ignorance. . . Men have every
where been taught by priests, that some NATIONAL religion is essential;
it is to the religion already established, that the majority in almost every
country are attached.
The chief duty of reformers, for the moment, was to enlighten the people, encouraging
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them to investigate. Until the people became enlightened enough, any attempt to
change the established church would be reckless: 'Reformation should only be carried
on, as the majority of the people will bear it.' To avoid violence, moreover, all reforms
ought to proceed through a legislature 'fairly elected by the people'. Flower contended
that the legislature was the only body that had the power to 'reform, model, or new
model the National church'. After all, he did not rule out the possibility of a state
church: 'If the people choose to have an established church, nobody can dispute their
right to one.'139
in
Finally, it is necessary to examine the opinions of the radical writers on the
political systems of Europe. Most of Burke's critics, as might be expected, were
dissatisfied with the ancient governments which had hitherto existed in European
nations. David Williams, for one, complained that, for all the boasted learning and
improvement of mankind, there had never been any society which had been so
constituted that the security and happiness of the whole community could be properly
promoted.'40 Thomas Paine's assessment was just as damaging as it was
contemptuous. What the present governments of Europe presented, he declared, was
but a scene of iniquity and oppression. Even the much acclaimed British system of
government did not escape his stricture. 'What is that of England?' he asked: 'Do not
its own inhabitants say, It is a market where every man has his price, and where
corruption is common traffic, at the expense of a deluded people?' He was convinced
that, with perhaps the exception only of new France, European governments were all
founded upon a defective system, which rendered them generally inclined to create
wretchedness rather than happiness:
If, from the more wretched parts of the old world, we look at those
which are in an advanced stage of improvement, we still find the greedy
hand of government thrusting itself into every corner and crevice of
industry, and grasping the spoil of the multitude. . . It watches
prosperity as its prey, and permits none to escape without a tribute.
With obvious exaggeration, he asserted that the people under the ancien regime were
usually sunk into a state of 'poverty and wretchedness, far below the condition of an
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Indian'.""
From a political angle, many radical writers came to denigrate the old order as but
a deplorable world of despotism. Ever since the middle ages down to modern times,
one critic claimed, the governments of Europe were, generally speaking, absolute and,
as a result, prejudicial to liberty.142 In the same vein, Benjamin Flower charged that the
majority of the old governments in the world were little more than systems of
despotism. It turned out to be a group of 'shocking usurpations on every thing that
ought to be dear to men'.143 To David Williams, all the present regimes were merely
the different variations of absolutism, ranging largely between 'moderate oppression'
and 'cruel tyranny'.144 John Thelwall, above all, asserted that the old systems were
generally corrupt and oppressive. There existed in them much that was 'injurious to
the comfort and morals of mankind, repugnant to his nature, and hostile to his very
existence.
The most notorious aspect of the old order was that under it the natural rights of
man had suffered extensive abuses. Mary Wollstonecraft was infuriated at the
appalling state in which the rights of man were placed under the ancien regime. Most
of the existing governments, she wrote, were apt to encroach upon the sacred rights
of man and to fence around unjust laws 'with awful pomp'. She remarked that liberty
in its simple and unsophisticated sense seemed to remain a fair idea which had 'never
yet received a form in the various governments that have ever been established on
our beauteous globe'.146 For John Oswald, no old regime had ever shown the least
concern about the rights of man:
To a certain artificial system of morals they pay a profound
respect; but the real and indefeasible rights of humanity they are ever
ready to sacrifice to every sordid interest, or ridiculous caprice. The
regulations of the banditti must implicitly be obeyed; but the eternal
bonds of nature, the tender sympathies of the heart, may be cut
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asunder with impunity.147
'[W]e cannot point out the country where equal rights are possessed by the
inhabitants,' Benjamin Flower echoed. Of all the governments on earth, none had been
framed in accordance with the principle of natural rights. It would be futile if any one
should intend to track down these rights by referring to the old regimes where they
had been 'generally lost or obscured'.148 In truth, it was added, there appeared to be,
at this moment, scarcely any nation which deserved to be consistently proclaimed free
because none of them had yet been found erected upon 'the inherent and indefeasible
rights of man, resulting from his nature'.149
The ancien regime was also thought to be bent upon overlooking the general
interests of the people. The old form of government, according to Thomas Cooper,
was mostly no other than an oligarchy of 'the Few governing the Many, with
permanent Authority held in life-tenancy or inheritance'. It was ever ready to sacrifice
the welfare of the nation to the partial interest of a ruling caste, which had generally
flourished at the expence of the people who had been universally regarded 'merely as
the Footstools of their pride, and the means of their gratification'.150 Joseph Priestley
made a similar point. Flitherto, he observed, the old order had been little else than 'a
combination of the few, against the mantf] and
to the mean passions and low cunning of these few, have the
great interests of mankind been too long sacrificed. Whole nations have
been deluged with blood, and every source of future prosperity has
been drained, to gratify the caprices of some of the most despicable, or
the most execrable, of human species.
All those in power, he stressed, had been either weak or wicked; hence what they had
brought upon mankind was but vices and miseries.151 To Samuel Waddington, indeed,
the existing regimes throughout Europe were mainly fed upon the depravity of the
people. They proved to be systems absolutely incompatible with the improvement of
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mankind.152
For many critics, moreover, the ancien regime implied war and violence. The old
order of Europe, John Oswald pointed out, was founded upon a 'system of violence'. It
was permeated with a 'proud spirit of domination' and its operation became perversely
inconsistent with the principle of society and utterly repugnant to the sentiments of
universal brotherhood.153 Thomas Paine was convinced that the ancient governments
had never allowed the principles of civilisation to have a universal operation. The old
order had, as a result, generally sunk into a 'perpetual system of war and expense,
that drains the country, and defeats the general felicity of which civilization is
capable'. In Paine's view, violence had already been established into a common trade
in the old regimes: The vice is not peculiar to one more than to another, but is the
common principle of all.'154
If the ancien regime was defective, its cause, according to some writers, could be
traced to the unsatisfactory state of its origins. Mary Wollstonecraft pointed out that
the present regimes were all settled during the dark ages of ignorance when the
minds of men were still 'shackled by the grossest prejudices and most immoral
superstition'. Their forms, that is, were mostly taken in those days when the rights of
man were yet little understood. This circumstance, she insisted, served to account for
the imperfection of all modern governments.155 Vicesimus Knox was prepared to
attribute the defects of old regimes to the lack of wisdom in their original
constructions: 'In most of the states of Europe,' he claimed,
their original governments were formed when their legislators
could neither read or write, when the works also of the elder ancients
literally lay buried in dust; when history, art and science were alike
unknown or unnoticed, and when conquests also were much in fashion.
The ancient governments, indeed, had been mainly fixed while their legislators had
possessed neither enlightenment nor experience and 'when the few lorded it over the
many, and force stood in lieu of right'. From this dark source, Knox contended, nothing
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could be expected but injustice, ignorance, war and intolerance.'56 With Thomas Paine,
the originsof the present old regimes were murky and invidious: 'IT is impossible,' he
claimed,
that such governments as have hitherto existed in the world, could
have commenced by any other means than a total violation of every
principle sacred and moral. The obscurity in which the origin of all the
present old governments is buried, implies the iniquity and disgrace
with which they began.
These governments had historically arisen out of violence and iniquity, which, despite
the passage of time, remained to be their essential nature:
As time obliterated the history of their beginning, their successors
assumed new appearances, to cut off the entail of their disgrace, but
their principles and objects remained the same. What at first was
plunder, assumed the foster name of revenue; and the power originally
usurped, they affected to inherit.
Under such situation, the prevalence of war and extortion within the old order was but
a matter of course.'57
Monarchy was fundamental to the framework of the ancien regime; naturally, it
formed the chief target of the radical attack. A system of government which allowed a
monarch to monopolise all political power, William Belsham alleged, would become
the very worst species of despotism.'58 The monarchical states, Thomas Cooper
claimed, were based on the combination and monopoly of power, which rendered
them more able to suppress completely the complaints of the people, break their
spirits and deter them from pursuing their own interests. Cooper harboured a deep
hatred of monarchy and he was ready to deprecate monarchs as the execrable
mischief-makers of mankind:
The Sum of Misery produced by the Pride, the Revenge, the
Ignorance, and the Ambition of Kings exceeds the utmost Stretch of
human Calculation. The unfeeling Systematic devastation of the human
race, which this class of Beings have unremittingly and unrelentingly
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pursued, is almost incredible, even to those who read with astonishment
the undeniable evidence of facts which compose the bulk of antient and
modern History.
He went on to assert that the fancied utility which had been attached to monarchy
from the beginning of time to the present hour had been far outshone by the 'Mass of
Evils occasioned by the Sovereigns of Europe collectively within this half Century'.159
Thomas Paine launched by far the most savage attack upon the monarchical
system. He set out to taunt monarchy with vicious ridicule. To embarrass the
monarchical system, Paine chose first to make a butt of the 'crown': But, after all,' he
satirised.
what is this metaphor called a crown, or rather what is monarchy?
Is it a thing, or is it a name, or is it a fraud? Is it 'a contrivance of
human wisdom,' or of human craft to obtain money from a nation under
specious pretences? Is it a thing necessary to a nation? If it is, in what
does that necessity consist, what services does it perform, what is its
business, and what are its merits? Doth the virtue consist in the
metaphor, or in the man? Doth the goldsmith that makes the crown,
make the virtue also? Doth it operate like Fortunatus's wishing cap, or
Harlequin's wooden sword?
It continued to be derided as 'a something' which was 'going much out of fashion,
falling into ridicule, and rejected in some countries both as unnecessary and
expensive'. In another place, Paine again spurned monarchy as 'a silly, contemptible
thing': 'I compare it,' he wrote,
to something kept behind a curtain, about which there is a great
deal of bustle and fuss, and a wonderful air of seeming solemnity; but
when, by any accident, the curtain happens to be open, and the
company see what it is, they burst into laughter.
He had once gone so far as to harass the English crown, jeering at it as 'a metaphor,
shown at the Tower for sixpence or a shilling apiece'.160 Meanwhile, the principle and
practice of the monarchical system itself also fell under his attack. First of all, Paine
came to question the rationality of monarchical succession, which, being hereditary,
was in his opinion incompatible with the needs of a regular government, that required
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'talents and abilities':
Hereditary succession is a burlesque upon monarchy. It puts it in
the most ridiculous light, by presenting it as an office which any child
or idiot may fill. It requires some talents to be a common mechanic; but,
to be a king, requires only the animal figure of man - a sort of
breathing automaton.
It was, in sum, a measure that counteracted nature: 'It turns the progress of the
human faculties upside down. It subjects age to be governed by children, and wisdom
by folly.''61 Secondly, the monarchical system was believed to have lived entirely upon
the ignorance of the nation. Monarchy, Paine exclaimed, was 'all a bubble, a mere
court artifice to procure money'. It had been deliberately rendered mysterious in order
to baffle the understanding of men and thereby beguile them into its imposition. 'It is
the popery of government; a thing kept up to amuse the ignorant, and quiet them into
taxes.' The more ignorant a nation became, he added, the better would it be fit for a
monarchical system.162 Thirdly, Paine argued that monarchy was actually by no means
essential to a well-regulated civil government. America was a large country, he
observed, yet her government worked regularly without being monarchical. The tasks
of the local governments of England, from the office of constable to trial by jury, were
all properly carried out without the least appearance of monarchy in their processes.
To Paine, the existence of monarchy was only to benefit a throng of court parasites:
to common folks, it appeared 'something like a sinecure'.163 Lastly, monarchy was
further denounced as a vicious system apt to nurture corruption:
When extraordinary power and extraordinary pay are allotted to any
individual in a government, he becomes the centre, round which every
kind of corruption generates and forms. Give to any man a million a
year, and add thereto the power of creating and disposing of places, at
the expense of a country, and the liberties of that country are no longer
secure. What is called the splendour of a throne is no other than the
corruption of the state. It is made up of a band of parasites, living in
luxurious indolence, out of the public taxes.
Paine contended that the monarchy would always find it in its interest to connive at
certain inferior abuses, which would serve as so many outworks to shield its own
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great corruption: 'Monarchy would not have continued so many ages in the world, had
it not been for the abuses it protects.' It was the master fraud which sheltered all
others. The existence of the monarchical system, in the final analysis, was in complete
contradiction to the liberty of the people. It would ever be 'the enemy of mankind, and
the source of misery'.'64
Few radical writers, it is obvious, would be so disposed as to recommend pure
monarchy as a plausible political system. For what kind of government, then, would
they be prepared to contend? There were two alternatives here. On the one hand,
those pamphleteers of moderate mind tended to argue in favour of a mixed form of
government. Samuel Parr, for instance, professed his admiration for the wisdom and
utility of the principles that distinguished a mixed government. He was determined to
resist both the tyranny of republicanism and the despotism of monarchy.'65 Robert Hall
would not support pure democracy. A mixture of monarchy and nobility, he proposed,
was essential to a good government because it could operate to give regularity, order,
and stability to popular freedom.'66 One anonymous critic likewise contended that,
while democracy must be accepted as the basis of a government, monarchy and
aristocracy were not without their respective merits. The most admirable system of
government was the one that was able to integrate these various parts into a whole.
He was, that is, inclined to defend 'limited monarchy' which he believed had contained
'the wisest principles of government that are reducible to practice'. It was a system in
which the people could maintain an ample share of power, while, meantime, a body of
nobility would be set up to lessen the immense distance which the splendour of rank
placed between the king and his subjects.'67 From the socio-political perspective,
Capel Lofft explained that a government ought to be so devised as to be able to
regulate all the different social forces:
in every flourishing and long subsisting Society, continued
prosperity and eminent desert, in certain families, will always tend to
something of aristocratic interest; accumulation of wealth, by commerce
or manufacture in others, in a remarkable degree, to an Oligarchy, and
these will require to be controlled by the equal virtue and social spirit
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of a Democracy, which also requires to have its tendency to unadvised
determination, balanced by the gravity and prudence of the other
descriptions.
A mixed government, he was convinced, was the only political system that could have
all these powers and principles maintained in their due distinctness, and 'the
preponderancy preserved to the more general interests, without hazarding the security
of the others'. It provided the elements and form of a constitution best able to
guarantee the largest extent of stability, efficiency, private security and public
freedom. It was, above all, a safe and effective system, developed to incorporate all
the partial interests and prevent any of them from 'obtaining an ascendance to the
detriment of Society'.168
The political experience of Britain was naturally induced as the best example to
prove the excellence of mixed government. The English constitution, Sir Brooke
Boothby pointed out, was a system that had blended into an excellent whole the best
parts of all the principles of government.169 Due to many accidental circumstances,
another author claimed, Britain was able to secure a government whose constitution
was 'as beautiful in its parts, and systematically regular in the whole, as could have
been produced by the brightest efforts of foederative wisdom'. It was a moderate
monarchy that had worked with superior efficacy and that had produced happy
results.170 The British constitution, another writer claimed, was made up of three
different branches: King, Lords and Commons. It had been widely acclaimed as 'a just,
as well as an excellent form of government'.171 To these moderate authors, indeed,
though small flaws might lamentably appear in its operation, the principle of the
British constitution was fundamentally sound. Thus, one critic remarked:
The British Constitution is admitted to be a system of liberty. It is
a strong and capacious building, fitted both for convenience and for
defence; and, though it may have suffered a little from the injuries of
time, or from accidents, it is capable, by a small but timely reparation,
of being perfectly accommodatedto all the purposes of its inhabitants.
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It would always remain a 'venerable structure'.172
Those critics on the extreme radical wing, however, were not prepared to support
such a much acclaimed mixed system. According to Thomas Paine, a mixed form of
government always looked like a 'continual enigma'. It was a political system whose
constituent parts were apt to cover each other until responsibility was lost. It turned
out to be, moreover, an apparatus which could never be set in motion without some
sort of corruption:
However imperfect election and representation may be in mixed
Government, they still give exercise to a greater portion of reason than
is convenient to the hereditary part; and therefore it becomes necessary
to buy the reason up. A mixed Government is an imperfect everything,
cementing and soldering the discordant parts together by corruption, to
act as a whole.
Corruption, Paine complained, would ever become the moving power behind this kind
of government. Due to the scale of corruption necessary for such a purpose, one
could be sure, the nation would be plagued with the enormous expense of 'supporting
all the forms of Government at once'.173 James Mackintosh was another critic who
dismissed the merit of balance and control claimed for mixed government as but 'the
vision of theorists'. The reality of British politics proved that the alleged principle of
control was merely imaginary. In England, he pointed out, the supposed counteraction
of interests, which was thought to be able to prevent 'all conspiracy against the
people', had never existed:
That this is the state of England, the most superficial observation
must evince. The great proprietors, titled and untitled, possess the whole
force of both Houses of Parliament that is not immediately dependent
on the Crown. The Peers have a great influence in the House of
Commons. All political parties are formed by a confederacy of the
members of both Houses. The Court party, by the influence of the
Crown, acting equally in both, supported by a part of the independent
Aristocracy. The Opposition by the remainder of the Aristocracy whether
Commoners or Lords.
The history of England had never provided any undisputed example of the pretended
balance: her politics, he insisted, had betrayed every symptom of collision but no
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vestige of control.174 Upon the whole, Francis Stone exclaimed, it would be a great
folly to chant the praises of the 'nominal tripartite constitution' of Britain while the
crown and the nobility could still command so decisive an influence in the House of
Commons.175
To this circle of critics, therefore, a more radical option seemed desirable. John
Oswald should not be thought to be contending for an ordinary mixed government
when he proposed that the best political system should be the one that could unite in
one 'a pure democracy, a pure aristocracy, and a pure monarchy'. He had in effect
invested this enigmatic proposal with an essentially radical interpretation:
the government must consist in a pure democracy, inasmuch as
the power of the whole must be omnipotent over all its parts. . . In the
second place, a pure aristocracy must be established (that is to say, an
aristocracy in the proper and primitive sense of the word, which
signifies pre-eminence of the best}. But who are the besft Those
certainly who are chosen by the people. . . In the third place, a pure
monarchy is necessary to good government; or, in other words, it is
necessary that one will should reign supreme over all. . . In a good
government, there can be but one will, or monarchy, which is the will of
the people
It was ultimately styled a 'POLITICAL TRINITY', whose foundation, none the less, was
explicitly laid on the radical principle of popular sovereignty.176 Francis Stone argued in
favour of 'a simple government, to be based on a scrupulous attention to the equal
rights of man. In this government, he suggested, the executive power would reside in
'an annually-elected king', freely and fairly chosen by the people at large, 'from among
the numerous individuals of their collective body'. There would also be a 'democratic
legislature' in the choice of which every man would have a voice, and for which he
himself could be eligible as a legislator whose term was to be no longer than a year.
Most important of all, its whole structure would be so devised that its legislative,
judicial and executive powers could achieve a permanent equilibrium.177 This bordered
on a radical democracy.
Other writers preferred to appeal directly to republicanism. According to
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Mackintosh, democracy in its etymological sense implied the power of the people.
Thus understood, he claimed, all governments, to be legitimate, ought to be
democratic.178 David Williams argued that a republic must be insisted upon as the only
lawful form of government. There was no other system which was able to set the
interests of the people as its object.179 Indeed, Joel Barlow was quite optimistic that
republicanism would soon prevail. It would not be long, he was convinced, before the
opinion was universally accepted that
the republican principle is not only proper and safe for the
government of any people; but, that its propriety and safety are in
proportion to the magnitude of the society and the extent of the
territory.180
Thomas Paine was perhaps the most straightforward among the supporters of
republicanism. All civilised nations needed some kind of civil government, but, he
stressed, the republican system must be deemed the only legal form of government.
What was called a 'republic!, he explained, was a body politic which took as its object
the 'RES-PUBLICA' - that is, the public affairs, or public good, or public things. He
continued to assert:
Every government that does not act on the principle of a Republic,
or in other words, that does not make the res-pub/ica its whole and
sole object, is not a good government. Republican government is no
other than government established and conducted for the interest of the
public, as well individually as collectively.
A well-constituted republic, moreover, must always derive its legitimacy from the
people. Based on popular sovereignty, all its constituent parts, whether executive or
legislative, would share 'one and the same natural source'. They would then not be
foreign to each other, thus making it easier for them to coordinate without the
necessity of corruption:
As there are no discordant distinctions, there is nothing to corrupt
by compromise, nor confound by contrivance. Public measures appeal of
themselves to the understanding of the Nation, and, resting on their
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own merits, disown any flattering application to vanity.
It would be the only political system which could be consistent with reason, and in
which nation and government would always appear 'in their proper character'.181
The republican government here proposed, it must be noticed, was generally
asserted to be a system radically different from those which had previously been
denominated a republic or a democracy. Ancient democracy, according to Paine, was
merely a simple system of government in which the mass of people could assemble
together to rule 'in the first person': 'Simple democracy was no other than the
common-hall of the ancients.' Though possessed of the form, as well as the principle,
of a republican system, it was not fit for a country of large population and extensive
territory.182 David Williams was persuaded that those states which had so far been
styled republics could hardly be consonant with the reason of modern politics.
'Athens, Lacedemon, and Rome were ruled by idle and profligate mobs in contention
with privileged senates.' It was not truly democratical and it had never attempted to
promote the public welfare.183 James Mackintosh, indeed, regarded this kind of
government 'rather as an ochlocracy than a democracy, as the despotism of the
rabble, not the dominion of the people'. The ancient democracies, he claimed, were
always dominated by a corrupt and tumultuous populace: The rabble legislated,
judged, and exercised every political authority.' It was at most a degenerate
democracy.184 On the other hand, Thomas Cooper was of the opinion that the
old-style republics were by no means governments by the people:
In the Republics (as they are falsely called) antient and modern,
such as those of Greece and Rome, Holland, Venice, Genoa, &c. there
has always existed a Nobility: the Government has always been in the
hands of a permanent Aristocracy, in conjunction with a certain portion
only of the People, more or less large, more or less subjected.
Since the aristocracy and the people would be always divided on their interests, there
existed a perpetual tendency 'to intestine Commotion; to struggles and quarrels
between the Governors and the Governed'. On the whole, he stressed, the old
181
Paine, Rights of Man, pp. 148, 162. 164, 200, 224.
182 Ibid, p. 199.
183 [Williams], Lessons to a Young Prince, p 23.
184
Mackintosh, Vindiciae Gaiiicae. pp. 222-3
250
republics could never be sure of promoting the interest of any class of men: 'Such
Governments are bad for the few, in proportion to the share of power possessed by
the many - and for the many, in proportion to the power possessed by the hereditary
few.'185
It can, at last, be enquired: what then was the nature of the republican government
proposed by these radical writers? In the ancient democracies, James Mackintosh
observed, there was 'neither representation nor division of powers'.186 Here, he hit
upon an essential point about this question. According to David Williams, the nature of
modern politics required that the general voice of the people should be heard and that
a proper mode for its expression had to be made a part of its constitution. This
demand, he noted, had given rise to the specific principle of 'representation and
appointment of deputies'.187 For Thomas Cooper, the most important aspect of a
republican government, properly so-called, consisted not so much in the fact that
there would be no king, as in the principle that the people would be their own
governors. It must then adopt a system which could embody the 'government of the
MANY by the MANY'. For a country of extensive territory and numerous inhabitants,
where the people were not able by themselves to take charge of public affairs, this
ideal could only be realised through a properly planned scheme of representation:
The many. . . can only govern themselves by means of Agents or
Representatives appointed for the purpose; and that these Agents or
Representatives may be truly such - that they may not introduce
gradually and effectually the other division of Government, viz. that of
the many by the permanent few - they must be either removable at
pleasure, at short periods, or by rational exclusion.
This form of republican government, he emphasised, would have the merits of
simplicity, tranquility and cheapness that the example of America had recently
evinced.188
The republican system which Thomas Paine worked out was perhaps the most
typical of all. It adopted a constitution which was essentially different from both
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monarchy and aristocracy. It was not even a simple democracy, but turned out to be a
delicate combination of democratical principle and representative system. An old
democracy, Paine pointed out, was a direct government by the people. Though
excellent in its principles, it was not, due to the inconvenience of its form, suitable for
a government on a large scale. Paine was confident, however, that this deficiency
could well be made up through the introduction of a representative system which he
believed could transform the original simple democracy into a system applicable to a
society which became 'too populous, and too extensive for the simple democratical
form':
Simple democracy was society governing itself without the aid of
secondary means. By ingrafting representation upon democracy, we
arrive at a system of government capable of embracing and
confederating all the various interests and every extent of territory and
population.
This combination, he insisted, was properly what a viable modern republic ought to
be. Hence, the political system of America was cherished as the 'only real republic in
character and in practice, that now exists':
It is on this system that the American government is founded. It is
representation ingrafted upon democracy. It has fixed the form by a
scale parallel in all cases to the extent of the principle. What Athens
was in miniature, America will be in magnitude. The one was the
wonder of the ancient world; the other is becoming the admiration and
model of the present.
It was the easiest system of government to understand and the most eligible to be
put into practice. It would exclude at once 'the ignorance and insecurity of the
hereditary mode, and the inconvenience of the simple democracy'. Upon the whole,
Paine concluded, this would be a government which would take 'society and
civilization for its basis; nature, reason, and experience, for its guide'. It would be able
to meet the reason of men everywhere, and become 'always parallel with the order
and immutable laws of nature'.189
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Writers critical of Burke, whether moderate or radical, seemed almost unanimously
inclined to defend the Revolution in France In defiance of Burke's attack, these British
friends of French liberty generally felt jubilant at what was going on across the
Channel, with high expectations of its beneficial effects. In a survey of the recent
progress of history, Joseph Towers pointed out:
Few periods in the history of mankind have been more
distinguished than the present, by great, important, and interesting
events. The most signal, and the most unexpected revolutions have
taken place. An ardent and enlightened zeal for the great interests of
mankind has been manifested, in different parts of the globe, and has
produced the most salutary consequences.
Of all these great events, he emphasised, the French Revolution was the most striking.
It exhibited many noble and patriotic sentiments never before observed and it made
great strides towards the formation of a free constitution based on the natural rights
of man.' One anonymous writer marvelled at the uniqueness of the occurrence: The
records of ancient and modern times,' he claimed,
furnish not an instance of any other Revolution so peculiar in its
circumstances, - of so much moment in its consequences. One of the
most powerful and populous nations upon the face of the globe has
effected, not a partial reform, - not the correction of a system, - but a
complete and perfect change, by which a subsisting government is
demolished, and a new form, differing in every principle, established.
It formed an example so illustrious that every nation in the world must be affected.2 In
William Belsham's opinion, no nation had ever attempted 'so great, so extensive, and
so beneficial a reformation'. The French people had, in a short time, accomplished
more for the glory and happiness of their community than it 'could previously have
been imagined possible for the highest efforts of wisdom and perseverence to effect'.3
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From many aspects, Joseph Priestley echoed, the French Revolution stood for a
wonderful and significant change that could find no parallel in history:
It is. . . a change from dark to light, from superstition to sound
knowledge, and from a most debasing servitude to a state of the most
exalted freedom. It is a liberating of all the powers of man from that
variety of fetters, by which they have hitherto been held.4
France was, that is, transformed from a most despicable despotism to an admirable
system of freedom. And the transition was so tremendous, and so extraordinary, that,
Joseph Towers was convinced, it must arrest the attention of all those who were
concerned about the general interests of mankind.5 Thus, Benjamin Flower exclaimed:
When we consider the manner in which it has been accomplished,
the effects it has already produced, and the greater effects which it
probably will produce, ... we may safely assert, that it demands the
very serious consideration of every friend to those best interests of
mankind. Truth and Liberty.
He maintained that there was, since the Christian era, no other event which had been
'more unexpected, more astonishing, or more worthy the attention of mankind, than
the late Revolution in France'.6
To the British radicals, therefore, the French Revolution became an heroic moment
that evoked delight and admiration. The glorious march of freedom in France, Philip
Withers exclaimed, had unfolded a scene bound to fill every enlightened mind with
rapture. It was a spectacle which patriots would 'behold with admiration, and angels
with applause'.7 William Augustus Miles pointed out that the emancipation of a great
nation from a regime of despotic dominion and vexatious oppression would be always
a subject of rational triumph to those whose minds had not yet suffered corruption.8 It
afforded a sublime pleasure to the friends of liberty, Joseph Towers echoed, to
perceive a great nation 'shaking off its fetters, compelling its rulers to acknowledge
the just claims of the people, and asserting the rights of men, in the noblest and the
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fullest manner'.9 Indeed, George Rous admitted:
He must be dead to all the finer feelings of humanity; he must
wish to degrade man from a rational nature to brutal instinct, who can
contemplate, without joy and exultation, this grand effusion of a
Philosophic spirit illuminating all Europe, this improving progress of the
human mind. . .'°
Upon the whole, one tract proclaimed, the French Revolution was an endeavour which
merited the admiration of the world.11 It would be to plead against mankind, Thomas
Christie added, if any one should attempt to arraign such an effort.12
The French Revolution, no doubt, would produce widespread consequences. It had,
first of all, effected a fundamental change within France herself. Here, the most vital
aspect was of course the downfall of despotism. Through a great exertion of heroic
valour, William Belsham claimed, the people of France had smashed 'a vile and
oppressive yoke':
they, by one grand effort, annihilated the despotism of a thousand
years, and established, by general consent, that form of government
which appeared to them most equitable and eligible.13
The Political Correspondence acclaimed the new achievement of freedom in France.
The French people were long despised as the 'patient slaves of the most shameful
tyranny'; but they were now awakened to a sense of their humiliating situation and
were determined to be free: 'they assert their rights, and they are free.'14 It amounted
to a victorious liberation. After many centuries of oppression, Matthew Campbell
Browne declared, the French nation had at last 'emancipated themselves from the
voracious jaws of a devouring despotism, and shivered their tremendous shackles
against the heads of his oppressors'.15 George Rous asserted that the French people
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had broken the old fetters of tyranny, aiming to establish a new system of freedom.
They overthrew a despotism 'in its nature subversive of ait the rights of mart and
founded a new order upon the 'natural rules of justice'.16 Indeed, one author noted, no
sooner had the French nation awoken from their long 'dream of ignoble slavery' than
the old despotism glided away like a phantom and liberty was erected as an eminent
monument.17 It was remarkable that France was able to throw off the rule of iron
power, break down the chain of servitude and start 'at once into a new and
self-created existence'.18 To Benjamin Bousfield, before the Revolution, France was a
nation spoiled and ruined; and she now turned out to be the 'greatest school of moral,
and political wisdom ever opened in the world'.19
The universal implication of the Revolution, meanwhile, became all the more
obvious. The fall of the ancien regime in France, Joel Barlow remarked, was a change
that could not be limited to 'the concerns of a nation, or the improvements of an
age'.20 Benjamin Bousfield, while he rejoiced at the emancipation of France, had, at the
same time, cherished great hopes for the general spread of the Revolution:
I glory at seeing liberty, the best and first gift of God to man,
extended to 24 millions of my species; and I cherish the animating hope,
that it will irradiate every part of the habitable globe, which has not, as
yet, felt its invigorating influence.21
Earl Stanhope was persuaded that the Revolution in France, when it was once
completed, would become the source of happiness to that nation. Moreover, since the
Revolution must set an unparalleled example, for other enslaved nations, of the
triumphant upsurge of public spirit, it would help to spread that happiness to the
whole of Europe and even beyond:
That great and glorious Revolution will, in time, disseminate
throughout Europe, liberality of sentiment, and a just regard for Political,
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Civil, and Religious Liberty. It will, in all probability, make the World, for
Centuries, prosperous, free, and happy.22
Other supporters of the Revolution were even more certain about this general impact.
The freedom of France, Charles Pigott claimed, could not fail to set a flame of
revolution spreading over Europe. It would teach all nations to vindicate their natural
rights.23 The Political Correspondence predicted that the example of France would
exert 'a powerful influence over the conduct of other Nations':
We shall have witnessed the success of a grand experiment, viz, a
Government founded on goodness, that will either induce a reform in
those States which are intrinsically good, but disgraced by abuses, and
a complete subversion of those of which the principles and the practice
are despotic; or finally, render all the Governments of this little Globe,
Republics, divided from each other by sections, less for the purpose
perhaps of national distinction, than that of universal convenience.
It was expected that the French Revolution would soon touch off a wave of universal
amelioration which would work to render governments endearing to their people, thus
bringing the whole world to 'smile under the mild reign of Civil and Religious
Liberty'.24 At any rate, one writer commented, the Revolution in France was bound to
sap the foundation of the ancien regime in every state of Europe and 'point them out
the road to the enjoyment of equal freedom'.25
Many critics of Burke, ultimately, were inclined to deem the Revolution in France
as a great victory for the rights of man. William Belsham pointed out that the object
for which the French people contended was favourable to 'the interests of liberty and
the natural rights of humanity'.26 The Revolution, James Mackintosh claimed, had made
a great contribution to the cause of humanity: 'amid the long catalogue of calamities
and crimes which blacken human annals,' he wrote, 'the year 1789 has furnished one
spot on which the eye of humanity may with complacence dwell.' From this angle, the
French Revolution could be regarded as the 'greatest attempt' ever made in the
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course of human history.27 It completed, Joel Barlow stressed, an eminent edifice
which had long been contemplated, but which had never before been exhibited in
Europe.28 Thomas Christie, after all, asserted that the French Revolution was the only
revolution that had completely respected the rights of mankind. 'It is the only
revolution,' he continued, 'that is likely to. . . enlighten the darkest corners of the
globe, and diffuse every where the salutary rays of freedom and happiness.'29 To
Thomas Paine, in sum, the Revolution represented the solemn and majestic effort of
the French people to establish the natural rights of man. It was a scene so new, and
so unique, that 'the name of a Revolution is diminutive of its character'.30
ii
To vindicate the French Revolution, the first and foremost task was, of course, to
explain its origins. For an event of this nature, Burke's critics generally acknowledged,
there could be no simple explanation of its sources. James Mackintosh, for instance,
had dismissed as fallacious Burke's allegation that the Revolution in France had chiefly
resulted from the 'conspiracy of individuals, or bodies': a change with such a
momentum, he suggested, could only be occasioned 'by general causes, where the
most conspicuous individuals produced little real effect'.31 Thomas Christie, too,
pointed out that the French Revolution, though it looked as if it had taken place all of
a sudden, could not have been the work of a moment. It was, in truth, an event which
the French 'had been preparing for a century before'.32 What happened in France,
another writer stressed, had its origins in a combination of causes moral and physical:
'there is a chain of causes existing in the moral as well as political world, that may
lead to such events.'33 There existed, first of all, among the radical writers a
disposition to trace the source of this great change to a profound intellectual
revolution which had been going on for some time inside French society. Paine's
observation here was perhaps quite typical: the French Revolution, he wrote,
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has apparently burst forth like a creation from a chaos, but it is no
more than the consequence of a mental revolution priority existing in
France. The mind of the nation had changed beforehand, and the new
order of things has naturally followed the new order of thoughts.34
No less than Burke, then, many of his critics seemed prone to link the Revolution in
France with the intellectual movement of the Enlightenment.
The French people were shown to have been long subject to the arbitrary rule of
an absolute monarchy notorious for its domestic oppression and foreign conquest.
The monarchical despotism of France had reached its meridian during the reign of
Louis XIV when, James Mackintosh thus pointed out, the 'intrusion of any popular
voice was not likely to be tolerated'. Paradoxically, however, it was the despotic
monarchy itself which had, at its zenith, sown the seeds of its own destruction: 'It
fostered that literature which was one day destined to destroy it.'35 Here, Mackintosh
struck upon an important point respecting the intellectual background of the French
Revolution. According to the Political Correspondence, Louis XIV, while he was building
up his empire, had not neglected the promotion of letters - a measure intended to
adorn the splendour of the monarchy. But this literary policy had brought about an
unexpected consequence. It led gradually to the calling forth of the social conscience
of the literary world: 'as it is the peculiar property of great minds to act only for the
general good, that genius which had been first encouraged for the basest purposes,
was exerted for the noblest.' The men of letters, originally sponsored with a view to
guilding despotism, soon became awakened enough to commit themselves to 'the
various offices of enlightening the Peopid, encouraging them to 'sigh for the dignity
and happiness of freedom'.36 To be sure, William Belsham noted, since the era of Louis
XIV a new class of illustrious writers had arisen, and Voltaire, Helvetius, Montesquieu
and Rousseau appeared most conspicuous in the band'. These authors devoted
themselves to spreading radical ideas about the theory of government, the social
contract, the right of toleration, and the spirit of laws; and their works, possessed of
great and potent charm, had conduced to dispel the clouds of darkness, ignorance and
bigotry in which the nation had been so long enveloped.37 Thomas Paine's
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observations were along the same lines. During the two reigns before that of Louis
XVI, he wrote, the only signs of the spirit of liberty in France were to be found in the
writings of the philosophes. Notwithstanding their different motives, these
philosophes, from various angles, had all made their contributions to help bring the
French people back to their political consciousness:
by the different manner in which they treated the subject of
government, Montesquieu by his judgment and knowledge of laws,
Voltaire by his wit, Rousseau and Raynal by their animation, and
Quesnay and Turgot by their moral maxims and systems of economy,
readers of every class met with something to their taste, and a spirit of
political inquiry began to diffuse itself through the nation.38
Thomas Christie contended that all the popular writers of France had made different
efforts to disseminate the idea of liberty and the rights of man, which had been hence
'slowly and silently gaining ground in the nation'.39 Due to such efforts, another author
added, the French people were gradually enlightened and became more able clearly to
discern, and to assert, their rights.40 Hence, William Belsham pointed out, at the time
when Louis XVI ascended to the throne a 'mighty revolution' had already taken place
in the mind of the nation. As a result, the enlightened part of the nation became 'fully
sensible of their own dignity and importance, and resolutely determined to preserve
their rights and privileges sacred and inviolate'.41
The intellectual revolution, no doubt, had helped, as Mark Wilks remarked, the
people of France to escape from their previous 'political darkness'.42 The outbreak of
the American Revolution, moreover, reinforced this newly awakened political
consciousness in France. It furnished an unprecedented case exemplifying the success
of a nation in carrying into practice the principles of liberty. This experience, through
the French volunteers of the American War, had spread over in time to make its
impact on the political development of France. Thus, Benjamin Bousfield pointed out:
The seeds of French liberty were sown in the forests of America - removed from
38
Paine, Rights of Marx pp. 115-6.
39 Christie, Letters on the Revolution of France, p 62.
40 Letters on the Present State of England and America p. 19.
41
Belsham, 'Reflections on the French Revolution', Essays ii, 195-6.
42
Wilks, The Origin and Stability of the French Revolution pp 69-70.
260
thence, it has sprung up a mighty oak.'43 In Paine's eyes, the American struggling for
liberty formed a great 'school of Freedom'. The French soldiers sent there were
unwittingly placed in an environment where they became susceptible to the influence
of the principle, as well as the practice, of liberty.44 It afforded them a good
opportunity to see their speculative principles put into action; and, William Belsham
contended, an indelible impression was thereby made on their minds 'in favour of
liberty'.45 Once these soldiers returned after the war, Paine claimed, the cause of
liberty in France soon gained a vast reinforcement: 'A knowledge of the practice was
then joined to the theory; and all that was wanting to give it real existence, was
opportunity.'46 In fact, one author noted, the French soldiers, having imbibed the spirit
of freedom, were apt to help fan the flame of freedom which had already been kindled
at home.47 With regard to the impact of the American War on France, the Political
Correspondence thus commented:
The effect of this War could be nothing else than to import from
America those sentiments of independence which the troops had
naturally imbibed there, and, when it thus tended to confirm the people
in just and liberal sentiments, it rendered their humiliated situation less
tolerable.48
The French volunteers, David Williams added, were charged with the 'electric fire' of
freedom during their stay in America; their coming back to France, therefore, was like
a spark falling on touchwood, and the 'whole at once blazed into ashes'.49
The intellectual revolution was, of course, to have a profound impact on the later
development of French politics. It helped, in particular, to awaken the political
consciousness of the French people, preparing thereby the mind of the nation for
change. Its importance admitted, however, the intellectual movement, by itself, could
not occasion such a momentous event as the French Revolution. 'All the theories of
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speculative men, and all the oratory of republican writers', Thomas Christie declared,
were not the direct factors that 'persuaded the people of France to this great and
general revolt against their government'. He would impute them more to the social
distress which France suffered under the ancien regime.50 William Belsham, too,
asserted:
Popular insurrections have invariably arisen from the most grievous
oppression, on the most deplorable prejudice; and the French historians
give no hint that any speculative reasonings had the slightest influence
in exciting the insurrection in question. . , We see, therefore, that these
poor wretches were not enlightened, but exasperated into resistance.51
The origins of the French Revolution, to be sufficiently explicated, must, that is, be
traced back to the reality of the old order itself. Many opponents of Burke tended to
suggest that, to a large extent, the French people had revolted because they could no
longer endure the ever miserable state of the nation. France, Sir Brooke Boothby
moaned, had foundered under the dreadful load of a despotic regime:
that fine country has always appeared to languish under the evils
of a vicious constitution; presenting an odious contrast between the
higher and lower orders, an insolent and imperious nobility, and an
oppressed and suffering people.
It was a nation grossly divided into two extremes of 'penury and privation' on one
side and the 'fastidious, offensive luxuries' on the other.52 The old government of
France, William Cuninghame declared, was a 'corruption of the feudal system'. It had
degenerated into a situation in which the ruling class grew arbitrary and tyrannic,
while the people were despised, oppressed and utterly sunk into nothing.53 Thus, one
French critic of Burke confirmed, previous to the revolution France had already been
crushed under the remains of a vexatious feudalism. There was then 'nothing left from
the rights of men', and the whole country fell into an hopeless state.54
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To the defenders of the Revolution, indeed, the ancien regime in France was
fundamentally defective. Earl Stanhope had attacked the old order of France, claiming
that it contained nothing that could bear 'even the semblance of a free Constitution':
'You know, Sir,' he reminded Burke,
at that time, the Bastile existed, the practice of Arbitrary
Imprisonment existed, no Habeas Corpus was then established, no Trial
by Jury was then known in that Country; . . . there was then no
Declaration of Rights, no Liberty of the Press.
All that could then be found was but a despotism of the most 'horrid extent'.55 In fact,
George Rous claimed, the ancient government of France consisted of an absolute
monarchy, which was supported by a pampered nobility and a dependent clergy,
defended by a mercenary army, and, most of all, consolidated by a landed revenue of
'five millions sterling'.56 It relied on, another author noted,
a body of 200,000 nobility, and an army of 150,000 men; they were
supported by as many collectors of the revenue, and a multitude of
spies; against any of this vast body of oppressors, an individual of any
other class of the community, scarcely ever. . . could obtain impartial
justice.
The entire system formed a severe and complicated apparatus of absolutism, which
brought oppression, extortion and insult to the door of every people, and banished all
confidence and comfort from the whole society.57 The nature of the ancien regime in
France, thus, became manifest enough. 'What was that Government?' one pamphleteer
enquired:
A state of despotism, where the lives and fortunes of millions were
liable to be sacrificed to the resentment of a favourite, the caprice of a
mistress, or the interest of a despicable minion. Where a Nobility and
Clergy, forward in supporting the most arbitrary measures of the Crown,
were, in recompense, maintained in exemption from public burdens, and
many other privileges galling and oppressive to the people: - where the
inhabitants were drained to support the matchless extravagance of the
voluptuous and dissipated adherents of a licentious court, money being
taken without consent, and squandered without account, in most
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scandalous profusion: - where the execution of the laws was perverted
to the purposes of the great, and the regular administration of justice
withheld: - where a quiet and harmless life, with industry and integrity,
were not any security against the misery of chains and the horrors of a
dungeon; as the least opposition to the unwarrantable will of a
worthless woman, the intolerable pride of an imperious lord, or the
grasping spirit of a rapacious priest, might draw down a lettre de
cachet by which the wretched object would be forever secluded from
the light and every comfort.
It bordered on an unlimited tyranny.58 Other writers held similar opinions. The old
order of France, one of them asserted, was a system despotic both in theory and
practice. Under such a regime, he added, the people were never able to 'enjoy their
liberty, life, and property in as full and ample a manner, as of right they ought to do,
and would have done under a just, wise, and equal government'.59
But Burke had argued that the ancien regime of France could not have been so
baneful because, he claimed, under it the French population had steadily increased and
the nation in general had become prosperous.60 To his critics, however, this observation
seemed rather superficial. On the one hand, many writers suspected that the growth
of population could not have much to do with the excellence of a government. The
population of a nation, Joseph Toweispointed out, could not be deemed as a proper
criterion to assess the merits of its government. It could prove, least of all, that it was
a system of freedom: the history of mankind, he stressed, showed that 'the human
species may subsist, and even increase in numbers, under the very great degrees of
oppression'.6' The population of the Roman Empire, Francis Stone instanced, had
grown despite the fact that its governments were the most execrable.62 The political
system of Persia was highly despotic, another author added, yet that country was full
of inhabitants. In his opinion, political power was not the major factor that affected
population. It was often the case that natural causes such as climate, nutrition,
employment, etc. played much more positive roles.63 Joseph Towers shared this
opinion: 'Whenever, from the fertility of the soil, or any other causes, the means of
58
Temperate Comments upon Intemperate Reflections, p. 11.
59 Strictures on the Letter of the Rt. Hon. Mr. Burke p 37
60 See, supra, chapter 2, pp. 51-2.
61 Towers, Thoughts on the Commencement of a New Parliament pp. 99-100.
62 Stone, An Examination of the Rt. Hon. Edmund Burke's Reflections, p. 170.
63 Strictures on the Letter of the Rt. Hon. Mr. Burke p 36
264
subsistence are easily afforded to the common people, population will naturally
increase, though the government may be oppressive and despotic.'64 With respect to
the population of France, Thomas Christie thus commented:
Men increase by the laws of Nature, not by the laws of States.
Civilization was highly advanced in France, and it obviated many of the
effects of a bad Government. The Government had no share in
augmenting the population of France. So far as its influence extended, it
was hostile to it; but, bad as it was, it could not overpower the strong
effects of natural causes.
Its growth, indeed, could not conceal the rude fact that its government was essentially
a bad one.65 To Francis Stone, after all, the natural propensity of mankind to propagate
itself had been, by the all wise Author of Nature, so strongly implanted in both sexes
that not even the power of the most despotic government could stop it.66
The radical observers, similarly, showed no intention of contradicting Burke's claim
that prior to 1789 France had been, generally speaking, in a rather prosperous
condition. But, again, most of them were reluctant to credit this prosperity to any
beneficial effects of her old system. Joseph Towers, for instance, accepted that
France under the ancien regime had indeed made progress in her economy, in her
culture, and in her national prestige. Nevertheless, he stressed, these achievements
seemed to have resulted, not so much from the absolute system of government itself,
as from the sometimes clement and moderate exercise, by the French monarchs, of
their powers, and the occasionally excellent administration of 'some very wise and
able ministers'.67 In the opinion of Thomas Christie, France had flourished, but she had
achieved this 'in spite of her Government':
Much of the prosperity of the kingdom was owing to its ancient
state, and to the remains of original freedom. For it is a position never
to be forgotten, that France was originally free. The influence of a good
Monarch, or a wise minister, served further to check the operation of
malignant causes.68
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Moreover, Francis Stone claimed, even though the old regime of France had paid some
attention to the improvement of the nation, its purpose was mainly to serve the
selfish interests of the ruling classes:
The old, absolute monarchy of France, abetted by its aristocracy
and hierarchy, did certainly promote the improvement of agriculture,
manufactures, and commerce, from this principle of policy, that, without
them, they would want the means of gratifying their own luxurious, . .
style of living. But the people at large, the industrious bees, plundered
of their lives by the swarms of drones and hornets issuing from these
three destructive nests, enjoyed but a very small portion of the honeyed
fruits of their labours.09
'It is true,' Christie echoed, 'great men cannot live without poor men.' The common
people, because of necessity, were indeed maintained 'in existence, but they were
always kept in a miserable state of ignorance, poverty and depression: They were
deprived of the rank and dignity of man; they seemed to exist only as animals.'70
Some writers, on the other hand, suspected that the professed prosperity of
monarchical France might be more apparent than real. It was widely maintained that
throughout the ancien regime there had existed serious social and economic
injustices. Prior to the Revolution, Joseph Towers claimed, the French nation had
suffered the combined oppression of the crown, the nobility and the clergy: 'the
commonality and peasantry groaned under the weight of unequal and unjust taxes,
and of burdensome and unreasonable feudal services.'71 It became then a country
where the nobility grew too rich, while the multitude were almost ground down by
'arbitrary exactions'.72 One critic thus depicted the miserable situation of the lower
classes:
The poor peasant paid a variety of taxes from which the opulent
noble was exempt. He dare not use sea-water to dress his meat, or
even dip his vessels in the ocean, lest the king should want a customer
for the salt, which he forced on him to what quantity he pleased, and at
four times the value; he was enjoined on pain of death, to suffer the
animals reserved for the amusement or the luxury of his lord, to destroy
with a delegated despotism, the labour of his hands, and the hopes of
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his children's subsistence.73
For all the professed prosperity, Joseph Towers stressed, a great extent of poverty
could still be detected among the 'middling and inferior classes'.74 Sir Brooke Boothby,
indeed, had witnessed a more deplorable scene: 'If at your return from Versailles,' he
told Burke,
you had looked into the Marne, where the bodies of those
unfortunate wretchs whose miseries had driven them to seek the last
refuge from their despair were daily exposed to frightful numbers; if you
had followed the peasant or the artisan to his scanty meal or a morsel
of black unsavoury bread, such spectacles would not have been lost
upon a heart like yours.75
It was a truly bleak picture.
The state of France on the eve of the Revolution was, in general, asserted to have
been radically defective. The ancien regime in France, one author remarked, had, in all
its parts, constituted a connected system of despotism and oppression.76 It turned out
to be, in essence, a body politic in which the spirit of despotism was pervasive. 'It has
its standard everywhere,' claimed Thomas Paine:
Every office and department has its despotism, founded upon
custom and usage. Every place has its Bastille, and every Bastille its
despot. The original hereditary despotism resident in the person of the
King, divides and subdivides itself into a thousand shapes and forms, till
at last the whole of it is acted by deputation.
This formed a kind of despotism against which, he warned, there was no mode of
redress.77 In Thomas Christie's opinion, the old government exerted a widespread
oppression which extended 'from the highest down to the lowest ranks of society'.
Under such a tyrannic rule, the nation as a whole had suffered severe dilapidation:
73 An Answer to the Rt. Hon. Edmund Burke's Reflections pp 31-2.
74
Towers, Thoughts on the Commencement of a New Parliament pp 101-2.
75 Boothby, A Letter to the Rt. Hon. Edmund Burke, p.44
76 a. b„ Letters on the Character and Writings of Mr. Burke, p. 20.
77
Paine, Rights of Man, p. 70.
267
The picture of ancient France exhibits. . . the melancholy view of a
great and enlightened people, deprived of almost all the advantages
Nature had given them, by an oppressive and arbitrary government: -
without agriculture, for the people (who are the cultivators) were
despised and kept in the state of the lowest servitude: - without
commerce, for it was reckoned dishonourable: - without liberty, for the
life and property of every individual was constantly at the mercy of a
minister, or of his mistress: without laws, for where arbitrary will can
suspend any thing, there the laws are a mere fiction: and lastly -
without morals, for these depend on laws and a fixed constitution.78
Viewed from every respect, the ancien regime in France was depraved. It looked,
Samuel Parr thus observed, 'morbid in its aspect, morbid in its extremities, and morbid
in its vitals'. He was convinced that, shortly before the Revolution, the maladies of the
nation had reached 'almost the last stages of malignity' that its entire edifice
'threatened a speedy dissolution'.79 Thus, Benjamin Flower moaned: The situation of
the French, antecedent to the revolution, was almost hopeless. The government was
despotic. The whole system was most wretchedly mismanaged.' It had sunken into
such a miserable state that a total regeneration became necessary.80
in
Those who attended to the state of the old order would perhaps all agree that
France needed a certain kind of change; but between reform and revolution there
existed wide difference of opinion. Burke had contended against the necessity of
revolution. The ancien regime in France, though suffering dilapidation, he insisted, was
far from being incorrigible. It could still be reformed into a viable system: 'I must
think,' he asserted, 'such a government well deserved to have its excellencies
heightened, its faults corrected, and its capacities improved into a British
constitution.'81 Was, then, drastic change unavoidable? Could France go through a
reformation without revolution?
Despite Burke's argument to the contrary, most of his critics believed that France
could hardly be salvaged from a total wreckage without some radical change timely
carried out. The French government would collapse, one pamphlet pointed out, if
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essential changes were not made in its constitution. It required a thorough revolution,
rather than a mild reform, before its vices could be eradicated.82 William Cuninghame
argued in favour of the justice of the Revolution. The ancien regime of France was
hopelessly incurable. It had deteriorated into a system in which abuses were rampant:
'the whole body was infected; every limb required regeneration.' The French people,
hence, could not be accused of having gone to 'too great lengths' when they chose to
abolish the old order in its entirety.83 Without drastic measures, Thomas Paine insisted,
there would be no way to resurrect a system such as the old government of France,
whose despotic principles had become so deep-rooted as not to be easily
removeable. Fie was to compare the French monarchy to an 'augean stable of
parasites and plunderers', which he insisted had become 'too abominably filthy to be
cleansed, by anything short of a complete and universal revolution'.84 With Thomas
Christie, revolution seemed to become the only measure left that was effective
enough to extricate France 'from the complicated evils into which she was plunged':
It is impossible to review the ancient state of things in France,
without being convinced that the abuses were too inveterate to yield to
any palliative, that no half measure would have been effectual; that
nothing but a total revolution was equal to the cure. They wanted
amongst them, the very principles of a Constitution.
The body politic of France, he declared, was desperately in need of radical reform
which could never be achieved if the ancient establishments of the kingdom, with all
their old habits and prejudices, were kept up.85 In the end, another writer thus
asserted, the old established government of France was of such a texture that only its
total abolition was able to help the people to lift the burden of slavery, and that
'nothing less than another substituted in its room, calculated to force the growth of
freedom, could in any means satisfy a nation, determined to be free'.86
The supporters of the Revolution, to strengthen their case, went further in order to
confute Burke's claim that the ancient edifice of the French monarchy should have
been retained as the foundation upon which the new order could be established.
82 Political Correspondence, pp. 55, 76-7.
83 Cuninghame, The Rights of Kings, pp. 38-9.
84
Paine, Rights of Man p. 69
85 Christie, Letters on the Revolution of France, pp 81-2, 90
86 Letters on the Present State of England and America p 20
269
Catharine Macaulay, for one, had contended that, when the old vessel of a
commonwealth was once shattered to pieces, the new builders could be under no law
of duty or reason to make use of those old materials, which were considered to be of
an injurious tendency, in the structure of their new constitution. The French people,
that is, were completely justified in their attempt to form a new government for
themselves:
The leaders of the French Revolution, and their followers, see none
of those striking beauties in the old laws and rules of the Gallic
institutions of Europe. . . In such a view of things, they have chosen a
simple rule for the model of their new structure.87
In truth, Sir Brooke Boothby claimed, no free and equal constitution could ever be
engrafted upon the ancient establishment of France. The political order in that country
had long been warped by despotism. It included an unqualified monarchy, a feudal
nobility, a domineering hierarchy, and an impoverished and servile people. There was
nothing there that was worth preserving. The French determination to level the whole
old edifice without distinction, then, could not, with justice, be denounced as a rash
and dangerous experiment.88 To another critic, the ancien regime of France looked like
an old castle whose walls were almost obsolete beyond repair:
Corruption, despotism, and other vicious qualities had not only
completely sapped the foundations of the ancient fabric, but had rotted
most of the materials, so that they became useless in their present
form, and a new edifice was necessary.
The political architects of France were well aware of this, and hence they chose to
destroy the old castle 'as a nuisance'.89 Indeed, Benjamin Flower insisted, the French
people would never be able to rejuvenate a system which had long been deranged:
any effort of this kind would prove but a feeble endeavour to prop up an old, crazy,
ruinous mansion, which daily threatened destruction to its inhabitants'. The National
Assembly was wise in choosing to mould the whole system afresh, making use of
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those old materials only which might be found fit for the new order.90 As a whole,
Benjamin Bousfield claimed, the people of France had never enjoyed any rational
semblance of freedom. There was no proper constitution in their country after which a
free system could be patterned. It was therefore proper for them to new-model 'a
complete and confident constitution': They have not patched up their ruinous house,
but have taken it down wholly, and laying anew the foundation, in the rights of men,
have erected on it a superstructure that will be the admiration of the world.'91
At this point, Burke's opponents had taken care to point out the difference
between the Revolution in France and the 1688 Revolution in Britain whose moderate
turn had been induced by Burke in order to argue against the radical nature of the
former. According to William Belsham, the French Revolution, though consonant in
principle with the 1688 Revolution, could not have followed its course of moderation:
The Revolution of France. . . is equally capable of vindication with
that of England, for both rest upon the same general foundation - the
rights of the people; both have in view the same object - the happiness
of the people. In this important respect they differ, that with them this
object was attainable only by a total subversion, with us by a resolute
defence of the antient constitution.92
There were many reasons to explain such a difference. It was, for one thing, widely
held that the situations of Britain and France on the eve of their respective revolutions
were essentially different. The constitution of Britiain in 1688 was a good system
abused, while what France possessed prior to 1789 proved to be a government
fundamentally bad. Samuel Parr had drawn this comparison:
In England the mischiefs which more immediately called for a
remedy endangered a good government. In France they almost
constituted a government completely bad. In England despotism was an
excrescence, which deformed only the surface of the state. In France it
was a canker, which preyed upon the vitals.
Both in bulk and in strength, the distempers that caused the Revolution in France were
substantially much more serious than those evils that provoked the British to revolt in
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1688. The French people purported to attack an inveterate disease which had spread
throughout society and had produced more baneful effects: 'the root of it struck down
to Tartarus, and its top towered almost into the skies.' From this point of view, Parr
claimed, France needed a much more radical treatment than Britain had previously
required.93 Henry Mackenzie espoused a similar stand. The scale of change must
always be greater in proportion to the extent of depravity that befell a country. While
Britain in 1688 demanded but moderate change in order to restore a constitution
whose abuses could be rectified without much violence, radical measures had to be
taken in the case of France where distempers had become so deep-rooted that they
could not so easily be done away. Thus, he wrote: 'the English constitution had only
suffered some dilapidations which it was not difficult to repair: the French was rotten
at the foundation, and it required a great deal of pulling down to remedy the
mischief.The state of France before the Revolution, in sum, could admit of no
comparison with that of Britain in 1688. The British in the Glorious Revolution had
merely intended to remove a temporary impediment from the machine of government,
one which could be taken away without having to break the whole into pieces; as for
France, since her object was to reform an essentially oppressive system, some 'very
material change' therefore became indispensable 95
It was maintained, upon the whole, that against an arbitrary regime like the French
monarchy attempts at revolutions would be always plausible and, indeed, justifiable.96
To cure the malady of France, Thomas Christie argued, any effort at 'partial reform'
would be of no great avail since that could at best provide a ' temporary remedy' to an
essentially incorrigible evil. Had the ancient establishments been allowed to remain in
France, he believed, the same practices of oppression and control would always be
repeated. The minds of the nation, then, would forever remained fettered and
freedom could never be cultivated. 'It would have been to reform by ingrafting new
principles on an old stock, but it would have ended in no reform at all.'97 Radical
writers were generally sceptical about the effect of gradual, or moderate, reform. The
old regime of France, one wrote, was so bad that it was incapable of amendment:
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An entire revolution, therefore, was, in that country, indispensably
necessary, before any degree of liberty could be effectually established;
and an attempt to produce a partial or gradual reformation, would have
had no other consequence than to rouse the indignation and resentment
of the ruling powers, and to rivet so much the faster the fetters of
absolute government.98
It was all the more possible, James Mackintosh apprehended, that, if drastic change
had not been made in time, the ancient institutions 'would have destroyed LIBERTY,
before Liberty had corrected their SPIRIT'. Moderate reforms could serve no more than
to amuse the aspirations of the nation and might thereby lull the popular enthusiasm
for change. Meanwhile, 'Power vegetates with more vigor after these gentle prunings'.
Mild improvement could give new momentum to an old system, making it more able
to resist essential reformation. In this manner, a golden opportunity for fundamental
change might thus be missed forever:
If radical reform is not, at such a moment, procured, all partial
changes are evaded and defeated in the tranquility which succeeds. The
gradual reform that arises from the presiding principle exhibited in the
specious theory of Mr. Burke, is belied by the experience of all ages.
It would be vain to expect that, through gradual reform, the spirit of freedom could
silently enter into the old system and help by degrees to correct its defects 'without
convulsion'.99 With moderate reform, another writer claimed, some new spirit might
indeed be infused by drops into the old system, but one would have to wait, he
stressed, 'after the accumulation of an hundred years, when the grand-children of the
present race were sinking into their graves, [before] a constitution less liable to
exception might have appeared'.100
IV
Allowing that radical measures were requisite for dealing with the problem of
France, drastic change, however, had, at the same time, led to the emission of popular
excesses which, in Burke's eyes, had tarnished the cause of freedom. To defend the
Revolution, Burke's critics were hence obliged to rationalise its attendant enormities
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and violences. The radical observers, basically, did not attempt to deny the fact that
excesses had been committed, and that blood had been shed, in the course of the
Revolution. One critic, for example, was ready to admit that the French Revolution had
been 'somewhat disgraced by the licentiousness of the rabbles'.'01 There could be no
doubt, a second writer noted, that riots and excesses had taken place at Versailles on
6 October 1789.'02 It was a scene, Banjamin Bousfield added, that must incur many
sentiments of compassion and abhorrence from men of common sense and common
feeling.103 At a later stage, when the Revolution ran into extremes, even a passionate
supporter such as John Thelwall was also appalled at the ferocious barbarity, and the
'almost unparalleled cruelty', of the revolutionaries.104 Indeed, one tract commented,
some of the crimes consequent on the Revolution were so black and heinous that the
principle of humanity was outraged and the cause of freedom dimmed.105
Though popular excesses could not be concealed, most opponents of Burke were
prepared to exculpate them as the unavoidable evils that must accompany such a
great change. '[W]e should remember,' Thomas Christie claimed, 'that we live in a
world where it is in vain to expect pure good without any mixture of evil.'106 In fact,
another writer asserted, few radical changes had ever taken place which had not
produced some offences.107 Great revolutions, Sir Brooke Boothby also agreed, would
always bring with them violence and excesses: 'We know too that change itself cannot
be wrought without disturbance and disorder; the decomposition and combination of
elements will be attended with commotion and effervescence.'108 It would be
impractical to expect, William Cuninghame stressed, that a great revolution could be
completed without causing some atrocities at the same time.109 To be sure, it was
added, all revolutions could not proceed with that 'gentle ebb and flow' which Britain
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had previously experienced."0 The reason for this seemed clear enough. In a great
revolution, especially that of a popular nature, James Mackintosh pointed out, violence
could hardly be avoided:
when a general movement of the popular mind levels a despotism
with the ground, it is far less easy to restrain excess. There is more
resentment to satiate, and less authority to controul. The passion which
produced an effect so tremendous, is too violent to subside in a
moment into serenity and submission. The spirit of revolt breaks out
with fatal violence after its object is destroyed, and turns against the
order of freedom those arms by which it had subdued the strength of
tyranny.
It could not be imagined that a people, long sore with oppressions, would be
'punctiliously generous in their triumph, nicely discriminative in their vengeance, or
cautiously mild in their mode of retaliation'.1" At length, Gilbert Wakefield would
dismiss as 'inconsequent' the claim that a well-regulated system could establish itself
without producing some tumult, violence or bloodshed at the time of revolution when
an entire community was so fiercely split by discordant sentiments, opposing interests
and blind prepossessions.112
From the nature of things, popular excesses were ever apt to break out during a
great national emancipation. When a man was suddenly set loose from a long
bondage, Thomas Christie explained, his conduct might be expected to become
somewhat 'enthusiastic, or even riotous'. Similarly, a people could commit some follies
'in the first moments of exultation, on the recovery of their liberty'.113 Capel Lofft
asserted that, while a country fell into the ferment of revolution, even a usually
well-tempered people could give way to excesses 'on being at once awakened from
the iron slumber in which they had been held by Despotism'.114 It was like the
giddiness of an inmate, Gilbert Wakefield wrote, who was suddenly exposed to the
'meridian blazes of the sun' after having been so long locked in
the gloomy recesses of a dungeon; where, for a succession of
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years, no light, save the casual glimmerings of a star, or the pale
glances of the moon, shall render visible the palpable darkness, that
environs him."5
It was exactly the case with France. The French people were long buried in the
darkness of servitude; at the first dawn of freedom, thus Mackintosh noted, they
became unable to tell the proper 'boundaries of their duties and their rights':
It was no wonder that they should little understand that freedom
which so long had been remote from their views. The name conveyed
to their ear a right to reject all restraint, to gratify every resentment,
and to attack all property.
And this accounted for some of the commotions and calamities in the Revolution."6
Many radical observers, hence, pleaded for a sympathetic view of the conduct of the
French people. It was urged that special allowance should be made for the temporary
excesses of an oppressed and exasperated people, who were, 'in a moment of
delirium, agitated at once by the frenzy of joy for the actual overthrow of
despotism'."7 In those circumstances, Joseph Towers wrote, circumspection was
hardly desirable: 'It was not to be expected that a people, just emerging from a
despotic government to an high degree of liberty, should in every respect act with
perfect discretion, wisdom and moderation.'"8
While popular excesses in the Revolution were admitted, there was, however, a
general opinion among the radical writers that the picture given in Burke's Reflections
had been grossly overcoloured. Burke's account of the violences and misfortunes
befalling the French nation, Thomas Christie claimed, was an exaggeration in the
highest degree."9 There was perhaps no other event in history, James Mackintosh
pointed out, which had been more widely, malignantly, and systematically exaggerated
than the French commotions. He conceived Burke's picture of the Revolution to be a
mere 'illusion' perceived through a 'moral optics which makes near objects so
115
Wakefield, A Reply to the Letter of Edmund Burke, Esq. to a Noble Lord p 41.
"6
Mackintosh, Vindiciae Gallicae, p. 179.
117 See: Belsham, 'Reflections on the French Revolution', Essays ii, 237; Strictures On the Letter of
the Rt. Hon. Mr. Burke, p. 117.
118 Towers, Thoughts on the Commencement of a New Parliament pp. 83-4.
"9 Christie, Letters on the Revolution of France pp 120-1.
276
disproportionately large'. Had it been placed under a proper light, people would have
been rather struck at 'its unexampled mildness, and the small number of individuals
crushed in the fall of so vast a pile'.'20 Indeed, Thomas Paine asserted, 'when the
French Revolution is compared with the revolutions of other countries, the
astonishment will be, that it is marked with so few sacrifices'.'21 Many writers held on
to the view that few revolutions of such consequence could be accomplished with so
little violence.'22 As Benjamin Bousfield put it:
Notwithstanding Mr. Burke's pathetic tale descriptive of the
excesses and enormities committed on the mobs of France, . . . we may
challenge his historical research to produce any one instance in either
antient or modern annals, where a revolution, of any nearly equal
magnitude, was effected with less enormity or less bloodshed. The
unhappy objects of popular rages and popular sacrifice were few,
comparatively speaking.23
Historically, Mackintosh remarked, Holland, England and America had, in their
respective struggles for freedom, all experienced more bitter wars and prolonged
terrors: 'the different portions of liberty which they enjoy, have been purchased by the
endurance of far greater calamities than have been suffered by France.''24 In Thomas
Christie's estimation, the total number of people killed since the Revolution were far
less than those whom kings had sacrificed in 'a single battle of an unjust war'.'26 In
fact, John Butler noted,
the secret intrigues of a cabinet council of the best regulated state
or common wealth in Europe, have done some more mischief, and shed
more human blood, by one rash decision, than all the blundering
stratagems of the National Assembly of France were capable of doing.'26
Compared with other occurrences, Bousfield claimed, the excesses of the French mob
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would prove only too trivial.127 'In this French Revolution, considering the numbers
concerned, and the opposing interests,' another writer echoed, 'it is almost miraculous,
that it should attend with so few which do violence to humanity.'128
Two more things deserved further notice. It was claimed, first, that the behaviour
of the mobs in the French Revolution was not particularly violent. In British history, Sir
Brooke Boothby claimed, the siege of Londonderry (1699) had produced more horrors
than all that could be attributed to the French people in the present turmoil. In fact,
the history of France itself witnessed more examples of an even more horrid nature:
The execution of M. Foulon cannot be compared for atrocity with that of the Marechal
D'Ancre, or the massacre of the King's guards with the nights of St. Bartholomew.'129
Secondly, attention was also drawn to the fact that, for all its commotions and
tumults, the Revolution had not turned violence into a constant policy. During the
Revolution, Henry Mackenzie observed, the popular outrages had not occurred so
frequently as might have been expected on such an occasion.130 The scene on 6
October was no doubt unpleasant, and the massacres on 10 August and 2 September
were indeed horrid. It was, however, a great wonder, the Political Correspondence
claimed, that the conduct of the French people,
since the first Revolution, has not consisted of an incessant series
of slaughters, in consequence of the treacheries they have had to
encounter, and the sanguine spirit they might be expected to have
imbibed, from a long familiarity with the dungeons, tortures, and racks,
of their ancient Government.131
Furthermore, Benjamin Bousfield stressed, those people who fell in the turmoil were
mostly those who had been the 'willing instruments' of the horrible despotism and
whose lives could, therefore, be justly forfeited.132 Thus, Thomas Christie claimed:
Though I regret their mistaken violence, I see it only took place
where they conceived themselves threatened with the greatest danger;
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and while I deplore their needless cruelty, I cannot at the same time
hinder myself from perceiving, that they imagined themselves acting as
the Ministers of Justice, appointed to take vengeance on their
oppressors.133
At length, Bousfield added, the zeal that actuated the French people, no matter how
excessive and mistaken, was honourable after all: Their object was not to plunder or
to despoil, or to enrich themselves. Their fury was directed against the plunderers of
the state, and the supposed oppressors of the people.'134
i
If, however, the people of France had indeed turned out to be violent and
atrocious, it was the ancien regime itself that was to blame. The Revolution had not
nursed their propensity for savagery. It had its remote origin, John Thelwall claimed, in
the inhuman environment of the old despotism; the Revolution having but given it an
opportunity to display itself in open deeds. 'Revolutions are touchstones for the real
dispositions; but they do not, like the whip of a harlequin's sword, change the dove
into a tyger, or the tyger into a dove.'135 How, then, did the people become atrocious
under the ancien regime? The barbarity of the French mobs, according to Thomas
Christie, had much to do with the utter ignorance in which the nation had been
deliberately kept.136 Francis Stone would blame the French disposition to 'cruel
outrages' on the general demoralisation of the French people, caused by the failure of
its old government to provide better instruction for the people in the obligations of
religion, in the duties of morality, in the virtues of industry, and in the knowledge of
the rights of man.137 The tyrannic legal practices with which the ancien regime
contrived to punish its subjects, furthermore, also produced adverse effects. On the
one hand, these ruthless acts had operated to dehumanise the common people. The
often sanguinary scenes of horror and barbarity seen in the old government, Thomas
Christie remarked, tended to inure the people to atrocities:
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The Basti/e had accustomed them to condemn and punish without
trial or accusation; the frequent repetition of public capital punishments.
. . had familiarized them with putting men to death; the gibbets of the
State pointed to the lanterne and the racks, stakes and wheels of
established authority, had fatally habituated them to shut their ears
against the cries of the dying, and to abuse the bodies of the dead.138
Practices of this nature, Catharine Macaulay stressed, would naturally strike great
terror into men's minds and operate to barbarise the people.139 The effect of those
cruel spectacles exhibited to the populace,' Thomas Paine echoed, 'is to destroy
tenderness, or excite revenge.' It was to torture their feelings, harden their hearts,
and, as a result, render them ruthless.'40 In the meantime, the old regime, by such
brutal practices, had also set up examples of atrocities apt to instruct the people how
to revenge themselves. In truth, Christie insisted, the savage acts returned upon the
fallen grandees were all learned from their former governments. The people in France
had been ruthlessly treated; when once power fell into their hands, they would, it
might be expected, retaliate upon their oppressors in the same manner as had
previously befallen them.'41 Thus, Paine concluded: 'It is over the lowest class of
mankind that government by terror is intended to operate, and it is on them that it
operates to the worst effect. They have sense enough to feel they are the objects
aimed at; and they inflict in their turn the examples of terror they have been
instructed to practise.'142
Most of the violences complained of, nevertheless, might not have happened, it
was further argued, had it not been for those malicious provocations from the
enemies of the Revolution. The outrages of the French people, one author asserted,
were directly provoked by the very difficult situation confronting them. From both
within and without, the Revolution had faced tremendous opposition that served to
sow 'suspicions, jealousy, and party rancour and malignity'.143 When the Revolution
was under threat, Charles Pigott stressed, the people were driven almost to madness
for fear that their new freedom might be lost and the nation again replunged into
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their ancient horrors. Under such an infinitely complicated situation, any kind of
enormity could take place.'44 Before the court party revealed their 'infernal intentions',
one author noted, the people had shown no sign of tumult. Unfortunately, while the
National Assembly was pursuing reforms,
a proclamation was issued for their dissolution; - a military force
was employed to drive them from their house, - the existing Ministry,
which possessed a considerable portion of popular confidence, were
compelled to resign their places to successors odious on account of
arbitrary principles, and well known enmity to the States, - an army was
collecting, under the command of the sanguinary Broglio - the most
diabolical measures, were adopted for causing an artificial scarcity of
provisions.
These moves combined to disclose 'a horrid determination to subdue the spirit of
reform'.145 Joseph Towers, likewise, recounted:
The firing on the people in the gardens of the Thuilleries on the
12th of July, 1789, justly increased the suspicions of the inhabitants of
Paris respecting the designs of the court; and when the National
Assembly was conceived to be in danger, when foreign troops were
brought to act against the citizens, when artillery was pointed against
the capital, when the ministry was changed, and marechal Broglio was
made minister of war, the people had abundant reason to believe, that
all which had been done in favour of their liberties was about to be
overturned.
This series of events was set to incite the people to violence and disorder.'46 There
seemed no doubt, James Mackintosh added, that the French then had great
apprehensions of sinister plots, whether 'real' or 'chimerical', against their freedom.
These causes operating on that credulous jealousy, which is the malady of the Public
mind in times of civil confusion, which sees hostility and conspiracy on every side,
seem sufficient to have actuated the Parisian populace.''47 In fact, Thomas Christie was
convinced, a great part of the ensuing hardships could have been avoided if the
Revolution had not faced so much stubborn resistance.'46 Those measures of strong
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coercion,' Henry Mackenzie echoed, 'were necessarily opposed by exertions of equal
force; and in such conflicts, in the shock of heated and contending parties, not only
delicacy and decorum, but even justice and humanity are sometimes forgotten.'"19
To Burke's critics, at last, the popular excesses attendant upon the French
Revolution, though regrettable, were at least excusable. It was the more so if one
considered that the Revolution was expected, in the long run, to produce incalculable
good to the nation as a whole. Those popular excesses which were often deplored as
having tarnished the cause of the Revolution, James Mackintosh urged, must be
treated with an expansive mind. People should learn to approach the defects of the
Revolution, not with a 'womanish and complexional sensibility' which shrank 'at a
present evil, without extending its views to future good', but with a 'manly and
expanded humanity' which fixed its steady eye 'on the object of general happiness'.
This was not of course to suggest that a crime could always be committed because
there was prospect of a certain good; however, Mackintosh asserted, no one could
pretend that, in the case of the French Revolution, 'we are to decline the pursuit of a
good which our duty prescribed to us, because we foresaw that some partial and
incidental evil would arise from it. On balancing the limited evil of transient anarchy
with the inestimable good of established liberty, the French Revolution proved
commendable.150 Henry Mackenzie took a similar stand. Speaking of popular excesses,
he claimed;
If it sometimes shook the pillars of justice, if it sometimes
loosened the bonds of humanity, the transient evil must be endured for
the sake of the future permanent good. If France shall ultimately
obtained freedom at no greater expence than the blood which has
already been spilt, though individuals may have to mourn their private
losses, the public cannot repent of the purchase.151
In the opinion of Sir Brooke Boothby, when much was to be gained much would have
to be hazarded: The destruction of an inveterate tyranny, and the probable
establishment of a free constitution must be always regarded as cheaply purchased at
the expence of a few years of anarchy and disorder.'152 He urged the true lover of
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liberty not to make too much of the blemishes of the Revolution, for, after all, the
excess of freedom remained a 'glorious fault'.153 William Belsham also stressed that
the confusion and bloodshed caused by malicious provocations should not derogate in
the least from the merits of the Revolution itself.154 And to Robert Hall, no matter how
lamentable these crimes and disorders might have been, 'the French Revolution has
always appeared to me, and does still appear, the most splendid event recorded in the
annals of history'.155
v
The British sympathisers with the French Revolution went on to defend the
National Assembly whose composition had been so vehemently vilified, and whose
authority so vigorously challenged, in Burke's Reflections. In spite of Burke's assault,
his critics were generally prepared to accept the Assembly as the true representation
of the French people. The French legislators, it was claimed, were chosen largely from
'the favourable opinions, and unbiassed suffrage, of their constituents'.156 The election,
another asserted, had been conducted with fairness and justice.157 It was, Benjamin
Bousfield agreed, pure, virtuous and uninfluenced. He maintained that the French
people had been serious in their 'first exercise of the glorious privilege of election':
There was not time for corruption, intrigue, and under influence, to
debase the principles, to pervert the judgment, and to suppress the
spirit of the people - All was done on the impulse of the moment, and
that impulse must have been virtuous.158
The whole nation, meanwhile, was conceived to have been completely, and
comprehensively, represented. Men from different ranks and various professions had
all been returned.159 It was at least, Joseph Priestley insisted, a more genuine
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representation than the Parliament of Britain.'60
Burke had cavilled at the the National Assembly, reviling the obscure origins of its
members. Most of his critics, on the contrary, contended that such an allegation was
both mistaken and slanderous. The French people in the election, it was true, had not
particularly favoured those from higher orders. This seemed, however, but too natural.
'In France,' Benjamin Bousfield claimed, 'the nobility were all, and the people nothing.'
Public virtues in that country could scarcely be discovered among its higher ranks,
who, he asserted, were merely interested in forging the chains for the people,'6'
Moreover, the States General had been convened to undertake reform, aiming to
eradicate the abuses of the privileged orders. It would be unreasonable, then, to
expect that the French people would give such a task to a class whose privileges had
become the object of reform. They had, instead, chosen to entrust it to men of less
rank, whose views were more agreeable to their own.'62 Notwithstanding this, one
would be much mistaken if he supposed that the delegates to the National Assembly
were mostly from the lowest, and the most despicable, social classes. If the people
of France had thought it unwise to select their representatives from the higher orders,
there was equally no reason why they should risk giving the serious task of reform to
people of contemptible condition. Indeed, one writer contended:
Reason cannot easily be persuaded that in the election of
representatives, upon an occasion of the highest solemnity, success
should have attended the most contemptible of every condition; and,
least of all, that the clergy should be so blind to their own interest, as
to fix upon the meanest, the poorest, the most worthless members of
the church to be the representatives of that ever jealous order, in the
grand council of the nation.'63
Evidence seemed to suggest that the middle class had, in reality, formed the main
body of the National Assembly. According to Joseph Towers, the people of France, in
the election, had shown a preference for 'professional men'.164 They included, James
Mackintosh recounted, mainly lawyers, physicians, merchants, men of letters,
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tradesmen and farmers. Such choices, in a sense, were unavoidable: These
professions then can only furnish Representatives for the Tiers Etat' The people had
no other proper candidates: these groups constituted the 'middle rank' of the
community, within which, Mackintosh indicated, 'all the sense and virtue of society
reside'.165 Thus, Benjamin Bousfield wrote: 'It is true, there are some great exceptions,
but in general, the public spirit of the country resides among the middle class of
men.'166
Burke's opponents had undertaken, in particular, to defend the merits of the two
delegations dominant in the National Assembly, the lawyers and the lesser clergy,
whom Burke had contemptuously styled as 'country attorneys' and 'country curates'.
On the one hand, James Mackintosh was confident about the political potential of the
legal profession:
The majority of the Third Estate was indeed composed of lawyers.
- Their talents of public speaking, and their professional habits of
examining questions analogous to those of politics, rendered them the
most probable objects of popular choice, especially in a despotic
country, where political speculation was no amusement for the leisure
of opulence.
He continued to confute Burke's allegation that the lawyers delegated had come
chiefly from the unlearned and mechanical part of the profession. The list of the
Assembly, he noted, suggested that the majority of them belonged to the 'provincial
advocates', a group whose importance in French society, in his opinion, could not be
estimated by the 'English idea of 'country attorney^.167 The deputies of the clergy,
meanwhile, were also not lacking in talented men. Joseph Towers believed that even
among the lower clergy there could be found many people who were well qualified for
the role as legislator.168 Burke's claim, that most of the representatives of the clergy
were ignorant, seemed ill-founded. They were composed mainly of parochial clergy,
who, Mackintosh again indicated, should not be ranked with the poor 'country curates'
of England.169 To emphasise the political capacity of the two leading groups of
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legislators, one author had thus asserted: in France
the provincial advocates. . . were to the distinguished magistrates.
. what the compass is to a ship in a voyage around the world; that the
mere country curates. . . have, either in divinity, law or politics, more of
true knowledge than the generality of the high clergy. . . and are all
endowed with the hearts of Gentlemen and men of honour.170
Compared with the parliamentarians in Britain, Joseph Towers satirised, there was no
reason to suppose that the country divines and the practitioners of law and physicians
could not
make full as good legislators, as many of those fox-hunters and
sportsmen, who have often appeared in the former parliaments of Great
Britain; and who have been much more attentive to the preservation of
the game, than to the preservation of the liberties, or to the promotion
of the interests of their country.171
For Joseph Priestley, after all, no matter from what class these delegates were
elected, there seemed no doubt that they must have been persons 'in whom their
constituents thought they could best confide'.172
The moral fitness of the French legislators was also widely acclaimed. Benjamin
Bousfield, for one, declared that the the National Assembly had consisted largely of
people whose enlightened wisdom, public virtue and private integrity would enable
them to fulfil the sacred trust of the state.173 The French legislators, Catharine
Macaulay remarked, had combined a 'bold and enterprising spirit' with the
'disinterestedness of principle'.174 George Rous, moreover, praised their 'honest
intention' to promote the public welfare:
These men could not intend to convert a public trust to private
benefit, who began their operations by enabling the nation to crush all
their oppressors That their labours have, in fact, advanced the public
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happiness, twenty-five millions of witnesses. attest, who
enthusiastically devoted to the new constitution, contend only who shall
be most active in its defence.'75
For Mark Wilks, the Assembly had revealed the soundest judgment and the most
extensive legislative capacity. It became an institution where 'mercy and truth meet
together, where righteousness and peace embrace each other'.176 Its members had
shown, Joseph Towers added,
a greater degree of intellectual illumination, a more ardent zeal for
the principles of just and equal, and. . . more noble and sublime views,
than any other body of men invested with power in that country, from
the foundation of the French monarchy to the present hour.177
At last, John Butler noted that, though the new legislators of France might not be
perfect, they had taken care to act on the 'strictest principles of liberality'.178
The legitimacy of the National Assembly itself, too, needed to be vindicated. The
States General, if following its ancient rule, had to be convened in three separate
orders - the nobility, the clergy and the third estate - each with a similar number of
delegates. From the procedural view. Burke had accused the French legislators of
having grossly violated the regulation of the States General by not only doubling the
delegates of the third estate but even conflating the three distinct orders into one
assembly.179 In response to this charge, Burke's opponents, though unable to dispute
such facts of violation, were ready to defend them as deviations necessitated by the
critical situation of the time. It was well known that the aim of the States General was
to reform abuses which had much to do with the privileges of the nobility and clergy.
To achieve this object, William Belsham asserted, the people should be allowed to
secure a proper share of political influence. This naturally meant that the delegates of
the third estate in the States General had to be made equal in number to that of the
other two orders united.180 Unless the number of delegates of 'the oppressed' were
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increased to the same level as that of 'the oppressors', the much expected reform
would be defeated.181 This measure, again, would be good for nothing, Thomas Christie
added, if the three orders continued to meet in separate houses and vote by orders.
Little reform could be expected from a States General 'meeting and voting on the old
system':
From an attentive consideration of the former state of France, of
the prevalence of ancient prejudices, and ancient habits, . . and still
more from the dispositions and conduct actually manifested by the
various orders of men, at the summoning of the Etats Generaux, it is to
me perfectly clear, that if the States had adhered to their ancient form,
and continued to vote by distinct orders, the Reformation so much
hoped and wished for, would have ended in a mere farce - nothing
great or effectual would have been done.182
The reason for this was clear enough. If the States General continued to meet in its
ancient form, Sir Brooke Boothby noted, an alliance of the two higher orders would be
able to reduce the delegation of the people into a mere nuillity.183 The nobility and
clergy, James Mackintosh claimed, always had great stakes in perpetuating those
abuses that were to be reformed. Their possession of two equal and independent
voices within the States General would render the efforts of the third estate irhpotent
and nugatory.184 Francis Stone emphasised that the two first orders, more attentive to
their own exclusive interests, would be sure to outvote the third estate by two to one.
In this manner, the delegates of the people would be turned into no more than
cyphers; and 'the public safety, welfare, and liberty would have been neglected, and
sacrificed to the ambition and avarice of magnates and ecclesiastics'.185 By and large,
it was claimed, the States General in its old form proved 'considerably inconvenient
for giving efficacy to the public will'.186 It was apt, William Belsham asserted, to
restrain the just influence and authority of the people. If, therefore, it were followed,
there would be no hope 'of any effectual reformation of the political evils and
oppressions by which the kingdom was reduced to a state the most deplorable, and
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to which it had so long indignantly submitted'.187 To Thomas Paine, after all, the
National Assembly could be excused for its departure from the ancient course, which,
he insisted, proved an essentially 'bad one'.188
Burke had made further attacks on the National Assembly. First, he declared, the
Assembly in making a revolution had obviously deviated from the original instructions
of the people who seemed to desire no more than reform. He was persuaded that all
the proposals set out in these instructions had run counter to what formed the
'fundamental parts of their Revolution'.189 Secondly, the procedure through which the
National Assembly took over the supreme authority was also regarded as radically
defective: They do not,' he wrote, 'hold the authority they exercised under any
constitutional law of the state.' The National Assembly, in his opinion, had merely
availed itself of the national crisis to seize power in the state.190
It was indeed true, respecting the first charge, that the National Assembly had
failed to follow the literal instructions of its constituents. Samuel Parr was ready to
admit that the delegates of the people had exceeded the limits of their original
commission. This excess, however, was necessary, because, he argued, if the original
instructions were to be strictly observed, these delegates would never be able
efficiently to discharge 'all of the momentous duties for which they were appointed'.191
To Thomas Christie, on the other hand, this alleged abuse of trust was rather in
appearance than in reality:
Every man of sense must see at first view, that their constituents
could not forsee, any more than themselves, what it would be requisite
to grant, or what the new and arduous scene they were going into
might render necessary for them to do. If the Assembly departed from
the tetter, they preserved the spirit of their instructions. They were to
act for the best and they did so. Their constituents pointed out all that
occurred to them at the times as good, and left them, as to the rest, to
be instructed by circumstances.
He insisted that what the National Assembly had since undertaken had in no sense
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violated the common goal of the people, who, it could be justly asserted, must have
intended their representatives 'to do what they found necessary, to rectify abuses, and
give France a free, regular, and fixed constitution'.192 In truth, Capel Lofft further
remarked, the original letter that summoned the States General had expressed an
explicit intention to entrust the delegates with a 'general power' to propose, advise
and consent to everything that might concern the needs of the nation.193 As Catharine
Macaulay put it:
Whatever might have been held out as the ostensible object of the
people in their demand for the meeting of their representatives, it
certainly was intended by them to use their power, when thus vested
with a legitmate form, and endued with a capacity of legislation, not
only to the reformation of abuses, but to the regeneration of their
constitution.
She was in no doubt that the National Assembly had been invested with 'the trust of
legislation, in the highest sense of the word'.194 They had taken on themselves a
mission which, as events developed, the original instructions were not sufficient
to direct.
The National Assembly's assumption of Supreme power, at length, could not be
properly deemed as usurpation. If its authority, as Burke claimed, had not been held
through formal constitutional procedure, it was mainly due to the necessity of the day.
The States General, James Mackintosh pointed out, had been originally convened
under existing laws as an ordinary legislature summoned to propose reforms, only to
be transformed by many unexpected events into a national assembly assuming the
supreme power to mould a new government. Ever since the Parisian revolt and the
defection of the army, the old government had been totally paralysed, with its
authority reduced to mere formality. From the nature of things, hence, the power of
the state devolved on the National Assembly: 'Every other species of authority was
annihilated by popular acts, but that of the States General. On them, therefore,
devolved the duty of exercising their unlimited trust, according to their best views of
general interest.' In Mackintosh's opinion, the lack of legal form in this conveyance of
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power would not at all nullify the authority of the National Assembly. Great
revolutions were always moments that proved too immense for technical legal
formality; and all the sanction that could be expected on such occasions was the
'voice of the people': The authority of the Assembly was then first conferred on it by
Public confidence,' Mackintosh went on, 'and its acts have been since ratified by public
approbation.''95 Thomas Christie also tried to defend the authority of the Assembly on
the same plea. At the start, the French legislators had met, not as the National
Assembly to mould a new constitution, but merely as the States General to propose
reforms. As the national crisis deepened, however, the course of events became
radicalised:
What was to be done in such a crisis? The executive power had
yielded. . . Things had returned to the state of nature - all the springs
of government were broken. There was but one way to prevent
universal anarchy: that was for the States General to declare themselves
a National Assembly - to assume the supreme power, not for the sake
of governing, or rather tyrannizing over the people. . . but for the sake
of forming to the people a just and equal Constitution, by which. . . their
nation should hereafter be governed.
The National Assembly, hence, was completely justified in its assumption, and the use
it had made, of state authority. It had, after all, received both the tacit consent and
open approbation of the nation as a whole.'96 From the view of contract theory, in
fine, Thomas Paine was to represent the Assembly as embodying the 'personal social
compact' of the French people. It stood for the nation 'in its original character' and
was therefore possessed of the supreme power to form a constitution.'97
VI
We shall conclude our discussion on the British radicals' defence of the French
Revolution with a survey of their opinions about the new order set up in France.
Before the new system was established, the National Assembly had undertaken, first
of all, to dismantle the old establishments. A most conspicuous landmark to be swept
away, without doubt, was the aristocratic order. The French nobility, George Rous
claimed, had composed an army of 'political Janisaries' that supported the
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monarchy.198 In France, James Mackintosh observed, the noblesse were 'a tribe of 200,
000' who formed themselves into a separate caste insulated from the rest of society.
From sentiments, interests and habits, this order of men were naturally devoted to,
and became utterly dependent on, the monarch. With privileged status, moreover, they
had monopolised almost all the rewards and offices of the state, whereas the common
people were reduced to 'political helotisnrl. Like other feudal institutions, the nobility
of France were tainted with a spirit of despotism which rendered them utterly unfit for
a free system.199 According to Sir Brooke Boothby, the French noblesse always
supported the hateful principle of arbitrary government and had become the declared
and determined enemies of liberty.200 Though servile to the throne, they were ever
imperious to the people: 'there was in the French Nobility,' one author claimed,
'something too much of pride, something too much of distance in conduct towards
other man, and too exalted ideas of their own pre-eminence.'201 In William Belsham's
eyes, the noblesse were no better than a gang of privileged oppressors and tyrants.202
They had always, Henry Mackenzie went on, held their people in a vassalage
intolerably oppressive.203 In them, another added, the nation was to find many 'petty
tyrants': 'their hauteur, their extortions and severity had rendered them odious to the
people, and their dispositions dangerous to freedom.'204 Thus, the Political
Correspondence declared:
the Nobles in general had not only rendered their order detestable
by arrogance and injustice, but had proved by their claim of exclusive
privileges, at the meeting of the States, and by their ostentation of
contempt towards the Tiers Etat that no liberal form of government
could be carried on while titles were suffered to exist.205
Most radical writers, hence, argued in support of their immediate and total
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suppression. The aristocracy of France was hostile to freedom and unfavourable to
reform. They proved utterly incapable of being accommodated into the new order
which the Revolution aimed to establish: 'But in France,' it was asserted,
the interest and prejudices of this order were so rooted in favour
of that partial consequence which it enjoyed at the expence of the state,
that there was no means of gaining such restrictions as liberty and
policy required, without levelling the rank to the ordinary condition of
life, and obliterating every mark of distinction.206
In fine, Sir Brooke Boothby emphasised, the abolition of this obnoxious order came to
be 'an essential point, a sine qua nonxo a free constitution under any form'.207
The National Assembly, next, had moved on to restructure the Galiican Church,
which would, it was claimed, need a radical reform in order for it to be integrated into
the new order of the Revolution. 'I have no doubt,' George Rous declared, 'that the
fabric of the Church establishment of France was adverse to public freedom, and that
to new model it was a duty incumbent on the National Assembly.'208 The most striking
aspect in this ecclesiastical reform was the nationalisation of church property, a
measure actuated by the financial crisis of the state. In opposition to Burke's
argument, the radical writers generally asserted that the nation had the right to
retrench for public purposes the revenue of the church, which, in their opinion, should
be deemed, not as ordinary private property which was inalienable, but as a public
pension granted for ecclesiastical services and thus resumable upon national
exigencies.209 The situation of France on the eve of the Revolution, further, seemed
also to render such a policy unavoidable. France was then a state where the
government was on the brink of financial bankruptcy while the church had amassed a
great deal of property. The excess of wealth in the church had not only produced
corruption among the clergy themselves, but had become destructive to industry,
harmful to the state and utterly incompatible with freedom. 'Every consideration of
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religion, justice and national advantage', therefore, 'pointed at the superfluous property
of the Church, as the national relief to the disordered finances of the State'.210 As for
the reforms within the Gallican church itself, the initial measures introduced were
mainly institutional. It was proposed, among other reforms, to rationalise the provision
for the clergy, to prohibit pluralities and enforce the rule of residence, to make clerical
offices elective, to dissolve monastic institutions, and to reject the supremacy of
Rome. 'No change, however,' William Belsham stressed, 'was made or even attempted
in the doctrinal articles of the church.'2" The merits of the reformed church were
widely acclaimed. In many respects, Benjamin Flower claimed, it seemed to excel over
the old establishment. First, the new church restored to the people the right to elect
their own pastors so that their spiritual concerns could be trusted to men with
genuine religious convictions; second, the plan to provide for the clergy with state
revenues would relieve the people from burdensome tithes; third, the more equal
incomes for the clergy would secure to all of them a decent living without being
excessive; fourth, the ban of pluralities and non-residence would make ministers more
attentive to their religious duties; and fifth, toleration had also been enlarged to
promote the freedom of religion.212 This last effort to establish the universal right of
conscience, in particular, was to win general admiration from British radicals.213 The
great act of toleration, Benjamin Bousfield praised,
will operate more to reclaim the morals of the people, to promote
Christianity, and to procure respect for all religious establishments, than
all the denunciations of vengeance, which, for many centuries before,
had been bellowed from the pulpit of intolerant bigotry. - This will give
respect and stability to their government - introduce wealth, extend the
commerce of their country.214
James Mackintosh, hence, felt no sorrow at the downfall of the old Gallican Church,
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which he believed had already degenerated into a corporation adverse to freedom.2'5
In contrast, Benjamin Flower claimed, the reformed church appeared more
recommendable: The church of France is now so far reformed, that it rivals all the
other churches of Europe: not in splendour and riches, but what is infinitely better, in
its conformity to the church in the earfier ages of Christianity.'2'6
The ancient boundaries of the French provincial divisions, at last, were also
smashed, and the whole was to be reorganised, from a loosely connected feudal
monarchy, into a compactly unified modern state. Despite its appearance as a simple
monarchy, James Mackintosh claimed, the old kingdom of France had never been truly
integrated:
France was, under the ancient Government, a union of Provinces
acquired at various times, and on different conditions, differing in
constitution, laws, language, manners, privileges, jurisdiction, and
revenue. It had the exterior of a simple Monarchy, but it was in reality
an aggregate of independent States. The Monarchy was in one place
King of Navarre, in another Duke of Britanny, in a third Count of
Provence, in a fourth Dauphine of Vienne. Under these various
denominations, he possessed, at least nominally, different degrees of
power, and he certainly exercised it under different forms. - The mass
composed of these heterogeneous and discordant elements, was held
together by the compressing force of despotism. When that
compression was withdrawn, the provinces must have resumed their
ancient independence, perhaps in a form more absolute than as
members of a federative Republic.
The feudal structure of the French monarchy, thus, became a great impediment
preventing France from developing a single national identity, since every thing then
'tended to inspire provincial, and to extinguish national patriotism'.2'7 Catharine
Macaulay pointed out that the various provinces, after their annexations to the French
throne, had still retained their own laws and customs which were apt to rekindle
those local prejudices and provincial jealousies previously prevalent in the kingdom.2'8
The old provinces could all claim their diverse local and immemorial exemptions and
privileges, which, William Belsham insisted, could benefit themselves little only to
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jeopardise the interest of the whole community. These feudal remains, indeed, had
formed an effectual bar to the complete coalescence and consolidation of France into
one regular and well compacted whole: 'It was one of the first and greatest object
therefore,' he continued,
of the National Assembly to abolish for ever these pernicious
exemptions, privileges, and feudal rights, the remains of a barbarous and
Gothic policy, and to establish a system of perfect equalization and
uniformity; a system of whole energy should pervade alike all the
classes of the community, and all the dependencies of the empire.219
In sum, Thomas Christie emphasised, the extent and limits of the French provinces
had all been settled by chance and caprice without regard to convenience and utility.
They could serve no valuable purpose but to keep up the 'old feudal ideas'. The
National Assembly, then, was right to abolish these old provincial privileges,
jurisdictions and peculiarities, and to draw up a new and more equal division
congenial to the spirit of the Revolution.220
Upon the ruin of the ancien regime was to be established a new order. The basic
principle that framed the new constitution of France, one author stressed, was the
doctrine of the rights of man.221 The French people, Thomas Paine announced, were
attempting to set up a system embodying the principles of the rights of man and the
authority of the people, such as were publicly instituted in the Declaration of the
Rights of Men and Citizens222 The legislators of France, James Mackintosh claimed,
were actuated by the grand theory that the object of a legitimate government
consisted in the 'assertion and protection of the NATURAL RIGFITS OF MAN'. It was
this ideological framework that countenanced the new body politic.223
In speaking of form, however, the initial change in the political system of France,
at first glance, might not appear so drastic. During the early stage of the Revolution,
at least, the French had not contemplated establishing a republican order. The National
Assembly, Thomas Christie noted, had not at once abolished the monarchical part of
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their government: They preserved the ancient form of Government, but corrected its
abuses; they kept their King, but deprived him of the power of doing evil.'224 Another
writer was baffled at how to name such a political system. He tended to deem it as a
'mixed' government, which was made up of a limited monarchy and a what he called
'trimocracy'. The latter, different from simple democracy, proposed to confer political
rights on those only who paid tax or had an income: 'the democracy respects person
the trimocracy person and property.'22* To William Belsham, indeed, the French
constitution was not absolutely and perfectly novel. It was, none the less, noticed that
the general plan of the new government was to be based on the principle of the
separation of powers. From this angle, he suggested, the entire system could be
compared to the British Constitution: The grand contour, or outline, is evidently
copied from the constitution of England, to which, in the separation of executive,
legislative, and judicial powers, that most important of all axioms of polity, it bears an
intimate resemblance.'226 On the whole, James Mackintosh stressed, the French
Revolution had ushered in a constitution which would lodge the legislative right in the
representatives of the people, the executive authority in an hereditary first magistrate,
and the judicial power in the personally elected judges 'unconnected either with the
Legislature or with the executive Magistrate'.227
The executive power of the state would be placed in the king, who was to assume
a role quite different from the old one. The king of France was formerly the sovereign
authority in the nation. The new constitution, Thomas Paine observed, had
distinguished the king from the sovereign: 'It considers the station of King as official
and places Sovereignty in the nation.'228 Such an arrangement clearly reflected the
ideological stance of the Revolution: the principle of popular sovereignty. 'It is a most
essential part of the French Constitution,' Thomas Christie declared,
that all power emanates from the People; and that ultimately and
in the last resort, sovereignty resides in the Nation, The King himself is
the creature of the Constitution; he is the delegate of the majority of
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the Nation.229
Within this framework, Benjamin Flower claimed, the king of France became merely
'the representative of the people, entrusted with the supreme executive power, for
their benefit'. He would, in fact, turn out to be more like the king of Britain: The
royalty is delegated, hereditarily, to the race on the throne. The person of the king is
sacred and inviolable. He reigns by the law, and it is in the name of the law he
requires obedience.'230 A monarch of this nature, of course, could not enjoy as much
power as it had before. To prevent the future revival of monarchical despotism,
Francis Stone asserted, the new constitution had set to curtail the king's authority in
many respects.23' All those prerogatives were abrogated, The Political Crisis noted, the
possession of which would be dangerous to the liberty and interest of the subject.232
These included notably the authority of legislation, the right of taxation, and the power
of war and peace. It might be complained that the crown seemed to have been left
with too little power. Joseph Priestley, nevertheless, warned that 'kingly power'
is a plant which, having once taken root, is very apt to grow too
luxuriant; and this though lopped, may sprout again. As the French
kings had gradually acquired, and grossly abused, their power, it is not
to be wondered at, if, in the first instance, the Assembly should have
reduced it too low.233
After all, Catharine Macaulay remarked, the limitations set on the crown had been
mostly necessitated by the then state of the nation, and would be still 'inseparable to
the security of the democracy'.234
Some writers argued, on the other hand, that the authority of the French king,
even after such an abridgement, still remained too powerful. Against Burke's
declamation, Thomas Christie asserted that the throne of France in fact had not lost
so much power. The monarch would retain the respect of the people, and the dignity
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of his condition; and he would lose nothing of his just and lawful prerogatives. 'He is
still the Chief of the State, the Supreme Head of the Empire - the Head of the
executive, and, conjointly with the Legislative Body, the Delegate of the legislative
power.'235 In Mackintosh's opinion, the power a king of France would reserve was
certainly as much as pure theory could allow to an executive magistrate.236 Thus,
William Belsham recounted:
Though the constitutional authority of the Kings of France is
reduced somewhat below the level of the authority of the Kings of
England, it is still greatly superior to that with which the Kings of
Sweden were invested previous to the Revolution in that country: and to
that which the Kings of Poland at this day possess. The King of France
is the sole depository of the executive power. He is the supreme head
of the general administration of the kingdom. He sanctions or rejects
the acts of the legislative body. He is the supreme chief of the army
and the navy. The external safety of the state, and the conservation of
its rights and privileges are confided to him. He disposes at his pleasure
of the great offices of state. He appoints ambassadors to foreign courts.
He nominates the military and naval commanders, the tribunitial and
tresorial commissioners. And to maintain the dignity and splendor of the
crown, he has a civil list revenue of 1, 250, 000. I. per annum
These could still constitute a 'mighty aggregate of power, wealth, and dignity'; and a
monarch with an authority of this extent, indeed, would remain able to turn into a
'very worst species of despotism'.237 The throne of France, in short, was by no means
reduced to a mere royal nonentity: 'In forming a new constitution,' thus one author
wrote to a member of the National Assembly,
you did not destroy his prerogative, but only extracted the sting -
you gave him every power calculated for the benefit, though none that
he could employ to the injury of the state; like frugal directors of the
public treasure, you abridged his enormous allowances, but left enough
to support the true and amiable splendour of royalty.
There was no doubt that the king had lost not a little in the Revolution, 'but purely in
proportion he [still] possessed too muctl23B
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The National Assembly had also ventured to remould their old judicial system. The
present judiciary of France had come into existence long before the feudal era and
had become almost out of tune with the liberal spirit of the new age. Catharine
Macaulay, attacking the French legal system, pointed out that
a system of jurisprudence formed by ignorant barbarians, from
codes of law adapted to support the despotic tyranny of the Roman
Emperors, could not be in unison with the sentiments of an enlightened
people, or capable of supporting the principles of a free government.
It was an institution which was formed under the influence of the rankest prejudices
and which, therefore, could not be fit for administering laws that were 'dictated by the
humane spirit of an enlightened age'.239 Moreover, James Mackintosh observed, these
judicial establishments had for years accumulated numerous abuses. The offices of
justice became openly purchaseable and the judges generally regarded the 'right of
dispensing justice as a marketable commodity'. The ancient judicature of France, that
is, had failed to maintain equitable laws, and it could hardly be compatible with a free
government.240 To sum up, one tract stressed, the obscurity of the ancient laws, and
the venality of legal offices, had rendered the administration of justice in France ever
precarious. It called for the abrogation of the old system and the formation of a new
one.24'
One important step in the legal reform was the abolition of the 'parlements'. The
French parlements - the high courts of justice of the country - had formed
themselves into a corporation of 'Judiciary Aristocracy' whose spirit and claims, James
Mackintosh wrote, were not consonant with liberty: They had imbibed a spirit
congenial to the authority under which they had acted, and suitable to the arbitrary
genius of the laws which they had dispensed.'242 In fact, it was observed, the offices of
the parlements had virtually become the favourite stepladder for those social upstarts
aspiring to enter the noble order. These people, despite their lack of legal
qualifications, were allowed, through purchase, into those judicial situations which
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were to 'decide on the property, the honour, and the lives of their fellow-citizens'.243
Furthermore, the parlements, as independent judicatures, had indeed in the past
served as effective bulwarks against the inroads of arbitrary will. With the
establishment of a democratic order, however, their functions in this aspect had
become redundant. If the parlements could previously form some checks upon the
monarchical power, Catharine Macaulay claimed, there was no reason for them, after
the Revolution, to continue their control over the supreme authority of the people.244
As Mackintosh declared:
The usurped authority of the Parliaments formed, it is true, some
bulwarks against the caprice of the Court. But when the abuse is
destroyed, why preserve the remedial eviP ... To such establishments,
let us pay the tribute of gratitude for past benefit; but when their utility
no longer exists, let them be cannonized by death, that their admirers
may be indulged in all the plenitude of posthumous veneration.245
Since the National Assembly had already taken over the function of supervision,
another author agreed, the parlements became dispensable: The offices of Parliaments
were extinct, and therefore it was necessary they should be dissolved'.246
The object of the legal reform was to set up an independent judicial system able
to dispense justice with equity. In this respect, William Belsham noted, the National
Assembly had decreed in principle that the judicial power should be forever separated
from the legislative and executive authorities. It proceeded to determine that the jury
should be instituted in criminal courts, that justice should be gratuitously administered
to the people, and that the office of judge should be no longer purchaseable or
hereditary.247 Samuel Parr recommended the French decision to simplify the 'intricate,
uncouth, and ponderous jurisprudence', to abolish the lettre de cachet and to mitigate
the forms of punishment.248 On the other hand, there were also critical opinions.
James Mackintosh, for instance, had great doubt about the venture of the Assembly to
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render the code of law sufficiently simple and readily intelligible, intending thereby to
abolish professional lawyers. 'Of all the attempts of the Assembly, the complicated
relations of civilized society seem to render this most problematical.'249 Capel Lofft, in
addition, opposed the move to institute the popular, and periodical, election of judges.
The experience and independence requisite for the office of justice would certainly
militate against such a novel experiment.250
The legislative authority, no doubt, was to become the centre of politics under the
new order. The French constitution vested this power in a body of representatives
originating, Thomas Paine claimed, 'in and from the people by election, as an inherent
right'.25' The complicated system of representation which constituted this legislature,
however, had turned out to be controversial. The National Assembly, first of all,
planned to base the representation of the nation upon a combination of the three
principles of population, territory, and contribution. Such a bizarre contrivance had
met quite mixed responses. James Mackintosh, on the one hand, frankly opposed
elements like territory and contribution to be represented. Territorial or financial
representation, he claimed, was the monstrous relic of ancient prejudice: 'Land or
money cannot be represented. Man only can be represented, and population alone
ought to regulate the number of Representatives which any district delegates.'252
Based on the principle of natural rights, Francis Stone also argued that only population
could form the proper basis of the representation of a nation.253 Some critics, on the
other hand, came to its defence. Benjamin Flower had voiced against James
Mackintosh's view, arguing that, though land or money might not be represented, their
possessors could be. People who owned greater property, or paid more taxes, ought
to have their corresponding share of influence in politics. A representation combining
the basis of population together with those of territory and contribution, he asserted,
was consonant with the purest principle of justice and equity.254 It could form a
system that, another claimed, would have the greatest regard to equality.255 Thomas
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Christie was convinced that inequality would never take place in such a contrivance:
'It is fortified even against the changes of events, and the destructive hand of time.'
Indeed, he went on, this plan revealed the 'originality and correctness' of the National
Assembly in 'their ideas of political economy'.256 To William Belsham, in fine, the
combination of these principles in one election would be the most effectual method
that human wisdom could work out to secure the aim of representation: 'the liberty
and happiness of the community'.257
The gradation of elections won a more favourable reception Francis Stone, it was
true, had accused the National Assembly of having confused the principle of simplicity
by bringing in a strange and perplexed hierarchy of representations. He agreed with
Burke that the insertion of two intermediate elections would so distance the primary
elector from his legislator that the connection between the one as constituent and the
other as representative would be broken off and that all the professed responsibility in
the latter would become pointless.258 James Mackintosh, on the contrary, was to
as
welcome the hierarchy of elections/a master-piece of legislative wisdom'. He had,
first of all, tried to play down the question of responsibility at issue. No organised
system, hitherto, had been able to prevent the possible 'variance between the popular
and the representative will':
Responsibility, strictly and rigorously speaking, it can rarely admit,
for the secrets of political fraud are so impenetrable, and the line which
separates corrupt decision from erroneous judgment so indiscernibly
minute, that the cases where the Deputies could be made properly
responsible are too few to be named as exceptions. Their dismission is
all the punishment that can be inflicted, and all the best Constitution
can attain is a high probability of unison between the constituent and
his deputy.
The French system of representation seemed able to answer this purpose. In fact, he
continued, the hierarchy of representation had been obtruded on France by necessity.
It was introduced as a means to prevent tumults, which were apt to happen in popular
governments:
Had they rejected it, they had only the alternative of tumultuous
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electoral Assemblies, or a tumultuous Legislature. If the primary
electoral Assemblies were to be so divided as to avoid tumult, their
deputies would be so numerous as to make the National Assembly a
mob. If the number of electoral Assemblies were reduced according to
the number of deputies that ought to constitute the Legislature, each of
them would be numerous enough, on the othe hand, to be also a mob.
From a political view, Mackintosh stressed, the gradation of elections must be deemed
as a grand improvement on the representative government.259 It was calculated,
William Belsham echoed, to infuse animation and energy into every corner of the
political system and, meanwhile, to preclude the kind of tumult and excess that were
notorious in English elections.260 It could, another writer added, give the people 'the
satisfaction of a suffrage while the dignity and fitness of delegates is secured'.261
The qualification of property for the right of suffrage, on the other hand, was to
call forth many criticisms. Francis Stone, for one, contended against property being
set up as a qualification for election, which, he asserted, belonged to personal right in
which property should not interfere at all:
The right of suffrage in the choice of legislators being merely a
personal right, totally independent of the plus or minus of property, and
consequently the poorest man's right equal with the richest, every man
arrived at the age of twenty-one years, at least, should have been
invested with the full enjoyment and exercise of it.
Adhering to the tenet of natural equality. Stone argued that by imposing tax
restrictions the National Assembly had 'swerved from their wise and just principle of
the equalization of all men'.262 James Mackintosh, by conviction, opposed any kind of
disqualification: 'I regard all disfranchisement as equally unjust in its principle,
destructive in its example, and impotent for its pretended purpose.' It would prove
inefficient and preposterous, he agreed with Burke, that the French constitution
disfranchised all citizens who could not pay direct contributions: 'Nothing can be more
evident than its inefficacy for any purpose but the display of inconsistency and the
259
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violation of justice.'263 Indeed, Capel Lofft asserted, the qualifications the French
constitution set for the elective right would be too small to secure the independence
of electors, but strong enough to infringe the principle which justly regarded the
choice of a representative as 'a Right attached to the person of the Citizen, not to his
property'. There was further danger to be apprehended. Such qualifications, however
slight, if once admitted into the constitution, he warned, would 'furnish a Basis for
more and more restraints'.264 Of course, not all radical writers were inclined to oppose
the restriction of elective right. Catharine Macaulay, surprisingly, suggested that those
who lived on the alms of society could not be entitled to enjoy political rights. She
supported the decision of the National Assembly to limit the right of suffrage 'to every
man who is not a paupef\ This plan, in theory at least, promises to unite the highest
degree of freedom with the highest degree of order.' It would be plausible in its
appearance and 'exactly agreeing with the rights of the citizens in the strictest sense
of the word'.265 Benjamin Flower admitted that the qualifications on the right of
election were not in line with the principles of the Revolution. None the less, he
indicated, the present state of France might not yet be ripe for universal suffrage: 'I
confess,' he claimed,
that rendering any pecuniary qualification absolutely necessary, is
seemingly contradictory to the declaration of rights; but the warmest
friend of that declaration must confess, that the utmost care is requisite,
in restoring to mankind rights which for a considerable length of time,
they have not enjoyed, and which require to be understood in
proportion as they are brought into exercise.
It would not be prudent all of a sudden to make the right of election universal while
the majority of the nation was yet in ignorance. Fie was confident, however, that the
people of France, once having become enlightened enough, would be able to assert
this right: 'Should the passive citizens of France, at any future period, demand the
exercise of those rights possessed by their fellow citizens, I trust their demand will
263
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not long be resisted.'266 For James Mackintosh, this abuse of disfranchisement was
certain to be merely short-lived. He predicted that the spirit of reason and liberty,
which had so far scored such mighty victories, would soon overcome 'this puny foe'
and that the right of suffrage would, in due course, become universal.267
To the critics of Burke, generally speaking, the new order introduced into France
was a remarkable achievement of the Revolution. Thomas Paine, for instance,
applauded the French constitution for achieving a rational order of things: The
principles harmonize with the forms, and both with their origin.' Its form grew out of
the principles of the Revolution and would work, in return, for their perpetuation.268
The political system set up in France, George Rous claimed, was a noble edifice
erected for the accommodation of public liberty.269 It was founded upon the equitable
principle of fraternal union, aiming to wipe out all those tyrannous distinctions that
had kept the nation in slavery.270 For Benjamin Flower, the French constitution
promised to establish a system
that levels at once the corrupt prejudices with which the world has
long been overcast; which annihilates despotism; which raises the
depressed part of mankind; which breaks the fetters of slavery, both
civil and ecclesiastical; which renounces those horrid principles of
action that have made nearly one half of the world at war with the
other; which has purified the church from those corrupt innovations that
infested it for more than a thousand years past.271
William Belsham, above all, was to compare this new order, in glory, with ancient
Athens: The government of France,' he declared, 'like that of Athens, as described by
Pericles, may now with a noble pride, boast "that it is popular, because the end of it is
the happiness of the people or nation, and not that of a few individuals".' It would
prove favourable to the liberty and happiness, he added, not only of the French nation,
but also of the world at large.272
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These acclamations notwithstanding, the system established in the wake of the
Revolution, in the eyes of its supporters, was by no means complete or perfect. One
writer claimed that people might be highly pleased with the Revolution as a whole
without endorsing every aspect of the new order. He would fain allow that some of its
measures were likely to be inconvenient while the effects of others doubtful.273 William
Cuninghame took care not to claim perfection for the French constitution. It was, he
admitted, undoubtedly defective and many things in it should still be mended.274 Indeed,
Benjamin Bousfield asserted:
Much has been done, and much certainly remains to be done. - It
could not be the work of a day to reform the monstrous abuses of ages
- where every object of good government was perverted, where every
department of state was corrupt.275
The French constitution, another added, was the work of men and must, hence, ever
be susceptible to errors. Defective as it might be, however, what was important was
that avenues were not closed for further reform and melioration as experience might
suggest, until the whole could be brought to the zenith of improvement and
perfection.276 Most supporters of the Revolution seemed disposed to endorse such an
optimistic view. There were, no doubt, flaws in the new system of France, but,
Charles-Jean-Francoise Depont assured Burke, only time, experience and reflection
were able to provide proper correctives.277 'If any defects should be discovered in the
new constitution of France,' Joseph Towers claimed confidently,
there is so much information, knowledge, and good sense, diffused
throughout that nation, that. . . these defects will be rectified, and such
a constitution finally established, as will in an eminent degree promote
the freedom and happiness of the people.278
The French people, Henry Mackenzie echoed, would be able to overcome their
difficulties and succeed, at last, in 'establishing, though not a perfect or an
273
a. B„ Letters on the Character and Writings of Mr. Burke, p. 19,
274
Cuninghame, The Rights of Kings P 40.
275 Bousfield, Observations on the Rt. Hon. Edmund Burke's Pamphlet p 25
276 Strictures on the Letter of the Rt. Hon. Mr. Burke, pp. 19-20.
277 m, Depont, An Answer to the Ref/ectionsof the Rt. Hon. Edmund Burke, p. 4
278 Towers, Thoughts on the Commencement of a New Parliament pp 122-3.
307
unexceptionable government, one at least more consonant to the natural rights . . .
and more friendly to the happiness of man'.279 For the moment, another writer
admonished, people ought to greet a change that was on the whole a great blessing,
and trust 'to time, and to further opportunity, for improving what was imperfectly
finished'.280
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chapter 8
britain and the need for reform
'Of all nations in Europe,' Thomas Paine announced, 'there is none so much
interested in the French Revolution as England.'1 The British reformers, in particular,
had been much agitated. Indeed, the French Revolution was to give new inspiration,
and to bring new momentum, to the reform movement in Britain, which had lain
dormant ever since the mid-1780s. The spectacle of France achieving liberty was a
prospect that was bound to rekindle the hopes of the British radicals, who were
already longing for change. 'I rejoiced in the hope,' David Williams declared, '. . . that
England, stimulated by general emulation, might be induced to revise its government,
correct its errors, and remove its inconveniences.'2 It was from this perspective, in
fact, that their enthusiasm for the revolution in a neighbouring country should be
properly understood.3
i
The astonishing revolution effected in France, William Belsham observed, had
excited in the minds of many people in Britain a spirit of political examination and
enquiry.4 It inspired them to reflect on the present state of Britain. The French
revolution,' Benjamin Flower claimed, 'compels us to consider our situation, and forces
us to confess, that notwithstanding the collected wisdom of ages, which is so much
boasted, there is still something materially wanting for our security.'5 Richard Price
was among the first to catch the implication of the occurrences in France for Britain.
In the Revolution Sermon of 4 November 1789, he hailed the French Revolution as
ushering in a new era favourable 'to all exertion in the cause of public liberty'. Price
naturally focussed his discourse on the pressing issues facing Britain. Reviewing the
heritage of the Glorious Revolution, he claimed that the British people, though
achieving a great deal in 1688, had unfortunately not then done quite enough to
1
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provide for the 'secure and complete possession of the blessings of liberty', and that
their posterity, as a result, were during the following century to see their constitution
gradually sinking into abuses. It might be true that at present Britain had not yet
arrived at the last stage of national corruption and misery, but, he reminded his
audience, there remained much room for 'apprehension and alarm':
It is too evident that the state of this country is such as renders it
an object of concern and anxiety. It wants the grand security of public
liberty. Increasing luxury has multiplied abuses in it. A monstrous
weight of debt is crippling it. Vice and venality are bringing down upon
it God's displeasure. That spirit to which it owes its distinctions is
declining; and some late events seem to prove that it is becoming every
day more reconcileable to encroachments on the securities of its
liberties. It wants, therefore, your patriotic services.6
Price was by no means alone in sounding the tocsin about the approaching crisis of
Britain. Robert Hall, for instance, also warned that British liberty was at a critical
moment:
The present crisis, is in my apprehension, the fullest of terror and
danger, we have ever experienced. In the extension of excise laws, in
the erection of barracks, in the determined adherence to abuses,
displayed by parliament, in the desertion of pretended patriots, the
spread of arbitrary principles, the tame subdued spirit of the nation, we
behold the seeds of political ruin quickening into life. The securities of
liberty. . . have given way.
Indeed, he believed, those who contemplated the present state of Britain would be
'tempted to predict the speedy downfall of liberty'.7
The radical observers contended that Britain under the old order was never as
admirable as people had often thought it to be. One anonymous writer challenged
Burke's claim that the British nation had prospered under its 'old fashioned
constitution'. During the hundred years past, he pointed out, Britain had witnessed
revolutions and rebellions. It had run to frequent armaments and had thus built up
stupendous debts. Most serious of all, its people were to suffer repressive laws and
excessive impositions.8 Benjamin Flower was ready to admit that since the 1688
6
Price, A Discourse on the Love of Our Country, pp. 29, 34, 39-41.
7
Hail, An Apology for the Freedom of the Press pp 94. 104
8 Strictures on the Letter of the Rt. Hon. Mr. Burke, pp 162-5.
310
Revolution the people of Britain had indeed secured a degree of felicity unknown to
their ancestors. There could be no reason, however, to pretend that the nation had
already reached a state of bliss:
What has been the happiest of our situation? Have we not, for this
century past, been almost continually engaged in bloody and expensive
wars? Have we not an enormous national debt, and a load of taxes,
which press heavy upon the majority of the people?
He regretted that in the course of time Britain seemed to have gradually 'lost sight of
the best principles of government'.9 William Beisham was actually not so sure whether
the bulk of the community had enjoyed much more ease, comfort and happiness after
1688 than before. Observers were apt to marvel at the outward prosperity of Britain
without attending to the real state of her people. In truth, he contended, the political
order founded upon the Revolution Settlement had benefited only rich stockholders,
great traders and those who depended on the government:
All these different classes of men talk much and loudly of the
flourishing state of the kingdom. But those who are conversant with the
middle and lower ranks of the community, who have visited the
cottages, or rather the hovels of those stiled, in the language of
aristocratic insolence, 'A Swinish Multitude', are sensible of the fallacy of
this flattering, but fatal delusion.
The Revolution Settlement failed, in short, to bring many real advantages to the lower
orders of society.10 In Britain, John Oswald echoed, the rich few flourished, and rioted
in their enjoyments; but the great mass of the people were actually harassed and
oppressed.11 John Butler exclaimed: There are none richer, there are none poorer, than
the people of England.' The present system of Britain tended to award privileges to a
small minority who paid little regard to the general interest of the nation and who
sought to 'swell their property at the expence of the poor, or keep the nose of the
humble cottager to the grinding-stone'.12
The British people, there seemed little doubt, had suffered oppression and
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injustice. Christopher Wyvill pointed out that, despite her apparent prosperity, there
still existed many great and undeniable grievances in Britain: 'they are felt as evils;
they are resented as injuries.'13 Excessive taxation was the grievance perhaps the most
complained of. Robert Hall claimed that Britain had now accumulated a national debt,
and had consequently multiplied her taxes, to a degree 'unexampled in any other age
or country'.14 Since the 1688 Revolution, Mark Wilks declared, the British Government
had, within the span of 103 years, contracted a public debt up to 'the moderate
amount of TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY MILLIONS STIRLING'.15 The Hanoverian
succession, Thomas Paine emphasised, had engulfed Britain in destructive continental
politics, which were to occasion so enormous an increase in the national expenditure
that the people were forced to bear a heavy load of taxes.16 To defray her huge
expenditure, another author noted, taxation in Britain had soared exceedingly high, and
duties were unreasonably levied 'on not only what people eat and drink, but on their
windows, ... on their rides, and on their walks'.17 A British subject was often
compelled. Major John Scott observed,
under a severe penalty, to give to a collector an account of the
number of his carriages, his horses, his men and maid servants, and to
hold up an infant as a plea for the remission of a tax; to sign a
muster-roll of his wagons, his carts, and his windows.
The burden was enormous, partial and oppressive.18 Indeed, George Rous asserted,
impositions had become so widespread that every individual could feel its effect on
most of his expences.19 Thus, another writer complained: The importunate
tax-gatherer is never out of our houses, collecting money for the light of heaven, and
diving into our pockets for the last solitary shilling, while water and air remain the
almost only articles untaxed in the kingdom.'20 It was so notorious that, John Butler
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claimed, foreigners were pleased to call Britain 'the Island of Taxation,21
Two kinds of taxes were especially singled out for attack: the excise and the
window tax. The imposition of the excise was widely hated as the most oppressive of
all taxes. The excise, George Rous claimed, was an odious and detestable system
which rendered every one it touched 'a slave to the ruling Power'.22 The Political Crisis
believed it to be an assessment most apt to promote abuses:
the collectors of the revenue are licensed in committing the most
daring insults, under the pretence of doing their duty; while imposters,
and others, frowning at the wanton severity of the laws, think
themselves justified in carrying on an illicit trade, and in defrauding the
public.23
Under the mask of royal authority, John Butler complained, an exciseman was
empowered to burst people's doors, ransack their houses and commit whatever
depredations he pleased. He was authorised to stop any free subject on the king's
highway, examining his goods and seizing anything thought amenable to the excise;
'and on the smallest resistance, a pistol is clapped to his head, his brains blown out'.24
This could never be, Joseph Towers contended, a constitutional mode of taxation. It
ran counter to the true spirit of the British constitution and would prove utterly
inimical to British liberty:
the permanency of this mode of taxation, which has a tendency to
render the crown less dependent on the parliament; the power that it
gives to officers of the crown to enter men's houses at their pleasure,
and without any warrant from a civil magistrate; the great increase
which it occasions of revenue officers appointed by the crown; the
deprivation of the subject, in excise causes, of the right of trial by jury;
these. . . render the excise highly dangerous, and very inconsistent with
the genius of a free nation.25
The principle of liberty, John Butler insisted, could never exist in the measure of
excise: There is no liberty, there is no happiness, where the excise laws are in full
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force.'26 At the same time, the 'window tax' was seen as yet another outrageous
example of absurd and arbitrary impositions. The Political Crisis argued that to lay a
duty on windows was tantamount to compelling the people to pay for 'light' which
was a free gift of providence.27 Britain was perhaps the only country on earth, John
Butler exclaimed, where subjects were forced, against nature, to purchase light:
we are deprived the benefits of this great comforter of nature, and
not permitted to enjoy the radiant light of the Sun, the free gift of
heaven, without contributing to a tax that would hardly gain credit in
any country in Europe.
'Every additional hole in the wall of our houses,' he added, 'is a fresh source of
revenue to the king.'28 To Joseph Towers, in sum, this imposition was essentially a
bad tax. It would work to exclude light and air from the habitations of peopie, thus
undermining 'the healthfulness and the beauty of the edifices of a country'.29
The administration of justice in Britain became another main target of attack. It had
been current, Joel Barlow noted, for people, 'especially among Englishmen, to speak in
praise of the English jurisprudence, and to consider it as a model of perfection'. But,
he contended, this appeared to be a grossly mistaken impression.30 Robert Hall was
also convinced that the British legal system was very defective. It proved too corrupt
to serve as the proper rule of civil life: 'For want of gradual improvements, to enable
it to keep pace with the progress of society, the most useful operations of law are
clouded by fictions.'31 The penal laws, first of all, were condemned as being much too
severe and too inhuman. Joseph Towers complained that there were too many capital
punishments carried out in Britain, and that the penalties imposed were not always
properly proportioned to the nature of the offence and to the degree of guilt.32 'Our
penal laws punish with death the thief who steals a few pounds,' exclaimed Mary
Wollstonecraft. The laws seemed to regard the life of a deer more sacred than that of
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a man.33 The legal costs, meanwhile, were so high as to render justice barely
accessible to the common people, Robert Hall observed that a lawsuit in Britain often
incurred an expence 'as formidable as the penalty'. It could not, indeed, be fairly
claimed that justice could be the same for the poor as for the rich, whose opulence
must certainly place them in a more privileged position.34 The murky multiplicity of
legal procedure, Joel Barlow asserted, was the main factor which rendered legal
charges so high that few people dared to make the attempt: The courts are
effectually shut against the great body of the people, and justice as much out of their
reach as if no laws existed.'35 The corpus of the British laws, furthermore, were
themselves rather complicated, and even often contradictory, beyond the
comprehension of common folk. 'In England,' John Butler pointed out, 'we have laws
to contradict laws, laws to explain laws. The combustibles of our acts of Parliaments
are a heterogeneous compound of contradiction.' Its entire system was crowded with
ridiculous absurdities and seeming contradictions which could even confound the
judgements of the most learned judges and puzzle the skills of professional lawyers.36
'As to the general system of the laws of the land,' Joel Barlow wrote,
... no man in the kingdom knows them, and no man pretends to
know them. They are a fathomless abyss, that exceeds all human
faculties to sound. They are studied, not to be understood, but to be
disputed; not to give information, but to breed confusion.37
The laws in Britain, Robert Hall continued, had been piled into volumes, encumbered
with numerous precedents, and perplexed with dark intricacies: '[T]hey are often rather
a snare than a guide, and are a fruitful source of the injustice they are intended to
prevent.'38 In effect, John Butler added, the rapid increase of laws in Britain seemed
rather to signal 'the degeneracy of our liberty'.39
There remained many other grievances. The charters and corporations that existed
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throughout the British Isles were resented as, to couch it in Thomas Paine's terms, the
'badges of ancient oppression' and the 'instruments of injustice'. Paine set out his
attack on the corporations by confuting the old opinion that charters conferred rights:
'It is a perversion of terms to say, that a charter gives rights. It operates by a contrary
effect, that of taking rights away. Rights are inherent in all the inhabitants; but
charters, by annulling those rights in the majority, leave the right by exclusion in the
hands of a few.' Great evils had resulted from the institution of charters and
corporations. In England, Paine observed, every chartered town formed an aristocratic
monopoly in itself. Such establishments were able, first of all, to engross enormous
political influence through their exclusive electoral interests, since in many
corporations only council members were qualified to vote in elections. In fact, he
added, the House of Commons in Britain was, 'in a great measure, made up of
elections from these corporations'. The social and economic effects, meanwhile, were
no less unfavourable. The corporations hindered the movement of population and
thereby arrested the circulation of property. They were bound to block free trade, thus
preventing the nation from becoming prosperous. Charters and corporations, above all,
were utterly detrimental to the liberty of the people. In the chartered towns, Paine
complained, all the strangers would be driven out as if they were foreign enemies:
A native of England, under the operation of these charters and
corporations, cannot be said to be an Englishman in the full sense of
the word. He is not free of the nation. . . His rights are circumscribed to
the town, and, in some cases, to the parish of his birth; and all other
parts, though in his native land, are to him as a foreign country.
He was deprived of his natural rights and could not, therefore, be properly called a
freeman.40 The corporation, John Butler further pointed out, was originally instituted to
guard public property and hereditary liberty. It had, however, long degenerated into a
'rampallian tribe of interested engrossers and unjust detainers', tending rather to
trespass on the property and liberty which it was supposed to protect. In Britain, he
observed, charters were everywhere:
What is Great Britain in the greatness of her consequence but a
charter'd isle, and every city, town, borough, and cinque port, have their
charters also. These charters, though first granted as privileges and
marks of royal favours, are now reduced into systems of concealed
policy, and rendered so obnoxious to the liberty of the subject as to
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become a perfect nuisance to civil society.
The corporations were always governed in the most arbitrary manner. They formed
many little oligarchies where one part of the people was able to tyrannise over the
other. A chartered town was often a corrupt body composed of the 'the whole gang
of ragamuffin gentry'. In command of the city, these chartered tyrants, under the
colour of authority, came to 'usurp the privileges of their fellow citizens, and commit
the most daring acts of violence upon the freedom of those born to equal liberty as
themselves'. To Butler, in the end, the corporations appeared to be but many 'enlarged
prisons' where freedom had to be purchased and where the people suffered
oppression.41
The Game Laws constituted a major grievance to farmers in particular. In England,
Thomas Paine claimed, game was made the property of the higher orders.42 The Game
Laws, The Political Crisis observed, prohibited the peasants from catching birds that
hovered round their roofs, or killing beasts that ranged their fields: The beasts of the
fields, and the fowls of the air, were made for the service of man, and man has a
natural right to take them: but the law reserves them for the sport and luxury of the
Great.'43 There was a more destructive aspect to this regulation. Mary Wollstonecraft
pointed out that a poor farmer in Britain could do nothing to prevent his noble lord
from planting a decoy field near his meagre farm. 'Games devour the fruit of his
labour; but fine and imprisonment await him if he dare to kill any - or lift up his hand
to interrupt the pleasure of his lord.' For some very slight violations, many people had
been plunged into great misery.44 John Butler claimed that the Game Laws were
oppressions of the most abominable nature. They sacrificed public interest to the
private conveniences of a few individuals. Under such laws, no rustic labourer was
allowed either to enjoy the simple sport of the field or to reap the 'bounties of
Providence'. He could not even protect his crops from the devastation caused by the
pleasure of the noble 'sportman':
There comes the esquire, mounted on his steed, overleaps the
hedges, breaks down fences in pursuit of game; his spaniel and his
41
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pointer put to flight the herdsmen's flock, regardless what depredations
he commits while in pursuit of charming sport; and who shall dare to
interrupt the licenced pastime of this qualified sportsman while in
pursuit of hare, of pheasant, and of partridge, woodcock, snipe, or other
birds, for which a man more needy than himself, must pay a heavy fine,
or suffer long imprisonment.
Butler came to deem the Game Laws as the most mortal stab at British liberty. 'What
foreigner can envy the liberty of a British subject,' he wondered, 'when he is informed
that for shooting, or killing a bird. . . a man shall be cast into prison like a common
felon [?r5
Complaints were also raised against the notorious press-gang. To impress
soldiers, seamen and marines, Joseph Towers remarked, was a custom flagrantly
violating the spirit of the British constitution as well as the principles of justice and
humanity. It had proved cruel to those who were impressed on the one hand, and
expensive to the state on the other.46 Such a measure was bound to bring misery and
distress upon the lower orders of the society. Thomas Cooper observed:
The Labour of the poor Man, constitutes the whole of his Wealth,
and his domestic Connections almost the whole of his happiness. But
on a sudden, under the dubious authority of a Press Warrant, he is cut
off from his peaceful habitation and domestic Society, and forcibly
dragged on board the floating Prison of a Tender: he is impelled to
labour in the dreadful Service of murdering his fellow Creatures at the
command of his Superiors, and paid such scanty Wages. . . as the
niggardly System of Government Finance thinks fit to allow. His family
meanwhile, who look up to him for Comfort and Substance, ignorant of
his Misfortune, are anxiously expecting his wonted return; perhaps their
homely repast for the night depended on his earnings for the day; but
his usual hour of return to his family is gone by. . . The next or
succeeding day brings the mournful tidings of his destiny; and leaves
the widowed wife. . . to eke out a comfortless existence47
Pressed men would incur further social evils. Mary Wollstonecraft claimed that those
veterans who might be fortunate enough to return could find that it was not easy for
them, after long service, to readjust, both mentally and occupationally, to normal
civilian life: The vulgar have not the power of emptying their mind of the only ideas
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they imbibed whilst their hands were employed; they cannot quickly turn from one
kind of life to another. Pressing them entirely unhinges their minds; they require new
habits, and cannot return to their old occupations with their former readiness.'
Pressing had often resulted in their sinking into idleness, drunkenness, and a train of
other vices.48 To John Butler, indeed, the orders of impressing were but dreadful death
warrants for their innocent victims. The entire system seemed as cruel as the 'French
Bastile, or Spanish Inquisition'. It was pernicious to the liberty of the people and
'disgraceful to a Christian country'.49
To the Dissenters, at least, the Test and Corporation Acts caused an additional
grievance. These laws, one Dissenting country attorney declared, were founded in
injustice and oppression.50 Richard Price, in his sermon to the Revolution Society,
strongly protested against the imposition of such laws, which, he claimed, had
unjustly deprived of the right to civil and military offices all those who refused to
conform to the established church. He decried this proscription as one of the most
notorious instances of Britain's 'public iniquities'; 'For I cannot call by a gentler name,
laws which convert an ordinance appointed by our Saviour to commemorate his death,
into an instrument of oppressive policy.'51 The Test and Corporation Acts, Benjamin
Flower contended, had long imposed hardship on the Dissenters, who were by such
laws disqualified from even the meanest offices of trust or profit.52 Samuel Heywood,
likewise, regretted the injustice of a practice that laid a part of the people under
restraints for merely embracing opinions different from the established church;
opinions moreover which had not in the least prevented them from being good
subjects or faithful civil servants.53 In spite of his Anglican background, Christopher
Wyvill was much in sympathy with the suffering of the Dissenters. In England, he
claimed,
the Dissenters are ignominiously marked as men unfit to be
trusted with any honourable or advantageous office, or a share even in
48
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the Government of a Corporate Town: they are forbidden, . . to serve his
Country in any civil or military post for which his attainments fit him.
For over one hundred years, Dissenters had been compelled to acquiesce in silence
under the disgrace and disabilities of the Test Laws.54 At present, Robert Hall angrily
claimed, the Dissenters in Britain were always 'Exposed to pains and penalties,
excluded from all offices of trust, proscribed by the spirit of the present reign, [and]
menaced and insulted wherever they appeared'.55
Richard Price contended that the proscription imposed by the Test Laws was an
oppression that the Dissenters by no means deserved.56 First of all, another author
argued, the Dissenters had made equal contributions to the state, in which, therefore,
they had as much stake as other subjects. It would be, then, completely just for them
to claim equal rights.57 Joseph Priestley made a similar point:
Paying our full share to the public taxes, and having always
distinguished ourselves by our industry, in manufactures and commerce,
. . we thought it not unreasonable to request a right of admission. . . to
such advantages as arise from that flourishing state of the country to
which. . . we have eminently contributed.
People ought never to be barred from such advantages upon pure religious account.58
The Dissenters, moreover, were always loyal subjects. They had never, it was asserted,
held principles unfriendly to the civil constitution of Britain: 'No Dissenter is so mad,
or unwise, as to think of resisting the civil power; they would risk their lives in
support of it.'59 Samuel Heywood, referring to the evidence of history, insisted that the
Dissenters had been the staunchest defenders of British liberty: 'I will venture,' he
wrote,
to recall the attention. . . to a few historical facts. In the reign of
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Charles II. at the very time when the Test Act was passed, the
Dissenters were ranked among the zealous asserters of the Protestant
religion and the liberties of their country; they were then esteemed
sincere friends to the public peace in Church and State. . . From the
time of passing the Test Act till the abdication of the last unfortunate
prince of the House of Stuart, the Dissenters were not less
distinguished for their steady opposition to the tyrannical measures of
the Court, than since that time for their zealous attachment to the
constitution, as settled at the Revolution. . . From that great era, when
the rights of mankind were vindicated against a tyrant, and the people
of England dared to assert their freedom, to the present moment, not a
single instance can be pointed out, in which their loyalty to the
monarch on the throne, or their affection to the government, can be
justly called in question.60
Indeed, Christopher Wyvill claimed, even their repeated humiliations in their efforts to
repeal the Test Laws had not, it seemed, rendered them disaffected to the government
or disobedient to the laws.6' It was, then, imprudent to proscribe such a community of
people. In sum, one author put it: '[T]he Corporation and Test Acts, if defensible when
made, . . . become impolitic and unjust, in discriminating between equally good
subjects, and in stigmatizing Protestant Dissenters as unworthy of trust under a
government they have uniformly supported, and whose burthens they have equally
borne.'62 They infringed the just right, and damned the proper interest, of the
Dissenters.63
To the radicals, in the final analysis, the British nation was far from being free.
John Butler was indeed of the opinion that liberty in Britain had been 'upon the
decline'.6* Butler seemed to be but 'an obscure citizen' who had himself deeply
suffered the oppressions of an execrable local oligarchy.65 His observations, therefore,
could perhaps afford a grass-roots view of the reality of liberty in Britain. People were
always inclined to extol England as 'an island of Liberty, but, Butler claimed, his
experiences seemed to prove it to be far otherwise. In Britain, liberty was no more
than a 'phantom':
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we are supposed to have many privileges, but we only see them
as it were through a glass darkly, they were not perceptible to our
naked eyes, or any of our outward senses. We have laws and customs
among us, which are a disgrace to a free nation; the symptoms of
liberty are but faintly breathed, through the modem customs and
manners of our constitution.
To common subjects, that is, liberty could have no real existence: 'We have the empty
name of liberty, but not the actual enjoyment of it.' Furthermore, the term, 'liberty',
was often twisted to serve as the 'common substitute for oppression, slavery, taxation.
&c':
Every manoeuvre of government comes forward under the
protection of liberty. When the king declares war against any foreign
power, to enrich one class of subjects and impoverish the other, it is to
extend our liberty. When the minister imposes partial and oppressive
taxes, to feed the wanton extravagances of the state, it is to support
our liberty. . .
The perversion was such that 'every repugnancy to the word' seemed to be taken for
its 'true meaning'. Worse still, he noted, the deluded people of Britain were themselves
also so misled as always unwittingly to boast 'of liberty under the banners of slavery,
and freedom under the pangs of oppression'.66 If, indeed, there was liberty or freedom
in the British Isles, Butler claimed, it must exist merely in the upper classes. To the
great mass, little was left:
to attempt to prove that any liberty exists within the walls of the
humble cottager, or the dismal mansions of the labouring mechanic, is
like an astronomer proving an invisible eclipse of the sun, which cannot
be contradicted by those who have no eyes; and truly the liberty of a
poor subject is equal to an invisible eclipse, which cannot be discovered
by the naked eye.
Above all, even those meagre rights which a poor subject was allowed to enjoy under
the constitution would remain vulnerable to the 'arbitrary hand of self-created tyranny
and oppression'.67 Mary Wollstonecraft, at last, tried to deny the reality of British
liberty. In England, she declared, property was always more secure than liberty: 'the
liberty of an honest mechanic - his all - is often sacrificed to secure the property of
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the rich'. Thus, she exclaimed: 'Security of property! Behold, in a few words, the
definition of English liberty.'68
ii
It seems, then, obvious that Britain had never been such a free country as was
often claimed. There was little question in the mind of the radicals that the nation was
at present replete with oppression and injustice. To the reformers, moreover, all the
grievances complained of were by no means distempers of an occasional, or
individual, nature. The existence and perpetuation of such abuses, according to them,
appeared to signal that there were fundamental defects in the political system of
Britain. Thus, Thomas Paine observed: The defect lies in the system. The foundation
and the superstructure of the government is bad.'69 Their attentions however were
drawn, in the main, to the British constitution.
The reformers in Britain were generally of the opinion that, despite its claim to
longevity, the British constitution had long since fallen into decay. The political system
of Britain was excellent, John Butler claimed, when it was first established. Through a
series of changes, however, the edifice had gradually suffered dilapidation. It was
flagrantly 'violated by modern corruptions, and dwindling each day into the grossest
scenes of absurdity'.70 Francis Stone lamented the departure of the British constitution
'from its original beautiful simplicity'. While he adored the primordial purity of the
constitution, he found it hard to recommend 'those instances of its present abused
and very corrupt state'.7' The writer of A Letter to a Member of the National Assembly,
too, declared:
Though I have paid a just tribute to the English constitution, it
would be absurd to maintain an unqualified assertion of its excellence;
there are many excrescences that cling to the oak of British liberty, and
are nourished by its sap. You must be conscious that they consume what
would give additional vigour to the fruitful branches.72
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To William Belsham, the British constitution was excellent at the time of its
establishment in 1688, but since then corruptions and defects had arisen which were
bound to excite the indignation of many people. He called attention to the growing
influence of the crown, the radical defect in the representation of the nation, the
maintenance of a formidable standing army in peacetime, and the existence of 'a
second army of placemen and pensioners'.73 Robert Hall claimed that a stream of
abuses had silently tainted Britain with decay. It operated to render the theory of the
British constitution in its most important particulars 'a satire on the practice':
The theory provides the responsibility of ministers as a check to
the execution of ill designs; but in reality we behold the basest of the
tribe retreat from the ruin of their country, loaded with honours and
with spoils. Theory tells us the parliament is free and independent;
experience will correct the mistake by shewing its subservience to the
crown. We learn from the first, that the legislature is chosen by the
unbiased voice of all who can be supposed to have a will of their own;
we learn from the last, the pretended electors are but a handful of the
people, who are never less at their own disposal than in the business of
election. The theory holds out equal benefits to all, and equal liberty,
without any other discrimination, than that of a good and bad subject;
its practice brands with proscription and disgrace a numerous class of
inhabitants on account of their religion. In theory the several orders of
the state are a check on each other; but corruption has oiled the wheels
of that machinery with united pressure on the happiness of the people.
At present, he insisted, Britain had merely preserved the form, but had already lost the
spirit, of her vaunted constitution.74 It turned out in practice to be, Political
Correspondence added, no more than 'a mere mockery of its theory, and an insult on
the people'.75 The British constitution was once the admiration of the world, while
other nations were possessed of nothing like it. However, Benjamin Bousfield noted, the
situation had recently changed. There were signs that the French people were about
to form a system able to surpass that of Britain, which was 'formed in the dark ages,
partially patched up as occasion offered; irregular in its original construction, arrested
and degenerated by time'.76
The derangement of the British constitution, most reformers believed, had chiefly
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resulted from the gradual dysfunction of its much acclaimed mechanism of checks
and balances.lt was an almost unchallenged view that the political system of Britain
was based on the principle of a balanced constitution. Philip Withers, for instance,
thus wrote:
In our constitution we have COMMONERS to watch over the
interests of the People, we have PEERS to maintain an equilibrium
between the EXECUTIVE POWER and the Commons, and the KING is
armed with a negative Power to protect the Prerogatives of the Throne,
with a power to curb licentiousness in the Commons, and with the
privilege of increasing the peerage to punish the obstinacy of the Lords,
when they obstruct the general good.
This is,' he emphasised, 'the Constitution of our ancestors'.77 To most radical
observers, however, this version of the British constitution appeared to be, in fact, but
the vision of theorists. James Mackintosh contended that such a government of
control and balance had never truly existed in Britain:
To speak of our practical Government would be an outrage on
common sense. There no trace of those discordant powers which are
supposed in our theoretical Constitution remains. The most beautiful
simplicity prevails. The same influence determines the executive and
legislative power. The same cabinet makes war in the name of the King,
and sanctions it in the name of the Parliament.
There could be no mutual control, or well-poised balance, in a system where the
same class of men were suffered to wield excessive and uncontrolled influence.78
Samuel Parr claimed that people were apt to exaggerate the independence of the
component parts of the British constitution. In practice,he contended, there was an
'intimate connection between them': 'Instead, therefore, of considering them merely, or
even chiefly, as mutual checks, I have of late been accustomed to view them as
wheels facilitating the motion of each other in a vast and complicated machine.'79
Indeed, George Rous observed, the political system of Britain tended to unite in the
same persons 'the responsible character of Ministers, and the effective power of
controui. There could be, then, no such things as mutual checks.80 John Oswald thus
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mocked at the working of Parliament:
His Majesty's Prime Minister comes down to the House of
Commons, with measures previously concerted in the King's Cabinet: he
proposes his Bills; and the House exclaims, What a prodigy of wisdom!
He makes his motion; and his motion is carried on by a great majority,
as virtuous as unbought A similar farce is carried on in the House of
Lords; and the will of the Cabinet is proclaimed as the will of the
people, who, perhaps, all the while are lifting up their voice against the
measure.81
For sure, David Williams contended, the three powers in Britain had seldom, or
perhaps never, been balanced by counter-action.82 James Mackintosh came to the
conclusion that Britain had in effect maintained a government, 'not of check, but of
conspiracy'.83 In substance and fact, John Oswald echoed, 'IT IS THE CONJURATED
TREASON OF THREE PARTS AGAINST THE WILL OF THE WHOLE'.84
The balanced constitution of Britain had been toppled from different quarters. First
of all, it was feared, the influence of the crown had increased to such an extent as to
destabilise the constitutional balance at the expense of the people.85 Thomas Cooper
pointed out that the British crown, though apparently a limited one, was in effect
possessed of far more influence than necessity could justify.86 The influence of the
crown at present,' William Belsham also claimed, 'extends indeed far beyond what is
necessary to preserve the balance of^bonstitution.'87 To Sir Brooke Boothby, the
corrupt influence of the throne was a 'radical disease' that would become fatal to the
British constitution:
In this country those who consider the immense and growing
influence of the Crown in addition to powers which had been already
81
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deemed sufficient for its support, will not I think be at a loss to
prognosticate the malady which will one day give the mortal blow to
our boasted constitution.88
The king was able to command excessive influence chiefly because he was left
considerable room for manoeuvre in managing the enormous revenue raised mainly to
fund the national debt. The immense public debt in Britain, Joseph Priestley observed,
had in various ways contributed to the increased power of the crown.89 The
accumulation of debt and taxes,' Robert Hall echoed, 'has so augumented the influence
of the crown, as to destroy the equipoise and balance of the constitution.'90 The
influence of the throne was secured through a comprehensive network of corruption.
The huge expenditure of the government, Thomas Paine noted, served to keep this
channel of corruption open.91 Benjamin Bousfield, hence, condemned the vast heap of
national debt as the 'deposit of the foul torrent of venality and corruption, which has
almost deluged the land, and levelled the great barriers of freedom'.92 Indeed, Robert
Hall concluded:
The multiplied channels through which seventeen millions of
money must flow into the treasury, the legion of officers it creates, the
patronage its expenditure on the several branches of the administration
supplies, have rendered the influence of the crown nearly absolute and
decisive.
There seemed no other power in the nation that was able effectively to counter such
a 'silent irresistible force of royal patronage'.93
It was well known that the crown had usually operated to manipulate Parliament
by means of corruption. The legislature of Britain had not shut its door to the king's
servants and dependents. Because of their admission, Francis Stone observed, the
minister of the day was able, by distributing royal patronage, quietly to assert his
control over Parliament, many of whose members had actually become no more than
88
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mercenaries 'at his sole command'. Indeed, he stressed, with the good things of the
crown - pensions, places, lucrative offices, and sinecures - at their disposal, the king's
ministers could always secure a majority 'for the vile purpose of legislating for their
own private emolument and aggrandisement, instead of the national welfare'.94 In the
eyes of Thomas Paine, members of Parliament were mostly but the 'mere machines of
the court, placemen and dependants'.95 If one should draw attention to the British
legislature, Benjamin Flowers noted.
The first object which strikes a spectator is, that famous place in
the House of Commons, called the TREASURY BENCH. Here. . . seated,
the first lord of the treasury and chancellor of his majesty's exchequer,
with a band of placemen, his chief supporters, on each side. . . That
minister is reckoned the compleatest Statesman, who by any means
whatever can best manage the house, and have the largest majority of
its members at his disposal. If we look a little farther into the House of
Commons, we shall see an host of placemen and pensioners; of
dependants on the crown, and on the ministers. All these men. . . are
allowed not only seats, but votes on every occasion.
Members of Parliament of this sort were so numerous, so connected and so united
that the crown could always, with ease, enforced its will on the House. Parliament
was therefore turned into a 'grand theatre of corruption, where the principal actors
were devoted to the will of the ministers, and ready. . . to sacrifice the dearest
interests of the people; to serve the purposes of the court'.96
The preponderance of the peers posed another serious threat to the balanced
constitution of Britain. The House of Lords, Thomas Paine pointed out, was a great
political force that lay beyond the control of the people; 'It is an hereditary
aristocracy, assuming and asserting indefeasible, irrevocable rights and authority,
wholly independent of the nation.' He ridiculed the peerage as a caste of persons
whose professions consisted mainly in 'letting landed property'.97 The peers, John
Oswald asserted, formed a privileged tribe who were totally distinct from the mass of
the people. They are the mere creatures of the Crown, and a part of that regal
pageantry, to support which the people are so shamefully taxed and so cruelly
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curtailed of the comforts of. . . life.'98 George Rous contended that the House of Lords
could not be the natural guardian of the interests of the people. It was an order
whose interests and prejudices must ever incline them to the crown.99 In truth, Paine
pointed out, the peers in Britain had formed a substantial part of that comprehensive
system of corruption emanating from the throne:
There are but few of its members who are not in some mode or
other participators, or disposers of the public money. One turns a
candle-holder, or a lord in waiting; another a lord of the bed-chamber, a
groom of the stole, or any insignificant nominal office, to which a salary
is annexed, paid out of the public taxes, and which avoids the direct
appearance of corruption.100
It would be chimerical, therefore, to expect such an order to play its supposed role of
constitutional balance against the sinister influence of the crown.
The domination of the peers in Parliament was the main object of complaint. The
House of Lords constituted a separate branch of the legislature and it possessed an
independent voice in legislation. Not content with this constitutional power, however,
the peers had, through their personal connections, gone much further in order to
dominate the House of Commons. This Colossus,' Robert Hall claimed, 'bestrides both
houses of parliament; legislates in one and exerts a domineering influence over the
other.'101 The present defective system of representation, one writer explained, had
enabled the peers to secure great political interests. They exposed the electorate to
undue influence and corruption, thus giving them the means of 'uniting a great part of
the representative body to themselves'.102 Because of their electoral interests in
boroughs, Francis Stone pointed out, the peers could command a decisive influence in
the House of Commons.103 Thomas Paine claimed that the 'borough traffic' had allowed
the peers to send many of their relations and connections to Parliament. Together
with their own independent voice, this had given them a preponderance in legislating
98
Oswald, Review of the Constitution of Great-Britain, p 9
99 Rous, Thoughts on Government p 38
100 Paine, Rights of Man. p. 250.
101
Hail, An Apology for the Freedom of the Press p 37
102 Strictures on the Letter of the Rt. Hon. Edmund Burke, pp. 6, 49.
103 Stone, An Examination of the Rt. Hon. Edmund Burke's Reflections p 124
329
on almost every matter of common concern.'04 Such a domination, Thomas Cooper
lamented, had virtually reduced the House of Commons to being 'more a
representation of the Lords than the Commons of Great Britain':
At present there is reason to believe, that about 70 or 80 Persons
are enabled to send an efficient Majority of Members to Parliament, so
that the House of Commons is in fact, the Representative of this
virtuous band of aristocratic electors. . . 'The Commons of England in
Parliament assembled", is a phrase false and absurd; it should be the
deputies of the Aristocracy in Parliament assembled!
The peers therefore were able to shake off one salutary check, which was originally
intended for them 'by the Spirit of the Constitution'.105 In effect, Francis Stone
asserted, the House of Lords could form but a 'fanciful equilibrium' between the rights
of the people and the prerogatives of the crown. They were more inclined to sacrifice
the welfare of the community to their own partial interest and all-grasping ambition.106
'If our liberty depends on the balance and controul of the respective orders in the
state,' Robert Hall added, 'it must be extremely absurd, to blend them together, by
placing the father in one department of the legislature, and his family in the other.'107
The influence of the Crown and the ascendancy of the Lords were, no doubt, both
noxious. It was, none the less, principally the defect in the popular branch of the
constitution that, to most of the reformers, was most to blame for the decline of
liberty in Britain. John Thelwall, explaining the distempers of the British constitution,
had pointed out:
It is not from the aristocracy, properly so called, that we have
most to dread. It is not even from the prerogatives of the executive
power. It is from the oligarchy of the rotten borough-mongers. It is
from the corruption of that which ought to be the representative branch
of the legislature. This is that which is undermining. . . the constitution
and liberties of Britain.108
It was generally held that a fair representation of the people in the legislature was the
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surest protection of their liberty. 'You should remember,' Richard Price exhorted his
audience, 'that a representation in the Legislature of a kingdom is the basis of
constitutional liberty in it, and of all legitimate government.''09 In the case of Britain
where a mixed government was maintained, George Rous contended, the House of
Commons, therefore, became the only quarter in the constitution where the direct
influence of the people ought to prevail and in which public liberty was to be
defended."0 The British people could assert their freedom through no better medium
than their own representation in the House of Commons, whose very independence,
Robert Hall insisted, formed 'the column on which the whole fabric of our liberty
rests'.1" The reality, however, seemed far otherwise. 'Equality of representation is to
any people the most valuable token of liberty,' one author claimed, 'and in this
essential ingredient is the boasted parliament of England miserably deficient.' Britain
had maintained a system of representation which proved too corrupt to become the
cornerstone of British liberty."2 The representation of the British people, Benjamin
Flower asserted, was so unequal as totally to distort the original nature of Parliament.
It had been turned into little more than 'an engine of corruption', often employed to
accomplish measures 'directly opposite to the interests of the people, and calculated
to promote the purposes of ambition or despotism'."3 Indeed, David Williams argued,
despite the better condition of Britain, no one there could truly be free while his life
and property were at the discretion of a legislature in whose election he had no real
choice and over whose conduct he could have no control."4 As noted in the Political
Correspondence. 'No Englishman who wishes well to his Fellow-citizens and his
Country, can resist the mingled emotions of regret and scorn, when he reflects on the
state of National Representation in Parliament.'"5 This had, to Richard Price, become in
truth the 'fundamental grievance' of the British people."6
The charge against Parliament, as indicated above, focussed upon the defectsin the
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system of representation. This issue can be examined from various angles. There
existed, first of all, a glaring inequality of representation between different
constituencies. It was a notorious fact, one writer complained, that the representation
of the British nation was 'partial and oppressive'. Whereas a number of old boroughs,
which had long declined, could still return members to Parliament, many other new
towns, which had recently flourished, were not directly represented.117 Thomas Paine
and Benjamin Flower had both made effortsto expose this appalling state of unequal
representation. The largest county in England, Yorkshire, which contained nearly a
million souls, sent two members; and so did Rutland, the smallest, whose population
scarcely exceeded one hundredth part of that of the former. The rotten and decayed
boroughs, such as Gatton and Old Sarum, where but several houses stood, remained
entitled each to send the same number of representatives as the city of Westminster,
which had around fifteen thousand voters. Most remarkable of all, a city such as
Manchester, one of the most prosperous towns and with a population of sixty thousand,
was not even directly represented at all.118 Thus, Robert Hall remarked:
The confused and inadequate state of our representation, at
present, is too obvious to escape the attention of the most careless
observer. While through the fluctuation of human affairs, many towns of
ancient note have fallen into decay, and the increase of commerce has
raised obscure hamlets to splendour and distinction, the state of
representation standing still amidst these vast changes, points back to
an order of things which no longer subsists. The opulent towns of
Birmingham, Manchester, and Leeds, send no members to parliament;
the decayed boroughs of Cornwall appoint a multitude of
representatives.119
There was an obvious reason to explain such a preposterous phenomenon as a few
rotten boroughs in Cornwall returning more members to Parliament than these great
towns. The Political Crisis acknowledged that the inadequacy here indicated had
resulted not so much from the 'evil conduct of individuals' as from the 'unavoidable
change in human affairs'. Demographic changes in Britain over the past centuries had
not been followed by timely readjustments in the nation's representation. Hence there
arose the inequality so much complained of.120 The population in many places in the
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British Isles, another author observed, had considerably increased within the last
hundred years, but the system of representation remained little changed:
The representation in this kingdom. . . continued in a changeable
state till the reign of James I. but has undergone no material alteration
since that period; for want of this, the evil has proceeded so far, that it
may be made a question, whether the numbers of boroughs, which are
deemed private property, did not return more than a third of the
members of the last parliament.
Parliament had done nothing for those places which had grown in size and wealth in
the course of time and which therefore deserved representation in the legislature: 'It
supports a nominal representation only, for those places which, by the effects of time
or other causes, may go to decay, which not only militates against, but actually
destroys, as far as it extends, the spirit and principle of the British constitution.',21
The qualifications of electors, meanwhile, were both unequal and irregular. In
Britain, Robert Hall pointed out, the restrictions set upon the right to vote were
extremely inconsistent. In the boroughs it was conferred on the corporations in some
places, but it went to house-holders in others; and, quite often, the right was attached
to a particular sort of property, whose owner hence possessed the vote. In counties,
the forty shilling freeholders had the right of election while wealthier copyholders
were not enfranchised.'22 Benjamin Flower called attention to the unequal requirements
with respect to property. There were places where no pecuniary qualification was
required and there were also others where the requirement became so oppressive as
to 'confine the right of election to a very small number". He continued to explore:
We have cities. . . containing twenty or thirty thousand inhabitants,
where the members are elected by a corporation of twenty or thirty
persons. . . The county of Cornwall is full of corporate towns, in which a
few persons engross to themselves the right of election. A freehold
estate of forty shilling a year, is the qualification necessary for a county
voter; and whatever property a person may possess, if destitute of this
particular species, his right of voting is withheld. In the city of London,
the great body of the freemen are entirely cut off, and the right of
election is confined to those who are members of companies or
corporations.'23
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The entire system, Thomas Paine thus claimed, appeared as capricious as possible:
'Everything is out of nature. . . in this strange chaos, and all sorts of follies are
blended with all sorts of crimes.''24
Under such an irregular system, those who were qualified to vote were limited in
number. Thomas Paine observed that the House of Commons which ought to
represent the people was in truth elected but by a small part of the nation: 'I
presume, that though all the people of England pay taxes, not an hundredth part of
them are electors.'125 John Oswald also claimed that the Commons were always
chosen by an electorate 'not exceeding, at a very extravagant calculation, a hundredth
part of the people of Great-Britain'.'26 In Britain, George Rous estimated, about 41,000
voters were able to return 369 representatives out of an assembly of 558 members.'27
To other radicals, indeed, not even this figure seemed sufficient to indicate the limited
nature of the British system of representation. A closer scrutiny revealed that in truth
the majority of the House of Commons had been returned by a far smaller body of
electors. John Oswald calculated that in Britain, where eight millions of people lived, a
total of '6087 persons' were entitled to elect a majority of members to the House of
Commons: that is, 'eight millions of inhabitants are every seven years brought to
market and sold, like cattle at a fair, by 6087 individuals'.128 A parliament thus
constituted could hardly be expected to speak the true voice of the people. Indeed,
Benjamin Flower contended, such a legislature might in certain circumstances act
against the will of 'many millions'.'29
The restrictions laid further on the candidates served still more to turn the House
of Commons into a virtually aristocratic oligarchy. At present, Francis Stone observed,
Parliament had disqualified all those who did not possess a certain quantum of landed
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property from being elected as its members.'30 John Oswald contended that Britain's
'phantom of election' was rendered even more illusory by the limitation prescribed on
the choice of the already small electorate: 'I mean, the regulation of Parliament, which
narrows the choice of the electors to a certain circle of the Aristocracy, consisting of
men possessed of at least three hundred pounds per annum' This restriction, he
satirised, had reduced the House of Commons to an establishment where the rich and
their dependants chose men from a class still richer than themselves to represent the
nation.'31 Thus, Thomas Cooper believed, the Commons seemed at present not so
much the representatives of the people as of 'Lords and rich Land-holders; of
Ministers and Borough Mongers'.'32 It could not, with justice, be called a popular'
representation, Francis Stone argued, while six-sevenths of the men of age, among six
or seven million people, were excluded from the right of election.'33
The activities of elections, to make matters worse, were also replete with
corruption and absurdities which served to vitiate even further the credit of
Parliament. William Belsham declared that the irregularities attending the few popular
elections were deleterious to the welfare of the nation.134 During elections, one writer
wrote, every measure was taken to corrupt and overawe the voters. He went on to
report:
In one borough, the determination of a wealthy inhabitant, who
hopes for indemnity in the gratitude of great friends, and whose power
and patronage enable him to exert an irresistible influence over the
minds of his less opulent neighbours, regulates the popular choice, and
some worthless, or perhaps detested, character, is thus rendered the
successful candidate. In other places, elections are carried on by an
unwarrantable act of tyranny, still less varnished over by the appearance
of mildness: the voters are coolly told by the steward of their powerful
landlord, whom they are to nominate. . . In others, the borough is
acknowledged to be personal property; its representation is even sold
by the lordly despot to the highest bidders; and the poor slaves of
electors, rather than be turned out of doors and starve, are forced to
resign their rights forever. And in others, where they are free from
those disgraceful shackles of evil bondage, every act is exerted to
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corrupt their integrity.'35
Venality was generally condemned as one of the most notorious abuses in elections.
There were quite a number of people, Benjamin Flower claimed, who acquired their
seats through purchase.136 The seats attached to the rotten boroughs, it was pointed
out, had often been simply thrown into the market for sale 'as any other species of
property'.'37 Thomas Cooper launched an attack on the traffickings of
borough-mongers, who, he exclaimed,
'buy and sell Seats in Parliament as openly and notoriously, as
Stalls for Cattle at a Fair' - who buy and sell the People, their nominal
Electors, as if they were Slaves appurtenant to the Soil - who treat
them as the worst species of Slaves, buying and selling their voices and
inclinations; dealing in the Consciences of their Tenantry, as a fair
object of traffic.'38
There could be no doubt, it was asserted, that those who purchased their seats in
Parliament must have been tempted by some promise of reward or by the distribution
of favours. It would be difficult to expect public virtue or merit from these venal
people.'39 The electorate, in the meantime, were also of no better sort. The Political
Correspondence claimed:
The voters think that they have gained their object, if they have
added a few guineas to their purse for the present moment, and seem
to have no idea how wretchedly they ought to expect to be governed,
when their governors owe their power to such base acts.'40
In this situation, George Rous was convinced, those who had public money at their
disposal were in a position, with utmost facility, to manipulate elections.'4' Mary
Wollstonecraft noted that sordid interest and licentious thoughtlessness had indeed
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become the spring of action at most elections.142 Thus, Catharine Macaulay lamented,
the important interests of the nation were often sacrificed to the ambition of private
individuals.143
To most radicals, in sum, even the popular branch of Parliament had failed truly to
represent the people of Britain. The Political Correspondence had categorically denied
that the House of Commons in its present abused state could be the real
representative of the people.144 The House of Commons,' Thomas Cooper echoed, 'it is
well known are not the Representatives of the People; it is not there that the voice of
the People is heard.'145 In fact, Benjamin Flower added, evidence suggested that the
modern House of Commons always operated in direct opposition to the will of the
people.146 It became neither the 'organ of their voice', nor the 'guardian of their rights'.
To call it a popular representation, James Mackintosh claimed, would be a most
'insolent and preposterous abuse of language'.147 That would be, Francis Stone echoed,
to make 'a mere mockery of the people, and unpardonable substitution of the
"shadow for the substance'.148 David Williams, above all, was to deride the British
legislature as but 'a FRAUDULENT DECEPTION'.149 It had, George Rous concluded,
neither expressed the will of the people, nor consulted the common interests of the
nation.150
in
'We have,' Robert Hall declared, '. . . at length arrived at that crisis when nothing
but speedy and effectual reform can save us from ruin.'151 The recent lesson of France
was to convince the British reformers that some kind of improvement had to be made,
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or else Britain would fall into a state of crisis. 'WE ARE NOT VERY WELL OFF,' Benjamin
Flower warned, 'AND WE DO WANT A MOST MATERIAL CHANGE.' The situation of
Britain at present was such that without a significant and essential alteration the
liberties of the people could not be secured.152 John Oswald laid stress on the
pressing necessity of a timely reformation.153 'Some reform,' Thomas Paine asserted,
'must, from the necessity of the case, soon begin.'154 Both Oswald and Paine had
indeed predicted the coming of a universal revolution in the old order of Europe, from
which Britain would not be able to absent herself.155 'Our poor little institutions like
our watches,' Sir Brooke Boothby contended, 'require to be periodically wound up and
frequently repaired.' Their original concoction contained latent principles of destruction
which tended to vitiate the entire body politic.156 The noble fabric of the British
constitution had long been the admiration of the world, but now, one writer claimed, it
had fallen into decay for want of repair. It needed to have its peccant parts excised
and 'replaced with those excellent materials of which it was originally composed'.157
They must be bigoted, Joseph Towers insisted, who should suppose that the
constitution was now so perfect as to leave no room for redress.158
There were different opinions with regard to reform. Those who embraced more
radical views were naturally apt to agitate for more sweeping changes. Thomas Paine,
for instance, supported a fundamental reformation in the political system of Britain. He
had no confidence in the old regime improving itself and he wanted to see Britain
undergo a popularly activated 'general reform'.159 John Oswald, likewise, preferred a
radical approach. The evils of Britain, according to him, were so serious as to be
beyond the reach of such time-serving expedients as parliamentary reform, which,
while able to amuse the people for a time, would never be effective enough to
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'remedy the defects, nor eradicate the deep-rooted vices of the Government'.160 For
most reformers, however, moderate reform would be a better alternative. Joseph
Towers renounced any attempt to pursue abrupt change in the British constitution: 'I
would not wish to have any alteration made in the general system of our laws, or in
our constitution, but on the most mature deliberation.'161 The author of The Political
Crisis plainly stood against revolution:
I am far from wishing a revolution, and would spill my blood to
prevent it. I only wish to see some reform; and perhaps a reformation in
the expenditure of money and the established church, and in the modes
of election, so as to produce a more equal representation of the people,
would render the present government as lasting as the pillars of time.'62
In fact, another writer asserted, the British constitution was not so hopeless yet as to
require so violent a remedy. He was persuaded that a proper improvement of
Parliament would be the sole reform 'necessary to give perfect energy to the English
constitution'.163
The British reformers were indeed mostly of the opinion that what Britain needed
the most, at present, was an effectual parliamentary reform. Robert Hall contended
that a reform of Parliament could provide an effective remedy for the malady of the
nation.164 Improvement of this nature, Sir Brooke Boothby emphasised, would be the
safest, the easiest, and 'the most perfectly constitutional' method to set right the
British constitution.165 Even Thomas Cooper, very much a Painite, had also made it
clear that, at this stage at least, the reformers in Britain meant no more than to
pursue parliamentary reform:
To restore this imperfect State of parliamentary representation to
its constitutional Vigour - to create what has never yet been seen in
this Country, a full, fair, and adequate representation of the People in
the lower House of Parliament. . . - to ensure upon all occasions that
the voice of the People and the voice of the House of Commons shall
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be the same, and that the representatives of the people shall be under
the due Controul of those who sent them, by means of annual or
triennial elections - is the sole end and aim of the friends of British
Liberty.
In the present state of Britain, he emphasised, 'no Man can be justified in going
farther than a complete and effectual reform in the Representation of the People, and
the duration of Parliaments'™6
Opinions were, again, divided over how to secure a proper reform in Parliament.
There were those who advocated moderation. Sir Brooke Boothby proclaimed himself
to be 'totally averse to all deep reform or new-modelling of the representation'. He
renounced any attempt to set up a new system of representation upon pure
democratic principles, that is, to set up 'a popular assembly'. His reform would extend
no farther than redressing the inadequate state of the national representation. This is
no more than to repair the common inevitable injuries of time.' It would also be a
means more consonant to the spirit of the British constitution.'67 At a later stage,
another writer who campaigned for peace with France, similarly dismissed as
impractical the schemes of annual parliaments or universal suffrage. The British
parliament, no doubt, stood in need of some change, but, he asserted, the people of
Britain should undertake
not such a visionary reform as the heated imagination of some
inconsiderate men has suggested. . . but such a prudent and temperate
amelioration; such an easy and gradual alteration in the system, as the
collective wisdom of Parliament, pointed to that most important object,
will be able to mature and digest.'68
Some radical reformers, on the other hand, were not satisfied with a mere temperate
approach. Thomas Christie, for instance, argued that a 'complete and radical reform'
ought to be carried out in the representation of the nation. It was this kind of change
that could be expected to create a free, honest and independent legislature.'66 Thomas
Cooper likewise contended in support of the more effectual reform of Parliament. It
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would be a paltry measure merely to disqualify rotten boroughs and to increase the
members representing counties. He was not even content with the proposal of
enfranchising all taxable householders. That could serve no more than, he asserted, to
create a corporation of property, leaving the cottagers, the mechanics and the day
labourers - the largest, the most important and the most oppressed part of the
community - still without a voice.170 Francis Stone was perhaps the most outspoken in
agitating for 'a substantial, and rigorously complete' reformation of Parliament. The
British people, he argued, were entitled, by nature and by constitution, to have a
House of Commons 'annually elected, on the comprehensive, liberal, benevolent
principles of universal suffrage'. To secure a legislature on this principle would be the
surest and safest way to defend the freedom of the nation:
The cause of liberty in Britain, to which the example of France is
auspicious, is the very necessary reform of the House of Commons, on
the broad basis of annual election, and of equal and universal
representation and eligibility, with the exception of the dependants on
the Crown.
It would also be the sole reform that was likely to last for long.171
The purpose of parliamentary reform was, of course, to secure to the people a fair
and just representation. This task could be dealt with from three aspects: a
rectification of the partial state of the representation, a redress of the absurd
qualifications for the franchise, and a revision of the duration of Parliament. There
were various proposals on each of these themes. To ensure that Britain was more
equally represented, two plans were suggested. On the one hand, reformers such as
Sir Brooke Boothby and William Belsham proposed a rather limited reform. They
intended to redistribute parliamentary seats by disqualifying rotten boroughs and
extending representation to the newly flourishing towns.172 On this principle, the
Political Correspondence worked out a more detailed plan. First of all, the rotten
boroughs, being the source of abuses, would be disfranchised; secondly, the number
of the knights for the shires would remain unchanged; and thirdly, all market towns
would be allowed to send representatives. The general aim of this author was that
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every town in the kingdom should be freely represented.173 On the other side, the
writer of The Political Crisis offered a bolder scheme. He cherished the principle of
'equal representation' and he was prepared to base the national representation on the
sole principle of population. The drift of his reform was, first, to take a national census
of all qualified inhabitants and, then, to fix each member to the same numbers of legal
voters. Meanwhile, the whole kingdom would be divided into different districts in
which the voters would be confined to elect their representatives. This scheme, he
was convinced, could render Britain 'more equally represented'.174
The next step of reform was to revise the qualifications of the electors on a more
general and rational basis. In this respect, Francis Stone favoured a radical redress. He
defended universal suffrage as the natural right of man, and as a principle embedded
in the ancient Saxon constitution. He intended to confer this right on all men who had
arrived at the year of maturity. This universal right,' he stressed, '. . . is a right not
dependent on property, much less on any species of it, but merely a personal right, to
which the poorest man has an equal claim with the richest.'175 But most reformers
were apparently not prepared to go this far. The author of the Political Crisis, who
otherwise supported a radical redistribution of parliamentary seats, surprisingly
rejected the idea of universal suffrage. Those who had no interest in the community
were not entitled to enjoy the right of election. He hoped merely to reduce the
property qualification so as to broaden the basis of representation. It was his plan to
grant the right of election to all those who possessed an estate equal to the value of
one hundred pounds, or had an annual income from property of four pounds, and all
with one year's residence in the places where their votes would be cast.176 Several
writers suggested that the right of suffrage should go to all male householders.
William Belsham would extend the franchise to all those who occupied such
tenements as might be 'supposed to place them upon a level with freeholders of forty
shillings per annurrl}11 The Political Correspondence wanted to abolish the distinction
between freehold and copyhold with respect to election. It would be dangerous to
adopt universal suffrage, but it would be 'both practicable and rational to grant that
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privilege to all householders, residing in places entitled to the right of election, and
paying taxes of fifty shillings'.178 In Robert Hall's opinion, a general enfranchisement of
householders in the kingdom would so extend the basis of representation as to make
it fair enough to express the sentiments of the people.179
More frequent elections were also considered essential to an independent
Parliament. The supporters of parliamentary reform were generally critical of the
present septennial parliaments. Francis Stone denounced the act which extended
Parliament to a duration of seven years, as a 'most gross and daring' infringement on
the right of the British electorate who used to have more frequent elections.180 The
introduction of the Septennial Act had been productive of numerous abuses. The
longer term of Parliament, Robert Hall pointed out, had set its members at too great a
distance from the people. It rendered a representative virtually independent of the
control of his constituents:
It is intolerable, that in so large space of a man's life as seven
years, he should never be able to correct the error he may have
committed in the choice of a representative, but be compelled to see
him every year dipping deeper into corruption; a helpless spectator of
the contempt of his interests, and the ruin of his country.181
Benjamin Flower decried the Septennial Act as a barefaced innovation which opened
the flood-gates of corruption and which 'totally altered the nature of the British
constitution'.182 What, then, should be the proper duration of Parliament? The Political
Correspondence urged a return to the old practice of a three-year term.183 William
Belsham would welcome either trinnial, or annual elections.184 Resorting (or so they
thought) to the old Saxon tradition, Robert Hall and Francis Stone were both in favour
of annual parliaments and were prepared to defend even more frequent ones.185 To
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these reformers, at any rate, frequent elections would help to create a more
responsible legislature. When once Parliament became more frequently elected, Joseph
Towers emphasised, both ministers and representatives would be obliged to pay more
attention to the sentiments of the people.186 It would be able especially to force the
members of Parliament, The Political Crisis stressed, to be more concerned with the
voters: They are not long enough possessed of power to abuse it, and are led to
consider the rectitude of their conduct as the only means by which they can acquire
the confidence of their country in future.'187
Further measures were proposed in order to secure an honest and independent
Parliament. One important suggestion was the separation of the executive authority
from the legislative body. George Rous was convinced of the necessity to exclude
legislators from all participation in the administration. He claimed that most abuses in
British politics had proceeded from the 'unnatural mixture of executive government in
an assembly formed to control?6* Benjamin Flower praised the wise decision of the
French legislators to debar the ministers and dependants of the crown from being
elected to the National Assembly with a view to preventing corruption. In Britain, he
contended, the presence of such people in Parliament had destroyed its
independence.189 It made the king's men able to engross too great a share of the
legislative function, Francis Stone claimed, thus placing the welfare of the nation at
their sole control and disposal. The people can never be free and happy, till they are
excluded from this legislative assembly.'190 The secret Ballot was also recommended
by some as a measure to forestall corruptions at election. William Belsham deemed
the ballot as the most eligible mode of election.191 'Election by ballot,' according to
Benjamin Flower, 'is one of the best methods. . . to preserve the purity of election.' It
would root out the sources of corruption and bribery.192 Several reformers,
furthermore, proposed that the Members of Parliament should be paid a salary. The
Political Correspondence suggested that severe punishments should be inflicted on
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those who gave, or received, bribes in elections, but he was prepared, at the same
time, to allot every Member of Parliament five hundred pounds per annum as a reward
for his public service,193 Such a measure, The Political Crisis was convinced, would
help to cultivate the integrity of the representatives: This would lessen the temptation
of embezzlement, and heighten the odiousness of the crime.' Parliament would then be
expected to become more responsible in the performance of its duties.194
To most reformers, after all, parliamentary reform was an operation indispensable
to the preservation of British liberty. A reform of the legislature, Benjamin Flower
asserted, was the sole great national measure that could prevent the ruin of Britain.195
It was essential for the nation to maintain an adequate representation, one author
echoed, if the evils complained about the British constitution were to be remedied.196
Benjamin Bousfield insisted on the priority of redressing the perversion of the
representation, which, he stressed, had long been the source of grievance in Britain.197
To regenerate the constitution, William Belsham argued, there could be no better
approach than to attack its abuses at their source. It would be more serviceable
'effectually to eradicate the cause, than to provide a remedy for any of the specific
mischiefs resulting from it'. If once Parliament had been reformed, he believed, all
other beneficial improvements would, in due course, be completed 'by the wisdom and
authority of the legislature, in a regular and constitutional method'.198 Many reformers
shared this optimistic view. George Rous remarked that there were indeed oppressions
to be redressed: 'Yet,' he argued,
we think that the first and most important object is to obtain an
organ, by which the public mind may speak in legislation. We flatter
ourselves that, this obtained, every other abuse will be gradually and
temperately done away by the increasing knowledge of the age.199
Indeed, Robert Hall asserted, a reform of Parliament would not only secure the liberty
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which the people already possessed, but would also pave the way for the rectification
of other abuses which permeated the nation.200 Upon the whole, Sir Brooke Boothby
summed up:
A wise and temperate reform in the representation, such as derives
from the nature and cause of this defect, must surely be considered as
a mighty desideratum indeed. It would remove a perpetual source of
scandal, and add greatly to the confidence of the people in the
legislature.201
A reformation of this nature, Joseph Towers added, would prove crucial in the end to
the security and establishment of freedom in Britain.202
IV
It is relevant, here, to draw attention to the opinions expressed about religious and
ecclesiastical reforms. The extent of the efforts devoted to this subject highlights the
deep involvement of the Dissenters in the British debate on the French Revolution. In
Britain, political changes and religious reforms were believed to be inseparable-
Joseph Priestley contended that a reform of the British government must necessarily
lead to an 'enquiry into ecclesiastical matters, which are now so closely connected
with things of a civil nature'.203 The abuses connected with the established church, in
a sense, could be traced, in origin, to the failure of the Glorious Revolution to effect a
proper religious reform. Richard Price pointed out that Britain's imperfect state of
religious liberty was a default left by the otherwise admirable Revolution of 1688.204
The revolution,' Samuel Heywood complained, 'introduced a happy change in the civil
constitution, and liberty became the portion of Englishmen; but the church remained
the same, and slavish are still her doctrines.' It was high time now to call for a just
reform:
it may deserve the serious consideration of the well-wishers to
the Church, whether the eager zeal of the sons of bigotry may not
accelerate its fall. The Church was established more than two hundred
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years ago, in the infancy of learning in Europe. The intellect of man has
been improving ever since, and yet the Church. . . has made no
improvement at a!L To suppose that there is nothing in its doctrines or
discipline that can be objected to, or improved, is an absurdity.205
The church establishment in England, Sir Brooke Boothby commented, was perhaps an
evil 'sanctified by time'. It might not be prudent to demand its total removal, yet there
was certainly plenty of room for redress.206 Indeed, Christopher Wyvill asserted, an
ecclesiastical reformation on the principles of moderation would conduce to purify,
without destroying, the Church. It could also add a strong fortification to the British
constitution.207
The alliance of church and state, as we have previously discussed, was widely
asserted to be the main cause of the abuses which afflicted the Church.208 In the
campaign for religious and ecclesiastical reforms, hence, many reformers came, first of
all, to press for its dissolution. Benjamin Bousfield was one who had severely attacked
the English policy of connecting church and state. It was ever his opinion that religion
ought to be kept completely separate from politics.209 Sir Brooke Boothby praised the
achievement of the French Revolution in this respect: The political part of the church
government has. . . been wholly dissolved by the late reformation in France, and this
was certainly the most pressing object of a political revolution.' He was much
aggrieved at the continuance of such a union in England.210 The connection in this
kingdom of church and state, Joseph Priestley stressed, ought to be dissolved, or else
both would fall together. It was his most ardent wish to see this fatal alliance ended,
but he was, he asserted, inclined to support a more 'peaceable separation, attended
with no calamity'. He invoked the example of the New World to prove the happy result
of such a separation: 'Happy is such a country as America, where no such alliance as
that of church and state was ever formed, where no such unnatural mixture of
ecclesiastical and civil polity was ever made.'211
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The dissolution of the union of church and state would naturally affect the position
of the established church. The Church of England had long been under attack. Because
of its accumulation of errors and abuses, William Belsham declared, the established
church had already become an object of contempt to serious and intelligent minds.212
Civil establishments, according to one writer, were the main source, and the fertile
soil, of evils such as indolence, luxury and pomp that vitiated the Church.213 Some
critics were therefore prepared to have the Church disestablished. Joseph Priestley
was perhaps the most avowed enemy to the established church. The church
establishment, he claimed, could be deemed as a 'parasitical plant which, unless it
was cut off in time, would drain to death the noble tree of Christianity. It was a
vermin to be exterminated without mercy.214 The stubborn opposition of the clergy to
the repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts convinced another critic that the
established church could never be compatible with equal liberty and justice. He would
not regret it if such an establishment should fall: 'it is impossible for me to wish the
continuance of that hierarchy, or not to feel pleasure, in the expectation of its
extinction.'215 Other reformers were more cautious. One anonymous writer claimed
himself to be no foe to the established church, though he agreed that its defects had
to be remedied.216 The establishment of a parochial clergy, Christopher Wyvill
contended, remained important 'in the present very imperfect state of knowledge and
virtue in the World'. While sympathetic to the Dissenters, he was not convinced that
the time was now ripe for England to abolish her established church in exchange for a
'simple and original mode of Instruction': That we are far distant from that state of
general knowledge and virtue, in which it would be expedient to adopt this scheme, is
readily allowed.'217 George Rous, who was, like Wyvill, an Anglican, admitted his
reluctance to approve 'all the arrangements of our national Church'. Nevertheless, he
indicated, the established church could still be of use if, of course, it was maintained
in line with justice.218 The opinion of Samuel Heywood is particularly interesting.
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Haywood, a Dissenter, launched a severe attack on the high church politics, but he also
disclaimed any intention of overthrowing the established church: The Dissenters in
general,' he claimed, 'so far from bearing ill-will to the establishment as such, admit
its utility, as a mere human institution, on the whole well calculated for the instruction
of the people in the principles of morality and religion.' An established church must
not, however, trespass upon religious liberty: 'Here indeed the Church of England
stands in need of great reformation.'2'9
Whether disestablished or not, the Church of England herself was in need of
reform. First of all, her doctrines and liturgy had to be purified. It could not be
pretended, one writer claimed, that the creed of the Church should always remain
unalterable. If there were defects in her present doctrine, discipline and worship,
sound policy would demand their removal.220 To many reformers, the Church of
England was certainly not perfect in this respect. Ever since the 1688 Revolution,
Samuel Heywood observed, little alteration had been made in the articles, canons, or
homilies of the Church: 'they are now in force; and subscribed, as before that glorious
era, and the rubric remains unreformed.' The Church continued to preach, against the
spirit of the times, the 'spiritual poison' which had operated with deadly effect before
the Revolution.22' The absurdities existing in the doctrines of the Church were now too
obvious to be tolerated: There is hardly a man,' Benjamin Flower claimed, 'who would
not, at once, acknowledge, there were several things in the articles, and in the
common-prayers, very objectionable.' The enforcement of such doctrines had served
more to cause dissent than to preserve uniformity. It was notorious, he noted, that
those who subscribed to them were mostly compelled, for practical reasons, to do so
without genuine conviction.222 There seemed little doubt, Robert Hall alleged, that the
creed of the Church failed to correspond with the sentiments of its members: The
world. . . will be little edified by the example of a church, which in compelling its
members to subscribe opinions that few of them believe, is a discipline of fraud.'223
The liturgy of the Church, Sir Brooke Boothby complained, was tautological and
Pharisaical. It stood totally contrary to the direct precept of Christ and its
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preservation would 'cast a ridicule upon the most sacred things'. For the sake of
religion, he stressed, the Church needed to adopt a more rational form of prayer, 'rid
of the remains of popery'.224 Christopher Wyvill hoped to save the main body, but
meantime to eradicate the disputed part, of the Anglican liturgy:
It is the sentiment of every liberal Churchman. . . that the use of a
Liturgy ought to be continued, and that our present Liturgy, in the main
part of it ought to remain unaltered; but it is their dear conviction also
that the language of dispute should never be heard in our addresses to
the Almighty, and therefore our Forms of Public Worship ought to be
rendered as nearly as they can be, conformable to the practice and
phraselogy of Scripture; some repetitions. . . might be struck out of the
Liturgy; some improvements might be introduced in its arrangement.
It was, after all, not his intention to replace the existing articles of the Church with an
entirely new system.225
It was proposed, secondly, to reform the current practice concerning the
nomination of clergy. At present, it was noted, all the officers of the Church were the
mere creatures of civil power.226 The arbitrary imposition of officiating ministers, The
Political Crisis claimed, was one great evil attendant on the established church. It was
usual that those in positions of civil authority preferred to choose men to administer
the sacred truth of Christianity who would 'officiate the cheapest' rather than those
with superior religious qualifications. The consequence was deleterious; This readily
accounts for the little attention paid to divine worship. The church is deserted by the
most conspicuous characters, and the Sabbath wantonly profaned.'227 Indeed, Benjamin
Flower believed, the present desolate state of religion could be attributed to the
people having no concern in the election of their priest:
Our bishops and pastors are NOT chosen by the people. We are
careless about religion, and trust our spiritual concerns to statesmen;
and so long as that is the case, it is impossible true Christianity should
flourish. Our bishops are chosen by the king, at the recommendation of
his ministers. . . Our deans, canons. . . are chosen by the crown. Those
persons who have most interest with administration, are sure to arrive
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at the highest preferments.228
It had reduced the established church to an institution more interested in worldly
pursuit than in religious concerns: 'You make it,' Joseph Priestley noted, 'a mere
engine of state, a source of wealth to some of the clergy, and of power to those who
have the nomination of them.' In both cases, he asserted, little attention was paid to
the proper interests of religion.229 The introduction of an elective clergy was
considered to be^better method of helping the Church out of its depressed state.
Benjamin Flower was convinced that the clergy would never become better qualified
for their stations until the people started to appoint them. The people,' he declared,
'have a right to choose their own ministers, from the highest to the lowest.' It had
been entrusted to politicians long enough and it was now time for its resumption.230
Another author wanted to allow the people to choose their own minister, and to
requite him as he deserved.231 Every one, The Political Crisis insisted, was entitled to
attend the preaching he pleased and every parish, it added, had a collective right to
appoint its own minister. It continued to propose:
Let every town, parish, or district, containing seventy families, be
obliged to provide itself with a teacher of religion and morality, and so
on in proportion to the number, and the contract of settlement be made
between the contracting parties.
Ministers would, hence, acquire a competency, while the people would show more
respect to the church.232 Popular election of ministers, after all, was in tune with the
practice of the original church; and the example of the Dissenters could also prove its
good effects.233
The third object of reform was the provision of the Church. It aimed both to revise
the income structure of the clergy and to alter the method of provision for the Church
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as a whole. The incomes of the clergy in England were grossly inequitable and often
oppressive. While some dignitaries lived in splendour, The Political Crisis observed, the
mass of lower clerics were impoverished.234 A minority of bishops, another critic felt
revolted, made 'no contemptible figure in horses, in equipages, in their parks, and their
palaces, in their tables and other luxuries', without the slightest thought of sharing
some of their spoils with the poor curates, whose incessant labours were 'more
beneficial in one month, than the toils of many bishops in many years'.235 The contrast
in fortunes between clerics was manifest: 'In the place where I live,' Sir Brooke
Boothby testified,
the respectable clergyman with a numerous family does the duty
of a most extensive parish for sixty pounds a year, while from the same
parish the Dean of Lincoln receives a thousand per annum for doing
nothing at all.
Poverty caused hardship to parochial clergy in particular, who were mostly able to
secure but miserable and inadequate provision.236 Benjamin Flower made efforts to
expose such irregularities and injustices:
Some of the livings are worth from twelve to fifteen hundred a
year, others only fifty or sixty pounds, and even this property is grasped
by those in higher stations; our bishops and deans often hold livings
with their other preferments. Those of the clergy who have interest
sufficient to procure two livings, hold them both together; the
consequence of this injustice is, that the clerical duty is performed in
various parishes, by curates, who with their wives and families are
existing, or rather perishing, while many of the higher orders of
ecclesiastics are living in indolence and luxury.
All these abominations, he insisted, ought soon to be annihilated.237 Christopher Wyvill,
at last, pleaded that measures had to be taken to augment the provisions of small
benefices which, he stressed, should be increased to such an extent as to provide a
decent living for resident clergymen. Without a proper readjustment, the Church could
never secure the 'general satisfaction of the Parochial clergy'.238
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The reformers, meanwhile, continued to press for the abolition of tithes. The
imposition of tithes, Benjamin Flower claimed, was an unhappy mode of providing for
the Church. It laid a heavy burden on most parts of the kingdom; and the strictness of
its collection, he noted, was odious to the people:
The keenness of the clerical scent in many parishes is truly
surprising; nothing can escape it; not only the produce of arable and
pasture land, but of the garden and the orchard is ravaged;
pigeon-houses and hen-coops are searched; pig sties are groped into;
and as if the squabbles often occasioned by such intrusions were not
warm enough, these christian pastors force themselves into hot houses,
and seize upon all plants and fruits, British and Exotic.
The collection of tithes often compelled people to languish in jail because they were
not able to satisfy the claims of their parish priest.239 Indeed, another critic claimed,
tithes had caused inconveniences and evils to the community. They formed a
perpetual source of litigation between the proprietors of land and the clergy, and an
everlasting bone of contention between ministers and their parishioners. They
impeded agricultural improvements because they hung like 'a millstone about the neck
of the landed interest'.240 At last, Robert Hall thus commented: 'As a mode of union
with parishioners, they are fruitful of contentions; as a restraint on the improvement
of land, impolitic and oppressive; as a remnant of the jewish law, superstitious and
absurd.' It would be better for the church to recede from making such a noxious
claim.24'
There was, hence, a general call for ending such an oppressive imposition. Earl
Stanhope urged Parliament to follow the example of France and replace tithes with
some other kind of provision which might be 'less vexatious, less detrimental to
Agriculture, more convenient for the Clergy, and less injurious to the Cause of
Religion'.242 Proposals had been made about how to secure a proper provision for the
Church once tithes were abolished. Joseph Priestley consistently contended that the
clergy ought to be left to subsist on 'the voluntary contributions of those who are
benefited by their ministry'. It would be more consonant to both the spirit of the
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Gospel and the practice of the primitive Christians. It would, most of all, make the
church independent of the state, rendering it more attentive to the cause of religion.243
Benjamin Flower, on the other hand, wanted the clergy to stay in the pay of the state.
He favoured the French mode of salarying clerics as public servants: This is certainly
as just, fair, equitable, and satisfactory a mode as could well be devised.' It would be,
no doubt, a more preferable alternative to the current one in England.244 Finally,
Christopher Wyvill suggested a more moderate plan. He agreed that the present
inconvenient system of provision ought to be replaced with a more unexceptionable
one. His scheme, however, appeared to be rather a revision of the old system, aimed
in the main to ease the vexations attendant on it:
if a valuation of the Tithes, payable to the Clergy. . . were made. . .
on an average of their value for the three last years, and the average
price of wheat for the same term were settled in a similar manner, it
appears that a full and proper equivalent for the Tithes to be abolished
might be obtained for each incumbent, in the shape of Corn-Rents,
payable out of those lands which are now charged with the payment of
Tithes; . . . and the quarterly payment of these rents in four equal sums
to be enforced in the same summary manner.
An assessment in the mode of corn-rents, he asserted, would establish a more stable,
adequate and permanent provision for the parochial clergy. It would help to quell
those troubles issuing from the collection of tithes, so that the harmony of the parish
would be maintained and the great business of religion 'more successfully
advanced'.245
The last, and perhaps the most important, effort in this campaign for ecclesiastical
reform was the attempt to secure universal freedom of conscience for all British
subjects. Two tasks in this venture had to be completed: first of all, the repeal of the
Test Laws and, secondly, the establishment of general toleration. The Dissenters
naturally formed the main force in the campaign for the abolition of the Test Laws.
Despite repeated defeats, Richard Price declared, the Dissenters were determined to
persevere in their struggle to rid themselves of the injustice of exclusion from civil
office. In view of the rising trend, throughout other parts of Europe, towards greater
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toleration, he was optimistic that their grievance would be redressed in the end.246 The
Dissenters, another writer claimed, would carry on their fight for the repeal of the
Tests. He reasserted, meanwhile, that their efforts would still be pursued via, as usual,
the 'peaceable and constitutional ways' of applications to Parliament. The Dissenters
could count on the reason of a future 'just and enlightened legislature' which might
be jjersuaded to reinstate them to 'the same irreproachable and eligible situation, in
all respects, as the rest of our fellow subjects'.247 Samuel Heywood maintained that
the sole end of the Dissenters was to repeal the Test Acts. He tried to assure
anxious churchmen that the Dissenters bore no ill-will to the establishment and had
no intention of overthrowing the Church. It was entirely without foundation to
apprehend that the Dissenters, if once admitted into offices, would seek to increase
their influence at the expense of the established church. He urged the churchmen to
yield to the dictate of reason and drop their opposition to the claims of justice: They
cannot make reparation for their past misconduct, but they may proceed with greater
moderation and honesty in future' Should their resistance persist, he warned, 'the ruin
of their church will probably record to posterity, their folly, and their crimes'.248
The Dissenters, to be sure, were not alone in the struggle. Their cause had its
sympathisers from outside their own circle, especially from liberal Anglican
churchmen. George Rous, for instance, did not hesitate to lend his support. There
could be no possible interest, he argued, for a society to maintain religious tests:
To those, who are so unfortunate as not to comprehend or believe
the relation in which man, as moral being, stands to his Creator, all
tests are vain. They cannot hesitate to subscribe any dogmas, or
perform any ceremonies, which convenience may require. Those, on the
other hand, whose minds are awfully impressed with this great truth,
find in that opinion alone all the sanction which religion can possibly
give to the discharge of social duties To such, tests are useless.
The Test Laws, he pointed out, had originated in, and were still upheld by, the 'worst
passions of the human heart'. Their institution, while oppressive to one part of the
community, had contributed little to advance true religion and virtue. 'While, therefore,
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test laws subsist, all who dissent from the Church will labour its overthrow.'249
Christopher Wyvill also favoured repeal, but from a different consideration. The
enforcement of the Test Laws in England, he observed, had been rather partial and,
indeed, preposterous. While the Dissenters were entirely excluded from offices,
unbelievers of various sorts had been notoriously found to be filling superior stations
of trust and honour. If such laws could even wink at persons who rejected Chirstianity
and who admitted not a single article of religion, it was absurd for them to be
particularly severe on those conscientious Christians 'who scruple to concur in some
unessential particulars, but embrace the essential part of the Public Religion'. It would
be politic, he stressed, to relieve the Dissenters from these oppressive restrictions:
'while men of capacity, for Public Affairs, are to be found among the various tribes of
unbelievers, it is an advantage to the Public, that their defective Creed should be no
bar to their employment.'250
The state of toleration in England, meanwhile, was under critical review. The
English people, Richard Price claimed, had, in 1689, obtained only an imperfect
toleration, which, though having been since improved, still remained insufficient. There
still existed penal laws on account of religious opinions, which, if carried into effect,
could, he warned, 'shut up many of our places of worship, and silence and imprison
some of our ablest and best men'.251 Samuel Heywood complained that the Act of
Toleration had hitherto refused to tolerate those Dissenters who oppugned the Trinity,
and that the recent relief of Catholics had not extended to those who failed to take
the oaths of allegiance. Notwithstanding the moderate climate of the times, he pointed
out. Englishmen would be surprised to learn that in this kingdom
all those sectaries who do not come within the protection of the
Toleration Act, or the statute enacted. . . in favour of a particular class
of Catholics, as oppugners of the Trinity, Moravians, Swedenborgians,
Non-juring Catholics, Jews, 8ic. are liable to penalties in the temporal
courts, for worshipping God according to their own modes, which reach
their property, liberty, and even lives.252
It was true, indeed, that these statutes of persecution had seldom been strictly
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enforced. The spirit of the time, Christopher Wyvill observed, was more liberal than
the letter of the law. With the indulgence of the government and the concurrence of
the public, those intolerant laws which remained unrepealed were mostly reduced to a
'state of dormancy'.253 The actual state of toleration in England, thus, seemed rather
complicated. It would be quite difficult, Benjamin Flower remarked, to apply the word
'toleration' with any degree of precision:
Englishmen are surely, in this respect, the most inconsistent
mortals on the face of the earth. Our church, as by law established, is
more intolerant than any of the reformed, and almost equally intolerant
with any of the Catholic churches. Her ministers in particular. . . are
confined more strictly than those of any other establishment. But if we
look at fact instead of law, their situation is completely reversed, and
no men in the world range with a greater licence. They preach and print,
and act as they please, and scarce any notice is taken of them. . . We
may, therefore, call the Church of England, with respect to their own
members, the most tolerant, the most intolerant, or the most
inconsistent, which ever we think proper.
Similar inconsistency also existed in the Church's conduct towards the Dissenters. The
Church had, at various times, persuaded the government to enact penal laws against
them, which had been since but partly repealed. At present, however, the Dissenters
were actually so tolerated as to be able to worship God agreeable to their
consciences, without the threat of molestation. In Flower's eyes, upon the whole, the
entire system of religious policy in England appeared rather like a strange medley of
persecution, toleration and connivance.254
For those astute reformers, none the less, indulgence and connivance could never
form a solid basis for freedom of conscience. So long as intolerant laws were
retained, there would always be the possibility that they might, again, be called into
action. Benjamin Flower was not persuaded that those who pleaded for such statutes
of persecution would not intend, on some occasion or other, to make use of them.255
The truth, to Robert Hall, seemed to be that, though there might be no immediate
chance of exertion, the laws of persecution, while unrepealed, would be maintained 'as
a body in reserve, ready to be brought into the field on the first occasion that shall
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offer'.256 They would still be able, Christopher Wyvill added, to 'operate to a greater
extent, with no immediate hazard'.257 From such a perspective, then, most British
reformers were disposed to see toleration institutionalised in the enlarged sense.
Benjamin Flower proposed to extend toleration to such a degree as almost bordering
on 'perfect liberty':
This is the case when an establishment is formed upon the most
equitable principles possible; in which the means of instruction are
adapted to answer the end, at the least expence to the community; and
when all those who dissent from it, have not only the undisturbed
enjoyment of their opinions and worship, but likewise, all the rights and
privileges of citizens, equally with their conforming brethren.
He called upon all sects - Dissenters, moderate Anglicans, Methodists, Quakers,
Catholics and Jews - to unite hand-in-hand in the struggle for this liberty.258 The aim
of the Dissenters, Samuel Heywood pointed out, was now to secure a 'general
toleration'
to all peaceable subjects, understanding by the word Toleration,
not merely an indulgence as to the exercise of public worship, but
religious liberty, allowing to all peaceable subject, the full enjoyment of
their own religious sentiments and forms, without the infliction of any
penalties or disabilities for preferring them.259
To Christopher Wyvill, toleration could never be too extensive. Experience had
sufficiently proved that even a mitigated system of intolerance would be merely an ill
attempt to promote uniformity in religion. It was, therefore, proper that 'more
honourable measures should be tried, that the maxims of impartial justice and equality
should more consistently govern the conduct of the State'.260 Capel Lofft was prepared
to invest 'toleration' with the amplest import, or even to drop it, if necessary, directly
in favour of 'religious freedom':
If the Term, Toleration, be too narrow for the rights which
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conscience, humanity, and the public interest requires us to recognize,
let it be ennobled by giving it the most ample sense; or if found
incapable. . . of a just and adequate import, let it sink into oblivion, and
religious Freedom supply its place in our language, and in our
practice.261
A general toleration, Benjamin Bousfield contended, would contribute better to serve
the cause of religion: This will operate more to reclaim the morals of the people, to
promote Christianity, to procure respect for all religious establishments, than all the
denunciations of vengeance, which, for many centuries before, had been bellowed
from the pulpit of intolerant bigotry.' In the end, he added, these reforms could also
help to secure respect and stability to the civil government.262
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